State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
1. Dr. Prithipal Singh vs Uppal`S Marble Arch on 11 February, 2013
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, U.T., CHANDIGARH First Appeal No. : 408 of 2012 Date of Institution : 10.12.2012 Date of Decision : 11.02.2013 1. Dr. Prithipal Singh, S/o Sh. Inder Singh, resident of 25627, Elena Road, Los Altos Hills, CA 94022 (USA). 2. Mrs. Rajinder Kaur, wife of Dr. Prithipal Singh, resident of 25627, Elena Road, Los Altos Hills, CA 94022 (USA) Through their duly authorized representative Sh. Navjit Singh, resident of H.No.706, Sector 25, Panchkula. Appellants/complainants V e r s u s Uppal`s Marble Arch (i). Uppal Marble Arch, C/o Uppal Housing Ltd., Office G-6, Centra Mall, 177-D, Industrial Area, Phase-1, Chandigarh. (ii). Uppal Housing Ltd., 5th floor, South Tower, NBCC Place, Bhishma Pitamah Road, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110003. ....Respondent/Opposite Party Appeal under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. BEFORE: JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT. MRS. NEENA SANDHU, MEMBER.
Argued by: Sh. Gunjan Rishi, Advocate for the applicants/appellants.
Sh. Lalan Sinha, Advocate for the non-applicant/ respondent.
PER JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT This appeal is directed against the order dated 04.04.2011, rendered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II, U.T., Chandigarh (hereinafter to be called as the District Forum only), in Consumer Complaint No.285 of 2010, vide which, it accepted the complaint, filed by the complainants (now appellants) and directed the Opposite Party (now respondent), as under:-
In view of the above discussion and in view of the fact that the completion certificate has already been issued by the Chandigarh Administration, the present complaint is allowed and the OP is directed as under: -
(i) to deliver possession of the apartment to the complainants within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order;
(ii) to pay a compensation of Rs.1 Lac for mental agony and harassment;
(iii) to pay an amount of Rs.7,000/- as litigation costs.
The above order be complied with by the OP within three months from the date of receipt of its certified copy, failing which OPs shall pay interest @18% per annum on the total amount of Rs.1,37,91,175/- deposited by the complainant plus the amount of compensation of Rs.1 Lac from the date of filing of the complaint i.e.11.5.2010 till the date of compliance of the order.
2. The facts, in brief, are that the complainants (now appellants), wanted to buy a luxury apartment, for themselves, in India, for their peaceful abode. Allured by the advertisement, given by the Opposite Party (now respondent), they approached it, with a view to have an apartment, at Chandigarh. Registration fee, in the sum of Rs.11,20,700/- was paid by the complainants, to the Opposite Party. Apartment Buyer`s Agreement was executed between the Parties, on 25.11.2006, whereby the Opposite Party, agreed to sell them a 4 Bed Room Apartment, bearing No.C-14, First Floor, Block C, having super area of 2450 sq. feet, @ Rs.5,490/-, per sq. ft. The total consideration, in the sum of Rs. 1,37,91,175/-, was paid by the complainants, to the Opposite Party, from time to time. The possession of the apartment was to be delivered to the complainants, by the end of 2008, but the Opposite Party failed to do so. The Opposite Party, however, assured to deliver possession of the apartment, on 31.03.2010, but again they failed to do so. The Opposite Party, had, however, offered to refund the amount, deposited by the complainants, alongwith normal/simple rate of interest, but, they refused to accept the offer, aforesaid. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts of the Opposite Party, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, as also indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainants, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only), was filed, directing the Opposite Party, to deliver the physical possession of apartment, as per the terms and conditions of the Apartment Buyers` Agreement; pay interest @24% P.A., on the basic sale price of apartment, already paid, w.e.f. 01.01.2009, till the date of handing over its possession; and compensation, in the sum of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and physical harassment, including cost of litigation.
3. In its written version, the Opposite Party, admitted the execution of Apartment Buyers` Agreement dated 25.11.2006 and payment of consideration, by the complainants. According to the Opposite Parties, it never committed to deliver the possession of apartment, on any specific date. It was, thus, stated that the averment, made by the complainants, that a specific date was committed for the delivery of possession of apartment, was wrong. It was further stated that the construction work was completed, as far as back, in March 2009. The possession could not be delivered, because of non-issuance of Completion Certificate, by the Chandigarh Administration. It was further stated that the delay in the delivery of possession of apartment, in question, was not on account of any deficiency, in service, of the Opposite Party, but due to the external factors, which were beyond its control. It was further stated that the delay occurred, due to the lethargic attitude of the Chandigarh Administration, in issuance of the Certificate aforesaid. It was further stated that the Chandigarh Administration had issued the Completion Certificate Annexure OP/2 and the possession would be delivered shortly. It was further stated that the Opposite Party had offered the refund of amount, to the complainants, alongwith normal bank rate of interest, but they did not accept the same. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Party, nor it indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.
