Madras High Court
Jagannathan Alias Govindarasu And ... vs Angamuthu Pillai And Others on 30 March, 1989
Equivalent citations: AIR1990MAD226
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is directed against the order passed in E. A. No, 223/84 in E. P. No. 17 of 1989 in O.S. No. 19/68 on the file of the First Additional Sub-Judge, Pondicherry,
2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal can be briefly stated as follows :--
The appellants herein filed the application E.A. No. 223 of 1984 under O. 21, R. 90, Code of Civil Procedure, praying for setting aside the auction sale held on 16-2-84 by the advocate-commissioner. The first respondent filed E.P. No. 17 of 1980 for appointment of a commissioner for sale of the properties in pursuance of the decree passed in O.S. No. 19 of 1968 in which the suit properties were directed to be sold in court auction and the sale proceeds be divided between the parties. Accordingly a commissioner was appointed for the purpose of holding public action. The Commissioner by his notice fixed the date of auction-sale as 16-2-84 and effected publication in "Daily Thanthi". Cuddalore and in "New Times Observer", Pondicherry. Accordingly the auction was held on 16-2-84 in the Central Nazir Office, District Court, Pondicherry. The Commissioner filed two reports, one interim report on 20-2-84 and another final report on 7-3-84. The said auction sale is challenged on the ground that there was no proclamation of sale made as required under law. In the absence of proclamation of sale as per the Code of Civil Procedure, the auction sale has to be held vitiated. The upset price fixed by the Commissioner is not in accordance with law, It is further stated that the claim of set off in respect of the first respondent allowed by the court in E.A. No. 106 of 1984 is illegal as no notice was given to the appellants. Hence, they prayed for setting aside the sale.
3. The said application was resisted by the first respondent who would contend that the Commissioner has evolved his own procedure for auction of the properties and that the holding of the auction by the Commissioner on 16-2-84 received wide publicity. Further, the appellants cannot plead ignorance of the conduct of auction and the rules framed by the commissioner for the auction as they are also deemed to be decree-holders since the decree was passed in the partition action. The court has approved all the acts done by the commissioner and the auction has been conducted by the commissioner on 16-2-84 strictly in accordance with law. The first respondent is entitled to have set off as per orders passed in E.A. Nos. 106 and 107 of 1984 and that there is no fraud or irregularity as alleged by the appellants in the matter of conduct of the sale. Hence he prayed for dismissal of the application.
4. On the side of the appellants, the first appellant examined himself as PW 1 and no exhibit was marked on the side of the respondents. The Sub-Judge lor the reasons assigned in his order dismissed the application with costs. Aggrieved by the same, this appeal is filed.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. T. R. Rajagopalan, mainly submitted that upset price for each of the properties sold by the Commissioner was fixed by him arbitrarily without notice to the appellants. Further, there was no proof of publication of the sale which is a condition precedent for the conduct of the sale in question. Even according to the Commissioner, the conditions of sale were given only to the bidders at the time of auction, The present proceedings arose under the Partition Act and hence the leave granted by the Court to bid and set off in favour of the first respondent is illegal and not according to law. The learned counsel mainly contended that since no proclamation was drawn up by the court, the entire sale is a nullity. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that actually notice of the application filed by the first respondent for permission to bid in E.A. No. 185/82 was given and after hearing both the parties, the petition was allowed on 2-7-82. The petition filed by the first respondent for permission to set off in E.A. No. 106 of 1984 was allowed on 7-2-84 on the ground that, in view of the order passed by the court permitting the first respondent to bid at the auction, the subsequent order to direct the Commissioner to adjust towards the share of the first respondent the amount payable by him in the event of his emerging as a successful bidder in the auction is only an administration order and that the appellants cannot have any grievance over the same. Further, in the instant case, there is proclamation drawn by the Commissioner and that has been done under the direction of the Court. Since the sale is under the partition decree, the provisions of the Partition Act alone are applicable to the sales. Further. O. 21, R. 66. C.P.C. will not at all apply in the case of sale by Commissioner in a partition decree. It is also vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent that the petition itself is filed under O. 21. R. 90. C.P.C. on the ground of material irregularity publishing and conducting sale and not on the ground of nullity. In the instant case, the main ingredient which is necessary for filling the petition under O.21, R.90, C.P.C., namely. sustaining substantial injury on account of irregularity in conducting the sale is baseless and has not even been pleaded in the petition. On the other hand, the properties were sold more than four times the upset price fixed by the commissioner. It is also stated that the appellants have got only a negligible share, On the other hand, the first respondent has got 5 8th share and as such, no injury, much less substantial injury, was caused to the appellants. Even according to the evidence of the first appellant, he wants only physical share and not value of the share; but that is contrary to the decree tor sale. