Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Dr. R.S. Tyagi vs All India Institute Of Medical Sciences on 22 May, 2015
CENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH
O.A.NO.4376 OF 2012
New Delhi, this the 22nd day of May, 2015
CORAM:
HONBLE SHRI ASHOK KUMAR, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
AND
HONBLE SHRI RAJ VIR SHARMA, JDUCIAL MEMBER
Dr. R.S. Tyagi,
S/o Late Shri Baljit Singh Tyagi,
Aged: 61 years,
R/o P-4, Green Park Extension,
New Delhi 110016 Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri S.D.Sharma with Shri Gourab Bhardwaj)
Vs.
All India Institute of Medical Sciences,
Ansari Nagar,
New Delhi - 110 029
(Through: Its Director) . Respondent
(By Advocate: Shir Mukul Gupta(Senior Advocate) with Shri Rishabh Kaushik)
..
ORDER
Raj Vir Sharma, Member(J):
The applicant, who had been working as Deputy Director (Computer Facility) in the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi, and was due to superannuate on 31.8.2010, had been imposed the penalty of Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government, by the order dated 28.8.2010, on the basis of an enquiry report submitted by the Complaint Committee of AIIMS constituted for prevention of sexual harassment of women at workplace.
1.1 Being aggrieved thereby, the applicant had filed OA No.1619 of 2011 praying for quashing the said enquiry report and the penalty order, and for issuance of a direction to the respondent-AIIMS to make payment of all consequential benefits including pay, perks, retiral dues including pension, gratuity, leave encashment, etc., with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of their accrual. Following the decision rendered by the Honble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition ( Civil ) No. 7849 of 2006 (Sandeep Khurana v. Delhi Transco Limited & ors), the Tribunal, vide order dated 13.12.2011, had allowed the said O.A. in terms of the directions contained therein. The Tribunal, in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the said order dated 13.12.2011, held thus:
10. Quite evidently, the action in this case was initiated only by serving a copy of the complaint to the applicant, without any proper charge sheet with supportive documents. From the averments before us, it also is not the respondents case that the initiation of the action was with the approval of the Disciplinary Authority. It was meant to be simply an investigation, and no indication at that stage had been given that the same could be the basis for imposition of a major penalty. The contention in the OA regarding the Members of the Committee being lower in rank and pay scale to the applicant has not been rebutted. The report of the Complaint Committee does not reveal about any opportunity having been given to the delinquent to cross examine the prosecution witnesses.
We find the judgment in Sandeep Khuranas case of substantial relevance to the issues raised in the OA at hand. The law laid down by the Honble High Court regarding the requirement of a due observance of the procedure as prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rule 14, before imposing a major penalty such as removal in the instant case, being in consonance with the constitutional protection as per Article 311, is found to have been grossly violated in the present case.
The respondents reliance on the provisions as incorporated vide the proviso to sub rule (2) of the CCS(CCA) Rule 14 (regarding the inquiry as far as practicable being in accordance with the procedure laid down in these rules) would not help in the present case, in view of even the basic requirements not being fulfilled.
11. Without undermining the gravity of the issue and the need for protection of women at work place against sexual harassment; we note that whereas the Complaint Committees recommendation was only for a much lighter penalty (i.e. warning with stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect); the final infliction, however, is of removal from service. The fact that the applicant even otherwise would have superannuated just a couple of days after the penalty orders were issued, is also a relevant factor.
Thus in their present form, the impugned orders are not found to be sustainable; however, the competent authority, considering the facts and circumstances of the case including the superannuation of the applicant, can take a view regarding appropriate action in accordance with law.
12. To conclude, applying the law laid by the Honble Delhi High Court in Sandeep Khuranas case, the impugned inquiry as also the order of penalty are not found to be in consonance with law. Accordingly, they are quashed. Directions are also issued to the respondents to release all the dues of the applicant including the retiral dues as per law, without being impeded by the impugned penalty. The prayer for payment of interest would be admissible only to the extent as provided under the relevant rules.
The OA is allowed in terms of the above directions, which are to be complied by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs. 1.2 Respondent-AIIMS had filed W.P. (C) No.1396 of 2012 before the Honble High Court of Delhi, challenging the Tribunals order dated 13.12.2011 ibid. The Honble High Court of Delhi, vide judgment dated 12.3.2012, had disposed of the said writ petition. In the penultimate paragraph of the order dated 12.3.2012 ibid, the Honble Court observed thus:
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We are not interfering with the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal held that the Enquiry Report dated 12.01.2010 and penalty order dated 28.08.2010 cannot be sustained. We make it clear that the Tribunal had also given liberty to the competent authority to take a view regarding appropriate action in accordance with law. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he has instruction to state that the disciplinary proceeding following prescribed rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 shall be followed from the stage of sub-rule 3 thereof and shall be concluded within a period of six months. Insofar as the direction with regard to release of all dues of the applicant are concerned we modify the same by directing the petitioner to make such payments as would be in accord with the relevant rules applicable to a person facing disciplinary proceedings under the said rule 14 at the time of retirement. This will, however, be subject to the final decision taken pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings under rule 14. 1.3 The respondent-AIIMS issued Memorandum dated 11.7.2012 proposing to hold an inquiry against the applicant under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 and calling upon the applicant to submit his written statement of defence within 10 days from the date of receipt of the said Memorandum.