4. The Parties led evidence, in support of their case.
5. After hearing the Counsel for the Parties, and, on going through the evidence, and record of the case, the District Forum, accepted the complaint, in the manner, referred to, in the opening para of the instant order.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the instant appeal, has been filed by the appellants/complainants, for enhancement of compensation, in the shape of interest @12% P.A., on the amount Rs. 1,37,91,175/-, from the respective dates of deposits, till the date of handing over the physical possession, to them.
7. Alongwith the appeal, an application for condonation of delay of 560 days, as per the applicants/appellants/complainants (infact 577 days, as per the office report), in filing the same (appeal), was moved. The grounds, set up, in the application, by the applicants/appellants/complainants, were to the effect, that earlier, they filed First Appeal No.107 of 2011, against the impugned order, tilted as Dr. Prithipal Singh and Anr. Vs. Uppal`s Marble Arch. The said appeal was listed on 16.05.2011, for preliminary hearing, and, ultimately, on 06.07.2011, the applicants/appellants/ complainants were permitted to withdraw the same, with liberty to file a fresh one, on the same cause of caution, with an application for condonation of delay. It was stated that after withdrawing the appeal aforesaid, the appellants/complainants, on 13.07.2011, filed an Execution Application bearing 40 of 2011, under Section 25 of the Act, before the District Forum, on the ground, that since the order dated 04.04.2011, had not been complied with, by the respondent/Judgment Debtor/Opposite Party, in toto, it be directed to do so. It was further stated that after hearing the Execution Application bearing 40 of 2011, the District Forum showed its inability, to get the award executed, citing the reason, that the possession of apartment was delivered to the appellants/complainants, in the month of September 2010, and there was partial compliance of the order. It was further stated that, thus, the applicants/appellants/ complainants had to withdraw the Execution Application. It was further stated that, thereafter, on 02.09.2011, the applicants/appellants filed Miscellaneous Application no.113 of 2011, before this Commission. It was further stated that this Commission allowed the applicants/appellants/complainants to withdraw the application, with liberty to file a fresh Execution Application, on the same cause of action. It was further stated that, thereafter, the applicants/ appellants/complainants filed Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011, on 04.10.2011, before the District Forum, for execution of the award dated 04.04.2011. It was further stated that Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011 was allowed, vide orders dated 07.05.2012 and 06.08.2012, by the District Forum. First Appeal bearing No. 312 of 2012, was filed against the same, by the respondent/Opposite Party, which was allowed by this Commission, on 06.11.2012. It was further stated that Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011/Execution Application filed by the applicants/ appellants/complainants, thus, was ordered to be dismissed. It was further stated that, under these circumstances, left with no other alternative, the instant appeal, was filed by the applicants/appellants/ complainants. It was further stated that, hence, the delay in filing the appeal was, on account of the circumstances, beyond the control of the applicants/appellants/ complainants. It was further stated that the delay, in filing the appeal, was neither intentional, nor deliberate. Accordingly, the prayer, referred to above, was made.
