Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Dev Raj Singh vs Cabinet Secretariat on 5 December, 2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.1607 OF 2019
Orders reserved on : 20.11.2025
Orders pronounced on : 5.12.2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Dev Raj Singh, Age-56 years,
Junior Technical Officer-I
Group -B, Subject: Removal from Service
S/o Sh. Jagdish Prasad,
R/o C-69, Sector-37,
Greater Noida(UP).
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Sachin Chauhan)
VERSUS
1. Union of India,
Through its Cabinet secretary,
Govt. of India,
New Delhi.
2. The Cabinet Secretary,
Cabinet Secretariat,
Rastrapati Bhawan,
Raisina Hill Road,
New Delhi-11.
3. The Director General .(Security),
Directorate General of Security,
Cabinet Secretariat, East Block-V,
R.K. Puram, New Delhi-66
4. The Special Secretary,
Aviation Research Center,
Directorate General of Security,
Cabinet Secretariat, East Block-V,
R.K. Puram, New Delhi-66.
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5. Sh.D. Pattanaik,
Dy. Director (Admn.),
Aviation Research Center,
Directorate General of Security,
Cabinet Secretariat, East Block-V,
R.K. Puram, New Delhi-66.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri R.K. Jain)
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:
"8.1 To quash and set-aside the order dated 25 .1. 2018 whereby the extreme punishment i.e. removal from service is being imposed upon the applicant, order dated 7. 5. 2018 whereby the statutory appeal made against the order of removal from service has been rejected and to further direct the respondent that applicant be reinstated back in service forthwith with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowance.
8.2 To quash and set aside the memorandum dated 16.7.2015 whereby D.E. is being initiated along with Article of Charge and Imputation of Misconduct.
8.3 To quash and set aside the order dated 28.4.2016 whereby request for change of E.O. has been rejected.
8.4 To quash and set aside the order dated 2.2.2016 whereby the request of applicant for providing defense document has been rejected.
8.5 To quash and set aside the Order dated 25.1.16 whereby it was communicated that Defense Assistant of the applicant i.e. Sh. Amrik Singh was rejected by the respondent and the applicant can have Defense Assistant from ARC only.
8.6 To quash and set aside the order dated 23.2.2016 whereby defense assistant is being allowed subject to fulfilling various conditions.
8.7 Report dated 25.11.2017 Or/and Any other relief which this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper may also be awarded to the applicant."
2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 3 OA No.1607/2019 FACTS OF THE CASE
2. After rendering 26 years of service in the Indian Air Force, the applicant joined the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) on 05.05.2007 as Junior Technical Officer Grade-II at Sarsawa, Saharanpur, following a distinguished 26-year career in the Indian Air Force. It is stated by the applicant that he earned commendation certificates during his tenure both in the Indian Air Force and in ARC (Annexures 46 and 47). 2.1 The applicant was transferred from Sarsawa (near Saharanpur) to Delhi w.e.f. 01.06.2010 after completion of three years, and was deployed at ARC Palam.
2.2 Thereafter the applicant was transferred from Delhi to Sarsawa vide order dated 13.08.2013. At that time, although the applicant had completed only three years in Delhi, there were about 6 to 8 officials in the applicant's own trade (JTO-II Radar) and around 70 to 80 officials in general, who had remained in Delhi for much longer periods, many for 10 to 15 years without being transferred even once. The applicant submitted representations dated 21.08.2013 (Annexure A-22) and 23.08.2013 (Annexure A-23) to the Special Secretary, ARC Headquarters, pointing out that the officers with a much longer stay had been retained while he alone had been singled out. 2.3 The competent authority (Special Secretary, ARC) vide order dated 06.09.2013 cancelled the aforesaid order of transfer of the applicant from Delhi to Sarsawa.
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2.4 The applicant, along with 28 officials, were detailed for the MI-
17 V5 Helicopter Course was to be conducted from 22.09.2014 to 14.11.2014 (Annexure A-24) at IAF Station Bagdogra, West Bengal, vide Message No. TC/263 dated 23.06.2014. In order to comply with the training requirement, the applicant undertook the following steps:
a) Booked ticket of Rajdhani Express Train No. 12436 from NDLS to DBRT for 21.09.2014 (Annexure A-25).
b) Applied for tour advance of ₹47,000/-, which was credited on 23.08.2014 and later refunded with penal interest (₹48,270/- via DD on 17.11.2014). (Annexure A-26 to A-29)
c) Requested a colleague, Shri R.N. Mandal, to arrange shared accommodation.
d) Shifted his family from Govt. accommodation to his native village so that his mother, who had suffered a hip-joint fracture in Jan - Feb 2014 could receive care during the period of training. 2.5 On 18.09.2014, the applicant developed fever and body ache. On medical advice, he applied for one day CL for 19.09.2014, which was duly sanctioned and entered in the Daily Servicing Section (DSS) Leave Register whose existence was later admitted by the then Chief Engineering Officer (CEO), ARC Palam.
2.6 The applicant's condition worsened and he was diagnosed with Typhoid based on pathology reports dated 19.09.2014 and 04.10.2014 (Annexure A-11), both showing positive results. He remained under treatment of Dr. K.K. Sharma, who issued medical and fitness certificates covering the period 19.09.2014 to 24.10.2014 (Annexure 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 5 OA No.1607/2019 A-31). The applicant reported back for duty on 27.10.2014 (25 - 26 October being weekend holidays) and submitted a medical certificate along with an application for 36 days commuted leave. 2.7 On 05.11.2014, the applicant was called by Air Vice Marshal Sauvik Ray, Joint Director (Air), who examined the medical documents and directed him to submit the papers to Shri P.K. Singh (then Dy. CE, Palam), for onward reporting to ARC Headquarters. This was necessary because during the applicant's illness, CEO Palam, Shri S.K. Sinha, had sent a letter dated 29.09.2014 to ARC HQ recommending administrative action against the applicant. Despite having knowledge and acknowledging in the said communication that the applicant had intimated his sickness and leave extension, "Court of Inquiry" (COI), without jurisdiction and contrary to CCS Rules, was ordered on 11.11.2014 against the applicant to which the applicant submitted a detailed response explaining that:
His absence was purely medical.
All medical documents were duly submitted.
There was no intention to avoid training.
A COI is impermissible for civilian Government employees.
2.8 During the DE proceedings held later, the applicant received an
extract of the COI report dated 27.11.2014. Paras 8 and 9 conclusively recorded:
The applicant had indeed fallen sick on 19.09.2014, He suffered from Typhoid and was medically unfit up to 24.10.2014, 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 6 OA No.1607/2019 His absence was due to illness.
2.9 Thus, no misconduct was established. Despite this, CEO Palam, Shri S.K. Sinha, still recommended "suitable action," demonstrating clear malice.
2.10 As no information was communicated regarding the status of his commuted leave or the COI, the applicant submitted an application dated 05.01.2015 to the Special Secretary, ARC, requesting:
Status of leave
Copy of COI findings
Legal authority under which COI was conducted
2.11 On 19.01.2015, the applicant was called by Dy. Director
(Personnel), Shri S. Balachandra Iyer, who merely advised him to "use proper language" but could not point out any improper words, nor did he provide the information sought.