1.3.1 The O.M. dated 11.7.2012 ibid, reads thus:
ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES No. F.Vig./2-831/2009 Ansari Nagar, New Delhi 29 Dated the 11 JUL 2012 MEMORANDUM In accordance with the Honble High Court order dated 12.3.2012, the Disciplinary Authority proposes to hold an inquiry against Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Deputy Director (Computer Facility) under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The substance of the imputation of misconduct in respect of which the inquiry is proposed to be held is set out in the enclosed statement of article of charge (Annexure-I). A statement of the imputations of misconduct in support of each article of charge is enclosed (Annexure-II). A list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained are also enclosed (Annexure III & IV).
2. Dr.R.S.Tyagi is directed to submit within 10 days from the date of receipt of this memorandum a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person.
3. He is informed that an inquiry will be held only in respect of those articles of charge as are not admitted. He should, therefore, specifically admit or deny each article of charge.
4. Dr.R.S.Tyagi is further informed that if he does not submit his written statement of defence on or before the day specified in para 2 above, or does not appear in person before the Inquiring Authority or otherwise fails or refuse(s) to comply with the provisions of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules, 1965 or the orders/directions issued in pursuance of the said rule, the Inquiring Authority may hold the inquiry against him ex parte.
5. Attention of Dr.R.S.Tyagi is invited to Rule 20 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct)Rules, 1964 under which no Government Servant shall bring or attempt to bring any political or outside influence to bear upon any superior authority to further his interests in respect of matters pertaining to his service under the Government. If any representation is received on his behalf from another person in respect of any matter dealt within these proceedings, it will be presumed that Dr.R.S.Tyagi is aware of such a representation and that it has been made at his instance and action will be taken against him for violation of Rule 20 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules,1964.
6. The receipt of the Memorandum may be acknowledged.
BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY Sd/ (VINEET CHAWDHRY) DY. DIRECTOR (ADMN.) Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Deputy Director (Computer Facility) AIIMS 1.3.2 The statement of article of charge framed against the applicant, which was appended to the Memorandum dated 11.7.2012, reads thus:
ARTICLE OF CHARGE:
That Dr.R.S.Tyagi while working as Dy.Director (Computer Facility) is responsible for attempt to molest Ms.Sudesh, Data Entry Operator (Contract) on 8.4.2009 at around 5.15 p.m. in his office room in the Computer Facility, AIIMS, New Delhi. Dr.R.S.Tyagi tried for physical contact/advances with Ms.Sudesh on the pretext of further extension to her contract as Data Entry Operator. This act of Dr.R.S.Tyagi with Ms.Sudesh is unbecoming of an Institute employee and amounts to a serious misconduct.
Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director (Computer Facility) is, thus, responsible for gross misconduct, misbehaviour, failed to maintain amenability to discipline and has acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee of the Institute, thereby contravening Rule 3(1)(iii) & 3 ( C ) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 as applicable to the employees of the Institute. 1.4 On 27.7.2012 the applicant submitted his written statement of defence against the Memorandum dated 11.7.2012. In the said written statement of defence, it was, inter alia, contended by the applicant that the Honble High Court, vide its order dated 12.3.2012, had not directed initiation of departmental proceedings against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965; and that as he had superannuated from service of the AIIMS on 31.8.2010, the Disciplinary Authority could not have initiated disciplinary action against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
1.5 Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 12.3.2012 passed by the Honble High Court to the extent it modified the Tribunals direction to the respondent-AIIMS to release all the service and retiral dues in favour the applicant, and also to the extent it directed the respondent-AIIMS to make payment of the said dues as would be in accord with the relevant rules applicable to a person facing disciplinary proceedings under the said Rule 14 at the time of retirement, the applicant had filed SLP (CC 19449 of 2012) before the Honble Supreme Court on or about 17.9.2012. The Honble Apex Court dismissed the said SLP by order dated 8.11.2012, which reads thus:
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
Delay condoned.
We find no merits in the petition.
The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. 1.6 Thereafter, the applicant filed the present O.A.No.4376 of 2012 on 18.12.2012 before this Tribunal, seeking the following relief(s):
(a) quash the impugned memorandum dated 11.07.2012 i.e. the charge-sheet issued by the respondent to the applicant after his superannuation, same being illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory.
(b) Award cost of this application and proceedings against Respondent and favour of the Applicant.
(c) Such other further order(s)/relief(s) as be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the ends of justice. 1.7 In the O.A., it is, inter alia, contended by the applicant that the respondent-AIIMS has misinterpreted the order dated 12.3.2012 passed by the Honble High Court in W.P. (C ) No.1396 of 2012. The respondent-AIIMS has no power/authority to issue charge sheet against the applicant under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, after the applicants superannuation on 31.8.2010.
2. The Tribunal, vide interim order dated 1.2.2013, directed that the inquiry might continue, but no final decision would be taken on the report of the inquiry officer.
