Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Raghunandan vs Union Of India on 22 May, 2017
Author: P.K. Lohra
Bench: P.K. Lohra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision No. 580 / 2017
Raghunandan Vyas S/o Damodarlal Ji Vyas,, By Caste Brahimin,
R/o House No. 1-P-23, Tilak Nagar Bhilwara. the Then Chief
Booking Supervisor, Railway Station, Udaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
Union of India- Through CBI
----Respondent
_____________________________________________________
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Mahesh Bora, Senior Counsel with Mr.
Nishant Bora.
For Respondent(s) : Dr. Sachin Acharya, Spl. P.P. for CBI.
_____________________________________________________
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. LOHRA
Order 22/05/2017 Imploring quashment of impugned order dated 26 th of April 2017, passed by Special Judge, CBI Cases, Jodhpur (for short, 'learned trial Court'), accused petitioner has laid this revision petition under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. By the order under challenge, learned trial Court has allowed application of the prosecution under Section 311A Cr.P.C. in Criminal Original Case No.06/14, wherein petitioner is charged for offence punishable under Sections 120B read with Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, consequently directing the accused petitioner to provide his specimen signatures for its examination by handwriting expert of Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Bhopal.
(2 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that although Legislature has conferred discretion on the trial Court to invoke Section 311A Cr.P.C., if it is expedient to do so, but then, such power is not unfettered and in the instant case learned trial Court has exercised its power without any justifiable reason so as to make the impugned order per se vulnerable. Learned Senior Counsel has urged that during investigation specimen signatures of petitioner were obtained twice and sent for examination to Central Forensic Science Laboratory but the expert has not given any definite opinion upon comparison with signatures marked Q1 to Q162, was a significant fact, which is completely eschewed by the learned trial Court, is sufficient to render the impugned order infirm. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel would contend that impugned order is per se an affirmative attempt of the learned trial Court to collect incriminating evidence against the petitioner, therefore, the same is not tenable. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of M.P. High Court in Ravi Neal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [2008 (2) MPHT 107].
Per contra, learned Special Public Prosecutor, Dr. Sachin Acharya, submits that learned trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion by resorting to Section 311A Cr.P.C., and therefore, impugned order requires no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Learned Special Public Prosecutor has urged that Section 311A Cr.P.C. is an extension of Section 311 Cr.P.C. conferring wide discretion on the trial Court to unearth the truth (3 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] as and when it is found expedient to do so. Learned Special Public Prosecutor would, therefore, contend that in the given circumstances when learned trial Court has exercised its discretion for just decision of the case, the said discretionary order is not liable to be tinkered with. In support of his arguments, learned Special Public Prosecutor has placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in Mannan Shaikh & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. [(2014)13 SCC 59].
I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, learned Special Public Prosecutor, and perused the impugned order as well as materials available on record.
The core issue which requires judicial scrutiny in the instant case is power of the Court under Section 311A Cr.P.C. Power conferred on a Magistrate under Section 311A Cr.P.C., to direct a person including an accused to give specimen signatures or handwriting, pre-supposses satisfaction of the Court to pass such an order for expediency.
The term "expedient", as per Black's Law Dictionary, conveys following meaning -
"Appropriate and suitable to the end in view - Whatever is suitable and appropriate in reasons for the accomplishment of a specified object."
(4 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] The word "expedient" has several shades and meanings. In one dictionary sense, 'expedient' means 'apt and suitable to the end in view'; 'practical and efficient'; 'fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case'. Webster's New International Dictionary, while defining its another shade, has given its meaning as a device 'characterised by mere utility rather than principle conductive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right'.
Supreme Court, in case of Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana [(2000) 5 SCC 82], had the occasion to interpret the term "expedient" appearing in Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The Court held that the word "expedient" is to be interpreted keeping in view the context and the object of the provisions in widest amplitude, and that while dealing with the question of grant of probation under the Act a duty is cast on the Court to take into account the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and form an opinion whether it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct.
