Punjab-Haryana High Court
Om Parkash Alias Chitru And Anr. vs Balwant Rai And Ors. on 23 April, 2003
Equivalent citations: (2003)135PLR360
Author: J.S. Khehar
Bench: J.S. Khehar
JUDGMENT J.S. Khehar, J.
1. Balwant Rai, the erstwhile landlord of the premises in question filed an ejectment application under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 against Om Parkash on three grounds. Firstly that the premises had been rented out to Om Parkash, however, he had sub-let the same to Ishar Dass, Gian Chand and Shakuntla Devi. Secondly, that the premises had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation.And lastly, that the structural changes effected in the premises by the tenants had materially impaired the value and utility of the property. Since the plea of sub-letting had been raised by the landlord, Balwant Rai, he impleased Ishar Dass, Gian Chand and Shakuntla Devi as respondents No. 2 to 4 in the ejectment application.
2. The Rent Controller by his order dated 4.11.1982 dismissed the ejectment application. Since the plea of sub-letting is the only plea on the basis of which arguments have been addressed before this Court, it would be pertinent to mention that the Rent Controller while adjudicating upon the plea of sub-letting had concluded that a genuine partnership existed between Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi. In this behalf, the Rent Controller had relied on the partnership deed dated 23.10.1978, which was placed on the records of the Rent Controller as Ex.R-1. In view of the aforesaid partnership deed, the Rent Controller held that Om Parkash had not transferred exclusive occupancy rights to respondents No. 2 to 4. In this context, it would also be pertinent to mention that Ishar Dass (respondent No. 2 in the ejectment application) is admittedly the father-in-law of Shakuntla Devi, and Gian Chand (respondent No. 3 in the ejectment application) is admittedly the husband of Shakuntla Devi.
3. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the Rent Controller, the LRs of the landlord preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. By an order dated 5.8.1986, the Appellate Authority accepted the appeal preferred by the landlord. In fact, before the Appellate Authority the only issue agitated on behalf of the landlord was on the ground of sub-letting. The Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that the partnership deed dated 23.10.1978 (Ex.R-1) was a bogus transaction executed between the tenant Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi in order to save the parties from eviction proceedings that may be initiated at the hands of the landlord. The Appellate Authority heavily relied on the record of Local Commissioner, Brij Raj Singh Chohan, Advocate. The Appellate Authority in paragraph 9 of its orders felt that a share of 13% of the profits earmarked for Om Parkash by itself was sufficient of depict that the transaction was bogus. The Appellate Authority also took into consideration the fact that the electric connection in the premises was in the name of Shakuntla Devi and not in the name of partnership firm, or in the name of Om Parkash, and additionally, that no evidence was produced to show the participation of Om Parkash in the business of the alleged partnership firm,
4. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Appellate Authority, Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi have preferred the instant petition. The LRs of the landlord Balwant Rai have been impleaded as respondents No. l to 5. Ishar Dass, father-in-law of Shakuntla Devi has been impleaded as proforma respondent No.6 and Gian Chand, husband of Shakuntla Devi has been impleaded as proforma respondent No. 7. Learned counsel for the original tenant Om Parkash and the alleged sub-tenant Shakuntla Devi has emphatically relied upon the judgment rendered by the Rent Controller to substantiate the claim of the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also heavily relied upon Ex.R1 i.e, the partnership deed dated 23.10.1978, executed between Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi in order to assert that Om Parkash had transferred exclusive tenancy rights to Shakuntla Devi. Relying on various judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court, learned counsel for the petitioners states that creation of a partnership is in-sufficient to substantiate the ptea of sub-letting.
