Madras High Court
A.P. Sagar And Ors. vs Govindaswami Gramani on 4 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1996)1MLJ146, 1996 A I H C 4844, (1996) 1 MAD LJ 146
Author: Ar. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
JUDGMENT AR. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The unsuccessful defendants in O.S. No. 268 of 1987 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry, are the appellants in this second appeal.
2. The case of the plaintiff/respondent in short is as follows: The respondent is the owner of 'A', 'B' and 'C portions of the suit schedule property. The said property is the ancestral property of the respondent. Under the registered lease deed Ex. A-1 dated 13.11.1967, the respondent had leased out portion 'A' of the suit property to one Pavadai Naicker, the father of the appellants/defendants. On the same day, he had leased out the remaining portions of the suit property in favour of one Sinna Ponnu, sister of Pavadai Naicker under Ex. A-2 lease deed. The said Sinna Ponnu had vacated and handed over possession of 'B' and 'C portions of the suit property to the respondent. However, Pavadai Naicker continued to keep portion 'A' ofthe suit property and was paying rent to the respondent. Pavadai Naicker died in the year 1968. After his death, the appellants, who are his sons, refused to pay rent to the respondent and claimed ownership to the entire suit property. The 1st appellant, in support of his claim of title to the suit property, collusively filed O.S. No. 546 of 1984 on the file of the First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, against appellants 2 and 3 behind the back of the respondent herein, praying for partition and separate possession of the suit properties. The plaint was presented on 12.11.1984 and taken on file on 17.11.1984. A preliminary decree was passed in O.S. No. 546 of 1984 on 18.12.1984 within a month's time from the date of suit. Ex. A-3 is the preliminary decree. A compromise memo was filed by the parties viz., the appellants herein who are the plaintiff and defendants therein, and on the basis of the same, the First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, divided the property into three equal shares as shown in the plan and allotted each of the parties equally. The compromise memo was signed on 13.3.1985. The final decree passed by the First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, dated 13.3.1985 is marked as Ex. A-4. Pursuant to the final decree, the appellants had taken delivery of possession of their alleged shares through Court as per Exs.B-4 to B-9. Relying on the partition decree, the appellants have attempted to remove the fence put up by the respondent around portions 'B' and 'C of the suit property. Therefore, the respondent was constrained to file O.S. No. 268 of 1987 for the following reliefs:
(a) To declare that the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 546 of 1984 on the file of the Sub Judge, Pondicherry, are null and void.
(b) To declare that the plaintiff/respondent is the absolute owner of the same and to recover possession.
(c) For permanent injunction.
(d) Costs of suit.
3. The appellants/defendants filed their written statement. The case of the defendants is briefly as follows: They denied that the respondent is the owner of the suit property, and that their father Pavadai Naicker never recognised the right and title of the respondent over the suit property nor executed any lease deed on 13.11.1967. Pavadai Naicker did not pay any rent to the respondent till he died on 29.6.1968. The respondent did not file any antecedent title deeds to sustain his claim. The suit property is in the possession and enjoyment of the father of the appellants for more than thirty years and thereafter the appellants are in continuous possession of the same by residing therein. The appellants have thus perfected their title to the suit property. I Tie respondent never enjoyed the suit property and that the patta and tax receipts are concocted and prepared by the respondent by using influence for the purpose of this case. The document of lease is also a concocted one. The suit property was the ancestral property of the father of the appellants. The 1st appellant filed O.S. No. 546 of 1984 on the file of the First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, against appellants 2 and 3 and obtained a preliminary decree and final decree for partition. Thereupon, the appellants took possession of portions 'A','B' and 'C of the suit property through court in execution proceedings. The suit summons were also served on the appellants in the said address.
4. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:
1. Whether the property, as found in the lease deed dated 13. 11.1967 as relied by the plaintiff, is one and the same of the suit item? Or, they are the different items as alleged by the defendants?
2. Whether the measurements given by the plaintiff to the suit item and to the item as found in the lease deed dated 13.11.1967, are correct?
3. Whether the boundary descriptions are correct ones with reference to the measurements as found in the suit item and the document dated 13.11.1967?
