Karnataka High Court
Chandrashekharappa vs State Of Karnataka on 11 August, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001CRILJ765, ILR2000KAR4936, 2001(3)KARLJ244, 2001 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 363
Author: S.R. Bannurmath
Bench: B. Padmaraj, S.R. Bannurmath
JUDGMENT S.R. Bannurmath, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the convicted accused challenging the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimoga, dated 30th of May, 1997 in Sessions Case No. 72 of 1996, convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life.
2. The brief facts as per the prosecution case are as follows:
The deceased Annapurnamma was the daughter of Ramalingappa, P.W. 3 and Smt. Lolakshamma, P.W. 8. According to the prosecution without the consent of the parents Annapurnamma got married with the appellant in a temple and also got the marriage registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar. According to the prosecution P.Ws. 3 and 8 were totally unaware of the fact of the marriage. After some time it is stated that the parents of the deceased received a letter or a chit from the accused stating that he is coming to Bangalore in search of a job and as such the parents to have the daughter for some time till he secures the job. According to the prosecution earlier to the date of incident viz., 22-4-1996 P.W. 3 went to Jeenahalli wherein the appellant and the deceased were staying and all the three started towards the place of residence of P.Ws. 3 and 8. It is stated that on the way appellant got down at Belagutthi stating that he will come later. Thereafter P.W. 3 and the deceased proceeded to Jeenahalli wherein later they were joined by the appellant. On 22-4-1996 in the morning P.W. 8 had gone to the land to collect the grass for the cows and as such in the house it was only P.W. 3-the deceased and the accused stayed. According to the prosecution when the accused came into the house and started talking with the deceased, P.W. 3 came out of the house and stood near a lamp house at a distance of about 30 feet from the house. After some time it is stated that he saw the accused going away from the house in a suspicious manner. As such P.W. 3 went inside the house and saw Annapurnamma lying on the ground. As she did not give any response to his calling suspecting something was wrong with her he called P.W. 2-doctor Basavarajappa, an Ayurvedic Practitioner staying nearby, who on arrival found Annapurnamma dead. It is to be noted here itself that P.W. 2-doctor found certain marks on the neck of Annapurnamma and as such suspecting the hand of the accused in the death of Annapurnamma, P.W. 3 went to the jurisdictional police at Nyamathi and at about 5,30 in the evening lodged his oral complaint. P,W. 20-the P.S.I., recorded the complaint and on the basis of the same registered a case in Crime No. 98 of 1996 for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and took up the investigation. During the investigation, necessary mahazars were drawn, the body was sent for autopsy, statement of the witnesses were recorded, search for the accused was set in and on 28-4-1996 the accused was apprehended by P.W. 20-the P.S.I, at K.S.R.T.C. bus stand, Shimoga. During his interrogation it is stated that the accused volunteered to show the rope used in the crime and in the presence of panch witnesses the said rope, M.O. 1 was seized. On receipt of all the necessary reports and on completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant. As the appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried, he was tried in Sessions Case No. 72 of 1996. In order to establish the guilt of the accused the prosecution examined 24 witnesses and got marked Exs. P. 1 to 24 and M.Os. 1 to 10. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., the accused denied the prosecution case and further submitted to Question No. 46 as follows.-
"Ans.--I was happy with my wife Annapurna. I was unemployed. I told my wife that I intend to go to Bangalore for search of work. My wife permitted me to go to Bangalore and she went to her father's house. I went to Bangalore. I returned after one week and went to Jeehahalli. Within two days I was arrested by Nyamati Police. They told me that my wife complained for divorce and obtained my signatures. After 4-5 days I went to -Bangalore and stayed in the house of my mother's cousin Ramappa. One day my father came to Bangalore and brought me to Jeenahalli. I went to Police Station. After two days I was sent to jail".
3. Apart from this defence the accused also examined his relative Ramappa as D.W. 1 to substantiate his plea of alibi. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record the Trial Court disbelieved the alibi of the defence and accepting the evidence of the prosecution held that accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC though acquitted him of the charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Hence, the present appeal.