While it is true that in the instant case specimen signatures of petitioner were obtained twice during investigation and upon FSL Examination Handwring Expert has not given a definite opinion, but then, endeavour of the Court is to see as to whether learned trial Court has rightly invoked power under Section 311A Cr.P.C. after submission of charge-sheet. It is clearly borne out (5 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] from perusal of the impugned order that the order has been passed by learned trial Court upon consideration of the prayer made by prosecution. Section 311A falls under Chapter XXIV of the Code which is titled "General provisions as to inquiries and trials". Upon examining Section 300 to 327 Cr.P.C. under the aforesaid Chapter of the Code, it is clearly discernible that these provisions are general provisions applicable to inquiries and trials. Therefore, it is not conceivable that Section 311A is having no co- relation with Section 311 Cr.P.C. or other provisions envisaged in this Chapter of the Code.
True it is that the powers conferred on a Court/Magistrate under the aforesaid Section are not unfettered but the Court may, in its discretion, exercise such powers after recording its satisfaction that it is expedient to direct the person, including an accused, to give specimen signatures or handwriting. Section, as such, is inserted by Cr.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2005 in adherence of the suggestions made by Supreme Court in case of State of U.P. Vs. Ram Babu Mishra (AIR 1980 SC 791) The contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, that during investigation signatures of accused petitioner were obtained twice and the expert has not given any definite opinion, is a fact of significance to render the impugned order vulnerable, appears to be quite alluring but then its merit requires judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of legislative intent. The Legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on a Magistrate/Court to (6 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] exercise power under Section 311A Cr.P.C. if it is not satisfied that for the purposes of any investigation or proceedings under this Code it is expedient to do so. The learned trial Court has though examined the fact that during investigation specimen signatures of the petitioner were obtained and no definite opinion of the handwriting expert is available on record, but it has made endeavour to make a distinction between Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the aforesaid provision. The learned trial Court has also observed that opinion of the expert in the matter about handwriting of the petitioner is essential and consequently it has exercised its discretion in favour of the prosecution.
The judgment in Ravi Neal (supra), on which learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance, though supports the cause of petitioner but the same is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the said case relates to a criminal trial for offence under Section 302/394 and 120B IPC. In the instant case, the petitioner is charged for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the prosecution is required to prove criminal misconduct of a public servant. Unlike offence under the Penal Code, offences under the Act of 1988 are edificed on documentary evidence and an act or omission of a public servant in discharge of his public duties. Therefore, it is rather difficult to countenance that same standards are to be applied in relation to powers of a Magistrate/Court under Section 311A Cr.P.C. vis-a-vis a trial of IPC offences and offences under the Act of 1988.
(7 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] High Court of Gauhati (Agartala Bench), in case of Basab Bhattacharjee S/o. Late Krishna Bandhu Bhattacharjee Vs. State of Tripura, represented by the Public Prosecutor, has declined to interfere with the order passed by trial Court under Section 311A Cr.P.C. asking the petitioner second time to give his specimen signatures or handwriting for FSL examination. The Court has further held that the said order has not caused any prejudice to the incumbent and therefore the order is not liable to be tinkered with.
There cannot be two opinions that discretionary powers conferred on a Court are not unfettered and such powers are to be exercised judiciously keeping in view the legislative intent. In the instant case, upon overall analysis of the impugned order, I feel persuaded to observe that learned trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion for exercising power under Section 311A Cr.P.C.
Supreme Court, in Mannan Shaikh & Ors. (supra), examined the provisions contained under Section 311, 243(2) and 246(5) Cr.P.C. to recall and further recall witnesses. Although the said verdict is essentially dilating on powers of the Court to summon material witness or examine persons present, but the Court has also observed that the aim of every Court is to discover truth. The ratio decidendi of the verdict may not have direct ramification on the controversy involved in the matter but solemn duty of every Court to unearth truth in a given case cannot be underplayed.
(8 of 8) [CRLR-580/2017] Therefore, considering the facts in entirety, I am unable to find any manifest error in the impugned order requiring interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. In view thereof, while recording my satisfaction about correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned order, I feel dissuaded to interfere in the matter.
Consequently, the revision petition fails and same is hereby dismissed.
(P.K. LOHRA), J.
arora/