4. Is it not a case filed by the plaintiff for misleading the court by concocting a document dated 13.11.1967 as alleged by the defendants?
5. Is it true that the prayer of the plaintiff is inconsistent i.e., asking for recovery of possession and injunction?
6. Whether the court-fee paid by the plaintiff is correct when he is not in possession?
7. Whether the defendants are having valid title over the suit items and got decree as found in O.S. No. 546 of 1984 and can it be set aside?
8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for?
9. What relief, if any?
10. And order as to costs?
5. On the side of the plaintiff/respondent, P.Ws. 1 to 5 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-6 were marked. On the side of the defendants/appellants, D.Ws. 1 to 6 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-13 were marked. The trial court, on a consideration of the materials placed before it, decreed the suit as prayed for. The unsuccessful defendants filed A.S. No. 19 of 1993 on the file of the Second Additional District Judge, Pondicherry. The learned Second Additional District Judge, on a consideration of the materials placed before him, decided the point for determination in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. Hence the present second appeal by the defendants. 6.1 have heard the arguments of Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, and Mr. G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent.
6. As seen already, the respondent filed the suit against the appellants for declaration of his title to the suit property and for consequential relief of declaration in regard to the decree in O.S. No. 546 of 1984 on the file of the First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, besides possession and injunction. The respondent, in proof of his title, relied on a document viz., Ex. A-1 dated 13.11.1967 executed in his favour by one Pavadai Naicker in the presence of a Notary. The execution of the said document was witnessed by two witnesses besides the writer. The case of the respondent was that the lessee under the document viz., Pavadai Naicker was the father of the appellants. The respondent had also produced another document bearing the same date viz., 13.11.1967, marked as Ex. A-2. This document covers another portion of the suit property.
7. The respondent's case is that Pavadai Naicker, who executed Ex. A-1, was paying rent till his death and thereafter, the appellants, who are the sons of Pavadai Naicker, did not pay the rent and that the 1st appellant, with a view to gain the suit property, falsely instituted O.S. No. 546 of 1984 on the file of the Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, for partition and in collusion with the other appellants, obtained a decree in a fraudulent manner. The appellants denied the truth of the averments made by the respondent. They also denied that their father died only five years prior to 1987. It was contended that the death was as early as 29.6.1968. They also allege that the lease document has been concocted by the respondent. It was claimed that the father of the appellants lived in the suit property for more than thirty years and that the appellants were born only there and had been continuing to reside there. It was also claimed that the suit property was the ancestral property of the father of the appellants who enjoyed it by actually residing there. It was further claimed that their father had perfected his title over the property by long possession and enjoyment. The suit, which was dismissed for default was subsequently restored to file and after it was restored to file, the respondent examined himself as P.W. I on commission on 30.12.1991 and 6.1.1992 and when he attempted to mark the two documents dated 13.11.1967 during his chief-examination as Exs.A-1 and A-2, their marking was objected to on behalf of the appellants as they are unregistered ones. The Commissioner, however, marked the same subject to the objections.
8. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that though the respondent had averred in the plaint that the father of the appellants had paid rent till his death to the respondent, the same was not spoken to by him in his evidence and that he admitted that he could not identify the signatures found in the documents dated 13.11.1967. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that there were no rent receipts apart from the documents dated 13.11.1967, and though he deposed that the suit property has antecedent document standing in his name, he has not filed the same. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam has taken me through the evidence tendered by one Arumugham, examined as P.W. 2, who was working as Karnam at Muthialpet for four years. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out from the evidence of P.W. 2 the admission made by him viz., that he did not know the person who prepared the chitta register and that he cannot say whether the receipt Ex. A-5 dated 30.12.1991 was in respect of the suit property. On Asokan, Deputy Tahsildar, Town Taluk Office, gave evidence as P.W. 3.