4. Sri Shivaprasad, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court is contrary to the evidence on record and well-settled principles in respect of the circumstantial evidence and alibi. Highlighting his argument the learned Counsel contend that as the entire case of the prosecution revolves around the circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish each and every link in the chain of circumstantial evidence and unless the same is established, the prosecution cannot be said to be successful in establishing the guilt of the accused. The learned Counsel contended that in view of the fact that the appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act which is alleged to be the motive, there is no material to prove motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime in question. Hence, he contended that as in the case depending on circumstantial evidence, motive is a vital link and since the same has not been established, there is total break in the chain of circumstances. It is contended that the Trial Court has failed to consider this aspect in its proper perspective and as such prayed that accused be given benefit of doubt. Nextly, the learned Counsel contended that apart from the statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., the accused has led evidence in the form of D.W. 1 who has in clear terms stated that during the relevant period the accused was not at Jeenahalli but at Bangalore; that D.W. 1 and he was arrested thereafter. As such it is contended that the defence has successfully proved the fact of the accused being not present at the scene but somewhere else. It is submitted that the Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence of D.W. 1 in its proper perspective and on this count also it is contended that appeal is to succeed. The learned Counsel after taking us in detail through the prosecution evidence especially on the versions of P.Ws. 3 and 8 contended that since the deceased Annapurhamma had got married with the appellant without the consent of the appellant, it was the parents who were in fact angered with her and as such the motive to commit the crime was on their part and not on the part of the accused. Nextly the learned Counsel relying upon the following pronouncements of the Apex Court as well as this Court and other High Courts for considering and appreciating the circumstantial evidence and alibi.-
(1) Chandmal and Another v State of Rajasthan;
(2) Kehar Singh and Others v State (Delhi Administration);
(3) Akram v State ufMadhya Pradesh;
(4) Mahendra Shamaldas Sono v State of Gujarat;
(5) Thangarasu v State;
(6) N. Rajendra Prasad Bhat v State of Karnataka, and in the light of the argument addressed by him prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction is liable to be set side. On the other hand the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for the State/respondent argued in support of the findings cf the Trial Court and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. We have heard the learned Counsels on both sides and perused the evidence in detail.
5. Before appreciating the evidence, since the learned Counsel has relied upon certain pronouncements, it is necessary to consider the principles and guidelines in respect of the circumstantial evidence and alibi. The very case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant viz., Chandmal's case, supra, has laid down three tests for considering and relying upon the circumstantial evidence, (i) Inference from circumstances must be cogent and firmly established; (ii) it must be definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; and (iii) it must be incapable of any explanation or any reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. These are the well-settled guidelines followed by the Court while considering the case where circumstantial evidence is relied upon by the prosecution. It is also necessary in this regard to keep in mind two more decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Udaipal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh , wherein the Apex Court has laid down that if the evidence shows strong motive to commit the crime and explanation if any of accused excludes reasonable possibility of any one else being the culprit other than the accused, the accused can be held liable for the crime he committed and similarly in the case of Ram Dahin Singh and Others v State of Uttar Pradesh , it has been laid down that denial by the accused of prosecution case lends assurance that accused denying facts to conceal participation in the crime unless it is established otherwise by him.
6. So far as alibi is concerned in the case of State of Haryana v Sher Singh and Others , while considering the plea of alibi vis-a-vis, Section 103 of the Evidence Act, the Apex Court has held thus.-
"When an accused plead alibi the burden is on him to prove it under Section 103 of the Evidence Act".
7. In a later pronouncement in the case of Dhananjaya Chaterjee v State of West Bengal, the same principle has been accepted and highlighted stating as follows.-
"The plea of alibi must be proved by cogent and satisfactory evidence, completely excluding the possibility of accused's presence at the scene of occurrence at the relevant time".
8. In Chandrika Prasad Singh and Others v State of Bihar, it has been held thus.-
"The onus to establish alibi is on the accused and if it is not discharged, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the findings of conviction".
9. In State of Haryana v Prabhu and Others , it has been held that the prosecution case cannot be said to have not proved against the accused, merely because he comes out with a plea of alibi without establishing the same. In Soma Bhai v State of Gujarat, the plea of alibi has to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. Where there is ample time and opportunity for the accused to reach the place of occurrence, it is for him to prove that he did not reach the place and lastly in the case of Balvinder Singh v State of Punjab, the Apex Court has observed thus:
"The appellant's false plea of alibi denial of prosecution case are also incriminating circumstances giving rise to an inference of guilty".