5. In view of the submission advanced by the learned counsel for petitioners, it is essential first of all, to determine the genuineness of the partnership deed dated 23.10.1978. A perusal of 'Ex.RI reveals that Om Parkash entered into a partnership with Shakuntla Devi on account of the fact that he was in an extremely delicate financial position. The partnership deed dated 23.10.1978 discloses that the tenancy commenced in 1947 and that rent was payable to the landlord @ Rs.14/- per month. However, rent had not been paid by Om Parkash w.e.f. 1.12.1976. The aforesaid factual position leads to the conclusion that by the time partnership deed was executed in October, 1978, Om Parkash was already in arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.322/- i.e. for a period of 23 months from 1.12.1976 to 31.10.1978. The contribution of Om Parkash in the partnership comprised of the goods in the shop which as per the partnership deed itself are of the value of Rs,500/-. The partnership deed envisages that entire expenses for the business to be carried out in the premises in question would henceforth be incurred by Shakuntla Devi. On account of the fact that the expenses were to be incurred by Shakuntla Devi, it was agreed that Om Parkash would be entitled to 13% of the profits, whereas Shakuntla Devi would be entitled to 87% of the profits. The right to maintain accounts, in terms of Clause (iii) of the partnership deed, were vested in Shakuntla Devi, Clause (iv) debarred Om Parkash from taking any loan in the name of the shop. Clause (vi) of the deed allowed Shakntla Devi to seek government licences wherever required, in her own name, by herself.
6. In addition to the terms and conditions expressed in the partnership deed depicted it is apparent from the order passed by the Appellate Authority that Shakuntla Devi obtained an electric connection in her own name in the shop in question. It is also evident that Shakuntla Devi did not appear as a witness so as to avoid being subjected to cross-examination. The report of the Local Commissioner, Brij Raj Singh Chohan, Advocate placed on record as Ex.A1 shows that at the time of its inspection by him, Ishar Dass, respondent No. 2, father-in-law of Shakuntla Devi was carrying on business in the shop. Even Ishar Dass was not produced as a witness on behalf of the petitioners to repudiate the assertions made in the report of the Local Commissioner.
7. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that to substantiate the plea of sub-letting, it was incumbent upon the landlord to establish that the original tenant had put the sub-tenant(s) in exclusive possession in the premises in question. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the landlord in the present case, had not been able to establish exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant(s). In fact, it is the claim of the petitioners that there was a genuine partnership between Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi, executed formally through a partnership deed dated 23.10.1978 (Ex.Rl) and that by itself was sufficient to establish that Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi were in possession of the premises in question and further that Om Parkash had not vested exclusive possession in the sub-tenants(s). In order to substantiate the aforesaid assertions, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision rendered by this Court in "Victor Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi and ors. 1 (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 208. Emphatic reliance has been placed on the observations made in Para 10 of the aforesaid judgments:-
10. From the reading of the evidence it cannot be concluded that Nem Nath was ever put in possession of the premises in dispute exclusively. Statements of Mangat Ram AW1 and Panna Lal AW2 do not make out a case that the legal representatives of Sham Lal ever parted with exclusive possession of the shop in dispute to Nem Nath. Admittedly Victor Kumar and his younger brother were minors when their father died in the year 1976. Nem Nath may have started coming to the shop to help his nephew for running of the shop but that does not mean that he came into exclusive possession of the shop in dispute. Even if Nem Nath was called into join the business after the death of his brother Sham Lal to carry on the business on behalf of his minor nephew would not mean that a sub tenancy had been created. Nem Nath may have helped Victor Kumar in running the business after the death of Sham Lal. Ex.R4 is the receipt dated 20.11.1978 executed by the landlord stating therein that he accepted the rent from Victor Kumar his minor brother and his widowed mother.. meaning thereby that he accepted them to be the tenants upto 20.11.1978. The present petition was filed in the year 1980, The two witnesses produced by the landlord do not in their statement categorically state that Nem Nath was put in the exclusive possession of the shop in dispute to the exclusion of the legal representatives of Sham Lal. Appellate Authority drew an inference against the tenants because they had failed to produce their books of accounts to show as to on what terms Nem Nath was working in the shop in dispute i.e., on salary or on profit sharing in the business. No question was asked from Victor Kumar as to whether they were assessees with the Department of Income Tax or not. Even if the books of account were not produced still no interference can be drawn from this lapse only on the part of the tenants that they had parted with the exclusive possession of the shop in dispute, to Nem Chand.
Conclusions in the aforesaid case had been drawn in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In the aforesaid case, the original tenants had died. The son of the original tenants was carrying on the business in the shop in question after the death of his father with the assistance of his uncle (father's brother). In view of the aforesaid factual position, this Court arrived at the conclusion that the evidence produced by the landlord was not sufficient to establish that exclusive possession had been vested in the brother of the deceased tenant. The fact that the brother of the deceased tenant was carrying on the business after the death of the original tenant was held to be insufficient to draw an adverse inference on the issue of sub-letting.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in "Dev Kumar through L.Rs. v. Smt. Swaran Lata and ors.2 (1996-2)113 P.L.R. 391 (S.C.). The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment delineated the necessary ingredients of sub-letting by holding that sub-letting includes the transfer of exclusive possession and further that such transfer should be for consideration. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the evidence on the record of the instant case neither establishes the vesting of exclusive possession nor transfer by the tenant is for consideration. While relying on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioners has invited the attention of this Court to the following observations recorded therein:-
"Coming to the second question the expression "sub-letting" has not been defined in the Act. The conclusion on the question of subletting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on report as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration. As to what is the true meaning of expression , "Sub-letting", this Court considered the same in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, 1984(3) S.C.R. 216 in an eviction proceedings under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Building Rent and Eviction) Act. The Court held that merely from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop, subletting cannot be presumed and as long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. It was further held that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sublet, the allegations has to be proved. The question of subletting was considered by this Court in the case of M/s Shalimar Tar Products Ltd v. H.C. Sharma and ors. and it was held that in order to construe subletting there must be parting of legal possession of the lessee and parting of legal possession means 'possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others".
In the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur and anr. v. M/s S. Chokosiri & Co., .1982(2) S.C.R. (Suppl.) 310 (supra) this Court considered the question of subletting and held that the burden of making a case subletting in the guise of licenses are in their very nature clandestine arrangements between the tenants and the sub-tenant and it would be difficult to get direct evidence on the same. If exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant is established then it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with mandatory consideration in mind.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal position we would now examine the question whether the landlady respondent No. l in the present appeal, has established her ease of subletting by the tenant and further whether the conclusion of the High Court thereon is at all sustainable in law? The case of respondent No. l in this context is that respondent No. 2 to 4 have been given the disputed premises where they are transacting their business in their name and style Ram Saran Ratan Chand. The case of the tenant Dev Kumar, on the other hand, is that alongwith his own business, he was also transacting business as commission agent of M/s Ram Saran Bhole Nath. The only evidence led by the landlady in the case is the oral testimony of the power of attorney holder Gian Chand. The High Court, however, has relied upon the evidence of the local commissioner and his report. The report of the Commissioner merely indicates than on a particular day the Commissioner went to the disputed premises and purchased a piece of cloth and paid the money, the bill for which was given by the seller in the name of M/s Ram Saran Rattan Chand, Moti Bazar. The disputed premises, however, is not on Moti Bazar but on Pratap Bazar. The report of the Commissioner also indicates that when the Commissioner went for the second time, to the shop and asked for the bill book, a bill book was produced in the name of M/s. Ram Saran Bhole Nath having the Rubber stamp having the words "Sole Selling Agent Dev Kumar". Production of such a bill-book on being asked by the Commissioner lends support to the case of the tenant that he was transacting business as a commission agent of M/s Ram Saran Bhole Nath, of which firm respondent No. 3 is a partner. That apart on the mere purchase of a piece of cloth under a bill M/s Ram Saran Rattan Chand as indicated in the Commissioner's report, it is difficult for any Court to come to the conclusion that disputed premises was in exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant, namely, respondents No. 2 to 4. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the conduct of the local Commissioner as reflected from his evidence. He has stated that he took a sum of Rs.77/- from Gian Chand, Power of Attorney of the landlady, for purchase of the piece of cloth from the disputed premises and after purchasing the same he also handed over that piece of cloth to Gian Chand. The statement of the local Commissioner, who was examined as AW-5, and which has been annexed as Annexure 'E' to the Special Leave Petition unequivocally indicates that he has acted at the behest of the land lady and the said evidence must be held to be attainted one which in fact has substantially formed the basis of conclusion of subletting by the High Court. In this view of the matter the ultimate finding of the High Court that the report as well as the statement of the Local Commission is enough to hold that the Firm M/s Ram Saran Rattan Chand is carrying on the business in the demised premises and that the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are in exclusive possession of the demise premises and the tenant has parted the possession in their favour is wholly unsustainable and we accordingly set aside the said conclusion. At the most, the conclusion can be that while the tenant was continuing his own business as well as a business of Commission Agent of M/s Ram Saran Bhole Nath, the respondents No. 2 to 4 have also been permitted to continue their business in the name Ram Saran Rattan Chand. But that does not establish either the exclusive possession of respondents 2 to 4 or that the tenant has parted with his possession. The exclusive possession of the premises being the first criteria for establishing subletting and the same not being establishment, the conclusion of the High Court about subletting is vitiated."
9. There can be no doubt that the onus to establish sub-letting lies on the shoulders of the landlord. There can also be no doubt that while discharging the aforesaid onus, the landlord must establish that exclusive possession of the premises has been vested in the alleged sub-tenant. However, in so far as the second ingredient is concerned, namely, whether the transfer of possession by the tenant to the sub-tenant is for consideration, it has been held that the second ingredient is personal to the tenant and the sub-anani and it is not possible to be proved by any direct evidence and that it must be presume- from the proof of the firs! ingredient. In such circumstances, as is evident from tlit exit reproduced above, if exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant is established, .". will be natural to draw an inference that the passing on of possession to the sub-tenant by the tenant is for consideration. In Dev Kumar's case (supra), the Apex Court on the basis of the facts of that case arrived at the conclusion that the evidence produced on behalf of the landlord could not establish exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant and, therefore, recorded a finding against the landlord.
10. Insofar as the instant case is concerned, the claim of the petitioners is based on the partnership deed dated 23.10.1978. If a conclusion was to be drawn that the partnership deed is & sham transaction, the entire defence projected by the petitioners, would be shattered. The Appellate Authority has indeed drawn the aforesaid conclusion. Is the aforesaid conclusion acceptable in law" In my view, it is. The entire inputs, at the hands of Om Prakash, at the time of the execution of partnership deed dated 23.10.1978, towards the partnership have been described in the partnership deed as goods valuing Rs.500/-. Whereas, as already noticed above, the arrears of rent itself on the date of execution of the partnership deed were to the tune of Rs.322/-, The partnership deed places the burden of all financial inputs after the execution of the deed on Shakuntala Devi. In other words, Shakuntala Devi would pay arrears of rent amounting to Rs.322/-on the date of execution of the partnership deed. It is, therefore, evident that the participation of Om Parkash in the partnership concern is based on his contribution of Rs.500/- (-) 322 i.e. Rs.178/-. Such a transaction is obviously a sham transaction on the face of the record. It is not a matter of dispute that prior to execution of the partnership deed, Om Parkash was running the business of sale of tea, pan and cigarettes in the shop in question. The sole purpose of inducting Shakuntala Devi as a partner was on account of his not being able to carry on the business on account of lack of finances. It is difficult to understand the genuineness of the reason which compelled Om Parkash to enter into a partnership with Shakuntala Devi. To run a business of tea, pan and cigarettes, one would not require more than a few thousands rupees. After having executed the partnership deed, Om Parkash was entitled to only 13% of the profits, whereas, Shakuntala Devi as entitled to 87% of the profits. In para 9 of the order of the Appellate Authority, hypothetical conclusions have been made, which depict that Om Parkash would get nearly nothing from the shop after the execution of the partnership deed. Even if the arguments of the learned counse! for the petitioners is accepted that the Appellate Authority wrongly determined the profits that would fall to the share of Om Parkash, it is evident that the participation of Om Parkash in the partnership concerned is limited to a contribution of Rs.178/- (after deducting the