Allahabad High Court
Fida Hussain vs State Of U.P. And Others on 23 November, 2022
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Reserved On:23.9.2022 Delivered On:23.11.2022 Court No. - 30 Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 1514 of 2009 Revisionist :- Fida Hussain Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Others Counsel for Revisionist :- Pradeep Kumar Shukla Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt. Advocate,Rajneesh K. Srivastava Hon'ble Umesh Chandra Sharma,J.
None appeared for the revisionist. Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the material available on record. Since the criminal revision can not be dismissed in default, hence this revision is being decided on merit.
This revision has been preferred against the judgment and order of acquittal passed in S.T. No. 630 of 2005 (State Vs. Ram Chandra and Others) arising out of Case Crime No. 333 of 2004 under Section 302 I.P.C. Police Station- Bhuta, Bareilly, by Additional Sessions Judge Court No. XI, Bareilly on 9.1.2009.
In brief, the revision has been filed on the grounds that Additional Session Judge has not considered all the facts and circumstances and acquitted respondent no.1 which is not correct in the eyes of law. He has not passed the judgment in accordance with criminal law, hence, the impugned judgment be set aside and revision be allowed.
In brief facts of the case are that informant- revisionist (P.W.-1) Fida Hussain lodged an F.I.R. that on 14.7.2004, he along with his sons Pappu @ Israr (deceased), Iqbal (P.W.-2) and one Noor Hasan was sitting near pumping set. In the night at about 8:30 p.m. Bihari son of Khandari came there and asked the deceased to go to Mirzapur with him. As soon as deceased reached near the sugarcane field of Mohan Lal, informant heard voice of deceased and sound of fire. He with his son Iqbal Hussain and Noor Hasan rushed there and saw accused Ram Chandra, Uma Charan, Ram Autar and Bihari had surrounded his son Pappu and killed him by assaulting with Gupti (dagger) and country made pistol, thereafter, accused persons ran towards jungle. The incident was witnessed and accused were recognized in the light of torch. On this written complaint, an F.I.R. was lodged at 10:00 p.m. in Police Station Bhuta. Yashpal Singh, was appointed as I.O. of the case who started investigation. He copied chick F.I.R., G.D., statement of scribe, statement of the informant in the night and on next date i.e. 15.7.2004 inspected the place of occurrence and prepared map (Ex. Ka-12), appointed punch and conducted inquest (Ex. Ka-5) prepared papers for post-mortem and sent dead body for autopsy. He also took blood stained and plain soil and prepared recovery memo (Ex. Ka-11). He also prepared recovery memo of torch (Ex. Ka-17); copied post mortem report (Ex. Ka-2); arrested accused persons and recorded their statements and recovered a countrymade pistol of 12 bore with empty cartridges in its barrel on 16.7.2004 on the pointing out of the accused Ram Chandra and prepared its recovery memo (Ex. Ka-13); lodged F.I.R. at Crime No. 337 of 2004 under Section 25 of the Arms Act against accused Ram Chandra and submitted charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-16) under Section 302 I.P.C.
P.W.-7, S.I. Charan Singh, investigated the case under Section 25 Arms Act and copied chick F.I.R., G.D., statement of scribe and accused Ram Chandra, inspected the place of recovery and prepared map (Ex. Ka-18) and got prosecution sanction from District Magistrate (Ex. Ka-19) and submitted charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-20). Accused persons denied the charges and sought trial.
Prosecution examined following witness:-
P.W.-1 Fida Hussain, Informant P.W.-2 Iqbal P.W.-3 Ramesh Chandra- Scribe P.W.-4 Dr. Arvind Agrawal P.W.-5 Constable/Clerk Chandrapal P.W.-6 S.I. Yashpal Singh- I.O., P.W.-7 S.I. Charan Singh P.W.-8 S.I. Pyare Lal Prosecution submitted following documentary evidence;
Ex. Ka-1 Tehrir Ex. Ka-2 Post-mortem report Ex. Ka-3 Chick F.I.R.
Ex. Ka-4 Chick report Ex. Ka-5 Inquest report Ex. Ka-6 Specimen Seal Ex. Ka-7 Police Form No. 13 Ex. Ka-8 Photo Nash Ex. Ka-9 Letter to C.M.O. Ex. Ka-10 Letter to R.I. Ex. Ka-11 Recovery Memo Ex. Ka-12 Map Ex. Ka-13 Recovery memo country made pistol.
Ex. Ka-14 Map Ex. Ka-15 Recovery Memo Ex. Ka-16 Charge-sheet under Section 302 I.P.C.
Ex. Ka-17 Recovery memo of Torch Ex. Ka-18 Map regarding place of recovery Ex. Ka-19 Prosecution sanction u/s 25 of Arms Act.