8. In reply to the application, the respondent/ Opposite Party, stated that vide order dated 06.07.2011, passed by this Commission, First Appeal No.107 of 2011, filed by the applicants/appellant, was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to file a fresh one, in case, the Opposite Party filed an appeal, against the order dated 04.04.2011, passed by the District Forum. It was further stated that since the respondent/Opposite Party did not file any appeal against the order dated 04.04.2011, the present appeal, filed by the applicants/appellants/ complainants was without any mandate or liberty, and, as such, they could not challenge the order dated 04.04.2011, at such a belated stage. It was further stated that the applicants/appellants had withdrawn Execution Application No.40 of 2011, in the District Forum, stating that there was some technical defect therein. However, after withdrawing the same, they chose to file an application for revival of First Appeal No.312 of 2012. It was further stated that, by way of filing the present appeal, the applicants/appellants/complainants, attempted to circumvent the order dated 06.11.2012, passed by this Commission, in First Appeal No.312 of 2012, under Section 27-A of the Act, wherein, the Criminal Proceedings, initiated by the appellants/complainants, were dismissed by this Commission, on the ground, that the appellants/complainants, had filed the same, on the basis of deliberate concealment of material facts. It was further stated that, at the time of withdrawal of Miscellaneous Application No.113 of 2011, by the appellants/ complainants, they were restricted to file the same, afresh, only before the District Forum, and were never granted any liberty, to file fresh appeal against the order dated 04.04.2011. It was further stated that the applicants/appellants/complainants, having failed to make illegitimate gains, by filing the Criminal Petition, aforesaid, against the respondent, are now attempting to file the present appeal, against the order dated 04.04.2011, passed by the District Forum, in Consumer Complaint No.285 of 2010. It was further stated that the time spent, in pursuing the Criminal Proceedings, against the respondent, by the applicants/appellants/complainants, could not be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. It was further stated that the delay, in filing the appeal, was intentional, willful and deliberate. It was further stated that since, no sufficient cause was constituted, from the averments, contained in the application, the same deserved to be dismissed.
9. We have heard the Counsel for the parties, on the application, for condonation of delay, as also, in the main appeal, and have gone through the evidence, and record of the case, as also record of the Criminal Petition and Execution Application, carefully.
10. The first question, that arises for consideration, is, as to whether, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 577 days, as per the office report (as per the applicants/appellants 560 days), in filing the appeal, under Section 15 of the Act. It was held in Smt. Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR 1995 Punjab & Haryana 32, a case decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, that sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done, with due care and attention. In New Bank of India Vs. M/s Marvels ( India): 93 (2001) DLT 558, Delhi High Court, it was held as under:-
No doubt the words sufficient cause should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and their non-action and want of bonafides are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party. After all sufficient cause is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guide-lines can be given and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether, the defendant who has suffered ex-parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non- appearance and in examining this aspect, cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.
11. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it was held as under:-
There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.
12. In R.B. Ramalingam Vs. R.B. Bhuvaneswari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, the Supreme Court observed as under:-
We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.
13. In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors, V (2010) SLT 790=III (2010) CLT 201 (SC), it was held as under:-
The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]
14. In Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR 1977, S.C. 1221, it was held as under:-
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigation who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay
15. In Ansul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC) it was held as under:-
It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras
16. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, now let us see, as to whether, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 577 days, as per the office report (as per the applicants/appellants 560 days), in filing the appeal, under Section 15 of the Act or not. The grounds, set up by the Counsel for the applicants/appellants/complainants, are to the effect, that earlier, he filed First Appeal No.107 of 2011 on 09.05.2011, which was dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to file a fresh appeal, with an application for condonation of delay, and, that, appeal filed against the orders dated 07.05.2012 and 06.08.2012, passed by the District Forum, under Section 27-A of the Act, in favour of the complainants/ appellants/Decree Holders, was allowed on 06.11.2012, by this Commission, and the Criminal Proceedings were dismissed. No doubt, earlier First Appeal No.107 of 2011, titled as Dr. Prithipal Singh and Anr. Vs. Uppal Marble Arch, was filed by the applicants/ appellants/complainants, on 09.05.2011, against the order dated 04.04.2011, passed by the District Forum. On 06.07.2011, the following order was passed by this Commission, in First Appeal No.107 of 2011:-
The Learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted that he be directed to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file afresh one, in case, the respondent files an appeal, with an application for condonation of delay.
In this view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty as aforesaid
17.