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the sale was held on 16-2-84 and the matter is being protracted successfully. Further, if it is a question of nullity, the relevant provision would have been S.47, C.P.C. and not 0.21, R.90. C.P.C. It is submitted by the respondents that there is absolutely no irregularity or illegality in the conduct of the sale and hence the petition is to be dismissed. Both the parties drew the attention of this court to various case-laws on the point in support of their contentions. The main question to be considered in this case is whether even in a sale by commissioner in respect of partition decree, proclamation is to be drawn by court and published under O. 21, R. 66, C.P.C, as the learned counsel for the appellants restricted his argument only on the question and contended that the sale is a nullity because of the absence of the sale proclamation.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents invited my attention to the decision reported in Jibon Krishna Mukherjee v. New Bheerbhum Coal Co. Ltd., , and submitted that O. 21, R. 89, Code of Civil Procedure, will not apply to a sale by receiver and the receiver is not required to issue a proclamation of sale as required under O. 21, R. 66, C.P.C. It has been held in Jibon Krishna Mukherjee v. New Bheerbhum Coal Co. Ltd., :
"In a sale by the receiver he is not required to issue a proclamation of sale as required by O.21, R.66, of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the provisions of O.21, R. 89 under which a sale proclamation is an essential element, do not apply to sale held by him,"
In Official Receiver v. Samanthagam Ammal, (1979) 2 Mad LJ 115, while considering the applicability of O. 21, R. 85, Code of Civil Procedure, it was observed as follows:--
"Section 7 of the Partition Act, deals with the procedure to be followed in cases of sales. This section itself starts by saying that "save as hereinbefore provided, the property can be sold under the Act." The Act itself contemplates two types of sales. Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Act initially enables the shares of the property to buy the shares of other shares for a price to be fixed by Court, which would mean an internal sale within the co-sharers, and no question of public participation arises. The other type of sale is the one where the property is to be sold in public auction when S. 6 of the Act will become applicable, and the members of the public can bid in the court auction sale. Even in S. 6 of the Act, clause (2) itself provides for the Court to stipulate about "the non-payment of deposit or as to setting off or accounting for the purchase money or any part thereof instead of paying the same into Court." Hence, even the Partition Act itself has contemplated stipulation of certain special terms and conditions, when sales are effected under the Act, and therefore, it cannot be contended that only the provisions made under 0.21, Rr. 84, 85 and 86, Civil Procedure Code, will alone be applicable to all types of sales under the Partition Act. Section 7 of Partition Act, also is to the same effect by stating that "except as otherwise provided under the Act, "properties can be sold under the Act following the procedure as far as practicable, which would mean that certain types of sales under the Act will come under a special category and they cannot be governed by the sales that may be effected under the Code of Civil Procedure."
It has been held further :--
"The provisions made under Ss. 6 and 7 of the Partition Act and the Rules framed there under by the High Court, all go to show that all types of sales effected under the Partition Act, cannot be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code."
In the said case also a commissioner was appointed to sell property in a partition action. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the above decisions and submitted that in the instant case the commissioner after getting the value of the property from Tahsildar and with approval of the Court fixed the upset price and after due publicity, conducted the auction sale. Even though there was no proclamation drawn by court, yet in the instant case the commissioner has drawn proclamation under the direction of the Court after getting approval and in the circumstances it cannot be said that the conditions of proclamation are not complied with and that it is a nullity. The commissioner only put up the property for sale as per order and direction given by the Court.
7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants relied on certain decisions. In Appu v. Achuta Menon, AIR 1926 Mad 755, it was held:
"It is for the Court to settle the proclamation of sale and it cannot delegate that power to the Commissioner appointed by it."
In Venkateswara Ettu Naicker v. Ayyammal, , it was held:
"A sale held without a proclamation as required under O. 21, R.66, C.P.C. is void. Where the sale itself is held to be an illegality, the sale in its entirety must be set aside and the setting aside cannot be confined to the share of the applicant."
That was a case which has arisen in execution of a mortgage decree. It was further held in that discussion:
"The object of Order 21, Rule 66 is to afford a security for the fairness of public sales, that it has been properly published and that it would attract purchasers. But if the specific provision as to proclamation is violated there could be no doubt that the sale cannot be allowed to stand. It cannot be said that the total failure to make the proclamation under Order 21, Rule 66 is a mere irregularity in the publication or conduct of the sale."