10. Coining to the present case admittedly there are not eye witnesses to the occurrence. The entire prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. Considering various guidelines laid down by the Apex Court and this Court while appreciating the circumstantial evidence, it has to be seen that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilty is to be drawn have not only to be fully established but also with all the circumstances so established should be of conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilty of the accused. These circumstances should not be capable of being explained by any other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused and the chain of evidence must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the belief consistent with the innocence of the accused. It needs no reminder that only legally established circumstances and not merely indignations of the Court can form the basis of conviction and the more serious the case (crime), the greater should be the care taken to scrutinise the evidence lest suspicion takes the place of proof. Since in the instant case also as the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence and sentence awarded by the Trial Court is of imprisonment for life, we have to consider the circumstances carefully bearing the points noticed above.
11. We shall now deal with and consider the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution which have been accepted as conclusive proof by the Trial Court to indict the appellant with the crime.-
(1) motive.
(2) last seen together with deceased and disappearance thereafter till arrest from the scene leading to the circumstance of abscon-dence.
(3) conduct of the accused.
(4) recovery on the voluntary information furnished.
12. In addition to these, in this case we have also to consider the plea of alibi raised by the defence. At the outset we must note that the homicidal death of Annapurna is not in much dispute. Even otherwise, there is sufficient evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 8-the parents of the deceased P.W. 2-Dr. Basavarajappa, a private medical practitioner who was summoned to the spot as well as the evidence of the doctor, P.W. 1 who conducted the autopsy to show that Annapurna met with homicidal death on 22-4-1996 at about 11.00 a.m. P.W. 1-Dr H. Dayakar who conducted the autopsy has clearly stated that he noticed ligature mark present around the neck above the level of thyroid cartilage and according to him this injury was an antimony in nature and the death was done to asphyxia as a result of strangulation. Even in the cross- examination he has reiterated and stated that Annapurna died due to homicidal strangulation only.
13. Similarly so far as the relationship between the accused and the deceased is also concerned namely being husband and wife is not in dispute at all. In fact in 313 statement the accused has himself admitted that he got married with Annapurna. Hence, these two aspects are held to be proved by the prosecution.
14. Nextly so far as the motive is concerned according to P.W. 3 after Annapurna ran away with the accused, they did not hear anything from her till few months when P.Ws. 3 and 8 alleged to have received a letter or a chit from accused requesting them to take Annapurna from Ban-darahalli to Jeenahalli as he was proceeding to Bangalore in search of job. According to these witnesses the parents of the deceased accepted the secret marriage, and when relations became cordial the deceased complained before them that the accused was harassing her to bring some money from the parents house. According to P.W. 3, Annapurna had told him that accused was demanding a sum of Rs. 40,000/- to which he said to have replied that as he has no ready cash he would be transferring one acre of his land in the name of the accused which accused declined to accept stating that he was in need of money and not the land. This evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 8 has been further corroborated by the maternal grandmother of the deceased Hanumamma P.W. 16 and her son G.S. Prasad, P.W. 15. Similarly P.W. 5-Chandrappa neighbour of P.W. 3 though not detail has stated that relationship between the accused and the deceased were strained. No doubt the Trial Court did not find the alleged dowry demand in favour of the prosecution and in fact acquitted the appellant of the charge. It has to be noted that even if the demand was not of dowry there is enough material to show that the relationship between the accused and the deceased were strained. Apart from these versions regarding the strain relations, we have before us the independent evidence of Danappa P.W. 19 the head constable and SHO of Bhadravathi Police Station. According to him on 9-1-1996, he received a complaint from P.W. 15-G.S. Prasad, the maternal uncle of the deceased to the effect that the accused husband is harassing his wife Annapurna. According to him, after receiving the complaint as per Ex. P. 13 he registered a case in NC case No. 9 of 1996. As it we complaint regarding quarrel between the husband and wife, he thought it fit to summon the accused and accordingly accused was brought to police station and he was advised to behave properly. In