The afore-extracted order shows that liberty was granted to the applicants/appellants/complainants, to file a fresh appeal, in case, the respondent files an appeal, with an application for condonation of delay. The latter part was intentionally omitted by the applicants/ appellants/complainants, from the application, for condonation of delay. Thereafter, the applicants/ appellants/complainants, moved Execution Application No.40 of 2011, under Section 25 of the Act, before the District Forum, which was dismissed as withdrawn, with permission to file a fresh one, after removal of the defects. It was, thereafter, that Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011, was filed by the applicants/appellants/complainants, in the District Forum, in which, they insisted for the execution of the order dated 04.04.2011, passed in Consumer Complaint No.285 of 2010, as a whole, knowing fully well that they had already been delivered the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010, by the respondent/Opposite Party. During the course of Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011, on 05.07.2012, a statement was made by the Counsel for the complainants/appellants, that the complainants had taken the possession of apartment, in question, on 17.09.2010. Thereafter, it did not lie, in the mouth of the applicants/appellants/complainants, to say that the order dated 04.04.2011, passed in Consumer Complaint No.285 of 2010, had not been complied with. Even, thereafter, the applicants/appellants/ complainants, continued with the Criminal Petition. The applicants/ appellants/complainants, at that time, very well knew that the respondent/Opposite Party, had not filed any appeal against the order dated 04.04.2011. They could, immediately, thereafter, file an appeal against the order dated 04.04.2011. They, however, pursued Criminal Petition, with a view to make undue gains, by insisting that they be paid interest @18% P.A., on the amount deposited by them, though they had already been delivered possession, much earlier to the passing of the order dated 04.04.2011. Since, the District Forum, could not review its own order, ultimately, the Criminal Petition was allowed. Feeling aggrieved, the Opposite Party (now respondent), filed First Appeal No.312 of 2012, on 13.09.2012 under Section 27-A of the Act, which was, ultimately, accepted on 06.11.2012, holding that the order dated 04.04.2011, stood fully complied with, and at the same time, dismissed the Criminal Petition/Execution Application, filed by the complainants/appellants/Decree Holders. In view of the circumstances, referred to above, it can very well be held that the Criminal Petition was not being prosecuted by the applicants/appellants, in good faith and in a bonafide manner. The time spent, in prosecuting the Criminal Petition, therefore, could not be excluded, for computing the period of limitation. The applicants/ appellants, however, miserably failed to explain the delay of 560 days (infact 577 days as per the office report), in filing the appeal, which is about 19 times beyond the normal period of filing an appeal, under Section 15 of the Act. Complete in-action and lack of bonafides, is attributable to the applicants/appellants, in filing the appeal, after the delay of 560 days, as per the appellants/complainants (infact 577 days as per the office report), in filing the same (appeal). The delay, in filing the appeal was, thus, intentional, willful and deliberate. Since, no sufficient cause is constituted, from the averments, contained in the application, the delay of 560 days, as per the appellants/complainants (infact 577 days as per the office report), in filing the same (appeal), cannot be condoned. The principle, of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. The application is, thus, liable to be dismissed.
18. The next question, that arises, for consideration, is, as to whether, even if, sufficient cause is shown, it is obligatory on the Commission, to condone the delay. The answer to this question, is in the negative. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it was held as under:-
It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.
19. It is evident, from the principle of law, laid down, in Ram Lal & Ors.s case (supra), that even if, sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire, whether, in its discretion, it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter, requires the Commission, to take into consideration, all the relevant factors, and it is at this stage, that diligence of the party(s) or its/their bonafides, may fall for consideration. In the instant case, as stated above, the delay aforesaid, in filing the appeal, was not caused, on account of some bonafide mistake of the applicants/appellants, but with some ill motive. The conduct of the applicants/appellants throughout remained contumacious. The principle of law, laid down in Ram Lal & Others case(supra) is fully applicable to the instant case. This is, therefore, not a fit case, in which this Commission should exercise its discretion, in favour of the applicants/appellants, in condoning the delay.
20. Now coming to the main appeal, it may be stated here, that the conduct of the applicants/appellants, throughout remained blemished. They concealed the material fact, from the District Forum, during the pendency of Consumer Complaint, that they had already obtained the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010, as a result whereof, the District Forum was made to pass a wrong order, to the effect that they (complainants now appellants), shall be entitled to interest @18% per annum on the total amount of Rs.1,37,91,175/-, from the date of filing the complaint i.e.11.5.2010, till the date of compliance of the order, if the same was not complied within three months. Not only this, even in First Appeal No.107 of 2011, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 06.07.2011, no averment was made by the complainants/ appellants, that they had already obtained the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010, and, as such, the relief sought for, by them, in that regard, had become redundant. Not only this, even in the Execution Application No. 40 of 2011, under Section 25 of the Act, filed by the applicants/appellants/ complainants /Decree Holders, they did not aver that they had already obtained the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010, and, as such, the relief sought for, by them, in that regard, had become redundant. Even in Miscellaneous Application No.113 of 2011, filed before this Commission, which was dismissed, as withdrawn, with liberty to file a fresh Execution, before the District Forum, no averment was made by the applicants/appellants/Decree Holders, that they had already obtained the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010, and, as such, the relief sought for, by them, in that regard, had become redundant. Even in Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011, no averment was made by the applicants/appellants/Decree Holders, that they had already obtained the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010, and, as such, the relief sought for, by them, in that regard, had become redundant. It was only after the Counsel for the Opposite Party/Judgment Debtor, put in appearance, in Criminal Petition and filed reply, to the effect, that the possession of apartment, had already been delivered to the complainants/appellants/Decree Holders, and, as such, the order dated 04.04.2011 stood fully complied with, that the Counsel for the applicants/ appellants/Decree Holders/complainants, made a statement on 05.07.2012, that they had obtained possession on 17.09.2010. The applicants/appellants/ Decree Holders/ complainants, throughout, intentionally and deliberately concealed the material fact, aforesaid, from the District Forum, resulting into passing the wrong order dated 04.04.2011. Concealment of material fact, amounts to commission of fraud. In S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853, the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect, that the Courts of law, are meant for imparting justice, between the parties. One, who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. A person whose case is based on falsehood or concealment of material facts, is not entitled to any relief, and can be thrown out, at any stage of the litigation. In S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu`s case (supra), it was also held as under:-
"Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest Court has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings.