In Srikakula Chinnu Venkatanarayana v. Pannapati Elias, this Court held :
"A Court sale held without any publication whatever of the proclamation of the sale, as required by Order 21. Rules 66 and 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908). is illegal and void and not merely voidable,"
In Madappa v. Lingappa, Pit was held :--
"Order 21. Rule 66, C.P.C. is a mandatory provision. If the said mandatory provision is violated and if the sale proclamation is not issued at all, then it would be a violation of the mandatory provision and therefore a sale held without complying with the mandatory provision would be a nullity and void ab initio. In the instant case, the sale proclamation was alleged to be issued. It was handed over to Amin tor publication. The Amin returned it unexecuted with his endorsement. That endorsement was showing that it was as good as non-issuing the sale proclamation as required by Order 21, Rule 66. Admittedly there has been no publication at all of the sale proclamation. No sale proclamation has been attached to the property. Therefore, in such circumstances, though the sale proclamation has been issued, it would be no sale proclamation at all and would not amount to an issue of sale proclamation or publication of the sale proclamation as required by Order 21, Rules 66 and 67, C.P.C, and the sale held in such execution case would be no sale at all. AIR 1934 Rang 188. Dissented from. Distinguished."
In Shalimar Cinema v. Bhasin Film Corpn., Their Lordships have observed in para 3 as follows :--
"But we do wish to say that the Court has a duty to see that the requirement of Order 21. Rule 66 are properly complied with. In the words of the Judicial Committee, "in sales under the direction of the Court, it is incumbent on the Court to be scrupulous in the extreme." Though it may not be necessary for the Court to make a valuation and enter it in the sale proclamation in every case, it is desirable at least in cases of sale of valuable property that the Court make its valuation and enter it in the sale proclamation. We think it necessary to add that no action of the Court or its officers should be such as to give rise to the criticism that it was done in an indifferent or casual way. We are constrained to make these observations because it was found by the learned single Judge in the present case that there actually was no application under Order 21, Rule 66 and that the sale proclamation was prepared in a routine fashion."
In Sankaranarayana v. Sankara Iyer. AIR 1954 Trav Co 226 a Division Bench of that High Court held; that in view of (he provisions of Order 21, Rules 66 and 67, C.P.C. without the Court drawing up and setting the proclamation for the sale of the property sought to be sold, there cannot be a legal sale, Further, relying on the decision of this Court in Appu v, Achuta Menon. AIR 1926 Mad 755 it was also held :
"The authority to settle the proclamation and the obligation to draw it up are upon the Court. These cannot be delegated, Such a settlement of proclamation is a necessary condition to the validity of a sale by Court. The circumstance that the judgment-debtor defaults to appear in response to an intimation of the date fixed for the settlement of the proclamation is not one that will enable the Court to sell property without settling the proclamation for which purpose the date is fixed and intimation given."
The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in view of the above ratio since proclamation in this case was not settled by Court and that the Court cannot delegate power to the Commissioner appointed by Court, the sale is a nullity and that it is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. The learned counsel also submitted that the decisions submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents are not at all helpful to the case of the respondents as they are not applicable to the facts of this case. The learned counsel pointed out that Jibon Krishna Mukherjee v. New Bheerbhum Coal Co. Ltd., was a case where a receiver was appointed and direction under Order 40, Rule 1(d). C.P.C. given to the Receiver to sell the property charged. But there is no such authority under Order 21. Rule 66. Code of Civil Procedure given to the Commissioner in the instant case. On a careful reading of the decision reported in Jibon Krishna Mukherjee v. New Bheerbhum Coal Co. Ltd.. , I find that their Lordships of the Supreme Court had not expressed any decision on the question whether the provisions of Order 21, Rule 66, C.P.C. will apply to such sales or not. It was observed at page 203 (of 1960(2) SCR : (at p. 299 of AIR 1960 SC) as follows :--
"Courts have had occasion to consider questions about the applicability of several provisions of O. 21 to sales held by receivers and opinions expressed on such questions have diftered more particularly in the Calcutta High Court as we will presently indicate. In the present appeal we do not propose to consider or decide the general question about the character of the sale held by the receiver nor do we propose to attempt to specify which provisions of 0. 21 will apply to such sales and which will not. We are dealing with the narrow question as to whether O. 12, R. 89 applies to such a sale; and it is to the decision of this narrow question that we will address ourselves in the present appeal."
Ultimately after referring to various decisions, it was observed at page 208 (of SCR) : (at p. 301 of AIR):
"These decisions show that there has been a divergence of opinion at to the character of the sale held by a receiver as to whether it is a sale by the Court, or under the Court, or under the directions of the Court. It is because our attention has been invited to these decisions that we have thought it necessary to make it clear that our present decision is confined to the narrow question as to whether the sale held by a receiver attracts the provisions of 0. 21, R. 89."
