Karnataka High Court
Gurappa S/O Sirasappa Pattar vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer on 5 April, 2018
Author: B.Veerappa
Bench: B. Veerappa
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF APRIL, 2018
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B. VEERAPPA
MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL NO.200086/2015
BETWEEN:
GURAPPA S/O SIRASAPPA PATTAR
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HIS LRS
SHARANAPPA S/O LATE GURAPPA PATTAR
AGE: 54 YEARS OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O: MAGANGERA VILLAGE
TQ: JEWARGI DIST: GULBARGA
NOW AT H.NO.2-907
VIDYANAGAR COLONY
KALABURAGI. ... APPELLANT
(BY SRI.S.S.SAJJANSHETTY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
UKP, AWARAD TQ: JEWARGI
KALABURAGI
PIN NO.585101.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.ARCHANA.P.TIWARI, AGA)
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THIS MISCELLANEOUS SECOND APPEAL IS FILED
UNDER SECTION 54(2) OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT,
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD
DATED: 20.07.1998 PASSED BY THE IST ADDL. DISTRICT
JUDGE, GULBARGA IN LAC-APPEAL NO.199/1997 VIDE
ANNEXURE-A CONSEQUENTLY SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 11.07.1997 PASSED IN
LAC.NO.372/1995 BY THE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR. DN)
GULBARGA, VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND PLEASED TO
MODIFY BY ALLOWING THE APPEAL BY ENHANCING THE
COMPENSATION AT RS.53,000/- PER ACRE DRY LAND
FROM RS.12,800/- PER ACRE DRY LAND AS MODIFIED BY
IST LOWER APPELLATE COURT, WITH ALL STATUTORY
BENEFITS.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR HEARING -
INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
3
JUDGMENT
The claimant/appellant filed the present appeal against the Judgment and award dated : 20-07-1998 made in L.A.C.Appeal.No.199/1997 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Gulbarga allowing the appeal in part by setting aside the Judgment and award dated : 11-07-1997 passed in L.A.C.No.372/1995 and modified the Judgment and award dated : 11-07-1997 made in LAC.No.372/1995 and held that the claimant/appellant is entitled to market value of Rs.12,800/- per acre with 30% solatium and 12% additional market value on the enhanced compensation with interest in accordance with law.
2. There is a delay of 6168 days i.e., 16 years and 9 months in filing the appeal. The appellant has explained the delay by filing the affidavit and contended that in a similar placed circumstances, this Court was 4 pleased to enhance the compensation at Rs.35,750/- per acre for dry lands situated at Nagaral village of Chincholi Taluka, Gulbarga District acquired for the purpose of Lower Mulla Mari Project under section 4(1) Notification dated : 02-04-1982 by condoning the delay of 3507 and 5045 days respectively by common Judgment dated : 16-04-2012 passed in MSA.No.504/2011 and connected matters. It was contended that, the land in question acquired under 4(1) notification dated : 01-12-1988, which deserves to be awarded Rs.53,000/- per acre, if escalation @ 8% per annum is added for six years, as has been awarded in the Judgment dated : 10-04-2015 passed in MSA No.200009/2015 for dry lands in respect of Chimmaidlai village of Gulbarga District acquired under 4(1) notification dated : 23-08-1996 and the market value was fixed at Rs.1,53,000/- per acre in addition to escalation at the rate of 8% per annum. It was further contended that, the Division Bench of this Court in 5 MFA.No.1979/2005 filed by the State for reduction of compensation was modified by enhancing the compensation by modifying the Judgment re-fixing at Rs.87,000/- per acre for dry lands acquired under UKP project by 4(1) notification dated : 11-04-1996, by exercising the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure sue-motto. Therefore, on the ground of parity, the appellant is also entitled for the same compensation.
3. It was further contended that, several acres of lands situated at Chimmaidlai, Gadilingadhalli, Yelmamadi, Chennur, Sale Beernalli and Nagoor villages including Kotaga village, have been acquired by the State exercising powers under eminent domain by meager awards. All the villages are situated adjacent to each other surrounded by Lower Mulla Mari River. It was further contended that, it is learnt that, the Hon'ble High Court in number of Judgments was assessed at 6 Rs.1,72,630/- per acre for wet land and Rs.1,15,086/- per acre for dry land in respect of lands situated at Yelmamadi acquired under the 4(1) notification dated :
30-05-1991, the Division Bench of this Court in the year 2001 fixed the market value at Rs.1,53,000/- per acre by taking 8% per annum escalation by Judgment dated : 10-04-2015 passed in MSA No.200009/2015.
