Madhya Pradesh High Court
Santosh Singh vs M/S Jmc Project India Limited on 27 November, 2019
Author: Sanjay Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Dwivedi
1
R.P.Nos.1527/2019 & 1528/2019
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
R.P.No.1527/2019
(Santosh Singh v. Dilip Suryavanshi & Ors.)
&
R.P.No.1528/2019
(Santosh Singh v. M/s. JMC Projects (India) Limited & Ors.)
Jabalpur, Dated : 27.11.2019
Shri Prakash Upadhyay, Advocate for the
petitioner.
Shri Akshay Sapre, Advocate and Shri Aditya
Khandekar, Advocate for the respondents.
The learned counsel for the petitioner is heard on the question of admission.
By the instant review petitions, the petitioner is seeking review of the order dated 27.09.2019 passed in W.P.Nos.14987/2016 & 15907/2016.
In the original petitions which were filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the order taking cognizance by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class Rewa for an offence under Section 8B of the National Highways Act, 1956 (in short "Act of 1956") had been assailed. Vide order dated 27.09.2019, which is subject matter of these review petitions, this Court has allowed the writ petitions observing that National Highway-7 has been converted into National Highway-30 and no evidence has been produced by the complainant 2 R.P.Nos.1527/2019 & 1528/2019 to support that the old National Highway-7 after converting it into National Highway-30 still holds the status of National Highway and if same is blocked, no offence under Section 8B of the Act of 1956 could be made out.
The learned counsel for the review petitioner pointed out the mistake in the order passed by this Court saying that National Highway-7 though renumbered as National Highway-30, but that has not lost its status of National Highway, therefore, the Court has committed mistake which is apparent on the face of the record and based its judgment on this foundation which is apparently erroneous. He further contended that this Court has also not considered the provisions of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 (for brevity "Act, 2002") wherein under Section 34 it is clearly provided that unless notification is issued, the National Highway cannot lose its status merely because there is some change in alignment of the road and due to which bypass road has been constructed. For strengthening his argument, the learned counsel for the review-petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to the observations made in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the order passed by this Court and as such he has argued that the mistake is apparent on the face of the record as the Court has not considered the impact of Section 34 of the 3 R.P.Nos.1527/2019 & 1528/2019 Act, 2002.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents have argued that the order passed by this Court does not call for any interference because the same does not suffer from any irregularities. It is contended by them that the basic question which has been dealt with by the Court as to whether on the basis of allegations made and evidence produced by the complainant, offence under Section 8B of Act of 1956 is made out or not. They have contended that the Court in paragraph 44 onward has considered elaborately that for constituting an offence under Section 8B of the Act of 1956, the basic ingredient of mischief must be involved as the same is defined under Section 424 of IPC. On the basis of material available on record and also on the basis of statement of witnesses, the Court did not find any mischief on the part of the accused and hence finally held that no prima facie offence under Section 8B of the Act of 1956 is made out. The respondents have relied upon a decision reported in (2009) 10 SCC 464 parties being - S.Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission, in which, the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 has observed as under:-
"12. An error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. In other words, it must be an error of 4 R.P.Nos.1527/2019 & 1528/2019 inadvertence. It should be something more than a mere error and it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. When does an error cease to be mere error and becomes an error apparent on the face of the record depends upon the materials placed before the court. If the error is so apparent that without further investigation or enquiry, only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the applicant, in such circumstances, the review will lie. Under the guise of review, the parties are not entitled to rehearing of the same issue but the issue can be decided just by a perusal of the records and if it is manifest can be set right by reviewing the order. With this background, let us analyse the impugned judgment of the High Court and find out whether it satisfies any of the tests formulated above."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Governor of Delhi reported in (1980) 2 SCC 167 has observed as under:-
"13. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so....."
Also in case of Lily Thomas etc. etc. v. Union of India and others AIR 2000 SC 1650, the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of review has 5 R.P.Nos.1527/2019 & 1528/2019 observed as under:-
"The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practiced. However, the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Art. 136 or Art. 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment."
Thus, in view of the above and in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court laying down the scope of interference in a review petition, in my opinion, the learned counsel for the review-petitioner is trying to establish a case as if it requires rehearing.
6R.P.Nos.1527/2019 & 1528/2019 Therefore, the review petition cannot be entertained permitting the petitioner to make out a case for rehearing as in my opinion the basic issue involved in the case has been dealt with and tested. The mistake which is pointed out is not a mistake apparent on the face of record.
Accordingly, the review petitions are dismissed.
(Sanjay Dwivedi)
Judge
Digitally signed by
shukla SUDESH KUMAR SHUKLA
Date: 2019.12.04
10:29:14 +05'30'