Jharkhand High Court
Vijay Kumar Singh Aged About 57 Years Son ... vs Union Of India Through Cbi .... .... Opp. ... on 9 May, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:14078
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Revision No.1310 of 2023
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Vijay Kumar Singh aged about 57 years Son of Sri Ram Pravesh Singh, Resident of Dayal Nagar, Piska More, P.O.-Hehal & P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, Dist. Ranchi. .... .... Petitioner Versus Union of India through CBI .... .... Opp. Party CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Siddhartha Ranjan, Advocate Ms. Shipra Shalini, Advocate For the CBI : Mr. Deepak Kr. Bharati, Advocate
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08/Dated: 09.05.2025
1. The instant application filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), assailing the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for discharge from criminal prosecution in connection with R.C.03(A)/2011-R, has been rejected.
I.A. No.9879 of 2023
2. Since the instant revision petition is barred by limitation of 1233 days and as such, the delay condonation application being I.A. No.9879 of 2023 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1233 days in filing the instant petition.
3. The reason has been explained at paragraph-4 of the instant application showing therein that the cause has been said to be sufficient in not approaching the Court by challenging the order impugned dated 05.03.2018, since, it was pending for its 1 2025:JHHC:14078 consideration in interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018, which had been filed in Cr.M.P. No. 1149 of 2012.
4. It has been submitted that the said interlocutory application, i.e., I.A. No.6699 of 2018 was allowed vide order dated 28.08.2019 passed in Cr.M.P. No. 1149 of 2012 and the petitioner was directed to make necessary correction in prayer portion and also in the pleading of the petition.
5. It has further been submitted that the said Cr.M.P. being Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 had been dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 05.05.2023 and the present revision petition has been filed after passing of the order dated 05.05.2023 and as such, the delay has been caused of 1233 days.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that by applying the principle as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the explanation, so furnished at paragraph-4, is treated to be sufficient cause to condone the delay.
7. Mr. Deepak Kr. Bharati, learned counsel for the Opp. Party-CBI has opposed the ground shown for the purpose of condoning the delay.
8. The affidavit in opposition has also been filed.
9. It has been contended that the delay is in the nature of inordinate delay of 1233 days and as such, the same may not be condoned.
10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties.
11. This Court is conscious with the issue of consideration of delay condonation while exercising the power conferred under Section 2 2025:JHHC:14078 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 wherein, the underlying principle is that the parties concerned are aggrieved with the order, which is to be questioned, if has been able to show the sufficient cause and certainly the delay is to be condoned so as to enter into the merit of the issue. Contrary to that if the sufficient cause has not been shown by the party concerned, then, certainly the delay is not to be condoned.
12. This Court, before appreciating the reason which has been shown in the instant interlocutory application, needs to refer the definition of "sufficient cause".
13. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".3
2025:JHHC:14078 However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :
AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may 4 2025:JHHC:14078 harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh 5 2025:JHHC:14078 [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 :
AIR 1992 SC 1701] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted 6 2025:JHHC:14078 deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
15. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
16. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the 7 2025:JHHC:14078 litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
17. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position, this Court has considered the explanation furnished at paragraph-4 in order to assess as to whether the reason shown at aforesaid paragraph-4, is fit to be considered as sufficient cause to condone the delay. The ground has been taken of pending proceeding before this Court after allowing the prayer made in the interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018, wherein, the order rejecting the prayer to discharge from the criminal prosecution, was the subject matter and vide order dated 28.08.2019 the same was allowed by making part of Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012, in which, the, the issue of cognizance was under challenge.
18. The said Cr.M.P. being Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 has been disposed of vide order dated 05.05.2023, on dismissal of the prayer made therein.
19. This Court, taking the liberal approach, is of the view that the limitation petition is to be condoned so that the main issue be taken up.
20. Accordingly, the delay of 1233 days in filing the present revision application is hereby, condoned.
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2025:JHHC:14078
21. In view thereof, I.A. No.9879 of 2023 stands allowed. Cr. Revision No.1310 of 2023
22. The instant revision application filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. assailing the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in connection with R.C.03(A)/2011-R, registered for the offence under Sections 120B, 420, 468 & 471 of the IPC read with Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)d of the P.C. Act, Section 52 of the J.R.D.A. Act and Section 82 of the Registration Act, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for discharge from criminal prosecution, has been rejected.
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order refusing discharge is a mechanical order without taking into consideration the factual material, which has been collected in course of investigation and as such, even though, the petitioner is not fit to be tried and without taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the prayer for discharge has been rejected.
24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that in Cr. M.P. 1149 of 2012 whereby an amendment was sought in the prayer portion of the said application consequent upon the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned trial court whereby the prayer to discharge the petitioner was rejected.
25. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 6699 of 2018 in Cr. M.P. No. 1149 of 2012 for amendment of the prayer portion for assailing the Order dated 9 2025:JHHC:14078 05.03.2018 whereby the learned trail Court rejected the prayer of the petitioner to discharge him.
26. The said Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 6699 of 2018 was allowed vide order dated 28.08.2019 passed in Cr.M.P. No. 1149 of 2012 and the petitioner was directed to make necessary correction in prayer portion and also in the pleading of the main contention.
27. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since no orders on the merit of the said interlocutory Application was passed by this Court in the Cr. M.P. No. 1149 of 2012 which was disposed of on 05.05.2023, hence a separate application has been filed challenging the impugned Order dated 05.03.2018 through the instant revision application.
28. Learned counsel appearing for the O.P.-CBI, at this juncture, has intervened and submitted that the present petition is not maintainable under the power, which is to be exercised under the revisional jurisdiction conferred to this Court, since, the prayer which is now being questioned by filing the present revision petition, has already been dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court while passing the order dated 05.05.2023 in Cr. M.P. No. 1149 of 2012 .