9. A comment was made in regard to the filing of I.A. Nos. 2741, 2742 and 2743 of 1992 by the plaintiff in the trial court on 15.12.1992 to re-open the plaintiff s side and to recall the plaintiff as P.W. 1 and to pass an order directing him to produce the document kept in his custody to show the conditions of the respondent's documents. In this connection, Mr. S. Gopalaratnam invited my attention to the evidence of P.W. 1, who was examined on commission on 6.1.1992. He relied on the following portion in the evidence of P.W. 1 in support of his defence:
The suit property has antecedent document. It stands in my name. I have filed the document in court. It was my father's property and I got it towards my share. I don't know how my father get the property. My father settled the suit property in my name and I don't know when it was settled by my father in my name. I have filed the documents in the court. I don't know whether my father has obtained any notariate. I have obtained notariate in my name.
10. My attention was also drawn to the affidavit sworn to by the respondent on 15.12.1992 and filed in support of the above mentioned three interlocutory applications, wherein it is stated as follows:
I beg to submit that I was seriously bedridden with loss of my eye sight. Due to my illness my memory also seriously affected. Hence I did not depose (before) the Advocate Commissioner the reason for not producing the title deed of the suit property. Most of our family documents are more than 100 years old. The pages of the several documents are just like Pappadam and I am unable to touch the pages with my hands. Thus, I am unable to search and take out particular document relating to the suit property. Hence, I have also filed an application to permit me to produce these documents with such conditions in order to prove the inability of taking out the said particular document from and out of several documents, which are highly bad conditions.... I beg to state that own documents of title deeds are more than 100 years and the pages of several documents are just like Pappadam and I am unable to touch the same with hands, without knowing the name of the person sold and the date of the document. I am unable to get a certified copy of the same. Hence, I am prepared to produce the documents kept in my custody to prove and to show the conditions of my documents. I also submit that if I am not permitted to do so, I will be put to irreparable loss and hardship.
However, according to Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, the respondent did not press those three applications and the trial court dismissed the same as not pressed on 23.12.1992. On the same day the trial court delivered judgment in the suit decreeing the same. The appeal filed by the defendants was dismissed by the lower appellate court on 30.9.1994.
11. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the respondent has to affirmatively prove his title and he cannot rely on the evidence of the witnesses examined by the appellants to prove his title. According to Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, in the instant case, it will be clear from what has been referred to supra that the respondent who earlier made a claim that he has produced the title deeds, had to admit that he had not produced any document showing his title. While in his affidavits filed in support of the three Interlocutory Applications he claimed to be in possession of the particular document relating to the suit property and made a pretence of an attempt to produce the same, beat a safe retreat from doing so for some unexplained reason known only to himself.
12. As regards the documents dated 13.11.1967, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the trial court does not appear to have passed any order admitting the same in evidence since they were allowed to be marked by the Commissioner only subject to the objections as to their admissibility. He would further urge that even though they could be marked in evidence, it should be obvious that they were not proved by letting in evidence. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Gopalaratnam pointed out the rulings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court which are to the effect that proof of a document does not mean the proof of its contents and that the said rulings had been followed by this Court as well.
13. Referring to Ex. A-1, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the respondent was not able to read the document or identify the signature thereon and that the appellants never admitted that the document referred to as Ex. A-1 before the Commissioner contained the signature of Pavadai Naicker, their father. D.Ws. 1 and 6 have deposed that they were unacquainted with the signature of their father Pavadai Naicker. Commenting upon the finding of the courts below that the document referred to as Ex. A-1 was proved to have been executed by Pavadai Naicker, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the courts below have totally ignored the evidence let in before them and have acted on mere conjectures and that the courts below have failed to note that the plaintiff/respondent did not make any attempt to place before court either the two attesting witnesses or the writer of the same, whose names appeared on the face of the documents, nor even the notaire. According to the learned Senior Counsel, Ex. A-1 has not been admitted in evidence and that the respondent has not proved his title to the suit property and while coming to the conclusion, the Courts below have mis-read the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 and D.W. 2. Likewise, Ex. A-5 dated 30.12.1991, which came into existence after the institution of the suit on 21.9.1987, is not admissible in evidence.
