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[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Union Bank Of India And Another vs Bishamber Dass Kayat on 12 March, 2026

LPA-601-2020 (O&M)                                -1-




           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                        AT CHANDIGARH



                                                                LPA-601-2020 (O&M)

UNION BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
                                                                       ...Appellants

            Vs.

BISHAMBER DASS KAYAT

                                                                       ..Respondent


                                  Reserved on: 12.12.2025
                                  Pronounced on: 12.03.2026
                                  Judgment uploaded on: 18.03.2026

            Whether only the operative part of the judgment is pronounced or
            whether the full judgment is pronounced: Full Judgment

CORAM:      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHIT KAPOOR

Present:    Mr. K.K. Gupta, Advocate
            for the appellants.

            Mr. Arav Gupta, Advocate
            for the respondent.

                                           ****
ROHIT KAPOOR , J.

The instant Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 11.02.2020, passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP-24885-2015, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent-petitioner against the order of disciplinary authority imposing major penalty of compulsory retirement vide order dated 09.04.2014 and against orders rejecting his appeal and review, has been allowed. The learned Single Judge while setting aside the order of compulsory retirement remitted the matter back before the disciplinary 1 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -2- authority to look into all the issues and take an informed decision as to what penalty, if any, requires to be visited upon the respondent-petitioner. All other issues, including consequential benefits and the manner in which the respondent- petitioner's suspension period is to be treated, were also to be dealt with by the disciplinary authority. Further directions were given that the exercise should be concluded expeditiously and not later than four weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order.

2. Facts as noticed by the learned Single Judge in its decision dated 11.12.2020, are as under:-

"The petitioner entered the service of the Bank as a Clerk-cum- Cashier on 01.05.1989. He was promoted as an Officer in Junior Management Grade Scale-I (JMGS-I) in May, 2005, and as a Manager in Middle Management Grade Scale-II (MMGS-II) in April, 2009. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under charge-sheet dated 30.07.2013 (Annexure P-1) on the ground that he had failed to discharge his duties with utmost honesty and integrity; utmost devotion and diligence; that he had failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the bank; and had acted otherwise than in his best judgment in the performance of official duties. The charge-sheet recorded that the memoranda dated 17.12.2012 and 17.01.2013 issued to the petitioner would form part of the statement of allegations. The list of documents and the list of witnesses proposed to be pressed into service for substantiating the charges were appended therewith.
Upon completion of the inquiry, by his Report dated 20.12.2013, the Inquiring Authority held that the petitioner was guilty of making unauthorized debits and delayed/partial adjustments, which indicated misappropriation of the Bank's funds. The petitioner submitted representation dated 10.01.2014 (Annexure P-3) to the Disciplinary Authority in the context of the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority. Thereupon, the impugned order of punishment dated 09.04.2014 (Annexure P-4) came to be passed, visiting upon the petitioner the major penalty of compulsory retirement from service.

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It may however be noted at this stage that even before the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under the chargesheet dated 30.07.2013, the Deputy General Manager of the Nodal Regional Office of the Bank at Chandigarh addressed letter dated 18.06.2013 to the Assistant General Manager, Central Vigilance Department, of the Central Office of the Bank at Mumbai. Therein, he referred to various documents, which were also appended as annexures, and while recommending initiation of minor penalty proceedings against the petitioner, he asked for First Stage Advice. Again, by letter dated 28.06.2013, the Deputy General Manager of the Nodal Regional Office of the Bank at Chandigarh addressed the Assistant General Manager, Central Vigilance Department, of the Central Office of the Bank at Mumbai, wherein he reiterated his recommendation for initiation of minor penalty proceedings against the petitioner, indicating the proposed punishment as stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect for a period of two years. However, by letter dated 12.07.2013, the Deputy General Manager, Central Vigilance Department, of the Central Office of the Bank informed the Deputy General Manager of its Nodal Regional Office at Chandigarh that, upon examining the case, the Chief Vigilance Officer disagreed with the Disciplinary Authority as to initiation of minor penalty proceedings and advised initiation of major penalty proceedings against him. He further requested that the inquiry proceedings should be expedited and to submit relevant papers for the Second Stage Advice of the Central Vigilance Officer in due course.
After completion of the inquiry proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority, viz., The Chief Manager of the Regional Office at Chandigarh, addressed letter dated 12.02.2014 to the Deputy General Manager (Vigilance), Central Vigilance Department, Central Office, Union Bank of India, Mumbai, stating that he was of the opinion that the major penalty of reversion from MMGS-II to JMGS-I should be imposed upon the petitioner and that his basic pay should be fixed at `19,400/-. The Deputy General Manager, Central Vigilance Department, however disagreed with this proposal, vide letter dated 03.03.2014, and advised the Disciplinary Authority to re-visit the penalty proposed by him against the petitioner and to submit necessary papers for the Second Stage Advice of the Central Vigilance Officer. The Disciplinary Authority thereupon 3 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -4- addressed letter dated 11.03.2014 to the Central Vigilance Department proposing to impose the major penalty of compulsory retirement from service upon the petitioner. This met with the approval of the Central Vigilance Department, as is evident from the letter dated 12.03.2014 addressed by the Deputy General Manager of the Central Vigilance Department, wherein he recorded that the Chief Vigilance Officer was in agreement with the Disciplinary Authority with regard to the proposed punishment.
Significantly, this exchange of correspondence between the Nodal Office and the Central Vigilance Department of the Bank was not disclosed to the petitioner. It appears that even at the stage of filing an appeal against the punishment order dated 09.04.2014, the petitioner remained unaware and no ground of appeal was taken by him in this regard. This appeal was filed by him on 16.05.2014. The said appeal came to be dismissed on 25.09.2014, whereby the Appellate Authority opined that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was not only commensurate with the gravity of the charges/ allegations proved against him but was also just and proper.
It was only after the passing of this appellate order that the petitioner seems to have found out about the exchange of correspondence, referred to supra, and submitted application dated 09.12.2014 under the Right to Information Act, 2005, for documents in this regard being provided to him. The petitioner specifically raised this ground in his review petition dated 08.12.2014 filed against the appellate order dated 25.09.2014. In para 8 of his review petition, he categorically stated that he had suffered prejudice as copies of the First Stage Advice and Second Stage Advice of the Central Vigilance Officer had not been provided to him. He also referred to case law in this regard. However, by order dated 01.04.2015, the Reviewing Authority, viz., the General Manager (P&HR) of the Bank, rejected his review petition. Significantly, the Reviewing Authority did not even deal with the ground raised by the petitioner with regard to non-supply of the correspondence with the Vigilance Department."

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3. After taking into consideration the relevant facts and the rival contentions of the parties, as also various judicial pronouncements, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition by making the following observations:

"In any event, in the case on hand, it is demonstrated that the recommendation of the Vigilance Department was given great weightage. So much so that the Disciplinary Authority practically danced to the tunes of the Vigilance Department at all stages. This is clear from the fact that the earlier decision of the Bank to initiate minor penalty proceedings against the petitioner was brushed aside by the Vigilance Department when it pressed upon the Disciplinary Authority to initiate major penalty proceedings and the same was acceded to. In this regard, Mr. K.K. Gupta, learned counsel, would contend that the Deputy General Manager of the Nodal Office of the Bank at Chandigarh had no authority to address letters to the Vigilance Department opining that minor penalty proceedings should be initiated and that the said communications were made with the intention of favouring the petitioner. However, he concedes that no action was initiated against the said Deputy General Manager, if he acted in excess of power or to favour the petitioner. Therefore, this self-serving statement of the Bank cannot be accepted at this stage.
More importantly, after completion of the inquiry proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority itself addressed the Vigilance Department opining that a particular major penalty would suffice but again, the Vigilance Department brushed it aside and asserted that the proposed penalty should be re-visited. Thereupon, the Disciplinary Authority came up with the suggestion that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired from service and ultimately, that was the punishment imposed upon him, after the Vigilance Department approved it. This sequence of events clearly manifests that the Vigilance Department played a pivotal role in the progress of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner at every stage.
Be it noted that Regulation 19 of the Regulations of 1976 merely required consultation with the Vigilance Department and that too, only if the case involved a vigilance angle. In the present case, the issue as to whether the case against the petitioner even involved a vigilance angle is doubtful, in the light of the earlier decision of the IAC Committee of the 5 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -6- Bank holding to the contrary. That apart, the Bank did not stop at mere consultation with the Vigilance Department but virtually bent over backwards to accommodate and act upon its every 'recommendation'. The Disciplinary Authority therefore abdicated its responsibility and blindly acted upon the directives of the Vigilance Department. When it proposed to even consider such directives, the Disciplinary Authority was bound to share the same with the petitioner. In the absence of such disclosure, the initial order of punishment itself stood vitiated. The confirmation of the same in appeal and thereafter, in review, would not cure the inherent defect at the primary stage. All the more so, when the Reviewing Authority did not even apply its mind to the ground raised by the petitioner with regard to the effect of the non-disclosure of the Vigilance Department's advice.
The order of compulsory retirement passed against the petitioner is therefore liable to be set aside on this ground. As this Court now proposes to do so, the issues raised by the petitioner with regard to his consequential benefits, as well as the manner in which his period of suspension should be treated, need not trouble this Court at this stage. It is for the Disciplinary Authority to look into all issues, including the very requirement of consultation with the Vigilance Department in the light of the IAC Committee's decision that it was a non-vigilance case, and take an informed decision as to what penalty, if any, requires to be visited upon the petitioner. All other issues, including the consequential benefits and the manner in which the petitioner's suspension period should be treated, shall also be dealt with by the Disciplinary Authority. As the petitioner remained out of service since 2014, owing to the misguided and defective endeavours of the Bank, the present exercise shall be concluded expeditiously and in any event, not later than four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above."

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has assailed the decision of the learned Single Judge on the ground that it has failed to take into consideration that the plea regarding non-furnishing of the recommendation 6 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -7- of the Chief Vigilance Officer (for short 'CVO') was not raised by the respondent before any authority, except the reviewing authority. While referring to Regulation 19 of the Union Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short 'the 1976 Regulations'), learned counsel submits that in all cases involving vigilance angle, it is mandatory for the disciplinary authority to consult the Central Vigilance Commission. It is argued that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the respondent on account of non-furnishing of the correspondence between the Bank and the CVO. It is contended that the punishment order has been passed by the disciplinary authority after due application of mind and after taking into consideration the findings of the Inquiry Officer, wherein all charges against the respondent-petitioner stood duly proved. The decision of the disciplinary authority was affirmed by the appellate and reviewing authority by passing detailed orders, and therefore, the learned Single Judge has wrongly held that the disciplinary authority was influenced by the recommendations/directives of the CVO. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others vs S.N Goyal1 to contend that in a case where the correspondence between the Bank authorities and the CVO is not material on the finding regarding guilt/misconduct, then in that situation, non-furnishing of copies of such correspondence would neither violate the principles of natural justice, nor vitiate the order of penalty. It is argued that the judgments relied upon by the learned Single Judge are distinguishable on facts. It is submitted that the decision arrived at in the disciplinary proceedings could not have been interfered 1 (2008) 8 SCC 92 7 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -8- with by the learned Single Judge in the limited scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-petitioner has opposed the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. It is argued that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances involved in the matter, wherein the disciplinary authority failed to take an independent decision and mechanically adopted the directions of the CVO, which was against the opinion of the disciplinary authority, formed after perusal of the findings in the inquiry report. It is contended that once the Internal Advisory Committee (for short 'IAC') comprising the senior-most members of the management of the appellants-Bank had reached a conclusion that the present matter did not fall within the realm of a vigilance case, then seeking consultation from the CVO under Regulation 19 of the 1976 Regulations was not warranted at all. It is further contended that bare perusal of the contents of the inquiry report would show that the respondent-petitioner was not found guilty of breach of any instructions or regulations of the appellants-Bank, and it was specifically deposed by the management witnesses that no loss whatsoever has been caused to the Bank. The ground that the debited amounts were not deposited back within 'reasonable time' is based upon assumptions and conjectures, and there was no violation of any instructions of the Bank, which could have been the basis of imposition of major penalty. The CVO virtually dictated the discourse of the disciplinary proceedings from the initial to the last stage, and the authorities of the Bank mechanically followed such directions, despite formulating a different opinion to the contrary. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the 8 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -9- Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India V/s D.C. Aggarwal2; Oriental Bank of Commerce and others V/s. S.S. Sheokand and another3; and Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi V/s. Syndicate Bank Head Office, Manipal4, to contend that law is well settled that any material which goes into the decision-making process against an employee, cannot be kept away from him, and therefore, the entire disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated on this ground alone.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record.

7. The seminal issues that fall for our consideration in the instant case are whether in the peculiar facts of the case, non-furnishing of the correspondence between the authorities of the Bank and the CVO resulted in violation of the procedural safeguards and principles of a fair and just inquiry; and whether the recommendations of the CVO were mechanically followed, without independent application of mind, necessitating reconsideration of the matter by the disciplinary authority.

8. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to briefly discuss the relevant statutory provisions. The appellant-Bank is governed by the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The 1976 Regulations were brought into existence in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 19 of the said Act. Regulation 4 of the said Regulations pertains to penalty, both major and minor penalties. The relevant extract of the said regulation is reproduced as under:-

2

(1993) 1 SCC 13 3 (2014) 5 SCC 172 4 AIR 1991 SC 1507

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"4. PENALTIES: The following are the penalties which may be imposed on an Officer Employee, for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons:
...
Major Penalties
(f) Same as provided for in (e) above reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the Officer will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay;
(g) Reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale;
(h) Compulsory retirement;
(i) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment;
(j) Dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment."

9. Regulation 6 lays down the procedure for imposing major penalties, and it is in terms thereof that no order imposing any of the major penalties specified in clauses (f), (g), (i) and (j) of Regulation 4 shall be made without holding an inquiry. The disciplinary authority is required to frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the Officer Employee and the Articles of Charge, together with a Statement of the allegations, list of documents relied upon along with copy of such documents and list of witnesses alongwith copy of statement of witnesses, if any, on which they are based, are required to be communicated in writing to the Officer Employee, who is to submit a written statement of his defence within the stipulated time. The procedure regarding conducting preliminary inquiry into the truthfulness of imputation of misconduct; framing of charges; providing list of documents and 10 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -11- witnesses; granting opportunity to file written statement of defence; and holding of inquiry thereafter are detailed under Regulation 6. Regulation 7 stipulates the action that may be taken by the disciplinary authority on the inquiry report. Regulation 19 contemplates consultation with Central Vigilance Commission in cases having a vigilance angle and is reproduced hereunder:-

"19. CONSULTATION WITH CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION:
The Bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary, in respect of all disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle."

10. Records reveal that in order to assess whether the case of the respondent-petitioner was having any vigilance angle, the IAC of the appellant- Bank comprising the General Manager (PBOD), the General Manager (RMD) and the General Manager (DFB & IBD), considered the memoranda dated 17.12.2012 and 17.01.2013 issued to the respondent and after taking the same into consideration, as well as the reply of the respondent thereto, accepted the recommendation of the Regional Head and opined that the matter was a 'non- vigilance case'. As duly noticed by the learned Single Judge, there was no material on the record to show as to how and when it was decided to treat the case as a vigilance case under Regulation 19 of the 1976 Regulations. No order of the disciplinary authority or the CVO has been placed to show consideration upon the report of the IAC, and whether the matter was recommended to the Central Vigilance Commission or not.