3. The Tribunal, vide interim order dated 22.3.2013, again observed that the interim order dated 1.2.2013 would not come in the way of the respondent in taking steps in terms of the order dated 12.3.2012 passed in W.P. ( C ) No. 1392 of 2012, and that the respondents should act as per rules and nothing mentioned in the said order would have ramification on the final view to be taken in the O.A. on merits.
4. Opposing the O.A., the respondent-AIIMS filed a counter reply on 5.5.2013. It is stated by the respondent-AIIMS that the memorandum dated 11.7.2012 was issued in accordance with the order passed by the Tribunal and the judgment passed by the Honble High Court of Delhi. The present departmental proceedings emanated from the notices issued to the applicant while he was in service and thus, the proceedings cannot be said to have been initiated after his retirement. The memorandum dated 11.7.2012 is only in continuation of the said notices. The departmental proceedings so instituted, when the applicant was in service, shall be deemed to be proceedings under Rule 9 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. The applicant had challenged the Memorandum dated 11.7.2012 before the Honble Supreme Court and, therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present O.A. The O.A. has become infructuous inasmuch as the competent authority has already passed an order dated 28.3.2013 imposing penalty with reference to Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, which has also been communicated to the applicant.
5. On 26.8.2013, the applicant filed a rejoinder reply refuting the stand taken by the respondent-AIIMS.
6. On 28.3.2015, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant filed a short synopsis of arguments. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that the Proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, does not empower the employer to issue charge memo against an employee after retirement. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in UCO Bank and another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694; UCO Bank & another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257; and Union of India v. K.V.Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010.
7. On 12.2.2015, the hearing was concluded and order was reserved. As it was found that the respondent-AIIMS did not file the copy of the final order dated 28.3.2013 passed in the disciplinary proceedings, although the same was stated to have been filed along with the counter reply as Annexure R-2, the O.A. was listed on 16.3.2015 under the heading For Being Spoken To with a view to give an opportunity to the respondent-AIIMS as well as the applicant to file a copy of the said final order dated 28.3.2013. However, on 16.3.2015 the matter was adjourned to 27.3.2015. On 27.3.2015 the applicant and respondent-AIIMS were directed to file copy of the order dated 28.3.2013, along with affidavit, and the matter was adjourned to 16.4.2015. On 16.4.2015 neither the learned counsel representing the respondent-AIIMS appeared, nor was the copy of the said order dated 28.3.2013 filed on their behalf, along with affidavit, by that date. However, an additional affidavit, along with the copy of the said order dated 28.3.2013, was filed by the applicant on 8.4.2015. The said order dated 28.3.2013 issued by the Director, AIIMS, reads thus:
ALL INDIA INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES Ansari Nagar, New Delhi 110029 No.F.Vig./2-831/09 Dated: 28.03.2013 ORDER WHEREAS the penalty of Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government was imposed on Dr.R.S.Tyagi while working as Dy.Director, Computer Facility; vide this office order of even number dated 28.08.2010 based on the Inquiry Report dated 12.01.2010 of the Committee Addressing the complaints of Sexual Harassment of women at AIIMS,, New Delhi.
AND WHEREAS the said Dr.R.S.Tyagi filed an OA No.1619/2011 before the Honble Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the aforesaid order of imposition of penalty Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government.
AND WHEREAS the Honble CAT vide their orders dated 13.12.2011 inter alia passed the following orders in the said OA No.1619/2011:
Thus in their present form, the impugned orders are not found to be sustainable; however, the competent authority, considering the facts and circumstances of the case including the superannuation of the applicant, can take a view regarding appropriate action in accordance with law.
To conclude, applying the law laid down by the Honble Delhi High Court in Sandeep Khuranas case, the impugned inquiry as also the order of penalty are not found to be in consonance with law. Accordingly, they are quashed. Directions are also issued to the respondents to release all the dues of the applicant including the retiral dues as per law, without being impended by the impugned penalty. The prayer for payment of interest would be admissible only to the extent as provided under the relevant rules.
This OA is allowed in terms of the above direction, which are to be complied by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs. AND WHEREAS the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi filed an appeal against the aforesaid orders/directions dated 13.12.2011 of the Honble CAT, before the Honble Delhi High Court, being WP ( C ) No.1396/2012 and the Honble Delhi High Court vide their orders dated 12.03.2012 inter alia directed as under:
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. We are not interfering with the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal held that the Enquiry Report dated 12.01.2010 and penalty order dated 28.08.2010 cannot be sustained. We make it clear that the Tribunal had also given liberty to the competent authority to take a view regarding appropriate action in accordance with law. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he has instruction to state that the disciplinary proceeding following prescribed rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 shall be followed from the stage of sub-rule 3 thereof and shall be concluded within a period of six months. Insofar as the direction with regard to release of all dues of the applicant are concerned we modify the same by directing the petitioner to make such payments as would be in accord with the relevant rules applicable to a person facing disciplinary proceedings under the said Rule 14 at the time of retirement. This will, however, be subject to the final decision taken pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14. AND WHEREAS in pursuance of the aforesaid directions of the Honble High Court of Delhi dated 12.03.2012, the directions dated 13.12.2011 of the Honble CAT, the orders penalty of Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government imposed on Dr.R.S.Tyagi vide office order of even number dated 28.08.2010, were withdrawn vide office memorandum of even number dated 11.07.2012 . Further, Disciplinary Proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA)Rules,1965 were resumed against Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director, Computer Facility, vide office memorandum of even number dated 11.07.2012 on the following article of charge:
That Dr.R.S.Tyagi while working as Dy.Director (Computer Facility) is responsible for attempt to molest Ms.Sudesh, Data Entry Operator (Contract) on 8.4.2009 at around 5.15 p.m. in his office room in the Computer Facility, AIIMS, New Delhi. Dr.R.S.Tyagi tried for physical contact/advances with Ms.Sudesh on the pretext of further extension to her contract as Data Entry Operator. This act of Dr.R.S.Tyagi with Ms.Sudesh is unbecoming of an Institute employee and amounts to a serious misconduct.
Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director (Computer Facility) is, thus, responsible for gross misconduct, misbehavior, failed to maintain amenability to discipline and has acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee of the Institute, thereby contravening Rule 3(12)(iii) and 3(C ) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 as applicable to the employees of the Institute. A statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehavour on which the article of charge were based, together with a list of documents by which,, and a list of witnesses by whom, the charge was proposed to be sustained, were also forwarded to him along with the aforesaid memorandum dated 11.07.2012.
AND WHEREAS Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director (Computer Facility) denied the charge and hence an inquiry was ordered. Shri Attar Singh, Chief Administrative Officer, AIIMS, New Delhi was appointed as the Inquiring Authority to inquire into the charge vide order of even number dated 04.10.2012.
AND WHEREAS the AIIMS sought extension of time to conclude the disciplinary proceedings against Dr.R.S.Tyagi pursuant to the orders of the Honble High Court of Delhi 12.03.2012 and the Honble Delhi High Court vide their orders dated 29.01.2013 granted two months time for complying with the order dated 12.03.2012.
AND WHEREAS Dr.R.S.Tyagi filed an OA No.4376/2012 in the Honble CAT against initiation of Disciplinary proceedings against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 as he was retired from the service and therefore, no proceedings could be initiated under said Rule 14. The Honble CAT vide their order dated 01.02.2013 had inter alia directed as under:
Be that as it may, since the question of jurisdiction is involved, the inquiry may continue. However, in the meanwhile, no order or final decision would be taken on the report of the inquiry officer. AND WHEREAS the Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his report dated 28.0-2.3013 wherein the charge framed against Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director (Computer Facility) was proved and a copy of the Inquiry Report was sent to Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director (Computer Facility) vide office memorandum of even number dated 09.03.2013 and he was given an opportunity of making submissions on the report of the Inquiry as he desired. His submissions on the report of Inquiry were received vide his letter dated 14.03.2013. Dr.R.S.Tyagi questioned the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules,1965 and further informed that the Honble CAT vide their order dated 01.02.2013 restrained the AIIMS from passing any order or final order on the report of the inquiry officer. However, the Honble CAT in the course of hearing on 22.03.2013 has allowed the AIIMS to proceed further in accordance with the orders of the Honble Delhi High Court.
AND WHEREAS on careful consideration of the report of the Inquiry Officer and other relevant facts of the case and in the light of the submissions made by Dr.R.S.Tyagi, it was concluded that the charge against Dr.R.S.Tyagi, Ex-Dy.Director (Computer Facility) was proved. The representation dated 14.03.2013 submitted subsequently by Dr.R.S.Tyagi has also no weightage to rebut the charge. The inquiry was found to be held properly in accordance with the prescribed rules and therefore, the competent authority decided to accept the findings of the Inquiry Officer.
AND WHEREAS the Disciplinary proceedings against the said Dr.R.S.Tyagi were conducted in accordance with the procedures laid down in Rules 14 and 15 of the CCS (CCA)Rules, 1965 AND WHEREAS the said Dr.R.S.Tyagi had attained the age of superannuation on 31.08.2010; the Disciplinary Proceedings initiated under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 have further been dealt under Rule 9 of CCS (Pension) Rules,1972.
NOW, THEREFORE, after careful consideration of article of charge, findings of the Inquiry Officer, representations of Dr.R.S.Tyagi and other relevant material/facts and circumstances of the case, the President, AIIMS, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 9 of CCS (Pension)Rules, 1972 read with Regulations 28 and 33(2) of the AIIMS Regulations (as amended) 2012, now for good and sufficient reasons ahs decided to withhold 25% of pension and Gratuity of Dr.R.S.Tyagi for a period of two years. It is conveyed accordingly.
By order and on behalf of the President, AIIMS Sd/ (R.C.DEKA) DIRECTOR
8. We have perused the pleadings and have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. We have also perused the written submission filed by the learned counsel for the applicant on 18.2.2015.
9. The present O.A. was filed by the applicant on 18.12.2012 challenging the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 issued under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The Tribunal, vide interim order dated 1.2.2013, directed that the inquiry might continue, but no final decision would be taken on the report of the inquiry officer. The Tribunal, vide interim order dated 22.3.2013, again observed that the interim order dated 1.2.2013 would not come in the way of the respondent in taking steps in terms of the order dated 12.3.2012 passed by the Honble High Court of Delhi in W.P. ( C ) No. 1392 of 2012, and that the respondents should act as per rules and nothing in the said order would have ramification on the final view to be taken in the O.A. on merits. In view of these interim orders passed by the Tribunal, the order dated 28.3.2013 passed in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant, vide charge memo dated 11.7.2012, which is impugned in the present O.A., is subject to the outcome of the present O.A. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the contention of the respondent-AIIMS that the present O.A. has become infrcutuous.
10. The respondent-AIIMS has also contended that the present O.A. is not maintainable inasmuch as the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 was the subject-matter of challenge in SLP filed by the applicant and the Honble Supreme Court has dismissed the said SLP, vide order dated 8.11.2012. The applicant has refuted the said contention of the respondent-AIIMS. He has filed copies of the SLP and the order dated 8.11.2012 passed by the Honble Supreme Court dismissing the said SLP. In the SLP, the applicant prayed for the following relief:
(a) Grant Special Leave to Appeal against the final judgment/order dated 12.03.2012 passed by the Honble High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition ( C ) No. 1396/2012;
(b) Passed such other order or orders, as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. The applicant also prayed for the following interim relief:
(a) ex parte stay of the impugned order dated 12.03.2012 passed by High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition ( C) No. 1396/2012;
(b) such other order or orders, as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Although the said SLP appears to have been filed on 12.9.2012, yet no mention of the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 ibid was made therein. In his written note of submissions filed before us on 18.2.2015, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the SLP was filed against the order dated 12.3.2012 passed by the Honble High Court on the limited ground that the Honble High Court could not have modified the order of the Tribunal regarding payment of retiral dues of the applicant, while upholding the order of the Tribunal quashing the enquiry report date 12.1.2010 and the penalty order dated 28.8.2010. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that the issuance of the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 constituted a fresh cause of action and therefore, the O.A. was very much maintainable. After going through the SLP and the order dated 8.11.2012 passed by the Honble Supreme Court, we find substantial force in the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant. As the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 was not the subject-matter of challenge in the SLP before the Honble Supreme Court, the respondent-AIIMS is wrong to say that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the present OA filed by the applicant challenging the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 ibid.
11. On a perusal of the order dated 13.12.2011 passed by the Tribunal in OA No. 1619 of 2011 and the judgment dated 12.3.2012 passed by the Honble High Court of Delhi in W.P. ( C ) No.1396 of 2012, the relevant portions of which have been extracted in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of this order, we have found that neither the Tribunal nor the Honble High Court directed the respondent-AIIMS to issue charge memo to the applicant under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. In the order dated 13.12.2011 ibid, the Tribunal observed that the competent authority, considering the facts and circumstances of the case including the superannuation of the applicant, can take a view regarding appropriate action in accordance with law. In the judgment dated 12.3.2012 ibid, the Honble High Court only mentioned the submission of the learned counsel that he has instruction to state that the disciplinary proceeding following prescribed rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 shall be followed from the stage of sub-rule 3 thereof and shall be concluded within a period of six months. Thus, we do not find any substance in the contention of the respondent-AIIMS that the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 was issued in accordance with the order passed by the Tribunal and the judgment passed by the Honble High Court.
12. It is the contention of the applicant that he having retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.8.2010, the departmental proceedings could not have been initiated against him by issuing charge memo dated 11.7.2012 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 save with the sanction of the President, as mandated in Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
13. On the other hand, it is contended by the respondent-AIIMS that the departmental proceeding in question emanated from the notices issued to the applicant while he was in service and thus, the proceeding could not be said to have been initiated after his retirement. The charge memo dated 11.7.2012 was only in continuation of the said notices. The departmental proceedings so instituted, while the applicant was in service, shall be deemed to be proceedings under Rule 9 (2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the applicant had continued in service.
14. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, as noted in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, it would be necessary to reproduce Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, as follows:
9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension:
(1) The President reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part,, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement:
Provided that the Union Public Service Commission shall be consulted before any final orders are passed:
Provided further that where a part of pension is withheld or withdrawn, the amount of such pensions shall not be reduced below the amount of rupees three hundred and seventy-five (Rupees three thousand five hundred from 1.1.2006 see GID below Rule 49) per mensem.
(2)(a) The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service:
Provided that where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President.
(b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his re-employment,-
(i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President,
(ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and
(iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service.
(3) Deleted (4) In the case of Government servant who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or otherwise and against whom any departmental or judicial proceedings are instituted or where departmental proceedings are continued under sub-rule (2), a provisional pension as provided in Rule 69 shall be sanctioned.
(5) Where the President decides not to withhold or withdraw pension but orders recovery of pecuniary loss from pension, the recovery shall not ordinarily be made at a rate exceeding one-third of the pension admissible on the date of retirement of a Government servant.
(6) For the purpose of this rule, -
(a) departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date; and
(b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted
(i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which the complaint or report of a Police Officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made, and
(ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date the plaint is presented in the Court.
15. As per Rule 9(6)(a) of the CCS (Pension)Rules, 1972, departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner. In the instant case, the statement of charges, along with the memo dated 11.7.2012 (Annexure A/1), was issued to the applicant on 11.7.2012. Therefore, the departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted against the applicant on 11.7.2012.
16. As the applicant stood retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.8.2010, the departmental proceedings shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President. In terms of Regulation 28 of the AIIMS Regulations, 1999, the applicant and other employees of the respondent-AIIMS are governed by the provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. It is, thus, to be seen as to whether the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 was issued instituting the departmental proceedings against the applicant with the sanction of the President, as mandated in Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. The impugned charge memo dated 11.7.2012 (Annexure A/1), which has been issued by order and in the name of the disciplinary authority, i.e., President, AIIMS, does not disclose any sanction of the President to have been obtained by the President in accordance with Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. In our view, President, AIIMS, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be President within the meaning of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Therefore, in the absence of prior sanction of the President under Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the impugned charge memo dated 11.7.2012 instituting departmental proceedings against the applicant after his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation is a nullity in the eye of law and liable to be quashed.
17. The notices and/or communication issued by the respondent-AIIMS to the applicant regarding his alleged misdemeanor on the basis of the complaint and the report of the complaint committee constituted for prevention of sexual harassment of women at workplace could not have taken the place of statement of charges within the meaning of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Had it been so, then there would have been no necessity to issue the statement of charge to the applicant on 11.7.2012. In view of this, we do not find any substance in the contention of the respondent-AIIMS that the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 issued to the applicant being in continuation of the said notices, the present departmental proceeding cannot be said to be instituted after the retirement of the applicant. Consequently, we also find no substance in the further contention of the respondent-AIIMS that the present departmental proceeding shall be deemed to be proceedings under Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
18. In Union of India v. K.V.Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010, the Honble Supreme Court has held that it is only when a charge memo in a disciplinary proceeding is issued to the employee, it can be said that the departmental proceeding is instituted against the employee.
19. In UCO Bank and another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694, the respondent retired on superannuation on 1.11.1996 from service of the appellant Bank. After about two years, a charge sheet was issued to him on 13.11.1998, and on conclusion of enquiry, penalty of removal from service was imposed on him. The Single Judge of the Honble High Court considered the penalty as shockingly disproportionate and therefore, converted the same into compulsory retirement. Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the Single Bench was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Honble High Court. The main contention of the appellant Bank before the Honble Supreme Court was that it was not proper for the court to interfere in the departmental proceedings. The Honble Supreme Court accepted the contention in principle, but found that a rudimentary question in the case was whether penalty of removal from service could be imposed on an employee who already stood retired on superannuation and charge sheet was issued to him after his retirement. There was provision contained in Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees Service Regulations which created a legal fiction that an employee against whom disciplinary proceedings were initiated while he was in service would be deemed to have been continued in service for the purpose of those proceedings even though he actually ceased to be in service after his retirement on superannuation. The Honble Supreme Court considered whether this legal fiction could be applied in the case of respondent against whom no charge sheet was issued while he was in service but charge sheet was issued to him after he already stood retired. Allowing the appeal, the Honble Supreme Court, in Paragraphs 21 to 28 of the judgment, held thus:
21. The aforementioned Regulation, however, could be invoked only when the Disciplinary Proceedings had clearly been initiated prior to the respondent's ceases to be in service. The terminologies used therein are of seminal importance. Only when a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against an officer of the bank despite his attaining the age of superannuation, can the disciplinary proceeding be allowed on the basis of the legal fiction created thereunder, i.e., continue "as if he was in service". Thus, only when a valid departmental proceeding is initiated by reason of the legal fiction raised in terms of the said provision, the delinquent officer would be deemed to be in service although he has reached his age of superannuation. The departmental proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated merely by issuance of a show cause notice. It is initiated only when a chargesheet is issued (See Union of India etc. etc. v. K.V. Jankiraman, etc. etc. reported in AIR 1991 SC 2010). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by this Court recently in Coal India Limited & others v. Saroj Kumar Mishra [2007 (5) SCALE 724] wherein it was held that date of application of mind on the allegations levelled against an officer by the Competent Authority as a result whereof a chargesheet is issued would be the date on which the disciplinary proceedings said to have been initiated and not prior thereto. Pendency of a preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself cannot be a ground for invoking Clause 20 of the Regulations. Albeit in a different fact situation but involving a similar question of law in Coal India Ltd. (supra) this Court held :
"13. It is not the case of the appellants that pursuant to or in furtherance of the complaint received by the vigilance department, the competent authority had arrived at a satisfaction as is required in terms of the said circulars that a chargesheet was likely to be issued on the basis of a preliminary enquiry held in that behalf or otherwise.
14. The circular letters issued by the appellants put restrictions on a valuable right of an employee. They, therefore, are required to be construed strictly. So construed there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the conditions precedent contained therein must be satisfied before any action can be taken in that regard."
It was further more observed that :
"20. A departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a chargesheet is issued."
(See also Union of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak 2007 (6) SCALE 348)
22. Respondent, therefore, having been allowed to superannuate, only a proceeding, inter alia, for withholding of his pension under the Pension Regulations could have been initiated against the respondent. Discipline and Appeal Regulations were, thus not attracted. Consequently the chargesheet, the enquiry report and the orders of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority must be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction.
23. An order of dismissal or removal from service can be passed only when an employee is in service. If a person is not in employment, the question of terminating his services ordinarily would not arise unless there exists a specific rule in that behalf. As Regulation 20 is not applicable in the case of the respondent, we have no other option but to hold that the entire proceeding initiated against the respondent became vitiated in law.
24. We are not oblivious of the peculiar legal position obtaining in this case. A gross illegality has been committed by the appellant in initiating a departmental proceeding against the respondent but he did not question the same. The learned Single Judge of the High Court held him guilty of commission of some irregularities. He did not question the correctness or otherwise of the said order also.
25. However, the legal effect of the order passed by the learned Single Judge could be that he became entitled to receive all retiral benefits. Thus, in our opinion, it is permissible for him to raise all contentions in support of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in terms of the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the principles akin thereto.
26. Furthermore, the respondent has retired as far back as on 01.11.1996. At this late stage, we are of the opinion that we should not allow an illegality to be perpetuated which is otherwise apparent on the face of his record.
27. We, therefore, are of the opinion that although the learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court may not be correct in passing the impugned judgments, we should in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, should allow the Writ Petition of the respondent to do complete justice to the parties.
20. UCO Bank and another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257, arose out of review petition filed against the judgment rendered in UCO Bank and another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694 (supra), wherein it was held that disciplinary proceedings could not be initiated against an employee after his retirement unless there was a provision to this effect in the relevant rules. It was contended in the review petition that disciplinary proceedings were deemed to be pending against the respondent in view of Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the UCO Bank Officers Service Regulations, 1979, and therefore, conclusion drawn in main judgment should be reconsidered. The Honble Supreme Court compared two sets of Regulations and held that the scope of their applicability was different. Fiction of deemed pendency of disciplinary proceedings created by Regulation 20(3)(ii) of 1979 Regulations was for a different purpose and could not be imported in the 1976 Regulations. Dismissing the review petition, the Honble Supreme Court held thus:
16. Clause (iii) of sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 is an independent provision. It provides for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings. Such disciplinary proceedings indisputably for the purpose of applicability of sub-regulation (3) must have been initiated in terms of the 1976 Regulations.
17. It is worth noticing the distinction between terminologies "proceeding pending" or "proceeding initiated". Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 defines what would be pending, viz., for the purpose of attracting Clause (i) thereof.
18. A disciplinary proceeding is initiated in terms of 1976 Regulations, which are applicable only in a case where a proceeding is initiated for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against a delinquent officer for the purpose of imposing a punishment on him. Disciplinary proceedings, thus, are initiated only in terms of the 1976 Regulations and not in terms of the 1979 Regulations.
19. It is worth noticing that the 1979 Regulations would be attracted when no disciplinary proceeding is possible to be initiated. The 1976 Regulations, however, on the other hand, would be attracted when a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. Both operate in separate fields. We do not see any nexus between Regulations 20(1) and 20(2) of the 1979 Regulations and the 1976 Regulations.
20. The 1976 Regulations provide for the mode and manner in which a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. It expressly provides for service of charge sheet. Service of charge sheet is a necessary ingredient for initiation of disciplinary proceeding. A preliminary enquiry is not contemplated under the 1976 Regulations. If such an enquiry is held, the same is only for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction on the part of the disciplinary authority to initiate a proceeding and not for any other purpose.
21. If it is found that a disciplinary proceeding can be and should be initiated, recourse to the 1976 Regulations would have to be taken, if not, the 1979 Regulations may be resorted to if the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. It is only with a view to put an embargo on the officer to leave his job, Clause (ii) of Sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 20 of the 1979 Regulations has been made. It's scope is limited.
22. We have noticed hereinbefore that each regulations operates in different fields. When a proceeding is initiated for the purpose of taking any disciplinary action on the ground of any misconduct which might have been committed by the officer concerned indisputably the procedures laid down in the 1976 Regulations are required to be resorted to.
23. The 1979 Regulations would be attracted only for the purpose of termination of service. Had the intention of the regulation making authority been that the legal fiction created under Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 would cover both Clauses (i) and (iii), the same should have been placed only after Clause (iii). In such an event, Clause (ii) of Sub- regulation (3) of Regulation 20 should have been differently worded. Some non-obstante clause would have been provided for making an exception to the applicability of the 1976 Regulations when a legal fiction is created, although it is required to be taken to the logical conclusion [See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, [(1951) 2 All.E.R 587], but the same would not mean that the effect thereof would be extended so as to transgress the scope and purport for which it is created.
24. In UCO Bank and Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2007) 6 SCC 694] it has been held:
"We are not oblivious of the legal principle that a legal fiction must be given full effect but it is equally well-settled that the scope and ambit of a legal fiction should be confined to the object and purport for which the same has been created."
