Chattisgarh High Court
Laxmaniya Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 20 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:17782-DB
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BABLU
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.04.21
10:47:42
+0530
CRA No. 602 of 2024
Laxmaniya Yadav W/o Sonu Lal Yadav, Aged About 23 Years R/o
Village Bandrakona, Podikurd Police Station Shankargarh, District
Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Shankargarh, District
Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr.Chitendra Singh, Advocate For Respondent : Mr.Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 20.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Chitendra Singh, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent/State.
2. Today, the matter is listed for hearing on I.A.No.03/2024 application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant. However, with the consent of learned counsel for the 2 parties, the appeal itself is heard finally as the appellant is in jail since 16.01.2021.
3. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 2.1.2024 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj in Sessions Case No.74/2021, whereby the appellant/accused has been convicted for offences under Sections 302 & 201 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and Sections 4 & 5 of the Chhattisgarh Tonahi Pratadna Nivaran Adhiniyam, 2005 (for short 'Adiniyam, 2005') and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for three months, RI for three years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for three months, RI for one year and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for three months and RI for three years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for three months.
4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that Munia Yadav, who had been admitted to the Medical College Hospital, Ambikapur, was reported dead to the police outpost. Upon receiving this information, Sub-Inspector Pushpa Tirkey (PW-9), who was posted at the Police Assistance Centre, Medical College, Ambikapur at the relevant time, registered the merg intimation 3 (Ex.P-11). She issued notices (Ex.P-12) to witnesses for conducting the inquest proceedings, and the inquest report (Ex. P-2) was duly prepared. Dr. Santu Bagh (PW-8) conducted the postmortem over the body of deceased Munia Yadav vide Ex.P-10 and found following injuries:-
"1. Lacerated wound with stitches present on mid frontal region near hair line 2 cm long vertically oblique.
2. Lacerated wound just above upper lip 2 cm long, blood stain present on chin, cheek, local swelling on upper lip. Right eye swelling present.
3. Impacted abrasion present on tip of nose, root of nose 1.5 cm.
4. Lacerated wound on right side occipital region 3.5 cm x .5 cm long vertical obliquely on opening scalp under surface of right temporal scalp diffused ecchymosis present. Right temporal muscles contused all over depressed fracture of right temporal bone 4 cm x 2 cm and 1 cm inwards. "
The doctor has opined that cause of death is head injuries. Mode of death is haemorrhage and shock and manner of death is homicide.
5. During the merg inquiry, it was found that on 30.12.2020, deceased Munia Yadav was carrying water from her house towards a drain when the accused, Laxmaniya, struck her on the head with a stone and killed her. On this basis, Inspector Umesh 4 Baghel (PW-10) of Police Station Shankargarh, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj, registered the First Information Report (Ex.P-13) against accused Laxmaniya. During the course of investigation, Inspector Umesh Baghel prepared the spot map (Ex.P-6). Blood-stained soil, plain soil, a blood-stained stone, 13 broken pieces of red bangles, and 2 pieces of purple-red bangles were seized from the place of occurrence in the presence of witnesses as per the seizure memo (Ex.P-5). The memorandum statement of accused Laxmaniya was recorded (Ex.P-3), and pursuant to the same, one stone was recovered at her instance and seized under seizure memo (Ex.P-4). A requisition (Ex.P-15) was sent to obtain a map from the Patwari, and Patwari Shweta Bhagat (PW-6) visited the spot and prepared the site map (Ex.P-8). The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur, through letter (Ex.P-16), and the examination report is Ex.P-17. Upon finding sufficient evidence against the accused/appellant, she was arrested as per the arrest memo (Ex.P-7), and intimation of her arrest was given to her relatives in accordance with Ex. P-14.
6. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused / appellant under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the Adhiniyam 2005, before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajpur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.). The case was registered as Criminal Case No. 234/2021, State of Chhattisgarh vs. Smt. 5 Laxmaniya Yadav, and was committed to the Court of Sessions by order dated 06.07.2021. After committal to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, the case was transferred to the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj for trial in accordance with law.
7. Charges were framed against the accused / appellant under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the Adhiniyam, 2005. The accused / appellant denied the charges and, in her examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stated that she was innocent and had been falsely implicated. She did not examine any witness in her defence.
8. The prosecution examined the following witnesses: Sedgo Yadav (PW-1), Manoj Yadav (PW-2), Ramlal Yadav (PW-3), Sonu Lal Yadav (PW-4), Suresh Yadav (PW-5), Patwari Shweta Bhagat (PW-6), Smt. Bagiya (PW-7), Dr. Santu Bagh (PW-8), Sub- Inspector Pushpa Tirkey (PW-9), and Inspector Umesh Baghel (PW-10).
9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 2.1.2024, convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC and Sections 4 & 5 of the Adhiniyam, 2005 and sentenced her as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.
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10. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC and Sections 4 & 5 of the Adhiniyam, 2005, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and the dispute arose all of sudden and under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused her death. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part.
11. On the other hand, Mr.Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that it is not a case where the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.
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12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.
13. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Munia Yadav was homicidal in nature ?
14. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, particularly relying upon the statement of Dr.Santu Bagh (PW-8), who conducted postmortem, has come to the conclusion that cause of death was head injuries and death was homicidal in nature. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Munia Yadav was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding.
15. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question ?
16. In the present case, the prosecution has examined Sedgo Yadav (PW-1), husband of the deceased and Manoj Yadav (PW-2), son of the deceased as eyewitnesses.