11. Perusal of the correspondence supplied to the respondent belatedly under the Right to Information Act, after culmination of the disciplinary 11 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -12- proceedings, would show that the CVO virtually dictated the course of the disciplinary proceedings by brushing aside the opinion of the IAC, as well as the disciplinary authority itself, regarding imposition of minor penalty. Even subsequently, at the time of seeking opinion at the second stage, it has come forth that the disciplinary authority forwarded the findings of the Inquiry Officer along with copy of the submission of the respondent and other material to the CVO with his recommendations of imposition of major penalty of reversion from MMGS-II to JMGS-1 and to fix his basic pay at Rs.19,400/-. However, the CVO disagreed with the opinion of the disciplinary authority and categorically opined that good performance would not mitigate the gravity of misconduct involving questionable integrity of the officer and directed the disciplinary authority to revisit the penalty looking to the degree of culpability. It is pertinent to take note of the letter dated 03.03.2014 wherein the disciplinary authority was advised to revisit the penalty proposed by it in view of the discordant note of the CVO and it was only thereafter that the disciplinary authority immediately vide its letter dated 11.03.2014 proposed major penalty of compulsory retirement. Perusal of the original opinion of the disciplinary authority as well as the letter dated 11.03.2014, would show that it has been noticed that the respondent had put in more than 24 years of unblemished service and both the management witnesses had whole heartedly praised his sound working and especially highlighted that none of the accounts sanctioned during his tenure slipped to NPA and all customers spoke very highly about him besides the fact that he was awarded incentives by the management for his overall excellent performance. Despite recording that it is inclined to take a lenient view, the disciplinary authority in the penultimate part of the letter decided to change the penalty to that of compulsory 12 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -13- retirement, which immediately found favour with the CVO, which was communicated to the disciplinary authority on the very next date vide letter dated 12.03.2014. This entire correspondence is clearly reflective of the CVO's interference in the disciplinary proceedings right from the initial stage and the influence exerted upon the disciplinary authority, regarding the quantum of punishment that was to be imposed.

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs. D.C. Aggarwal (supra) considered the issue that whether the disciplinary authority while imposing punishment, major or minor, can act on material which is neither supplied nor shown to the delinquent. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia observed as under:-

".....Purpose of supplying document is to contest its veracity or give explanation. Effect of non-supply of the report of Inquiry Officer before imposition of punishment need not be gone into nor it is necessary to consider validity of sub-rule (5). But non-supply of CVC recommendation which was prepared behind the back of respondent without his participation, and one does not know on what material which was not only sent to the disciplinary authority but was examined and relied on, was certainly violative of procedural safeguard and contrary to fair and just inquiry."

13. In Oriental Bank of Commerce and others vs. S.S. Sheokand and another (supra), the following observations were made in paragraph 20 of the judgment:-

"20. We have considered the submissions of both the counsel. When we come to the question of imposition of punishment on the respondent, what we find is that undoubtedly, there was a serious allegation against him, and as it has been held in Disciplinary Authority- cum-Regl. Manager, (1996) 9 SCC 69, such acts could not be condoned. At 13 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -14- the same time, we have also to note that the bank management itself had taken the view in the initial stage that the action did not require a major penalty. It is also relevant to note that the High Court was also informed at the stage of review that the Bank was considering imposition of a minor penalty. It is quite possible to say that the bank management did arrive at its decision to maintain a major penalty at a later stage on its own, and not because of the dictate of CVC, but at the same time it has got to be noted that CVC report had been sought by the management of the Bank, and thereafter the punishment had been imposed. As observed in SBI, (1993) 1 SCC 13, may be that the disciplinary authority had recorded its own findings, and had arrived at its own decision, but when this advice from CVC was sought, it could not be said that this additional material was not a part of the decision-making process. When this report was not made available to the respondent, it is difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken under pressure. Any material, which goes into the decision-making process against an employee, cannot be denied to him. In view of the judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regl. Manager , the decision of the Bank could have been approved on merits, however, the two judgments in Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi, (1991) 3 SCC 219 and SBI v. D.C. Aggarwal, (1993) 1 SCC 13 lay down the requisite procedure in such matters, and in the facts of this case, it will not be appropriate to depart from the dicta therein. On this yardstick alone, the part of the judgment of the High Court interfering with the punishment will have to be sustained."