2.12 The applicant received a Memorandum dated 24.02.2015 from AD (Pers-C) cautioning him about "improper language," despite the fact that no such language was ever identified and no query raised earlier was addressed.
2.13 The applicant submitted another application dated 10.03.2015 requesting:
Withdrawal of the Memorandum;
Identification of the alleged improper language;
Information sought in his earlier applications;
However, no reply was provided to the same.
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2.14 The aforesaid leave was sanctioned vide Order No.23/2015
dated 25.03.2015 (Annexure A-30) which, according to the applicant, came to his knowledge only during the DE proceedings in February 2016.
2.15 The applicant received another Memorandum dated 28.04.2015 stating that the matter of not attending the MCF course had been closed on medical grounds, but again alleging discourteous behaviour without identifying any act or responding to the applicant's pending requests.
2.16 On the same issue, the applicant submitted further applications dated 29.04.2015 and 13.05.2015 reiterating his requests for information and withdrawal of the memoranda. But no response was ever given.
2.17 In January 2015, despite being trained only for first-line servicing on AN-32 aircraft, the applicant was wrongfully detailed for fourth-line servicing (Life Extension Checks) at AF Station Kanpur.
However, he completed the task successfully.
2.18 It is stated by the applicant that during this assignment, CEO Palam, Shri S.K. Sinha, instructed the applicant to send him a pair of shoes from Kanpur. The applicant complied and sent a pair costing ₹250/- along with the bill. The CEO initially accepted the shoes but returned them after seeing the price, evidently displeased. Immediately thereafter, the applicant's APAR for 2014-15 was deliberately downgraded without explanation and he was compelled to sign the APAR.
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2.19 The applicant submitted a representation dated 15.09.2015
against the lower grading in the aforesaid APAR. This was rejected through an unsigned, non-speaking order vide AD (NGO) letter dated 09.12.2015, stating merely that the request had been rejected. 2.20 The applicant was again detailed for the same MI-17 V5 course from 22.06.2015 to 14.08.2015 along with 23 other officials vide Message No. CT/505 dated 17.12.2014. In compliance, he:
1. Booked travel tickets for 20.06.2015, later rescheduled to 13.06.2015 due to advancement of course dates.
2. Applied for tour advance, which was later refunded with penal interest.
3. Surrendered government accommodation and shifted family and ailing parents to Greater Noida near the ECHS Polyclinic.
4. Updated his address with ARC Headquarters.
2.21 Out of 23 officials, eight (Shri U.K.K. Pandit, Shri S.K. Sharma, Shri K.N. Puttatunda, Shri C. Pramod Kumar, Shri Sreemadhavan TRM, Shri M.K. Thakur, Shri R.V. Chaubey and the applicant) did not attend the course. No action was taken against the seven others.
However, only the applicant was subjected to a departmental enquiry, which clearly demonstrates hostility and discrimination. 2.22 On 11.06.2015, the applicant received an urgent message from his wife through the DSS (Daily Servicing Section) Office and the Technical Control Room of the CEO's Office informing that the applicant's aged mother had suddenly taken ill and her condition had 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 9 OA No.1607/2019 deteriorated severely. Since mobile phones are not permitted inside the office premises, the message was relayed through office channels. 2.23 The applicant immediately sought permission from his superior, ATO Shri B.N. Reddy, and made an entry in the DSS Book- Out Register. However, the Technical Adjutant Shri S.K. Tayal directed the applicant to wait until instructions were received from the then CEO, Palam, Shri S.K. Sinha. Pursuant to directions of the CEO, the applicant was advised to apply for 1 and ½ days Casual Leave for the afternoon of 11.06.2015 and 12.06.2015 with suffix of 13.06.2015 and 14.06.2015, for attending his ailing mother. He was further instructed that if her condition improved, he should proceed for the MCF Training; otherwise, he should seek extension of leave. 2.24 The applicant applied for 1½ days Casual Leave for the afternoon of 11.06.2015 to 12.06.2015, which was duly sanctioned and recorded in the Approved Leave Register of DSS. Thereafter, the applicant proceeded to Dadri Hospital where his wife had taken his mother. Due to further deterioration of her mother's health, she was shifted to Green City Hospital, Greater Noida and remained under continuous treatment and observation.
2.25 The applicant accordingly conveyed the request for extension of leave through DSS. It is pertinent that two other officials, Shri Braj Lal Mehla and Shri P.K. Deo, who were also to proceed for the same training, did not proceed due to their wait-listed tickets. An aircraft was arranged exclusively for them, whereas, the applicant was not informed of such arrangement. This reflects that the leave of the 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 10 OA No.1607/2019 applicant was duly sanctioned and that the CE and CEO were, in fact, not inclined to send the applicant for training and instead created circumstances to falsely implicate him.
2.26 The applicant re-joined duty on 24.06.2015, after 13 days, and submitted an application for Earned Leave along with medical documents concerning his mother's treatment. The CEO recommended the leave, as reflected in both the CEO's Leave Register and the Approved Leave Register of DSS.
2.27 However, on 16.07.2015 (Annexure A-3), the applicant was served with a Memorandum containing three Articles of Charge, which reads as under:-
"Article - I : That the said Shri Dev Raj Singh, while working as JTO- I in the office of the CEO, ARC, Air Wing, Palam, Delhi, on account of operational commitments of the Department and national security interests, was detailed twice to undergo MCF training at Air Force Station, Bagdogra, West Bengal on MI-17 Helicopter, but on both the occasions he flouted the lawful orders of his seniors in this regard and did not undergo the said training, even when it was specifically communicated to him the second time that his not attending the course would be viewed adversely.
By the above said acts of commission and omission, Shri Dev Raj Singh, JTO-I (RADAR) has disobeyed the lawful orders of his superiors and failed to maintain devotion to duty and acted in a manner highly unbecoming of a Government servant. By doing so he has violated Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article - II : That the said Shri Dev Raj Singh, while working as JTO- I in the office of the CEO, ARC, Air Wing, Palam, Delhi, was detailed to undergo MCF training w.e.f. 15.06.2015 to 07.08.2015, but instead of attending the said course and complying with the orders of the superior authority in this regard, he applied for 1 ½ day CL and left his Hqrs without prior permission or sanction of the competent authority on 11.06.2015 and resumed his duties after a lapse of 13 days and remaining unauthorisedly absent for a period w.e.f. 11.06.2015 to 23.06.2015.
By the above said acts of commission and omission, Shri Dev Raj Singh, JTO-I (RADAR) has failed to maintain devotion to duty and acted in a manner highly unbecoming of a Government servant. By doing so he has violated Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
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Article - III : That the said Shri Dev Raj Singh, while working as JTO-I in the office of the CEO, ARC, Air Wing, Palam, Delhi while detailed to undergo MCF training at Air Force Station, Bagdogra, West Bengal on MI-17 Helicopter, has made representations against the said detailment in which he challenged the training, imputed motives to actions of his superior officers and has gone beyond representing his grievance to questioning the training imperatives of the Department, thus grossly overstepping his brief and jurisdiction, and that too, in intemperate language.
He has thus by these acts of commission acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a Government servant and has accordingly violated Rule 3(1)(iii) and Rule 3A(a) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
2.28 By the aforesaid Memorandum, the applicant was directed to submit a written statement of his defence within 10 days of receipt of the said Memorandum and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person.