17. Sedgo Yadav (PW-1) has stated that in para 1 of his evidence that the incident took place about two years ago, at around 8:00 A.M. on a Wednesday. He do not know the exact date. On the day of 8 the incident, his wife Munia had gone to Bandra Kona to fetch water. At the same time, the accused Laxmaniya had gone towards the forest carrying an axe to collect firewood. In para 2 of his evidence, he has stated that while his wife was filling water, accused Laxmaniya came from behind and struck her on the back of the head with a stone. His wife fell down. Thereafter, she inflicted two blows with an axe between the nose and mouth, and also gave two blows on the head with the sharp edge of the axe. When he tried to intervene, she also attacked him with a stone; however, he did not sustain any injury. In para 3 of his evidence, he has stated that when this incident created an uproar, his younger son Manoj also ran to the spot and, upon seeing his mother's condition, fainted. Thereafter, his elder son Sonu brought deceased Munia home from the place of occurrence. In para 4 of his evidence, he has stated that after bringing Munia home from the place of occurrence, they spoke with the villagers and arranged a government vehicle from Shankargarh Hospital. She was taken there for treatment in the same vehicle. From Shankargarh Hospital, on the doctor's advice, she was referred to Mission Hospital, Ambikapur, for better treatment. While she was undergoing treatment there, she died at around 1:00 A.M. The next morning, they brought the body of deceased Munia from Mission Hospital to their home at Podhi. Thereafter, they performed her last rites and cremation with the family members and completed the funeral rituals.
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18. Manoj Yadav (PW-2) has stated in para 1 of his evidence that he know accused Laxmaniya Yadav; she is his sister-in-law. He also know deceased Munia Devi; she was his mother. The incident took place in 2020, at around 8-9 A.M., on 30.12.2020. On the day of the incident, his mother Munia Devi had given them food and then gone towards Bandrakona stream to fetch water. At the same time, accused Laxmaniya left the house carrying an axe and a rope to collect firewood. In para 2 of his evidence, he has stated that when his mother did not return for a long time after going to fetch water, he went to look for her. When he reached near Dhansay's house, he saw accused Laxmaniya Yadav coming with a stone and striking his mother, Munia Devi, on the back of her head. His mother fell down, and thereafter his sister-in-law struck her two to four more times on the head with the stone. He do not now remember whether the blows were on the right or left side of the head. In para 3 of his evidence, he has stated that after witnessing this from near Dhansay's house, he returned crying and informed his elder brother Suresh Yadav about the incident over the phone from some distance. After that, he went back to his mother; she was lying in a pool of blood and was also vomiting blood from her mouth. He then fainted at the spot. While he was unconscious, he do not know who took him to his maternal uncle's house. When he regained consciousness, he was at his maternal uncle's house. In para 4 of his evidence, he has stated that after regaining consciousness at his maternal 10 uncle's house, he came to know that his family members had gone to the hospital. He stayed at his uncle's house that day and slept there at night. The next morning, he called his elder brother Sonu and asked about his mother's condition, and he informed him that she had died. The police also questioned him regarding the incident.
19. Considering the aforesaid evidence, learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who has caused injuries over the head of the deceased due to which she died. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
20. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and her conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ?
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu1 has made the following observations :
"Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating 1 AIR 1956 SC 488 11 line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion."
22. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that her act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat 'intent' and 'knowledge' in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that her acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely "intention" and "knowledge" has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the 12 said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v.
State of Haryana2 has observed as under:-
"21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year."
24. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of 2 (2002) 3 SCC 327 13 Haryana3 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :-
"23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending
3 (2009) 15 SCC 635 14 against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.
Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused."
25. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda4, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the 4 (2012) 8 SCC 450 15 death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.
26. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh5 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-
"20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) "7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly."
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if 5 (2017) 3 SCC 247 16 death is caused, it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 596, para 9) "9. .... The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons.
It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provisions means "unfair advantage".
27. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.
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28. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v.
State (NCT of Delhi)6 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:
"16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:
(i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and
(iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner."
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police (Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023) has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:
"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was 6 (2019) 6 SCC 122 18 caused. To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously.
Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of 19 Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section
304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) 20 when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind 21 while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of 22 nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."
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30. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is evident that the appellant assaulted Munia Yadav with an axe all of a sudden, as a result of which she sustained grievous injuries to her head and subsequently died in the hospital. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased, Munia Yadav; rather, the act was committed all of a sudden, out of anger and in the heat of passion. By causing such injuries, the appellant must be deemed to have had the knowledge and intention that the injuries inflicted were likely to cause death. Accordingly, the case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, as the act of the appellant satisfies all four essential ingredients of Exception 4, namely: (i) there was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the appellant did not take any undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner.
31. Considering the above-stated facts, also considering the evidence of eyewitnesses Sedgo Yadav (PW-1) and Manoj Yadav (PW-2) and taking into consideration that the appellant is in jail since 16.01.2021, it would meet the end of justice that if the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC.
32. Accordingly, conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC are set aside, however, she is convicted 24 under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years. Her conviction and sentence under Section 201 of the IPC and Sections 4 & 5 of the Adhiniyam, 2005 are hereby affirmed.
33. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.
34. In view of above, I.A.No.03/2024 stands disposed of.
35. It is stated that the appellant is in jail, she shall serve out the remaining sentence as modified by this Court.
36. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing her jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that she is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu