Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rukman Kanta vs Faquir Chand Labhu Ram on 31 July, 1959
Equivalent citations: AIR 1960 PUNJAB 493
JUDGMENT
(1) This is an appeal of Rukman Kanta against whom a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 has been granted at the instance of her husband Faquir Chand by the learned District Judge of Ferozepore.
(2) The parties were married at Jagraon on 27th of September 1952. The petitioner Faqir Chand at that time was a Head Constable in the Police force. Faquir Chand and his wife lived together as husband and wife at Amritsar. Jullundur, Ferozepore, Jagraon and Moga. In the year 1954, Faquir Chand got involved in a criminal case of embezzlement of a sum amounting to Rs. 1,300. He was told that if he would deposit this amount no harm would come to him. He approached in the first instance his father-in-law Harbans Lal R. W. 2, through his wife and Krishan Lal his wife's brother. Faquir Chand's request for funds from that quarter did not meet with success and he had to make approach for this purpose elsewhere. He did ultimately succeed in raising the money but all the same he was convicted of the offence under S. 409 I.P.C., though the sentence ultimately in appeal was reduced to a fine of Rs. 250.
This incident completely wrecked his married life. He felt embittered that his request for money had been turned down by his wife's people. He took back the ornaments which he had given to his wife at the time of marriage and by selling them raised a portion of the funds which he required to pay off in the embezzlement charge. The marital life of the parties was discontinued after July 1954 when the husband sent his wife of Jagraon in the Company of her brother to persuade her father to advance him a sum of Rs. 1, 300. After the criminal case had been settled the parties again resided for some time at Moga till September 1956. The wife then left for Jagraon to live with her parents while Faquir Chand accepted private employment as a commission agent to sell dhoop at Ferozepur.
(3) Fquir Chand brought the present application for restitution of conjugal rights on 19-12-1957 making an allegation that his wife would not reconcile herself to live in the changed circumstances of his comparatively humble status of a private employee. The petition is being opposed by the wife, who has made allegations of "cruel, unsympathetic and offensive treatment" by the husband towards her. It was stated that he "filthily abused and mercilessly beat her during the period she lived with him and never cared for her when she fell ill." According to the wife, he is addicted to gambling and drinking and is a reckless spendthrift. She further alleged that the husband had always been trying to extort money from her father on some pretext or another. It was stated that a telegram was sent by Faqir Chand to the wife's brother on 28th of July, 1954 saying, "Reach first train Thursday" with the object of using his good offices to persuade the father to give financial assistance.
As she and her brother were not able to obtain this money from their father he sent a letter on 12th of August, 1954 severing all connections with her and her parents. Later, he executed a receipt on 29th of September, 1954, in favour of the wife saying that he had received all the ornaments which he had presented to her at the time of marriage. According to the wife she was thus deserted by her husband in September, 1954. It is not denied that in early 1956, the petitioner came to Jagraon and asked for forgiveness from her father for his past conduct.
On this assurance to her father, the respondent accompanied her husband but during her stay with him she found him to be again "cruel, callous and mercenary". He kept on pressing for money and gave her a beating and snatched her Mattar Malla which had been given to her by her parents. Ultimately, according to the wife, she was turned out by her husband in June 1956 at Moga.
(4) A decree for restitution of conjugal rights under S. 9 can be granted when "either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other". The only issue in this case is whether Rukman Kanta withdrew herself from her husband without reasonable excuse. The learned District Judge on a consideration of the evidence has come to the conclusion that the husband is entitled to the decree which he has asked for. In the appeal preferred on behalf of the wife, it has been contended that the husband had deserted her and that she had been subjected to a cruel treatment, both being justifiable excuses for her withdrawal from the society of her husband.
The plea of desertion can be shortly disposed of. Under Sub-section (2) of S. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, only such plea can be taken in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which can also form the ground for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce. Now the plea of desertion may be taken for judicial separation when one spouse has deserted the other for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. According to her own written statement, Rukman Kanta resided with her husband till June 1956.
The desertion not being for the statutory period cannot therefore be pleaded on her behalf. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the actual desertion had taken place in 1954 when the husband wrote the letter, Exhibit R. 9, dated 12th of August, 1954 to her brother Krishan Lal, saying that he would have nothing to do with his wife's people thereafter. It is a letter written in anger and in the language of satire, obviously to show his ill-concealed feelings on the refusal of his father-in-law to come to his aid in the hour of his need.
He has stated in this letter that Krishan Lal and his father may now very gladly look for another husband for Rukman Kanta as he himself had been ruined, I am not prepared to take this document as evidence of desertion on the part of the petitioner. Indeed such a case is negatived by the subsequent living together of the parties as husband and wife in 1956. This period of residence cannot be regarded as a token of mere forgiveness but constitutes condonation.
(5) What has been pleaded as cruelty is nothing but a collection of grievances which are the normal incidents of conjugal life and the result of what in the felicitous phrase of Lord Denning has been called "the ordinary wear and tear of married life". Harbans Lal R. W. 4, a witness produced on behalf of the wife, stated that when he went to Faquir Chand's house in April 1956 he found Rukman Kanta very unhappy. He then asked Faqir Chand to behave better. Faqir Chand said that "there was nothing special between them and such domestic matters are ordinary and that he would behave better."
Faqir Chand's demand for money or his taking away ornaments cannot be regarded as a legal cruelty. Harbans Lal R. W. 2 has stated that Faqir Chand used to extend threats of violence to Rukman Kanta. One Captain Mehr Singh R. W. 6 has been produced to say that he found Faqir Chand in a drunken condition on one occasion in April 1956 I am not unmindful of the ever broadening concept of cruelty, but I cannot persuade myself that the wife's allegations in the instant case can individually or collectively be regarded as legal cruelty.
(6) It has been argued by the counsel for the appellant that the Court was not justified in granting the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights without being satisfied under sub-section (1) of S. 23 that "any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief."
It is true that the learned District Judge has not mentioned this specifically but there is no ground to suggest that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act in any way provides a bar to the petitioner from seeking relief which he prayed for. There is no collusion or connivance in this case and apparently the petitioner has not taken any advantage of his own wrong in seeking the relief.
In agreement with the learned District Judge I would therefore hold that the case of the petitioner has been made out and the appeal is dismissed. I, however, make no order as to costs of this appeal.
FD/H.G.P. (7) Appeal dismissed.