14. In Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank Head Officer, Manipal (supra), it was inter alia held that "The punishment to be imposed whether minor or major depends upon the nature of every case and the gravity of the misconduct proved. The authorities have to exercise their judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. They cannot act under the dictation of the Central Vigilance Commission or of the Central Government. No third party like the Central Vigilance Commission or the Central Government 14 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -15- could dictate the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how they should exercise their power and what punishment they should impose on the delinquent officer. (See : De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th edn., p. 309). The impugned directive of the Ministry of Finance, is therefore, wholly without jurisdiction, and plainly contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters."

15. In SBI and others vs. S.N. Goyal (supra), after considering the judgments in the case of SBI vs. D.C. Aggarwal (supra) and Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank Head Officer, Manipal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the dicta of the said judgments would not be applicable in the facts involved in the said case where the High Court had assumed that the appointing authority had placed some undisclosed additional material before the CVO. It was found that there was no material to show that the order imposing punishment was on the dictates of the CVO or that there was any mechanical acceptance of any suggestion or advice by the CVO.

16. It is well settled that each case is to be adjudicated upon its own facts. Having examined the peculiar facts and circumstances in the instant case, we find that the IAC report and the correspondence exchanged between the Bank and the CVO had a material bearing on the entire decision-making process and it would be difficult to rule out the apprehension about the decision having been taken under pressure.

17. The argument of the appellants that no prejudice has been caused to the respondent-petitioner on account of non-furnishing of the correspondence between the Bank authorities and the CVO, cannot be countenanced as the same 15 of 17 ::: Downloaded on - 19-03-2026 20:29:03 ::: LPA-601-2020 (O&M) -16- is in violation of the procedural safeguards and principles of fair and just inquiry. The contention regarding the respondent-petitioner raising the issue for the first time before the reviewing authority can also not be accepted as it is clear from the records that such information/document was never supplied to the respondent- petitioner, and it was at a much belated stage that such information was furnished after the intervention of the authorities under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Submissions regarding the order having been passed after due application of mind, are also bereft of any merit, in view of the findings as recorded hereinabove.

18. We find force in the submissions of learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner that non-furnishing of such correspondence to the respondent-petitioner is in violation of the procedural safeguards and principles of fair and just inquiry, which legal position stands crystallized in the judgments of the Supreme Court of India as mentioned hereinabove.

19. We are of the considered opinion that the decision in the case of S.N. Goyal (supra), would not come to the aid of the appellants, as the same was based upon its own facts. As noticed above, in the peculiar facts and circumstances involved in the instant case, wherein the IAC of the appellant-Bank itself had opined that the matter does not have any vigilance angle, seeking repeated consultations from the CVO in such a scenario would itself be circumspect. The apprehension of the disciplinary authority having mechanically adopted the directions of the CVO cannot be ruled out.





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20. We, therefore, concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the matter requires reconsideration by the disciplinary authority, by taking an independent decision after due application of mind.

21. As a result thereof, the present appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The disciplinary authority is directed to pass a fresh order in consonance with the directions passed by the learned Single Judge within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. It goes without saying that the fresh order shall be passed after giving due notice and opportunity of hearing to the respondent.

22. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

(ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA)                            (ROHIT KAPOOR)
         JUDGE                                         JUDGE


12.03.2026
Mohit goyal
                    Whether speaking/reasoned :        Yes/No

                    Whether Reportable :               Yes/No




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