2.29 In response to the aforesaid Memorandum, the applicant has submitted his reply on 27.07.2015 (Annexure A-9) denying all the charges levelled against him by giving his detailed reply to the same. The applicant has also submitted additional documents and statement in reply to the said charge Memorandum on 14.09.2015 (Annexure A-10).
2.30 Annoyed with the additional reply dated 14.09.2015 in which the applicant, according to the respondents, used intemperate language, the respondents have issued Memorandum dated 30.09.2015 (Annexure A-13) vide which the applicant was issued a show cause as to why departmental proceedings for violation of the relevant Conduct Rules should not be initiated against him by the competent authority for the reckless allegations and intemperate language against his superior officers used by him in his aforesaid application dated 14.09.2015 and reply to which should reach to the 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 12 OA No.1607/2019 concerned officer within 7 days, which was replied by the applicant on 12.10.2015, reiterating that all his statements were supported by witnesses and documentary and circumstantial evidence. Thereafter, the matter was suppressed to shield the erring officers.
2.31 The Disciplinary Authority appointed the Inquiring Authority and Presenting Officer to conduct the departmental inquiry in relation to the aforesaid charge Memorandum dated 16.07.2015. 2.32 During the inquiry proceedings, the applicant repeatedly sought relevant relied upon documents such as leave registers, attendance books, sanction orders, however, the said essential documents were not supplied, which is violative of Rule 14(11) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, causing prejudice to the applicant. Further the request for a Defense Assistant was arbitrarily denied through OM dated 25.01.2016 (Annexure A-7) despite applicant's right under the Rules ibid. However, only after objections, the retired ACP was allowed as his Defense Assistant but with severe illegal restrictions preventing effective defence (Annexure A-52).
2.33 However, the said inquiry was concluded by the Inquiry Officer by returning the findings on all the articles of charges as "proved" vide his Report dated 20.111.2017 ignored medical records, approved leave orders, sanction order and COI findings, which was supplied to the applicant vide Office Memorandum dated 14.12.2017 (Annexure A-
8) issued by the Disciplinary Authority to enable the applicant to submit his representation/submission to the aforesaid report of 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 13 OA No.1607/2019 Inquiry Officer and the final decision in the matter will be taken only after receipt of the applicant's reply, if any.
2.34 In response to the aforesaid Office Memorandum dated 14.12.2017, the applicant submitted his representation against the IO's aforesaid report on 10.1.2018 (Annexure A-14) as well as additional representations dated 11.1.2018 (Annexure A-15) and 15.1.2018 (Annexure A-16).
2.35 Thereafter the Disciplinary Authority vide Order dated 25.1.2018 (Annexure A-1) awarded the punishment of removal from service upon the applicant. Aggrieved by the same, the applicant has preferred an appeal dated 12.03.2018 (Annexure A-17) to the Appellate Authority which was considered by the Appellate Authority and vide Order dated 07.05.2018 (Annexure A-2) while confirming the aforesaid order of the disciplinary authority rejected the appeal of the applicant. Hence this OA.
3. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant. The applicant has also filed rejoinder refuting the contents of the reply. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the entire proceeding is liable to be set aside as the case is one of no misconduct and no evidence, and the findings recorded are contrary to the material on record. The applicant never intentionally avoided MCF training, and the alleged acts do not constitute misconduct under the CCS 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 14 OA No.1607/2019 (Conduct) Rules. The record clearly establishes that the applicant was already a TETTRA-trained MI-17 technical specialist and had no reason or motive to avoid further training.
4.1 Learned counsel also submitted that the first instance of absence from training was due to medically certified Typhoid Fever, duly supported by pathology reports and fitness records, and the leave stood sanctioned vide Office Order dated 25.03.2015 (Annexure A-
30). Likewise, the second absence occurred due to a sudden medical emergency concerning the applicant's aged mother, duly reflected in the Approved Leave Register and Occurrence Register, and the leave was sanctioned by the competent authority. The allegation of "intemperate communication" is equally misconceived, as the applicant merely submitted constructive suggestions through proper channel and in respectful language. No abusive, derogatory, or unparliamentary language has been attributed or proved. 4.2 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant completed the required MI-17 training at ARC Sarsawa during the period from 28.03.2016 to 26.04.2016 with exceptional grading, demonstrating bona fides and negating any allegation of wilful default. Accordingly, there was no wilful disobedience, violation of lawful orders, or conduct unbecoming of a Government servant. The findings are, therefore, perverse, arbitrary, and unsustainable in law. In support of the above contention, reliance has been placed on M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, G.P. Sewalia v. Union of India, and Union of India v.J. Ahmed.
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4.3 Learned counsel argued that having regard to the gravity of the
articles of charges and the applicant's submissions, the punishment imposed upon the applicant is shockingly disproportionate and unsustainable in law, particularly when examined in the backdrop of admitted mitigating circumstances, absence of wilful misconduct, and the applicant's long, distinguished, and unblemished service career. 4.4 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant has rendered 26 years of exceptional service in the Indian Air Force, earned commendations, and consistently received exceptional gradings, followed by a clean record in ARC. The allegations do not disclose any element of intentional disobedience or misconduct. Further, the first instance of absence stands fully justified as the applicant was on duly sanctioned leave due to medically certified Typhoid. The second instance was occasioned solely due to the sudden and serious illness of the applicant's aged mother, supported by contemporaneous medical records and approved leave entries.
4.5 Learned counsel also submitted that the remaining allegation pertains merely to the tone of written suggestions, which were submitted respectfully through proper channel using expressions such as "Humbly Submit" and "Humbly Request", and cannot constitute misconduct by any standard. Further, the applicant subsequently completed the MI-17 training with exceptional grading, demonstrating absence of any intent to avoid training. Considering the absence of wilfulness, the condonable nature of circumstances, the lack of prior adverse record, and the triviality of allegations compared to the 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 16 OA No.1607/2019 extreme penalty imposed, the punishment of removal from service is excessive, arbitrary, disproportionate, and violative of the doctrine of proportionality as propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases:
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611;
B.C. Chaturvedi v. UOI, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749; and State of Rajasthan v. Mohd. Ayub Naz, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 589.
Thus, the impugned orders warrant interference and are liable to be set aside.
4.6 Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the medical records concerning the applicant's mother were not fairly appreciated and have been selectively read, contrary to the full medical history placed on record. The medical certificate dated 11.06.2015 clearly records that the applicant's 74 year old mother required medical attention due to restlessness and abdominal pain and required short admission, as on 15.06.2015, she was again referred to Green City Hospital with severe periumbilical pain, rendering her immobile and requiring physical assistance. Again, on 18.06.2015, she presented with recurring symptoms including acute abdominal pain and loose motions, indicating a continuing and serious medical condition. The applicant was the only son present and sole caregiver, and her dependent status is duly reflected in his service book and discharge documents. All supporting medical documents were submitted but not 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 17 OA No.1607/2019 considered holistically. The Respondents selectively relied on medical records, thereby acting unfairly.
4.7 Learned counsel further argued that Article-II alleging absence fails even at the foundational level, as the charge does not allege nor does the record establish that the absence was wilful, which is an essential legal ingredient before absence can be treated as misconduct.