Thus, it cannot be said that in all cases where sales are held by receiver or Commissioner, Order 21 is not applicable. Even in that case. Their Lordships observed at page 204 (of SCR) : (at p. 299 of AIR):
"The provisions of the said rule (Order 21, Rule 66. C.P.C.) apply where the property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution by the Court, and the order for the sale of such property must be made by any Court other than the Court of Small Causes as provided by R. 82."
Hence, it cannot be said that their Lordships of the Supreme Court had laid down any authoritative decision on this question. In the other decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents, namely. Official Receiver v. Samamhagam Ammal, (1979) 2 Mad LJ 115 it was observed :
"Order 21. Rules 84. 85 and 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied only for public sale of the property."
The said decision made a distinction between INTERNAL SALE within the co-sharers and the PUBLIC AUCTION where participation of public is involved. In the instant case, admittedly, the property was directed to be sold only in public auction and not in between the co-sharers under the provisions of the Partition Act. As such, the said decision also is not at all helpful to the case of the respondents. On a careful analysis of the various decisions submitted on behalf of both the parties. I have no other option except to hold that in the instant case since admittedly the sale proclamation was not drawn by Court and that the Court cannot delegate power to the Commissioner, the provisions of Order 21, Rule 66. Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with and consequently the sale itself is not a legal one and is liable to be set aside. When once it is held the sale itself is a nullity, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, the other contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the absence of necessary ingredients which are contemplated under Order 21, Rule 90. C.P.C,. namely, absence of proof of sustaining substantial injury, the sale cannot be set aside, cannot be countenanced. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it it is a question of sale being a nullity, then the proper provision for filing the application is Section 47. C.P.C. and not Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., that in the instant case the petition is filed only under Order 21. Rule 90, C.P.C. and that as such the said requirement is to be satisfied. I do not find any merit in the said contention. The mere quoting of a wrong provision is not sufficient for negativing the relief. Only the substance of the relief is to be taken into consideration in deciding the real dispute between the parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the properties were sold twice or thrice of the upset price and that as such the appellants have not suffered any injury is also not relevant when once it it held that the very sale itself is void and nullity in view of the absence of sale proclamation drawn by Court under Order 21, Rule 66. C.P.C. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kanwar, , That was a case where it is alleged that the failure to mention the charge in favour of the first respondent, which has been recognised by a decree in a suit between responents 1 and 3 would constitute an irregularity within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 90(1), C.P.C. when once the application was made under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. It was held that before an application made under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. can succeed, the applicant has to show that the impugned sale was vitiated by a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it and as required by the proviso, it is also necessary that he should show that in consequence of the said irregularity or fraud, he had sustained substantial injury. It was also held (at p. 836 of AIR) :
"But, in our opinion, in a case like the present where substantial injury is alleged to be implicit in the material irregularity set out in the application, it would be too technical to hold that the application should be dismissed on the preliminary ground that no specific or express averment has been made as to substantial injury suffered by respondent No. 1."
That decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. The learned counsel for the respondents drew the attention of this Court to the decision in A. P. V. Rajendran v. S, A, Sundararajan. (FB), That was a decision which considered the distinction between application under Section 47 and application under Order 21. Rale 90, C.P.C. It was held (at p. 129 of AIR):
"The irregularity and the defects found by the trial Court will attract only Order 21. Rule 90. C.P.C. as the defects and irregularity are in the preparation and settlement of the sale proclamation, and not under Sec. 47. As the sale in this case has been impeached only on grounds which attract Order 21. Rule 90 the judgment-debtor cannot escape the period of limitation by framing his application as one under Section 47. The substance of the application must be considered in order to determine whether the application is one which falls under Section 47 or under Order 21, Rule 90."
The said decision is only supporting the case of the appellants, as the Full Bench has observed that to find out whether the application would fall under Section 47 or under Order 21. Rule 90. C.P.C. the substance of the application must be considered. It is nowhere stated that merely because the application is filed under Order 21, Rule 90. C.P.C, and not under Sec. 47. C.P.C. the application is to be dismissed. In the above quoted case, though the judgment-debtor had filed the application under Sec, 47. C.P.C., this Court came to the conclusion that it should be treated as an application only under Order 21. Rule 90. C.P.C. on the facts of the case and to make out a case under Order 21, Rule 90. C.P.C. the matter was remitted back to the lower Court for fresh disposal. For all these reasons, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order passed by the Court below is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the executing Court which is directed to hold a fresh sale after drawing a fresh proclamation for sale by the Court itself and then direct the Commissioner to proceed with the sale on the said proclamation and after observing all the formalities according to law and in the light of the observations made in the order. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
8. Appeal allowed.