this regard it is stated that the accused gave a statement that he will look after Annapurna properly thereafter as per Ex. P. 18, this incident took place on 9-1-1996. Nextly, we have evidence of P.W. 18-K.S. Rasheed, head constable and SHO of Nyamathi Police Station. According to him, on 30-3-1996 the deceased Annapurna came to his police station and gave complaint against her husband (the appellant) that he was harassing and assaulting her. This statement was recorded as Ex. P. 15 and case in NC 155 of 1996 came to be registered. Again, this police constable summoned the accused and recorded the statement as per Ex. P. 17 wherein again the accused assured treating the deceased properly. All these materials placed before us leave no doubt in our mind that something was wrong between the accused and the deceased. It has to be noted that the Courts cannot fathom the mental disposition of the assailant nor could it rule out the possibility of some cause of immediate provocation for the assailant. This is what we call as 'motive'. Motive would be known only to the deceased and the assailant. The deceased would not be before the Court to tell as to what was the provocation. The accused does not disclose the same to the Court. So it is not possible to definitely give a finding regarding the motive. All that the Court can do is to probe into the surrounding circumstances to find out whether there was any occasion for restatement between the assailant and the deceased leading to the situation. As we have noted above it can be seen that there Avas sufficient material to hold that the relationship between the accused and the deceased were strained and in fact the dispute went up to the police station on two occasions resulting in the accused giving undertakings or statements before the concerned police. Hence, we can safely hold that though the prosecution has failed to bring out the dowry aspect as a motive, there was sufficient material to show that something was wrong between the accused and the deceased. Appreciating this aspect, the Trial Court has found that the prosecution has established this motive there are. We see no reasons to differ with these findings so far as the motive is concerned.
15. The next circumstance is the last seen together. This aspect has to be considered along with the alibi pleaded by the accused. According to P.W. 3 on 22-4-1996 in the morning at about 8.30 P.W. 8-Lolak-shamma had left the house to get grass for the cows and as such it was only P.W. 3 and the deceased Annapurna and the accused who were in the house. It is stated by P.W. 3 that the accused went out to have tea in a nearby hotel and he returned to the house at about 11.00 a.m. or so. On seeing the accused coming back to the house as it was a small house and possibly to give privacy to the husband and wife, P.W. 3 is stated to have gone out of the house and stood near a lamp pole about 30 to 40 ft. in front of the house. According to him after sometime so entering the house accused was seen coming out of the house and going away hurriedly. As his behaviour was suspicious P.W. 3 is stated to have entered the house once again and saw the deceased lying on the ground without any response. Thus, according to P.W. 3 it was the accused who was last seen when Annapurna was alive and seen leaving the house immediately after which Annapurna was found dead by strangulation. This evidence regarding the presence of the accused on the fateful day has been corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 8-Lolakshanjma, the mother of the deceased. No doubt it is true that at the relevant point of time she was not present in the house but the presence of the accused on the date of the incident in the morning has been cogently spoken to by her. She has corroborated to the affect that it was the accused who had sent a letter to P.W. 3 to take deceased Annapurna and it was P.W. 3 who went to Bandarahalli and returned with Annapurna. She has specifically stated the accused came to the house on the next day. This is in consonance with what P.W, 3 has stated in the evidence. According to her, she returned to the house at about 11.00 a.m. or so and found Annapurna lying dead with ligature mark and her husband P,W. 3 who was standing outside told her that the accused had killed Annapurna by strangulation. In the lengthy cross-examination which she has faced boldly she reiterates that on the earlier night accused stayed in their house till the death of Annapurna. She has specifically stated that when she left the house accused was present in the house and when she returned he was found missing. The learned counsel attacked the evidence of these two witnesses on the ground that they are related to the deceased and as such interested and partisan witnesses. No douht they are related and as such can be said to be interested but only on that ground, namely of interested their evidence cannot be straightaway brushed aside. P.W. 3 being the father and P.W. 8 being the mother being present in the village in their own house cannot be said to be unnatural. Similarly presence .at and around the time of incident of P.Ws. 3 in the house also cannot be said to be unnatural. Though the learned Counsel tried to contend that P.W. 