It is a settled position that absence, without proof of wilfulness, cannot amount to unauthorized absence and cannot constitute misconduct. In the present case, the applicant's leave was duly applied for and medically justified, negating any allegation of intent or negligence. In absence of a specific charge alleging wilfulness, this Article itself is defective, vague, legally unsustainable, and incapable of sustaining any disciplinary penalty. This ground alone vitiates this charge and the consequential proceedings.
4.8 Learned counsel vehemently argued that the Inquiry Officer illegally denied the applicant access to essential defence documents, including copies of Leave Register entries for 19.09.2014 and 11.06.2015 to 12.06.2015, and EL approval from 11.06.2015 to 23.06.2015. Despite repeated requests and despite these documents being crucial for demonstrating that the applicant's absence was sanctioned and medically justified, the IO rejected the requests without reasons and unjustifiably termed them "dilatory tactics", although SW-1 admitted the existence of such records in cross- examination. Denial of relevant documents constitutes a violation of Rule 14 (11) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, read with MHA O.M. dated 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 18 OA No.1607/2019 25.08.1961 and the judgment in Jug Raj Singh v. Delhi Administration, reported in 1970 SLR 400. Such denial has caused serious prejudice and vitiates the entire inquiry. 4.9 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was effectively denied his lawful right to Defence Assistance. His first nominated Defence Assistant, Retd. ACP Shri Amrik Singh, was initially rejected arbitrarily, and when later permitted, it was subject to restrictive and unprecedented conditions, including curbs on document access and cross-examination, making effective assistance impossible and leading to withdrawal. Further, subsequent Defence Assistants, including Shri Rajender Singh (CBI Public Prosecutor) and Shri Lal Bahar (Inspector, NHRC), were also rejected without justification. When the finally accepted Defence Assistant, Shri Yudhveer Singh Khatana, attended the hearing, the Presenting Officer allegedly misbehaved and attempted to manhandle him, without IO intervention. These actions amount to deliberate obstruction of meaningful defence representation, violating Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and the principles of natural justice. 4.10 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant repeatedly sought change of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer on grounds of bias, but requests dated 28.04.2016, 22.08.2016, and 09.08.2016 were ignored or rejected without reasons. However, despite pending applications, the IO proceeded ex parte, depriving the applicant of the opportunity to examine or cross-examine witnesses. This violates the Government of India O.M. dated 09.11.1972 and the principles of 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 19 OA No.1607/2019 natural justice. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772, denial of reasonable opportunity and conducting the inquiry in such manner vitiates the proceedings. Accordingly, the inquiry stands legally invalid. 4.11 Learned counsel argued that the applicant has been subjected to hostile and arbitrary discrimination. Several similarly placed officials, who also did not attend the same training were neither issued charge-sheets nor penalised. Record shows that out of 28 officials, at least three (including the applicant) did not attend the first course, and out of 23 officials, at least eight missed the second course, yet only the applicant has been subjected to extreme action. Such selective targeting and unequal treatment render the action unconstitutional. 4.12 Learned counsel further submitted that the statutory appeal was rejected by a non-speaking order, without considering any of the specific submissions raised by the applicant in the said appeal. Authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions must pass reasoned orders, particularly where civil consequences follow, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following cases:
a) Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570; and
b) Kranti Associates v. Masood Ahmed Khan, SLP (C) No. 20428/2007 decided on 08.09.2010.
2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 20 OA No.1607/2019 Thus, the impugned orders being unreasoned, mechanical and non- application of mind, stand vitiated.
4.13 Lastly, learned counsel prayed that this Tribunal may be pleased to allowed the instant OA.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. Learned counsel for the respondents, by referring to their written submissions, contended that the applicant was detailed twice to undergo MCF training at Air Force Station Bagdogra, West Bengal, on MI-17 Helicopter. On both occasions, he flouted the lawful directions of his superiors and failed to undergo the said training. It is submitted that the applicant himself deliberately did not attend the training on both occasions. For the first training, scheduled from 22.09.2014 to 14.11.2014, the applicant applied on 18.09.2014 for one day's casual leave (CL) for 19.09.2014, allegedly with an intention to evade the training. The competent authority rejected the request and informed him accordingly. Even after such intimation, the applicant did not join the training; instead, he submitted a medical certificate dated 19.09.2014, claiming to have fallen sick. Taking a lenient view, the competent authority sanctioned 36 days' commuted leave after he resumed duties. For the second training, scheduled from 22.06.2015 to 14.08.2015, the applicant, despite being informed well in advance, repeatedly approached various authorities seeking cancellation of his nomination on one pretext or the other. His requests were duly considered but rejected. Thereafter, instead of joining the training, he applied for 1½ days CL from 11.06.2015 to 12.06.2015 and left the 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 21 OA No.1607/2019 office without prior sanction. He returned only after 13 days, and this period of absence was not sanctioned by the competent authority. From these facts, it is evident that the applicant had no intention of undergoing the training on either occasion. His plea that he could not attend the second training due to sudden medical emergency is, therefore, untenable. The conduct amounts to wilful disobedience of orders. The respondents submitted that the applicant's later completion of training does not mitigate the misconduct already committed.
5.1 Learned counsel also submitted that the Inquiry Officer proved all three articles of charge on the basis of evidence available on record. The charge was not about the use of abusive or unparliamentary language; rather, it was that the applicant exceeded the permissible limits of grievance redressal by questioning the training imperatives of the department in an imperious and authoritative tone. This conduct clearly establishes his unwillingness to undergo training. 5.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the penalty imposed upon the applicant is proportionate to the misconduct proved. The applicant not only avoided the training on both occasions but also questioned the departmental training imperatives, which could set a wrong precedent and encourage other personnel to refuse training. In a security organisation, such acts amount to serious misconduct. Reliance is placed on UOI v. Managobinda Samantaray, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 284, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority should not be interfered with unless it is shockingly disproportionate.
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In the present case, the penalty is fully commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and does not warrant judicial interference. 5.3 Learned counsel also submitted that the Inquiry Officer has duly considered the medical condition of the applicant's mother. Detailed findings have been recorded in para 5(d) of the Inquiry Report (Pg. 83 of the OA). Thus, the applicant's contention that the respondents ignored these facts is incorrect and denied. 5.4 With regard to the applicant's plea that absence cannot be termed unauthorised without proof of wilfulness, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the applicant absented himself deliberately and without prior permission only to avoid the mandated training. The competent authority sanctioned the first spell of absence purely out of leniency.
5.5 So far as the allegation of the applicant that essential defence documents were denied is concerned, learned counsel submitted that all documents considered relevant by the Inquiry Officer were supplied. Documents deemed irrelevant as per applicable rules and instructions were not furnished. The applicant has not explained the relevance of the documents, he claims were withheld; rather, he has made a bald allegation of denial.
5.6 Regarding the appointment of defence assistant, learned counsel submitted that The applicant never proposed the name of Sh. Lal Bahar of NHRC. His request to appoint Sh. Rajinder Singh, CBI Public Prosecutor, a legal practitioner, was rejected since neither the PO nor the IO was from a legal background, and rules do not permit such appointment. The applicant's request to appoint Sh. Amrit Singh, 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 23 OA No.1607/2019 ACP (Retd.) as his Defence Assistant was allowed with conditions keeping in view the security concerns of the organisation. The applicant did not avail his services and is now making false allegations. Further the allegation of the applicant that Sh. Yudhvir Singh Khatana, the final Defence Assistant, and his family were threatened or intimidated, or that the PO misbehaved with him, is baseless. Had such an incident occurred, the applicant known for making representations even on minor issues would certainly have raised it contemporaneously during the inquiry.
