Madras High Court
General Manager, Eveready Industries ... vs Eveready Industries Employees Union on 11 August, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1999)IIILLJ1228MAD
Author: D. Raju
Bench: D. Raju
JUDGMENT M.S. Liberhan, C.J.
1. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that writ petition for issue of mandamus was not maintainable against a private party to implement the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), as well as the settlement arrived at by the parties, which becomes (sic) statutory under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the I.D. Act'), and consequently ad interim relief cannot be granted.
2. In our considered view, the single Judge, keeping in view the provisions of Section 72 of the Act, which is a social welfare legislation, injuncted the appellants from withdrawing the benefits given under the settlement, which concedingly governs the parties and was part of the conditions of service. The only grievance made by the counsel for the petitioner is that no writ can be issued to a private party to enforce the statutory provisions of the conditions of service incorporated in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, duly attested under the Industrial Disputes Act, which becomes statutorily enforceable. We find that the petitioners sought, the issuance of writ for enforcement of statutory public duty under Section 72 of the Act as well as the settlement arrived at between the employer and employees, having the seal of the State under the Industrial Disputes Act, which becomes statutorily enforceable and has a force of law.
3. There is no gainsaying that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.A. Imanual, (1969-II-LLJ-749) (SC), and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979-II-LLJ-2I7) (SC), to the effect that a writ can be issued to a private person also, in order to enforce the compliance of statutory provisions, which he is enjoined to observe, apart from the fact that the writ jurisdiction is an equitable jurisdiction and, hence, has to undo injustice to sustain the faith of the people in the rule of law.
4. There is no gainsaying that the respondent is subject to the law enacted by the Legislature or the statutory settlement entered into by the parties, having the force of law, and legally enforceable or the regulations made by the State enforceable as such. The appellants have been only injuncted not to deny the statutory benefits accrued under the Act or under the regulation or under the settlement which governs the parties to the lis. By the impugned order, in our considered view, substantial justice has been done between the parties in spite of the fact that it is an interim order during the pendency of the writ petition and the same is subject to the result of the writ petition.
5. We find no ground to interfere with the interim order passed by the single Judge, especially when the appellant does not suffer any injury. The respondents are its own employees and if the writ petition is dismissed any excess payment made to the employees can be recovered in accordance with the directions finally issued in the writ petition. The single Judge will not take notice of the observations made in this appeal while disposing of the writ petition on merit.
6. The writ appeal is dismissed with the above observations. No costs. C. M. P. No. 11080 of 1997 is dismissed.