Under these circumstances, the instant appeal, being based on falsehood, as stated above, is liable to be dismissed.
21. Even otherwise, Appeal No. 312 of 2012, instituted on 13.09.2012, under Section 27-A of the Act, titled as Uppal Housing Ltd., Vs. Dr. Prithipal Singh and another, against the orders dated 07.05.2012 and 06.08.2012, rendered by the District Forum, which was decided on 06.11.2012, by this Commission, it was held as under:-
13. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is accepted, with no order as to costs.
The majority order dated 07.05.2012, to the extent of directing the Opposite Party/appellant, to pay interest @18% P.A., on the amount of Rs.1,37,91,175/-, from 11.05.2010, till the date of compliance of the same, and the order dated 06.08.2012 passed in the Criminal Petition/ Execution Application, are set aside, Whereas, the minority order dated 06.08.2012, holding that the respondents/complainants were not entitled to interest on the amount of Rs.1,37,91,175/-, is upheld.
14. Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011/Execution Application filed by the complainants/Decree Holders shall stand dismissed, as fully satisfied.
22. Once, this Commission, vide order dated 06.11.2012, in clear-cut terms, held that Criminal Petition No.90 of 2011/Execution Application filed by the appellants/complainants/Decree Holders, for execution of the order dated 04.04.2011, which is impugned in this appeal, shall stand dismissed, as fully satisfied, the applicants/appellants, if, had any grievance, against that order, could file an appeal, in the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. After passing of the order dated 06.11.2012, in Appeal No.312 of 2012, instituted on 13.09.2012, under Section 27-A of the Act, the instant appeal was not at all maintainable.
23. Even if, it is assumed, for the sake of arguments, that the instant appeal was maintainable, it may be stated here that the applicants/appellants, have asked for the relief, which had been granted to the other complainants, in similar situated cases. The applicants/ appellants/complainants cannot be granted that relief, as they were granted more relief, than the one granted, in those cases, by the District Forum, vide order dated 04.04.2011, on account of the reason, that they concealed the material facts, that they had obtained the possession of apartment, on 17.09.2010. Under these circumstances, the applicants/appellants, could not be said to be aggrieved persons, as envisaged by Section 15 of the Act. Once, the appellants/complainants pursued the remedy, till the end, by way of filing Execution Application/Criminal Petition, for the execution of order dated 04.04.2011, and, ultimately, failed in their effort, as is evident, from the order dated 06.11.2012, passed in Appeal No.312 of 2012, under Section 27-A of the Act, instituted on 13.09.2012, they could not turn round, and say that now they should be granted relief, which was granted to other similarly situated persons, in other complaints. The applicants/ appellants, could not approbate and reprobate in the same breath. They can also not be allowed to resort to the device of Forum-hopping. For the reasons recorded above, the applicants/ appellants, are, thus, not entitled to the grant of relief, sought for by them, in the appeal.
24. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the Parties.
25. For the reasons recorded above, the application for condonation of delay, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal being barred by time, and devoid of merit, is also dismissed, with no order as to costs.
26. Certified copies of this order, be sent to the parties, free of charge.
27. The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.
Pronounced.
11.02.2013 Sd/-
[JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.)] PRESIDENT Sd/-
[NEENA SANDHU] MEMBER Rg