5.7 Regarding the request for change of the IO and PO of the applicant, learned counsel submitted that the competent authority examined the allegations and found them untenable. The applicant had no locus standi to seek replacement of the PO. The representation was made only to delay the inquiry.
5.8 Learned counsel submitted that the applicant was proceeded ex parte as he remained absent during the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer has detailed the circumstances and reasons in para 9(a) onwards of the report (Pg. 86 of the OA). Hence, the allegation that the inquiry was conducted behind his back or that he was deprived of the opportunity to examine or cross-examine witnesses is incorrect and denied. 5.9 Learned counsel also submitted that the allegation of discrimination on the ground that similarly situated officials were not charge-sheeted is incorrect. The applicant alone avoided training on both occasions and repeatedly sought exemption. His case is materially different from others.
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5.10 Learned counsel argued that both authorities i.e. Disciplinary
and Appellate have considered the applicant's submissions in detail, as evident from the orders (Annexures A-1 and A-2). Reliance is placed on Regional Manager, UCO Bank & Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, reported in (2022) 5 SCC 695, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that allegations of bias must be supported by material, and that orders of Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities are valid when they record cogent reasons concurring with the findings of the Inquiry Officer.
5.11 Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the instant OA deserves to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the judgments relied upon by the parties. ANALYSIS
7. Since this matter pertains to departmental proceedings, we deem it apt to observe that it is settled principle of law that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, normally the Court/Tribunal may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court/Tribunal, since the High Court/Tribunal does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review. The Tribunal cannot, normally 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 25 OA No.1607/2019 speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. 7.1 In this regard, it is profitable to mention that by referring catena of judgments on the point of scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunals, the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under:
"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
(emphasis supplied) 7.2 In another case in the matter of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while re-appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings as under:-
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can
be based.
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(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
7.3 In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority............"
23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .
24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 27 OA No.1607/2019 (emphasis supplied)
26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.
27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained."
(emphasis supplied) 7.4 Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321, emphasised about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that: -
"22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct."
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8. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the facts and submissions of the counsel for the parties, we find that the following issues are required to be adjudicated in these cases:
(a) Whether the disciplinary enquiry was conducted by a competent authority and in accordance with the statutory rules governing departmental proceedings?
(b) Whether the principles of natural justice were complied with during the enquiry, including supply of documents, opportunity of defence, and fair hearing?
(c) Whether the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and affirmed by the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority are supported by some legal evidence, as required by law?
(d) Whether the findings recorded by the departmental authorities suffer from perversity, in the sense that they are: (a) based on no evidence, (b) based on irrelevant or inadmissible material, or
(c) conclusions that no reasonable person could have arrived at?
(e) Whether the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority have exercised their powers with proper application of mind, including recording reasons while accepting the findings returned by the IO in his report?
(f) Whether the penalty imposed upon the applicant is disproportionate to the nature of the alleged misconduct, applying the limited proportionality review permissible under judicial review?
9. So far as issue (a) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether the disciplinary enquiry was conducted by a competent authority and 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 29 OA No.1607/2019 in accordance with the statutory rules governing departmental proceedings, is concerned, for delving on this issue, we deem it to reproduce the article of charges levelled against the applicant, which read as under:-
"Article - I : That the said Shri Dev Raj Singh, while working as JTO- I in the office of the CEO, ARC, Air Wing, Palam, Delhi, on account of operational commitments of the Department and national security interests, was detailed twice to undergo MCF training at Air Force Station, Bagdogra, West Bengal on MI-17 Helicopter, but on both the occasions he flouted the lawful orders of his seniors in this regard and did not undergo the said training, even when it was specifically communicated to him the second time that his not attending the course would be viewed adversely.
By the above said acts of commission and omission, Shri Dev Raj Singh, JTO-I (RADAR) has disobeyed the lawful orders of his superiors and failed to maintain devotion to duty and acted in a manner highly unbecoming of a Government servant. By doing so he has violated Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article - II : That the said Shri Dev Raj Singh, while working as JTO- I in the office of the CEO, ARC, Air Wing, Palam, Delhi, was detailed to undergo MCF training w.e.f. 15.06.2015 to 07.08.2015, but instead of attending the said course and complying with the orders of the superior authority in this regard, he applied for 1 ½ day CL and left his Hqrs without prior permission or sanction of the competent authority on 11.06.2015 and resumed his duties after a lapse of 13 days and remaining unauthorisedly absent for a period w.e.f. 11.06.2015 to 23.06.2015.
By the above said acts of commission and omission, Shri Dev Raj Singh, JTO-I (RADAR) has failed to maintain devotion to duty and acted in a manner highly unbecoming of a Government servant. By doing so he has violated Rule 3(1)(ii) & (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article - III : That the said Shri Dev Raj Singh, while working as JTO-I in the office of the CEO, ARC, Air Wing, Palam, Delhi while detailed to undergo MCF training at Air Force Station, Bagdogra, West Bengal on MI-17 Helicopter, has made representations against the said detailment in which he challenged the training, imputed motives to actions of his superior officers and has gone beyond representing his grievance to questioning the training imperatives of the Department, thus grossly overstepping his brief and jurisdiction, and that too, in intemperate language.
He has thus by these acts of commission acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a Government servant and has accordingly violated Rule 3(1)(iii) and Rule 3A(a) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
9.1 In the first Article of Charge, it is alleged that "on both the occasions he flouted the lawful orders of his seniors and did not 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 30 OA No.1607/2019 undergo the said training, even when it was specifically communicated to him the second time that his not attending the course would be viewed adversely." However, this allegation is contradicted by the Department's own records. It is an admitted and undisputed fact that the respondents themselves sanctioned the applicant's leave for the period 19.09.2014 to 24.10.2014 vide Office Order dated 25.03.2015 (Annexure A-30). When the competent authority has formally sanctioned leave covering the very period during which the MCF training (22.09.2014 to 14.11.2014) was scheduled to commence, the applicant cannot in law be accused of "flouting" any lawful order. His absence from the initial period of the training was, therefore, not a deliberate or wilful act, but one authorised by the Department itself. An employee cannot be faulted for non-compliance with a direction that becomes impossible to follow due to leave duly sanctioned by the employer. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that no employee can be punished for an act that is neither intentional nor blameworthy. Thus, for the first training period, there is no material to establish that the applicant intentionally avoided training or disobeyed orders. The very sanction of leave destroys the foundational allegation of misconduct, rendering the charge factually unsustainable and legally untenable. 9.2 With respect to the second spell of the MCF training, initially scheduled from 22.06.2015 to 14.08.2015, it is an admitted position that the respondents themselves preponed the training period to 15.06.2015 to 07.08.2015. This unilateral advancement of dates materially altered the applicant's preparation and travel arrangements.