3 being agriculturist at that time he would be in the lands and as such his presence is unnatural. But again the defence itself has elicited and got it confirmed through the cross-examination of the P.Ws. 3 and 8 that though P.W. 3 is a farmer, he was going to the land at about 10.00 a.m. on the date of incident he was present in the house as he has visited the land one day earlier. We do not find any material to doubt the presence of P.W. 3 on the date of incident at the relevant point of time. As against this evidence we have to consider the alibi raised by the accused in 313 of the Cr. P.C. statement coupled with the evidence of the defence D.W. 1. As we noted earlier in his statement under Section 313, the accused has stated that as he wanted to go to Bangalore he had asked his wife to go to the parents house at Jeenahalli and after her so going he went to Bangalore and returned after one week and on his return after one week when he went to Jeenahalli within two days he was arrested by the Police and his signatuies were taken by the Police. Further he states that after 4 or 5 days he again went back to Bangalore and stayed in the house of D.W. 1-Ramalingappa and while he was so staying one day his father came to Bangalore and brought him back to Jeenahalli from where he was taken to police station and was anested. As against this statement of the accused D.W. l-Ranialingappa a close relative of the accused has stated thut he was working as a Security Officer at Bangalore. On 4th April, 1996 the accused came to him at Bangalore in search of job and stayed there for about 20 days. Thereafter, father of the accused came to Bangalore and informed him that police are searching him. It is stated that the father took the accused along with him and thereafter the accused did not return. Thess two versions of the accused and D.W. 1 cannot be co-related to each other and appears to be inconsistent one. It is undisputed that the accused was arrested by the Jurisdictional Police on 28-4-1996. From that day if we calculate the day backward as spoken to by the accused in 313 statement, accused is supposed to have been arrested on 19-4-1996 and thereafter he is released and after 4 or 5 days went to Bangalore whereas D.W. 1 is positive in saying that the accused came to him at Bangalore only on 4th April, 1996 and stayed for 20 days. D.W. 1 does not specifically state on what date the accused left his house. He also does not state as to where the accused attempted to get job. Even the accused himself is totally silent in this regard. Even if the arrest as spoken to by the accused is taken as the arrest in the earlier complaint lodged by the deceased against him in Nyamathi Police Station which is admitted on 30th March, 1996. Again, the dates as spoken to by the accused and D.W. 1 do not co-relate as to the date and time factor. The evidence of D.W. 1 if perused carefully appears to be that of an obliging relative. He in fact being a close relative and also said to be a father of the friend of the accused shows his ignorance about the accused being married to the deceased as he flatly refuses his knowledge in this respect. The nature of this evidence if scrutinised carefully would show is of general term and made only to help the accused. What is importantly missing is the evidence of the father of the accused who would have been the best person to reveal the presence or absence of the accused at Jeenahalli on the relevant date. It is undisputed that the father of the accused is also resident of Jeenahalli wherein the deceased P.Ws. 3 and 8 were living. According to both the accused and D.W. 1 it was the father who informed the accused that police are searching for him for the murder of his wife and as such it is stated that the accused went back to Jeenahalli. As such in the absence of the material evidence of the father of the accused in our considered view the Trial Court has rightly rejected the alibi pleaded by the accused. As we have noted from the various pronouncements of the Apex Court though it is not necessary for an accused to render explanation to prove his innocence and even if he renders a false explanation it cannot be used to support the prosecution case against him. However, once he raises plea of alibi under Section 103 of the Evidence Act he has to prove it satisfactorily as any other evidence. If the belated plea of alibi is not established, it has to be termed as an afterthought and a plea in desperation. On the other hand we have the independent evidence of a responsible officer in the form of P.W. 20 who has in unequivocal terms stated that he apprehended the accused on 28-4-1996 near KSRTC bus station in Shimoga. Taking into consideration cumulatively the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 8 and P.W. 20 and also the futile attempt of the accused to substantiate the alibi through his statement as well as the statements of D.W. 1 we have to hold that the accused has failed to prove his absence in the village on the date of the incident and as such evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 8 has to be accepted to hold that the accused was present in Jeenahalli in the house of P.Ws. 3 and 8 and was last seen with the deceased at about 11.00 a.m.