14. Mr.G. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, in reply to the arguments of Mr.S. Gopalaratnam, has also invited my attention to the pleadings and the evidence tendered by both parties, both oral and documentary. He has also argued the case elaborately with reference to the evidence tendered by both parties, more particularly with reference to the documents. According to him, the respondent, to prove his title, relied on the lease deed executed by Pavadai Naicker in favour of the respondent and marked as Ex. A-1. He also relied on Exs.A-2 and A-6 and the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5.1 have gone through the evidence of the P.Ws. and the D.Ws.
15. P.Ws. 1, 4 and 5 have consistently spoken about the title of the respondent and the occupation of the same by Pavadai Naicker as tenant. P.W. 2, Karnam has specifically stated that in the Chitta Register, for the property mentioned in Patta No. 332, the name of the respondent, son of Appavou, is found. The respondent has also marked Ex. A-6, copy of Chitta Register. P.W. 3, Deputy Tahsildar has deposed that Ex. A-6 was issued from the Chitta Register. He has also deposed that the properties mentioned in Patta No. 332 are private properties.
16. As rightly pointed out by Mr.S. Gopalaratnam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the case of the appellants has to stand or fall depending upon the genuineness and the admissibility of Ex. A-1.1 have perused Ex. A-1. It is a registered rental agreement dated 13.11.1967 executed by the father of the appellants in favour of the respondent. Ex. A-1 is written in hand on a stamped paper. On the reverse of page 1 of Ex. A-1, we find the signatures of Pavadai Naicker, father of the appellants, respondent and witnesses Pakkiriswami and Krishna Naicker. The scribe has also signed the document. I also find registration endorsement on the reverse of page 1 and the signature of the Registrar is found in page 2. As already seen, the appellants have objected to the markingof Ex. A-1 only on the ground that it is an unregistered document. Therefore, the trial court has marked the said document subject to the said objection. It is now seen that Ex. A-1 is a registered one duly signed by both the parties to the document and witnessed by two witnesses. The scribe of the document has also signed in the document.
17. In addition to the above, reliance was also placed by the respondent on Ex. A-6, copy of the chitta issued by the Deputy Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Pondicherry, in respect of Patta No. 332 standing in the name of the respondent, wherein the suit property has been mentioned as patta land registered in the name of the respondent. Besides the same, the 3rd defendant, who was examined as D.W. 6 has admitted during the course of cross-examination as follows:
Patta for the suit property stood in the name of Govindaswami Gramani even in 1985 and tax was paid by us for the said property till this date.... I know that the patta for the suit property stood in the name of Govindaswami Gramani in 1985. I did not give any objection or application to change the patta to our name.... We did not pay tax for the suit property prior to 1985.... We filed the suit in 1984.
18. The oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5 supported by Ex. A-1, registered rental agreement dated 13.11.1967, Ex. A-6 chitta extract showing Patta No. 332 standing in the name of Govindaswami Gramani, and the clear admission of the 3rd defendant and D.W. 6 that patta for the suit lands stood in the name of Govindaswami Gramani as early as 1985, prove beyond doubt that the respondent is the owner of the suit property and that the appellants' father Pavadai Naicker was a tenant in respect of portion 'A' of the suit property and consequently, the appellants, who claim through the said Pavadai Naicker, are estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff.
19. As against the above evidence and proof of the respondent's case, Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, placed reliance on Exs. B-1 to B-8 and on the oral evidence of D.Ws. 1 to 6. D.W. 1, the 1st appellant has taken not only inconsistent but also mutually destructive stand as follows:
The suit property is my ancestral property.... The suit property has become our property on the basis of prolonged possession.... The suit property is a poramboke land.
To support the case of ancestral title and prolonged possession, no documentary evidence was produced. However, to show that the suit property is a Natham Poramboke, reliance was placed on Ex. B-2 dated 30.6.1992, which is an extract from the Settlement Register.
20. Next we come to Ex. A-6, which is the copy of the Revenue Record and which was admittedly issued by the Taluk Office. I have also perused Ex. A-6. All the columns in Ex. A-6 were duly filled in whereas it was not so with Ex. B-2. A perusal of Ex. A-6 and B-2 would clearly establish that it is Ex. A-6 which should be relied on. Further, the appellants' defence viz., that the suit property is a poramboke land was a defence developed when P.W. 1 was in the box. There is no pleading in the written statement that the suit property is poramboke land. It is because of that the trial court held as follows:
But, suddenly during the cross-examination the defendants took a completely different stand which was not pleaded in their written statement or in Ex. B-4 that the suit property originally belong to Government and classified as "Poramboke or Natham'. It is a well settled law that any amount of evidence let in without pleading cannot be taken into consideration.