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It is undisputed that the applicant had applied for 1½ days' casual leave on 11 - 12.06.2015 due to the sudden illness of his 74-year-old mother, who was suffering from fever and other ailments and was admitted briefly on 11.06.2015 in a hospital. The request for leave was thus bona fide and supported by medical exigency. Upon receiving the communication regarding the rescheduled training as per schedule before pre-ponement, the applicant immediately acted in compliance, as he had already booked a train ticket for 20.06.2015 for the earlier schedule, and upon preponement of the training dates, he advanced his journey to 13.06.2015 and even applied for tour advance, which was later refunded along with penal interest only because his travel could not materialise due to subsequent developments. He also took consequential steps such as surrendering Government accommodation, relocating his family, and intimating the change of address to the concerned Personnel Branch of ARC Headquarters, all demonstrating clear readiness and intention of the applicant to attend the training. The applicant's leave was necessitated solely due to the aggravation of his mother's medical condition, which is duly recorded in the Occurrence Register of the DSS. Thus, his request for extension of leave was supported by contemporaneous records of the department itself. Crucially, the Inquiry Officer failed to consider or even take on record these material documents, such as medical papers, entries in the Occurrence Register, ticket and tour-advance records, and evidence of surrender of accommodation, despite repeated requests by the applicant. This omission strikes at the root of the fairness of the disciplinary enquiry. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 32 OA No.1607/2019 that non-consideration of vital defence documents amounts to violation of natural justice and renders the findings legally unsustainable as held in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772). In these circumstances, the allegation of wilful non-attendance of training cannot be sustained. The evidence on record, including departmental records, clearly shows that the applicant had made bona fide and proactive efforts to comply with the training order, and the impediments arose solely due to family medical emergency. Therefore, the second incident also lacks the essential element of intentional disobedience, rendering the charge factually baseless and legally untenable.
9.3 At this stage, it is apt to mention that admittedly it is undisputed fact that the said training had subsequently completed by the applicant, which fact has also been noted by the IO in his report. Further it is the case of the applicant that his father was also suffering from a brain tumour and required major neurosurgical intervention at Artemis Hospital, Gurgaon. His surgery was initially scheduled for 05.08.2015, but due to complications detected during the pre- anaesthesia check-up, including persistent blood and urine infections, the operation had to be postponed until his father was medically fit. Ultimately brain tumour surgery of his father was done on 21.08.2015. Post-surgery, his father remained under intensive medical care as his father is unable to move independently and requires continuous assistance throughout the day and night. Subsequently, his father again developed high-grade fever and cold and had to be re-admitted 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 33 OA No.1607/2019 to Kailash Hospital, Greater Noida. The treating doctors suspected postoperative infection and referred him back to the Neurosurgeon. His father's behaviour also became highly aggressive and unpredictable due to neurological complications. During this period, his father additionally developed PSVT (Paroxysmal Supraventricular Tachycardia), a heart ailment, and underwent Angiography on 11.09.2015 at Kailash Hospital. Due to such compelling medical circumstances it was impossible for the applicant to proceed for the training course. In the second instance, he had to urgently attend to my critically ill mother.
9.4 The Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others v. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 held that even if the authority is competent, violation of statutory rules vitiates the entire enquiry. Since the rules governing the enquiry were not meticulously followed, this issue must be answered in favour of the applicant, and the enquiry cannot be said to be legally compliant.
10. So far as the issue (b) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether the principles of natural justice were complied with, is concerned, the applicant has shown substantial procedural prejudice, as he was not given copies of documents necessary to prepare his defence; his requests for adjournments on genuine grounds (medical reasons, service exigencies) were rejected without reason; his request for assistance of a Defence Assistant was either delayed or denied; the enquiry proceeded ex parte despite valid justification for absence. The Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), P. Gunasekaran 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 34 OA No.1607/2019 (supra), and Ajay Kumar Srivastava (supra) has repeatedly held that denial of reasonable opportunity, even if technically compliant, amounts to violation of natural justice if it causes prejudice. The cumulative facts reveal that the applicant was not afforded a fair and meaningful opportunity to defend himself. Thus, this issue is answered in favour of the applicant, and the enquiry stands vitiated on this ground alone.
11. Regarding issue (c) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether the findings recorded by the authority are based on "some evidence,"
the applicant has established that the disciplinary proceedings were wholly devoid of proper evidentiary support. Specifically when no witnesses were examined in the applicant's presence; no contemporaneous or corroborative records were produced to substantiate the alleged intentional avoidance of training; and the Inquiry Officer relied on conjecture and assumptions rather than admissible evidence. Furthermore, the applicant's medical certificates in respect of his mother and father ailments and explanations were either ignored or summarily rejected without any reasoned analysis. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court in H.C. Goel v. Union of India, reported in 1963 SCC OnLine SC 16, held that "if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." Further in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that "judicial review is not an appeal from a 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 35 OA No.1607/2019 decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment..." As such a finding that lacks relevant or credible evidence is legally equivalent to a finding based on "no evidence" and is therefore unsustainable. Here, the charges have not been supported by any credible or tested evidence. The so-called evidence is either inadmissible, unproved, or uncorroborated. Therefore, the finding of guilt is unsupported by evidence, and hence judicial review is justified.
12. Regarding issue (d) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., Whether the findings suffer from perversity or are such that no reasonable person could have reached, after perusing the IO's report, we observe that the Inquiry Officer, ignored the applicant's medical evidence, did not consider his prior specialized TETTRA training, failed to address whether the applicant had any motive to avoid MCF training, disregarded extenuating circumstances and service record. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Srivastava (supra) held that findings are perverse if relevant material is ignored, irrelevant material is relied upon, or conclusions defy logic. The finding that the applicant "intentionally avoided training" is clearly perverse as there is no evidence of intention; the applicant's actions were supported by medical documentation; his prior training record contradicts any allegation of deliberate avoidance. Accordingly, the finding is perverse in law, warranting interference.
13. Regarding issue (e) as mentioned in para 8 above, i.e., whether the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities applied their mind and passed reasoned orders, before delving upon this issue, we deem it to 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 36 OA No.1607/2019 appropriate to reproduce the same. The relevant portion of order dated 25.1.2018 (Annexure A-1) passed by the Disciplinary Authority reads as under:-
5. AND WHEREAS the I.O. submitted the enquiry report on 20.11.2017, wherein all the three charges leveled against the C.O. stood proved. The enquiry report was examined and after having found the same in order a copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the C.O. vide O.M. No. ARC/AW/372/2007 Vol-II-2234 dated 14.12.2017 for representation and submissions, if any.
6. AND WHEREAS in reply to the OM referred to ibid, the C.O. submitted three representations dated 12.01.2018, 16.01.2018 and 22.01.2018. Vide his representations, the individual prayed for "keeping the present inquiry report of I.O. held in abeyance without any prejudice to the future proceedings and by changing the I.O. in the DE accord me fair and reasonable opportunity" for which the C.O. has mainly made the following submissions:
(i) Not been provided the required documents.
(ii) Conditional access to information/documents of Defence Assistant (DA).
(iii) Not allowing engagement of Defence Assistant of his choice.
(iv) Biased and partial attitude of I.O.
(v) Threatening to the Defence Assistant by the P.O.
(vi) Non-examination of the State witnesses.
(vii) Violation of procedure and not affording natural justice.
(viii) Confiscation of I-card and restrictions thereof which prevented from taking documents for defence.
(ix) Non payment of subsistence allowance in time causing financial hardship in attending the DE proceedings.