arrears of rent payable prior to tht; execution of the partnership deed). Om Parkash coulu not possibly have expected much from the partnership concern on the basis of the aforesaid contribution. This fact by itself, in my view, is sufficient to show that the partnership deed executed between Om Parkash and Shakuntla Devi was a sham transaction. It would also be relevant to mention that Shakuntla Devi installed an electric connection in the shop in question in her own name. Shakuntla Devi in terms of the partnership deed was an exclusive custodian of the record of accounts. Shakuntla Devi also had an exclusive right to obtain government licences whenever required, in her own name. The partnership deed does not disclose the exact contribution of Shakuntla Devi towards the partnership concern. It, however, discloses that Shakuntla Dev: would discharge previous liability and would also be responsible for all future inputs. In my view, the aforesaid constituents of the partnership are sufficient to establish that Om Parkash has nothing to do with the business in question. Obviously, his primary contribution was the subsisting tenancy rights (between Om Parkash and owner of the premises). At the time of the inspection, which was carried out by the Local Commissioner, The father-in-law of Shakuntla Devi was shown to the carrying on the business in the premises in question. Neither the father-in-law nor Shakuntla Devi herself appeared in the witness box to explain the position, and/or to repudiate the aforesaid factual position. The report of the Local Commissioner was not doubted or disputed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, there can be no doubt that occupancy rights of the shop in question have been exclusively vested by Om Parkash in Shakuntla Devi and her family members, who are running their own business therein. The partnership deed dated 23.10.1978 is obviously a sham transaction to cover up the factum of sub-letting. In view of the conclusion drawn by the Appellate Authority that exclusive possession has been vested by Om Parkash in Shakuntla Devi and her family members, which finding is hereby affirmed, it is natural to conclude that the first ingredient of sub-letting noticed in the judgment of the Apex Court in Dev Kumar's case (supra) stands fully substantiated. On the basis of handing over of exclusive possession by Om Parkash to Shakuntla Devi and her family members, it is natural to infer that the transfer of exclusive possession is based on valuable consideration. Thus viewed, I am satisfied that the two ingredients of sub-letting stand clearly established and proved in the present controversy.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the decision rendered by this Court in Umrao v. Smt. Minu alias Manju Sanghi,^ (2000-2)125 P,L.R. 96. In the aforesaid case, the allegation of the landlord was that the tenant had sub-let the premises in favour of his own son. In the facts and circumstances in Umrao's case (supra),on the basis of the fact that the original tenant had become old, he had associated his son to assist him in carrying on the business in the shop. On account of the fact that the original tenant continued to visit the shop and also carry out business therein, this Court arrived at the conclusion that he had not totally divested himself of the possession of the premises and as such had not exclusively vested possession of the shop in his son. The court, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the ground of sub-letting remained unsubstantiated. The facts and circumstances of this case have nothing in common with the aforesaid case and, therefore, cannot be considered to be relevant for the determination of the controversy in hand.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on the decision rendered in Summat Parshad Jain v. Murari Lal Jain and Ors., (2000-2)125 P.L.R. 212 and invited the attention of this court to the following observations recorded therein:-
"6. The short question that comes up for consideration is that as to whether respondent No.l continues to be a partner in the Firm or not. It is well settled that partnership is nothing, but an association of the persons. A formal name is given to it, If the tenant forms a partnership and retains the legal control and possession, then it will not be termed as a case of subletting. This question had been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohd. Mirasahed Kadri and others, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1782 The Supreme Court held:-, ".... The following important elements must be there in order to establish partnership : (1) there must be an agreement entered into by all the parties concerned; (2) the agreement must be to share profits of business; and (3) the business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned acting for all. The partnership deeds were there entitling the petitioner to share in the partnership. It is true that in the partnership deeds the Bank accounts were not to be operated by Ihe appellant, and further that irrespective of the profit the clause of the partnership deed provided that there should be a fixed percentage of profit to be given to the partner appellant No.l. The appellant was not to share the losses. But their is nothing illegal about it. The appellant was to bring his assets being the tenancy of the premises in question for the user of the partnership."