Ex. Ka-20 Charge-sheet After closure of the prosecution evidence, statement of the accused persons were recorded wherein they denied the charges and offence and claimed that false case and evidence have been adduced; I.O. has falsely investigated the matter. However, no evidence was produced in defence.
Learned trial Court has discussed the oral, documentary evidence as well as case laws and concluded that the F.I.R. is anti timed, I.O. and witnesses have made material improvements in the case and after obtaining post mortem report concluded that the injuries caused to the deceased can not be caused from the dagger and fire-arm; witnesses have not seen the occurrence and on the basis of suspicion and enmity, accused persons have falsely been implicated.
It would be better to decide the revision discussing the grounds taken by the learned trial Court separately.
According to the learned trial Court, the F.I.R. is anti timed. In this case, as per the F.I.R., the occurrence took place at 8: 30 p.m. on 14.7.2004. The distance of police station from the place of occurrence is 7 km. The F.I.R. was lodged at 10:00 p.m. In this regard, statements of witnesses and documentary evidence have been considered. The written complaint was reduced in writing by Ramesh Chandra of the village and after listening the informant put his mark on it and produced it in the police station and got a case registered at 10:00 p.m. In examination-in-chief, P.W.1 has deposed that the F.I.R. was written in village and he went police station with written complaint but in cross-examination this witness has admitted that when dead body was taken from Mirzapur to the police station, Ramesh also went with him. The dead body was removed after 2-3 hours from the spot meaning thereby the dead body remained on the place of occurrence at least up to 10:30 p.m. He again deposed that dead body was got up when the police reached the spot. It is also established that before lodging the F.I.R. the police had reached on the spot. Contrary to the statement of examination-in-chief this witness deposed that the Tehrir was reduced in writing by Ramesh Chandra sitting at the police station. This witness admits that the police station is about 7 to 7.5 km. away from Mirzapur (place of occurrence) contrary to the previous statement this witness again deposed that when he prepared the written complaint, the corpus was at police station. He further deposes that the Tehrir was written outside the police station and dead body was on the spot and he had gone alone to lodge the report. Thus, informant P.W.-1 has given self contradictory statement regarding time, writing and lodging of F.I.R.
P.W.-3, Ramesh Chandra, scribe, has also admitted that when he had written the complaint, the police had already reached on the spot. The learned trial Court opined that from the above statement it is established that before lodging the F.I.R. the police had reached on the spot. The informant P.W.-1, has also admitted that the dead body remained on the spot for 2-3 hours after the occurrence, thus, it is impossible for the informant to lodge the F.I.R. going 7-7.5 km away at 10:00 p.m. He cannot remain present same time at two places. Learned trial Court concluded that from the above statements it is established that the dead body was lying on the spot upto 11:00 p.m. P.W.-1 has also admitted in cross-examination that he went to police station with other persons carrying dead body of his son and the dead body had been sealed at the police station. In this respect statement of P.W.2 Iqbal, brother of the deceased, is also relevant. In cross-examination he deposed that after two and a half hours dead body was taken in a covered state keeping the same on lathi. The police had also reached on the spot, thereafter, the dead body was taken to the police station. The statement of this witness was recorded after 15 days while he was very much present at his house being the real son of the informant and real brother of the deceased.
From the aforesaid discussion, it is established that the F.I.R. was not lodged before reaching the police station and when they reached police station only then the F.I.R. was lodged making it ante-timed after consultation with police. Since the crime number and sections are also mentioned in the inquest report, therefore, it is obvious that the inquest proceeding was shown conducted after lodging the F.I.R., therefore, it was not possible for the I.O. to conduct the inquest proceeding on spot but in inquest report ( Ex. Ka-5) the I.O. has shown that the inquest was conducted at the place of occurrence on 15.7.2004 between 6:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and according to Panchan the deceased was killed by firearm. Thus, it is also established that the inquest proceeding was not conducted on the spot as shown in Ex. Ka-5. Thus, the lodging of F.I.R. after making it ante-timed and convenient for the prosecution is established.
The fact that the F.I.R. is anti-timed is not the sole realm to discard the prosecution case but if it seems that it was done with malafide intention to falsely implicate the accused persons and to show some persons as eyewitnesses, then the prosecution case gets corrupted, incorrect and impure.
The learned trial Court has concluded that the accused persons had another ground that the witnesses of fact P.W.1 and P.W.2 have not seen the occurrence, they are not the real witness and they are the interested witness being real father and brother of the deceased.