7. AND WHEREAS the contentions and submissions of the C.O. as above have been examined at length in the chronology as under:
(i) A perusal of the enquiry report revealed that the relevant documents in support of the case of the prosecution were served to the C.O. along with the memo of charges dated 16.07.2015.
With regard to other (additional) documents sought by the C.O. for his defence during the enquiry, the same issue was sufficiently dealt with by the I.O., who is at liberty to determine the relevancy of such documents during the enquiry. Documents demanded by the C.O. having relevance to the DE were relevancy were rejected.
ii) The department is a security organization of the GOI as such every precaution is taken while dealing with persons outside the department. Keeping this in view, the DA was allowed to the C.O. 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 37 OA No.1607/2019 with certain conditions in security interests, which was a correct decision on the part of the concerned quarters.
(iii) The C.O. was allowed two DAs, namely Sh. Amrik Singh, ACP (Retd.), DP and Sh. Y. S. Khatana (Retd. IAF personnel). However, the C.O. failed to take their services and instead levelled frivolous allegations to this effect. In addition, during the course of enquiry, the C.O. had also sought engagement of a Public Prosecutor, CBI (falls in the category of a legal practitioner), and a legal practitioner which was disallowed by the Competent Authority as per norms, considering the gravity of the charges, involvement of relevant documents and the status of the P.O.
(iv) It is observed in the records of the DE that since inception of the proceedings, the C.O. had levelled allegations against the I.O. and P.O. and made representations to the respective authorities for their change. The allegations were examined and found not tenable as the C.O. failed to give cogent reasons in support of his allegations. Thus, the representations were disposed of accordingly and intimation to that effect was conveyed from time to time. It is pertinent to mention that levelling allegations against the P.O. was a delay tactic, as the C.O. had no locus standi to represent against the P.O. and seek his change.
(v) Threatening by P.O. to the Defence Assistant in the presence of the C.O. and I.O. is not convincing. Had there been any such event, the C.O. would have projected the same during the course of enquiry on the relevant date; however, nothing to this effect is patent in the DE report, thus such submissions are without veracity. Moreover, in terms of norms there lies no business between the P.O. and the DA
(vi) Examining the state witnesses is the prerogative of the P.O. and same right lies with the C.O./DA for cross examination of those witnesses. The C.O., who chose to remain absent during the said examination and not preferred to cross-examine them has no reason to say to this effect at this juncture. The C.O. was given ample opportunity to this cause by the I.O., which he did not avail, hence raising the same issue at this point is of no relevance.
(vii) Record of the enquiry has been perused and found that there were good number of hearings held during the course of enquiry wherein the C.O. was afforded due opportunity at the relevant stages of enquiry but he did not avail the same. Allegations of bias against the I.O. based on the representations of the C.O. were appropriately disposed of by the Competent Authority wherein same were found without an iota of truth. It is not out of context to mention here that in the enquiry about 39 hearings have taken place and the enquiry could be completed in approx 02 years, which goes to show that the I.O. has taken sufficient time in completion of the enquiry during which procedural aspects have been taken care of and relevant summons for participation in the enquiry and for putting up his defence were issued, which are sufficient to speak that course of natural justice has been appropriately met with.
(viii) Last hearing in the instant matter was held on 24.08.2017, whereas the I-card, after suspension of the C.O. in connection with another enquiry, was confiscated on 18.09.2017 thus, submissions of the C.O. that for want of I-card he could not enter 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 38 OA No.1607/2019 the office premises for procuring documents for his defence in the instant matter are irrelevant.
(ix) After suspension of the individual with effect from 01.08.2017 in connection with another enquiry due subsistence allowance is being paid to the C.O. at regular intervals. In this regard OM dated 17.01.2018 is referred to which appropriately deals with the issue of the subsistence allowance. It is pertinent to mention that the last hearing in the present matter was held on 24.08.2017, the C.O. was suspended on 01.08.2017, accordingly subsistence allowance for the month of August, 2017 was due to be paid after 31.08.2017 hence, taking cover of non payment of subsistence allowance to attend the DE proceedings is a frivolous contention.
8. AND WHEREAS it is found that the C.O. is retired Air Force personnel and re-employed in a security organization of the GOI. As such, proper conduct and discipline is always expected from the person of his rank. Detailment of the individual in training course for upgrading his professional skills in national security interests was an urgent requirement to meet the operational commitments of the Department. Defying the lawful orders to that effect without cogent reasons is gross and grave misconduct on language and absenting himself unauthorisedly to avoid the training aggravates the charges.
9. AND WHEREAS, having agreed to the facts and circumstances of the case detailed as above, specifically the gravity of the delinquency, I consider that the removal of the Government servant from service would be the appropriate punishment in this matter.
10. NOW THEREFORE, having satisfied with the Proceedings and keeping in view the gravity of the Charges, in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 15 (6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, I impose the penalty of "Removal From Service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government" upon Shri Dev Raj Singh, JTO-I, with immediate effect, in terms of Rule 11(viii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which would meet the ends of justice.
11. As per Rule 23 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, an appeal can be made against the present penalty. Appeal against the orders of the Disciplinary Authority lies with the DG(S), Appellate Authority. And as per Rule 25 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, appeal if any expressed in proper language could be made within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of this order."
13.1 The relevant portion of the Appellate Authority's order dated 07.05.2018 (Annexure A-2) reads as under:-
"4. AND WHEREAS, the Inquiry Officer in conducting the said Inquiry had taken note of the Rules & Regulations in that regard and afforded required opportunity to the Appellant to defend the Charges. It is observed in the Inquiry Report and relevant annexure that although the Appellant had initially remained associated with the Inquiry Proceedings, at the subsequent stages he did not participate in the same despite notices to the said effect emanating from the end of the I.O. No forceful reason for not participating in the Inquiry 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 39 OA No.1607/2019 Proceedings on the part of the Appellant is noticeable in the record. It is observed that in conducting the Inquiry the I.O. has taken about 02 years which is sufficient to say that there was no hurry on the part of the I.O. to complete the Inquiry and there exists adequate evidence that the Appellant was given ample opportunity to place his defence.
5. AND WHEREAS, in terms of the established procedure the Inquiry Report was examined at the end of the Disciplinary Authority and after having accepted the findings of the I.O., a copy of the Inquiry Report was furnished to the Appellant vide O.M. No. ARC/AW/372/2007 Vol-II-2234 dated 14.12.2017 for representation and submissions, if any.
6. AND WHEREAS, in reply to the O.M. issued from the end of the Disciplinary Authority, referred to ibid, the Appellant had submitted series of representations dated 10.01.2018, 11.01.2018 and 15.01.2018. The said representations were examined at the end of the Disciplinary Authority wherein it was found that the Appellant has prayed for, reproduced in verbatim, "Keeping the present inquiry report of I.O. held in abeyance without any prejudice to the future proceedings and by changing the I.O. in the DE accord me fair and reasonable opportunity" for which he made certain grounds.
7. AND WHEREAS, the Disciplinary Authority had sufficiently and appropriately dealt with the contentions of the Appellant against the Inquiry Report find mention in the representations discussed in the preceding para. Consequent to the aforesaid, the Order No. ARC/AW/372/2007-Vol.-II-322 and 323 dated 25.01.2018 incorporating punishment of "Removal" in terms of Rule 11(viii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was issued from the end of the Disciplinary Authority, which is impugned in the present Appeal.