7. This Court in the case of Firm Ball Ram Nihal Singh, Jind and others v. Panna Lal, (1993-3)105 P.L.R. 269. in a similar case re-dealt with the question "n controversy. It was held that the real test to determine subletting is whether the tenant has walked out of the premises and handed over its exclusive possession and control to the sub-tenant. If the tenant take someone as a partner, it could be termed as subletting. Same view prevailed wirh the Gujarat High Court in the case of Olfdharilal Chhotalai Zaveri v. Lilavanben Rati Lal, 1996(1) Rent Control Reporter 4fc/ and it was held:-
"In view of the facts and circumstances emerging from the record there is no evidence to remotely indicate that the tenant had abandoned his leasehold interest or had Icwt legal possession in respect of demise shop. It is well settled proposition of law that if there was a partnership firm, of which tenant of the premises in which the business of the firm was carried on has been a partner, the fact of carrying on of business of the partnership in the demised premises would not mipso facto tantamount to subletting or transfer of interest or assignment, inviting the forfeiture of the leasehold of tenancy rights. This proposition is very well explained and expanded by . the apex Court in Helper Girdharibhai v. Sayed Mohammad, 1987(2) Rent Control Reporter I324:A.1.R. 1987 S.C. 1782 (supra). Decision of the Supreme Court in Madras Bangalore Transport Co.(West) v. Inder Singh, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1564, was followed in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the contention that the tenant had entered into a partnership and carried on the business alongwith strangers in the demised shop would disentitled him to continue and his tenancy rights cannot be sustained."
8. Reverling back to the facts of the present case as pointed above the pica offered was that respondent No.l continued to be the effective partner in all the partnership concerns. Reference has been made to certain partnership deeds to urge that they are fake documents, it appears that earlier one Bhiku Ram was the partner. He retired from the partnership on March 31, 1969. Sham Lal was joined in the partnership concern and fresh partnership deed Ex.R-3 was executed. Respondent had l/4to share therein. Tara Chand Jain was one of the partners, but he too retired. A partnership deed was executed which is Ex.Rl. In the view partnership deed, the share of the respondent was 10%. The documents on the record do not indicate that it was a fake document. An application had been moved before the income-tax authorities when partnership deed Ex,R3 was executed. Income-tax Officer, Rohtak granted registration to the Firm. The copy of the order is Hx.R6. In addition to that copies of the assessment orders of the partnership Firm for the years 1970-71, 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75 have been placed on the record. This shows that income by the Murari Lal was determined with respect to both the firms including the one with Sham Lal. These documents coupled with the evidence of the partnership deeds on the record clearly shows that respondent No.l continued to be a partner and in this process it cannot be termed that he ceased to be in legal control of the premises. Thus, the learned appellate authority rightly dismissed the petition for eviction and the appeal thereto."
There can be no doubt that in a case where there is a genuine partnership between the parties, it is not possible to draw an inference of sub-letting. In so far as the controversy in hand is concerned, there can be no doubt that the partnership deed dated 23.10.1978 is merely a sham transaction, executed in order to overcome the plea of sub-tenancy at the hands of the landlord. The reliance, therefore, on the aforesaid judgment, cannot confer any benefit on the petitioners in the present case.
13. No other argument was raised.
14. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in this petition. The same is accordingly dismissed.