Therefore, if escalation at 8% per annum for 8 years is considered the appellant is entitled to enhanced compensation of Rs.2,65,000/- per acre based on law of parity and equity. It was further contended that, the respondent has caused delay and deposited the award amount after an enormous delay that by getting reduced the compensation, from Reference Court award at Rs.18,000/- per acre toRs.12,500/- per acre, which is strange and peculiar circumstances. So, the delay caused in filing this appeal is due to penury, financial constraints and for bonafide reasons and not deliberate, which deserves to be condoned to adjudicate the matter 7 on merits, in view of covered by decision by this Court as stated supra. The land looser has to be compensated in the compulsory acquisition which is acquired for the public purpose. It was further contended that, the claimant/appellant undertake not to claim interest for the delay period in filing the appeal. Therefore, sought to condone the delay.
4. Inspite of granting time to file objections, though this matter is of the year 2015, ultimately this Court on 31-01-2018 granted four weeks time to file objections to I.A.1/2015, till today the Government has not filed objections. The learned Government Advocate orally opposed to condone the delay on the ground that there is inordinate delay of 16 years and 09 months in filing the appeal. Absolutely no reasons are assigned to condone the inordinate delay. Therefore, sought to dismiss the appeal on the ground of delay. 8
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis.
6. Sri.S.S.Sajjanshetty, learned counsel for the appellant contended by reiterating the averments made in the application that in identical circumstances narrated in Para.Nos.3 to 7, of the affidavit, this Court and Division Bench has enhanced the compensation in similar circumstances. Therefore the delay has to be condoned. He would further contend that, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mallikarjun S/o Basavanappa & Another V/s State of Karnataka in MFA.No.200729/2016, the delay of 4359 days was condoned, denying the interest. Therefore, learned counsel appearing for appellant/claimant submits that the delay of 16 years and 9 months has to be condoned in the present appeal. He has relied upon the decision of this Court in case of Shivasharanappa since dead by LRs /vs/ The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 9 Gulbarga, in MSA.No.848/2012 dated : 24.10.2017 condoned the delay. The learned counsel appearing for appellant has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Baswaraj and others V/s State through Spl. LAO MIP Gulbarga in MFA.No.1282/2005 dated :
16-03-2006 condoning the delay of 2800 days in filing the appeal denying the interest and 3524 days denying the interest. Therefore, he sought to condone the delay in filing the present appeal.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that, the land of the appellant acquired by issuing preliminary notification dated : 01-12-1988. The S.L.A.O., has passed award on 30-06-1990. Thereafter the Reference Court proceeded to pass award on 11-07-1997. The Lower Appellate Court, on the appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Officer by the impugned Judgment and award dated :
20-07-1998 in LAC.Appeal.No.199/1997 awarded 10 compensation of Rs.12,800/- per acre. In the entire application Para.Nos.1 to 7 for condoning the delay, the appellant instead of explaining the delay has stated that, on parity the application has to be allowed relying upon the several Judgments to condone the delay. This Court is aware that the party should not be deprive on technicality, when the party has made a sufficient cause to condone the delay when the rights of the parties are to be decided to provide substantial justice to the parties. But in the present case though there is a delay of 6168 days i.e., 16 years and 9 months in filing the appeal. In Para.No.8 it is only stated that due to penury and financial constrains and for bonafide reasons, but not deliberate delay in filing the appeal. Absolutely no reasons are assigned to condone the inordinate delay of 16 years and 9 months. It clearly slept several years more than 16 years 09 months. Now suddenly raised and filed the present appeal only after the Judgment and award passed by this Court enhancing the 11 compensation in other matters, it is nothing but a fence-sitter. The appellant has filed present application to condone the delay of 16 years 09 months in filing the present appeal. Absolutely, no reasons are assigned except the application on merits of the appeal seeking parity with other judgments in respect of other LAC cases.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee /vs/ Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 while considering the delay in filing the appeal held in Para No.8 to 22 as under :-
"8. Before we delve into the factual scenario and the defensibility of the order condoning delay, it is seemly to state the obligation of the court while dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the approach to be adopted while considering the grounds for condonation of such colossal delay.12
9. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, a two-Judge Bench observed that: (SCC p.108 para 3) "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts."