8. AND WHEREAS, the Appeal is considered on the touchstone of the relevant parameters as follows:
i. Whether the Disciplinary Proceedings have been drawn in conformity with the relevant Rules and in doing so there is no violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India and miscarriage of justice;
ii. Whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and iii. Whether the Penalty imposed is commensurate to the Misconduct/Charges.
9. AND WHEREAS, the Appeal has been examined and it is found that in support of his Appeal, the Appellant has mainly made the following grounds:-
i. Documents sought for the defence were not provided during the course of Inquiry.
ii. Deprived of the right to engage Defence Assistant of his choice. iii. Correct procedure established by law was not followed by the I.O.
wherein opportunity to cross-examine the State witnesses and examination of his witnesses was not allowed. iv. Request for change of I.O. and P.O. on account of their bias and partiality was rejected.
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v. Strong prejudices on the part of the Disciplinary Authority in
awarding the punishment.
vi. Punishment is disproportionate.
vii. Appellant may be given a personal hearing to explain the circumstances better and other additional grounds in support of his case.
10. AND WHEREAS, chronological examination of the grounds on the part of the Appellate Authority is here as under:-
i. Documents sought for by the Appellant for his defence during the Inquiry, issue was appropriately dealt with by the I.O. and on his directions relevant documents were provided and other documents not having relevancy were rejected. ii. The Appellant was allowed two DAs; however, he failed to take their services. In addition, the Appellant also sought engagement of a Public Prosecutor, CBI, and a Legal Practitioner which was disallowed by the respective quarters being not covered by the norms.
iii. I.O. had conducted the DE duly following the established procedure in which appropriate opportunity to defend the case including cross-examination of State witnesses and presentation of his witnesses was afforded to the Appellant, in which he failed. In addition, due notices to participate in the inquiry were given to the Appellant by the I.O. at the relevant stages of the inquiry. iv. Representations to change the I.O. and P.O. were examined and having found no forceful reasons, request for change of I.O. was rejected. However, request for change of P.O., for which no locus standi lied with the Appellant, was rejected. v. Inquiry was not conducted by the Disciplinary Authority himself but was got conducted by appointing an I.O. Disciplinary Authority was satisfied with the Inquiry Report with respect to procedural aspects, specifically the opportunities afforded to the Appellant. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are supported by the evidence. Based on the factual aspects as above, the Disciplinary Authority formed a judicious opinion to award the punishment. Hence, the allegation of prejudice on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is not tenable.
vi. The failure to undergo the prescribed training course essential for upgrading professional skills in the interest of national security and to meet the operational commitments of the Department, coupled with unauthorized absence and the use of intemperate language against seniors, constituted misconduct of a gross and grave nature. Thus, the punishment is commensurate with the gravity of the charges.
vii. The personal hearing sought by the Appellant to explain the circumstances of his case was duly considered. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the request was not found suitable and was therefore declined.
11. AND WHEREAS, the undersigned, being the Appellate Authority, has considered the Appeal on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case evident from the record and observes that the Departmental Enquiry in question had been conducted by the Inquiry Officer strictly following the procedure envisaged in the relevant rules and 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 41 OA No.1607/2019 instructions. The Disciplinary Authority awarded the punishment after taking due cognizance of the material placed before him.
12. AND WHEREAS, the most significant aspect in the matter is to judge the proportionality of punishment vis-à-vis the charges. It is observed that the Appellant, a retired IAF personnel, was engaged in the maintenance and upkeep of aircraft, which is a sensitive and technical assignment in a security organization. To improve professional skills required for such assignments, personnel including the Appellant are required to undergo prescribed training from time to time as per operational requirements.
In this case, the Appellant, for one reason or another, twice failed to undergo the relevant training, which is directly connected to the operational commitments of the Organization. In addition, he remained unauthorizedly absent and submitted representations against his detailment for training couched in intemperate language. Thus, the charges are gross and grave in nature, enabling the undersigned to form the opinion that the punishment is commensurate with the charges.
13. NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, within the precincts of the above examination and having found no cogent reason in the contentions of the Appellant, is of the view that there lies no occasion to mitigate the punishment. Thus, being Appellate Authority, in exercise of the powers vested under Rule 27(2)(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, hereby confirms the penalty of "Removal from Service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government" imposed upon Shri D.R. Singh, JTO-I, by the Disciplinary Authority vide Order No. ARC/AW/372/2007-Vol-II-322 & 323 dated 25.01.2018. Accordingly, the appeal is rejected being devoid of merit."
13.2 On a plain reading of above paras of the penalty order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority's order, we find that merely reproducing the enquiry report without dealing with the Applicant's detailed reply, analysing the medical certificates, considering his long unblemished service, addressing procedural lapses.
13.3 The Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd and another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, emphasized the need of assigning reasons in administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial function/order. The relevant portion reads as under:-
" 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
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(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered.
This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision- making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 43 OA No.1607/2019 wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process". 13.4 Therefore, mechanical approval of the Inquiry Officer's findings, without independent reasoning, shows non-application of mind. Thus, this issue, therefore, also goes in favour of the applicant.
14. So far as issue (f), as noted in paragraph 8 above, i.e., whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct, is concerned, this Tribunal notes the well-settled proposition of law that interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only in cases where the penalty is so excessive or disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, has reiterated that judicial review in disciplinary matters does not ordinarily extend to re-appreciation of the penalty unless the punishment is outrageously disproportionate or suffers from patent illegality or procedural irregularity. In Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad, reported in 2010 (3) ALSLJ SC 28, the Apex Court observed:
"The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, and/or on appeal the Appellate Authority, with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity, or the punishment is such that it would shock the conscience of the Court/Tribunal."
14.1 In the present case, having regard to the nature of the articles of charge, the mitigating circumstances placed on record, and the overall factual matrix, this Tribunal is of the considered view that the 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 44 OA No.1607/2019 punishment of removal from service upon the applicant, as imposed by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 25.01.2018 (Annexure A-
1), is wholly disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged misconduct. The conduct alleged viewed in the context of the applicant's medical constraints, prior service record, absence of any proven wilful disobedience, and the procedural infirmities noted earlier, cannot be said to justify the extreme penalty of removal. Further, it is noticed that the applicant successfully completed the above training as is evident from the certificate issued by the Aviation Research Centre dated 12.05.2016 during the period from 28.03.2016 to 26.04.2016 and obtained exceptional grading. The penalty imposed, therefore, shocks the conscience of the Tribunal, as the same is arbitrary and unreasonable, and falls foul of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
15. In the above facts and circumstances of the case and for the forgoing reasons, the present OA is allowed with the following directions:-
(i) The impugned Memorandum of Charge dated 16.07.2015 (Annexure A-3) is quashed and set aside;
(ii) The impugned orders dated 25.01.2018 (Annexure A-1) of the Disciplinary Authority and dated 6/7.5.2018 (Annexure A-2) are also quashed and set aside;
(iii) The respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant forthwith with all consequential benefits admissible in accordance with law and rules on the subject; and 2025.12.05 RAVI KANOJIA17:10:14+05'30' Item No.61/C-2 45 OA No.1607/2019
(iv) The respondents are directed to comply with the above directions as expeditiously as possible within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order.
16. There shall be no order as to costs.
17. Pending MA(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ravi/
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