25. In Imagic Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Ors. [JT 2008 (1) SC 496], this Court opined: SCC p.627, paras 30-31) "30[26] We have noticed hereinbefore that a legal fiction is created by reason of the said provision. Such a legal fiction, as is well known, should be applied only to the extent for which it was enacted. It, although must be given its full effect but the same would not mean that it should be applied beyond a point which was not contemplated by the legislature or which would lead to an anomaly or absurdity.
31[27]. The Court, while interpreting a statute, must bear in mind that the legislature was supposed to know law and the legislation enacted is a reasonable one. The Court must also bear in mind that where the application of a Parliamentary and a Legislative Act comes up for consideration; endeavours shall be made to see that provisions of both the acts are made applicable."
26. It is now a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the court must give effect to the purport and object of the Act. Rule of purposive construction should, subject of course to the applicability of the other principles of interpretation, be made applicable in a case of this nature.
27. In New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [JT 2008 (1) SC 31], this Court held:
51[50] .With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/ author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act fulfilled; which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations as held by the court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd (supra).
52[51) Barak in his exhaustive work on 'Purposive Construction' explains various meanings attributed to the term "purpose". It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Barak's words:
"Hart and Sachs also appear to treat "purpose" as a subjective concept. I say "appear" because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably."
(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at pg. 87) 53[52]. In Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli and Ors., (2007) 6 SCC 81, this Court held:
"The Parliament moreover is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute (see Breyer, Stephen (2005): Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Knopf (Chapter on Statutory Interpretation - pg. 99 for "Reasonable Legislator Presumption" )."
54[53]. The provisions of the Act and the Rules in this case, are, thus required to be construed in the light of the action of the State as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. With a view to give effect thereto, the doctrine of purposive construction may have to be taken recourse to. [See 2007 (7) Scale 753 : Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Brij Mohan and others.]"
28. All the regulations must be given a harmonious interpretation. A Court of law should not presume a 'cassus omissus' but if there is any, it shall not supply the same. If two or more provisions of a statute appear to carry different meanings, a construction which would give effect to all of them should be preferred. [See Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., 2008 (3) SCALE 469]
29. In terms of the 1976 Regulations drawing up of a charge sheet by the disciplinary authority is the first step for initiation of a disciplinary authority. Unless and until, therefore, a charge sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceedings for the purpose of the 1976 Regulations cannot be initiated. Drawing up of a charge sheet, therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceedings. We have noticed in paragraph 15 of our judgment that ordinarily no disciplinary proceedings can be continued in absence of any rule after an employee reaches his age of superannuation. A rule which would enable the disciplinary authority to continue a disciplinary proceedings despite the officers reaching the age of superannuation must be a statutory rule. A' fortiori it must be a rule applicable to a disciplinary proceedings.
30. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the employer may take resort to a preliminary inquiry, but it will bear repetition to state that the same has a limited role to play. But, in absence of the statutory rules operating in the field, resorting to a preliminary enquiry would not by itself be enough to hold that a departmental proceeding has been initiated.
31. Initiation of a disciplinary proceeding may lead to an evil or civil consequence. Thus, in absence of clear words, the court must lean in favour of an interpretation which has been applied by this Court in the main judgment.
21. Even if it is assumed that the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 ibid is a continuation of the notice(s) issued to the applicant by the respondent-AIIMS regarding his alleged misdemeanor on the basis of the complaint and the report of the complaint committee constituted for prevention of sexual harassment of women at workplace and that the said departmental proceeding instituted against the applicant, while he was in service, is deemed to be a proceeding under Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the disciplinary authority ought to have submitted a report recording its findings to the President, as mandated in the Proviso to Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension)Rules, 1972; the said disciplinary authority being subordinate to the President. The order dated 28.3.2013 does not disclose the disciplinary authority, i.e., President, AIIMS, to have submitted its report recording its findings to the President, as mandated in the Proviso to Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Under Rule 9(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the President only reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity if in any departmental proceeding the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service. The respondent-AIIMS has not produced before this Tribunal any other rule, or regulations, or orders issued by the Central Government, authorizing the disciplinary authority and/or President, AIIMS, to institute departmental proceedings, save with the sanction of the President within the meaning of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, against the retired employees of the AIIMS, who are governed by the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, and to withhold their pension or gratuity under Rule 9(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. In the above view of the matter, the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 and the final order dated 28.3.2013 ibid are ab initio void and liable to be quashed.
22. In the light of the above discussions, we hold that the charge memo dated 11.7.2012 (Annexure A/1) and the final order dated 28.3.2013 being unsustainable in the eyes of law are liable to be quashed.
23. In the result, the O.A. is allowed. The charge memo dated 11.7.2012 (Annexure A/1) and the final order dated 28.3.2013 ibid in the departmental proceeding, pursuant to the charge memo dated 11.7.2012(Annexure A/1), issued by the Director, AIIMS, by order and on behalf of the President, AIIMS, withholding 25% of pension and gratuity of the applicant for a period of two years, are quashed. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we would like to observe here that the respondent-AIIMS, if so advised, may proceed against the applicant in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
(RAJ VIR SHARMA) (ASHOK KUMAR) JUDICIAL MEMBER ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER AN