29. Submission has been made by referring to order dated 05.05.2023 passed in Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012, appended as Annexure-6 to the paper book as also para-4 of the delay condonation application being I.A. No.9879 of 2023, wherefrom, it 10 2025:JHHC:14078 will be evident that the prayer was made in Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 to quash the order dated 05.03.2018 by way of filing an interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018 which had been allowed vide order dated 28.08.2019 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and consequently direction was passed to make necessary correction in prayer as well as in pleading portion .
30. It has been submitted that since the interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018 has been allowed vide order dated 28.08.2019 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012, therefore when the prayer made in the instant revision petition which was also made part of Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 and the said petition (Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012) has been dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.05.2023, hence, the prayer made herein questioning the order dated 05.03.2018 has already been dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, hence, the present petition for the same cause is not fit to be entertained.
31. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in response, is not in a position to dispute the fact particularly with respect to the issue of challenging the order by which the prayer for discharge has been rejected, which was sought to be made part and parcel of Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018.
32. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and 11 2025:JHHC:14078 gone through the rival submissions made on their behalf.
33. This Court while hearing the matter and taking note of serious objection on behalf of learned counsel for the CBI by raising the issue of consideration already made and dealt with by the Coordinate Bench with respect to the issue, which has been raised in the present revision petition, therefore, this Court is thought it proper to first consider the said issue.
34. Before adverting to the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties , it will be relevant to refer the provisions as contained under Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, which reads as under:
"397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding. Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by Subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any 12 2025:JHHC:14078 person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.
482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
35. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. can be exercised where there is palpable error, non- compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. Further, in view of the provisions u/s 397(3) CrPC, a second revision against the same order with the same prayer is not maintainable. If the revision preferred against the order of the Magistrate is dismissed by the Sessions Judge, second revision before the High Court is not maintainable u/s 397, 399, 401 CrPC.
36. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be exercised against an interim or interlocutory order. When Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 CrPC cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference with the 13 2025:JHHC:14078 interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 CrPC. To set aside an interlocutory order, prohibition in Section 397 CrPC will govern Section 482 CrPC. The power under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be exercised only in respect of interlocutory orders to give effect to an order passed under the CrPC or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to serve the ends of justice. Such power has to be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases and not otherwise.
37. The object of Section 482 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to meet out justice. However, these two remedies cannot be availed simultaneously or one after the other in the High Court. Party filing a petition under Section 397 before High Court cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code at the same time. When the revision filed u/s 397 CrPC had been dismissed as not pressed, it is settled proposition that the accused cannot invoke powers of the High Court u/s 482 Cr PC for the grant of same relief merely because earlier revisional application u/s 397 Cr PC had been dismissed as not pressed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the 14 2025:JHHC:14078 Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajinder Prasad Vs. Bashir, 2002 Cr LJ 90(SC).
38. Now adverting to the factual aspect of the case. It is evident from the interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018 that the said application has been filed to challenge the order dated 05.03.2018 by which discharge application filed by the present petitioner had been dismissed. The said interlocutory was allowed vide order dated 28.08.2019 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and prayer as made in the said interlocutory application became part of the Cr.M.P. No. 1149 of 2012.
39. It is admitted case of the petitioner that the said interlocutory application (I.A. No.6699 of 2018) was filed in in Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012, seeking leave of this Court to challenge the order dated 05.03.2018 by which the prayer to discharge the petitioner from criminal prosecution has been refused by the learned trial court.
40. The said interlocutory application (I.A. No.6699 of 2018) has been allowed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 28.08.2019 passed in Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012, the relevant part of the said order is being referred as under:-
".... ..... .....Today, when the case is called out, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed the I.A. No. 6699/2018, which was filed on 26.07.2018, copy of the same has been served upon the learned counsel for the CBI, with a prayer to make necessary amendment in order to bring subsequent development wherein during pendency of the case on 05.03.2018, the discharge petition filed by the petitioner under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. was rejected by learned Special Judge, Ranchi and opined that there is ample material to frame the charges against the petitioner.15
2025:JHHC:14078 In view of the above submission, I.A. No. 6699/2018 stands allowed, subject to the condition that petitioner shall deposit Rs. 1500/- by way of cost in the account of Bandi Kalyan Kosh, Birsa Munda Central Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi being A/C No. 490710210000007, Bank of India, Branch Booty More, Customer ID-103610460, IFSC Code No. BKID0004907 and will submit the receipt of the aforesaid deposition in the concerned section. .... ..... ....."
41. The prayer so made in the interlocutory application being I.A. No.6699 of 2018 since has been allowed and as such, the issue of order by which the prayer for discharge has been rejected by the concerned court, has become the part and parcel of Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012.
42. The said Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 as per the copy appended therein as Annexure-6 has been dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.05.2023, as would appear from paragraph-20 of the said order, the relevant part of the order is being referred as under:-
"...... ....... Thus, I am not inclined to interfere with the order taking cognizance and issuing summons so far as these two petitioners are concerned.
Accordingly, these two cases, i.e., Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012 and W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012 are hereby dismissed."
43. Thus, from the aforesaid factual aspect, it is evident that the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court has already adjudicated the issue which has been raised herein. The law is well settled that the power under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be exercised by way of appeal since remedy has 16 2025:JHHC:14078 already been availed by invoking the inherent power conferred to this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
44. In addition, thereto, the Coordinate Bench of this Court since has already dealt with the prayer which is the subject matter of the present petition, hence, there cannot be a fresh consideration of the same issue which has already been dealt with by the Coordinate Bench vide order dated 05.05.2023 passed in Cr.M.P. No.1149 of 2012.
45. This Court, in view of the aforesaid, is of the view that the present revision petition deserves to be dismissed.
46. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Rohit/-A.F.R. 17