21. It is useful to extract the finding of the trial court which considered Ex. A-6. It runs thus:
Ex. A-6 is the copy of the Revenue Record compared and certified to be the true copy of the Chitta Register as per evidence of P.W. 2 (Deputy Tahsildar). It is also affirmed by P.W. 2 that Ex. A-5 is the receipt for payment of tax for the property wherein Cad.No.667 Pt., Which stand in the name of the plaintiff.... Ex. B-3 is admittedly copied from the Settlement Register, 1973. Even as per Ex. B-3, the patta for the said property stands in the name of the plaintiff. It is admitted by the 3rd defendant/D.W. 6 that patta for the suit property stood in the name of the plaintiff even in 1985 and even after knowing about it, the defendants did not give any objection or application to change the patta.
22. Six witnesses were examined on the side of the appellants. D.W. 2, Revenue Inspector, apart from producing Ex. B-2, has not supported the case of the appellants. Similarly, D.Ws. 3 to5, who are supposed to be independent witnesses, were not able to give material corroboration to the case of the appellants. The oral evidence of D.W. 6, the 3rd defendant, supports the case of the respondent. Similarly, D.W. 1, the 1st defendant, has not come forward to deny the signature of his father in Ex. A-1. He has only stated that he was not aware of the signature of his father. In the absence of a clear denial of the signature of the father of the appellants, the registered lease deed executed more than 20 years prior to the institution of the suit and produced from the custody of the landlord/respondent deserves acceptance and reliance. The documentary evidence viz., Ex. B-1 to B-l 1 do not lend support to the case of the appellants since all these documents, save Exs. B-4 to B-9, came into existence after the institution of the suit. Exs. B-4 to B-9 relate to the collusive partition suit proceedings created by the appellants behind the back of the respondent.
23. As already seen, O.S. No. 546 of 1984 was filed by the 1st appellant against appellants 2 and 3. That suit was for a preliminary decree for partition declaring that the plaintiff therein has got 1/3rd share in the suit property. The plaint was presented on 12.11,1984 and taken on file on 17.11.1984. According to the plaintiff therein, the cause of action for that suit arose at Pondicherry on 14.7.1983, 6.10.1984, 9.10.1984 and 18.10.1984 and subsequently. The suit was valued at Rs. 4,500 being the 1/3rd share of Rs. 13,500 and a court-fee of Rs. 30 is paid. On behalf of the plaintiff therein, Mr. S. Anandabaskaran, Advocate, appeared and the defendant appeared in person and submitted to a decree. The decree was passed on 18.11.1984, i.e., within one month from the date of taking the plaint on file.
24. Ex. A-4 is the application filed by the plaintiff therein to pass final decree for partition of the properties by metes and bounds. In the final decree proceedings, the 1st appellant herein was represented by a lawyer and appellants 2 and 3 herein were represented by one Mr. T. Thiruvengadam. The final decree was passed on the basis of a compromise memo filed by the appellants herein. In my opinion, with a view to create documents of title to the suit property, the 1st appellant collusively filed O.S. No. 546 of 1984 against appellants 2 and 3. The respondent herein was not a party to that suit and the decree was obtained behind his back. As already seen, within a month from the date of the suit, the appellants have obtained a preliminary decree in that suit collusively and have also taken delivery of their alleged shares through Court as per Exs.B-4 to B-9. I have already mentioned the inconsistent and mutually destructive pleadings of the appellants in their written statement filed in the present suit. At one breadth they say that the property is their ancestral property. On the other, they say that they have perfected their title by continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than thirty years. In the course of evidence they raised another plea that the suit property is a poramboke land. They have also denied that their father Pavadai Naicker had executed any lease deed on 13.11.1967.