16. As this aspect has been accepted by us and we find no reasons to differ the well considered findings of the Trial Court, we have to nextly consider the conduct of the accused as spoken to by P.Ws. 3 and 8 namely after strangulating his wife, the accused was seen leaving the house hurriedly and in disturbed state of mind and thereafter was found to be absconding till he was arrested on 28-4-1996 at Shimoga. This abscondence on the part of the accused also points out towards his guilty conduct. The fact that P.W. 3 seeing the accused entering the house has been pointed out by the learned Counsel stating that presence of P.W. 3 was not probable. However, we have another independent witness in the form of P.W. 21-G.R. Rajendrappa. P.W. 21 is an Advocate by profession and of the same village. He has stated that immediately after the incident due to the hue and cry raised by P.W. 3 he also came to the spot and saw Annapurna dead and P.W. 3 who was present there crying and uttering that his son-in-law (the accused) had killed the daughter. This evidence of independent witness can be in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case treated as "Res Gestae" under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the presence of P.W. 3 at the spot and the time cannot be much disputed. We have accepted the version of P.W. 3 that around 11.00 a.m. while he was in the house along with the deceased, accused came to the house and as such P.W. 3 went outside and stood near the lamp pole at merely a distance of 30 or 40 ft. In front of the house after sometime so entering the house, the accused was suspecting the conduct when P.W. 3 went inside the house, he found Annapurna dead by strangulation. Thus, the circumstances proved by the prosecution and the cumulative effect of which is that Annapurna was alive when P.W. 3 was with her and till the accused came inside at which time P.W. 3 went out of the house. Thus, it was the accused and the wife (the deceased) were alone together in the house and immediately after sometime the accused came out of the house and immediately thereafter Annapurna was found to be dead. Taking into effect cumulatively all these aspects it leaves no doubt in our mind that it was the accused and accused alone who was responsible for the homicidal death of Annapurna.
17. All these circumstances referred to above relied upon by the prosecution in our considered view after detail reconsideration of the entire material conclusively establishes the guilt of the accused. All the circumstances are specific and of a clinching nature and all of them irresistibly lead to the 'only conclusion that it was the appellant alone who could be guilty of the homicidal death of Annapurna. All these circumstances in our view conclusively and definetly lead to only hypothesis of guilt of the appellant and the evidence led by the accused by way of alibi is totally inconsistent with his innocence. At this stage itself, it is relevant to note the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that it was P.W. 3 who had actual motive to commit the crime than the accused. In this regard the learned Counsel has relied upon the statement of P.W. 8-Lolakshamma elicited in the cross-examination which is to the effect that after the secret marriage of Annapurna with the accused. P.W. 3 was angry and saying that he will kill Annapurna in case she comes back. Placing reliance on this statement, it is contended that it was P.W. 3 who had motive and opportunity to kill his daughter and not the accused who was stated to be a loving husband. So far as the relationship between the accused and the deceased as noted in detail has clearly revealed that the relations between both were totally strained which in fact on two occasions forced the deceased to approach and seek the help of the police. On the other hand, so far as the alleged utterances of the father is concerned it has to be termed as utterance of the angry father and nothing more. This could be seen from the later conduct of P.W. 3. Though he has stated that the marriage of the deceased with the accused was not of his liking, he further has stated that if both of them come back, he had no objections to accept them in the house. He has in his own natively stated that "when my daughter herself return, I do not refuse to receive her being parents we allow the accused and Annapurna to return to our house". The very fact that undisputedly the deceased was accepted back by P.Ws. 3 and 8 much prior to the incident would show that they had pardoned her of her secret marriage and as such there coutd have no ill-motive on the part of P.W. 3 to go to an extent of kilting his own daughter who was in fact found to be pregnant at the time of the incident.
18. Taking into consideration all these aspects and after reappreciat-ing the evidence in the light of the arguments addressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant we find no grounds to hold that the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court was either perverse of illegal one. As we find the appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court is just and proper. Even on re-appreciation of prosecution evidence, we see no reasons to differ from the findings arrived at by the Trial Court convicting the accused for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC.
19. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the appeal as devoid of merits and affirm the conviction and the sentence passed by the Trial Court.