(emphasis in original) The learned Judges emphasised on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. 13
10. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice.
11. In the said case the Division Bench observed that the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status and the courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause."
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12. In G.Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer, Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the court, has opined thus (SCC pp. 147-48, para 14) "14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumar, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd., v Nirmala Devi, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan and Collector (LA) v Katiji etc., There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred own special facts.
However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay"
15
13. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh The Court was dealing with a fact situation where the interim order passed by the court of first instance was an interpolated order and it was not ascertainable as to when the order was made. The said order was under appeal before the District Judge who declined to condone the delay and the said view was concurred with by the High Court. The Court, taking stock of the facts, came to hold that if such an interpolated order is allowed to stand, there would be failure of justice and, accordingly, set aside the orders impugned therein observing that the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be heard on merits.
14. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, the court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Shanti Misra, N. Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V.Ayisumm, came to hold that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protest public justice and it may result in public mischief.16
15. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn, where a two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that: (SCC p. 465, para 14) "14. ..... The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time."
Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal
approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.17
16. In Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh it has been held that: (SCC p.789, para 16) "16. While considering (an) application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not."
It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves.
17. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan, P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppoisetti Subba Rao and stated thus:
(Balwant Singh case, SCC p. 696, paras 25-
26).
"25. We may state that even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fail within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose 18 of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation".
"26. The law of limitation is substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."19
18. Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. Of Brihan Mumbai, the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil, wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus:
(Maniben Devraj Shah case, SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) "23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost".20
"24. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."
19. Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years.
20. In B.Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful. 21
21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1.(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legilise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4.(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigation is to be taken note of.22
21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7.(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.23
21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.24
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2.(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c.) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadiasical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters". 25
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar and others /vs/ State of Haryana and others, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1612 while considering the delay in filing the appeal at Paa No.11, 12 and 16 held as under:-
"11: The Courts should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However, the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.26
12: It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the Court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person.
16: In the instant case, after considering the facts and circumstances and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2 months and 29 days, the High Court did not find sufficient grounds to condone the delay".
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the "delay defeats equity" in the case of S.S.Balu and Another /vs/ State of Kerala and Others, reported in 2009 (2) SCC 479 at Para No.17 held as under:-
27
"17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. Appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were also wed and State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to isue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this state.
In New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh and Others (2007) 9 SCC 278, this Court held:28
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievance for a long time. They, as no ticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction."29
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act in the case of Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Vs. M.Prabhakar and Others, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607 at Para No.46 and 54 held as under:- "46. Re:Delay and Laches: Delay and laches is one of the factors that requires to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances".
"54. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are:30
(1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts.
(2) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights and emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners.
(3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that the had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy.31
(4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its o own facts.
(5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay".
12. In view of aforesaid reasons it is clear that except stating that there is a delay caused in filing this appeal is due to penury and financial constraints, the appellant has not explained the delay of 16 years 09 months in filing the appeal. Except contending parity, absolutely no reasons are assigned to condone the inordinate delay of 16 years and 9 months. It clearly slept several years more than 16 years 09 months. Now suddenly raised and filed the present appeal only after the Judgment and award passed by this Court enhancing the compensation in respect of other matters, it is nothing but a fence-sitter. It is well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity" to other side. 32
13. In view of aforesaid reasons and dictums of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, stated supra this Court is of the considered opinion that absolutely, the claimant has not made out any sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of 16 years 09 months in filing the appeal.
14. The appellant has not made out any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and award by exercising the powers this Court under the provisions of Section 54(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Accordingly, I.A.1/2015 for condoning the delay of more than 16 years 09 months in filing the appeal is dismissed as devoid of merits and consequently appeal also dismissed.
Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
JUDGE MWS/KJJ Ct:VK