25. The present suit is essentially for a declaration of title to the suit property, recovery of possession and for permanent injunction besides declaring the decree in O.S. No. 546 of 1984 as null and void. In my opinion, the respondent has established his title by producing Ex. A-1, registered lease deed, which was executed long prior to the present suit. Irudayam Ammal v. Salayath Mary , is adecision by a Division Bench of our High Court wherein this Court held that registration by itself in all cases is not proof of execution, but, if no other evidence is available, the certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of its execution and the certificate of the registering office under Section 60 of the Registration Act is relevant for proving execution. This Court has already noticed that Ex. A-1 is a registered document. The registration is a solemn act and that the court can presume that the Registrar performs his duty of satisfying himself that the document presented to him for registration was duly executed by the executant. In this case, the respondent has not only proved beyond doubt that Ex. A-1 was executed by Pavadai Naicker, father of the appellants, but has also proved by other evidence that the respondent is the owner of the suit property, and that the father of the appellants was paying rent to the respondent and that the appellants have collusively filed O.S. No. 546 of 1984 in order to put forth a false claim of ownership to the suit property.
26. This apart, Ex. A-1 is a registered document, which, in my opinion, is prima facie proof of execution of that document. I am of the view that the registration of Ex. A-1 itself enhances the reliability and evidenciary value of the said document. The said document was produced from proper custody of the respondent. The respondent's title to the suit property is also supported by Ex. A-6 relating to Patta No. 332 standing in the name of the respondent. Ex. A-6 is clearly proved by P.W. 2 Karnam and P.W. 3, Deputy Tahsildar. Above all, the clear admission of D.W. 6, the 3rd defendant that the patta for the suit property stood in the name of the respondent even prior to 1985 would clearly go to show that the respondent is the owner of the suit property. Therefore, the respondent's title to the suit property is supported by other documentary evidence as well as the oral evidence on record. Hence, in my opinion, the respondent has clearly established his case of ownership and the tenancy of the appellants' father Pavadai Naicker with him.
27. Mr. S. Gopalaratnam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants relied on the decision reported in Nagar Palika Jind v. Jaget Singh, Advocate , to say that the suit of the respondent should not be decreed merely on the basis of the entries on the revenue records and that in a suit for ejectment based on title, it was incumbent on the part of the Court of Appeal first to record a finding on the claim of title to the suit land made on behalf of the other person. In my opinion, the courts below have clearly recorded a finding on the claim of title to the suit land made on behalf of the respondent herein. I am not persuaded to take a different view than the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the courts below on an appraisal of the evidence placed before them.
28. The decision reported in Jagdish Narain v. Nawab Said Ahmed Khan (1946) 2 M.L.J. 98 : A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 59, was cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to say that the plaintiff has to prove his case and should not take shelter or plead defects in the case of the other side. As already seen, the plaintiff/respondent, in my view, has proved his case by letting in oral and documentary evidence.
29. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants then relied on the decision reported in Doraiswami v. Rettinammal (1978) 1 M.L.J. 546. In that case, a Division Bench of our High Court held that the identification of the signature of 'A' could only mean that document contained the signature of 'A' and that would not amount to the proof of execution of the document as there was a possibility of the signature of 'A' having been taken on blank paper or on a misrepresentation that the document represented a different transaction. In this case, as already pointed out, the appellants in their evidence have not denied the signature of their father Pavadai Naicker but they only say that they could not identify the signature found in the document Ex. A-1. It is also not the case of the appellants that the signature of their father was taken on blank paper or on a mis-representation that the document represents a different transaction. Hence, I am of the view that this judgment is distinguishable on facts.
30. The courts below have also concurrently decreed the suit of the respondent as prayed for. This being a second appeal filed under Section 100, C.P.C., against the concurrent judgments, no substantial question of law would arise for consideration. There are no error of jurisdiction or law or perversity on the face of the records. Hence, a re-appraisal of the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion than the one concurrently arrived at by the courts below is not warranted. This Court is also not expected to embark upon such re-appraisal of evidence in the second appeal. I do not find any reason to differ from the concurrent finding rendered by the courts below.
31. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are confirmed and the second appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.