In F.I.R., the informant has said that the accused persons killed the deceased by attacking with Gupti (dagger) and Tamancha (country made pistol) but the post-mortem report shows that there were six cut wounds, two lacerated wounds, one contusion and one injury of rubbing. Though the autopsy doctor has deposed that injury no. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 9 to 10 may occur from the attack of Gupti and sharp edged weapon and injury no. 3 & 6 may occur from the attack of blunt object but it is well known fact that from the attack of Gupti only punctured wound may occur and no cut wound shall occur. Informant P.W.-1, father of the deceased has deposed that after hearing the noise, he reached on the spot with his son, P.W.-2, Iqbal Hussain, saw that Umacharan had put foot on the neck of the deceased and Bihari had pressed his neck, Ram Chandra had caught his legs and Ram Autar was beating by the butt of the licensed gun and Uma Charan was assaulting from dagger. P.W.2 has also deposed about the attack in the same manner as alleged by P.W.1, Fida Hussain. According to him, when they exhorted, accused persons ran away on the road of Gualdiya by making fire. It is noteworthy that as per version of F.I.R., fire arm was also used in killing the deceased whereas this fact is not established from the medical evidence. Thus from beginning to the end of inquest proceeding the case of the prosecution was that the deceased was killed by firearm. After first recording of the statement under Section 161 CrP.C., the I.O. again recorded the statement of witness under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to make the case in conformity with medical evidence. But P.W.1 has also deposed that Ram Autar had gun in his hand, Ram Chandra and Uma Charan had country made pistols and by using these fire arms they killed the deceased and ran away towards the jungle. This witness has also deposed that accused persons had killed the deceased by firing at him. If we scrutinize oral and documentary evidence together, we find that deceased was not killed by fire arm and there was no injury of fire arm on the person of deceased. Hence, it is concluded that the witnesses have not seen the occurrence and they are falsely shown as eyewitnesses.
In Rambraksh Vs. State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2016 SC 2381 and Tomaso Bruno Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it has been held that-
"Improvement made by witness in its statement made to the Court than what was made to the I.O. u/s 161 CrPC not to be relied on. "
In Rohtash Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589, it has been held that-
" If the P.Ws had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance."
Generally, if there is inconformity between the ocular and medical evidence, the ocular evidence shall prevail over the medical evidence but if medical evidence is true and correct after the examination/autopsy of the deceased and the oral evidence does not inspire confidence and does not corroborate the medical evidence and the presence of the witnesses is doubtful, the prosecution version may be disbelieved and discarded. In this case medical evidence does not say two possibilities, it says only one possibility that the deceased was killed by sharp edged weapon and the blunt object whereas as per the prosecution witness the deceased was killed by using a dagger and fire arm, if witnesses had seen the occurrence, there would have been punctured wounds and fire arm injuries but such injuries were not found by the doctor during the course of autopsy. Therefore, it is concluded that in case where the F.I.R. had been lodged making it ante-timed and I.O. tried his best for making the case in conformity with the medical evidence and the I.O. has recorded the statement of the witnesses afresh then it can safely be concluded that the act of the I.O. is not an independent and impartial act and he has not collected the evidence but has created the evidence to ensure the conviction of the accused persons.
In Thaman Kumar Vs. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, (2003) 6 SCC 380, it is held that " the conflict between oral testimony and medical evidence can be of varied dimensions and shapes. There may be a case where there is total absence of injuries which are normally caused by a particular weapon. There is another category where though the injuries found on the victim are of the type which are possible by the weapon of assault, but the size and dimension of the injuries do not exactly tally with the size and dimension of the weapon. The third category can be where the injuries found on the victim are such which are normally caused by the weapon of assault but they are not found on that portion of the body where they are deposed to have been caused by the eye-witnesses. The same kind of inference cannot be drawn in the three categories of apparent conflict in oral and medical evidence enumerated above. In the first category t may legitimately be inferred that the oral evidence regarding assault having been made from a particular weapon is not truthful. However, in the second and third category no such inference can straightway be drawn. The manner and method of assault, the position of the victim, the resistance offered by him, the opportunity available to the witnesses to see the occurrence like their distance, presence of light and many other similar factors will have to be taken into consideration in judging the reliability of ocular testimony".
Thus, this Court is of the opinion that this case falls in first category about which it may legitimately be referred that oral evidence regarding injuries having been caused from a particular weapon is not trustworthy. Hence, it is concluded that the witnesses have not seen the occurrence and they are falsely deposing in evidence .
In Niranjan Prasad Vs. State of M.P., 1996 CrLJ 1987 (SC), " in murder trial, testimony of eye-witnesses was that the deceased and injured were assaulted with sharp cutting weapons but their testimony was not corroborated with medical evidence showing deceased having been injured by blunt object (weapon) only. Post Mortem Report showing that the deceased had not injury which could be caused by a sharp cutting weapon and, indeed, he had sustained only one injury which could be caused, according to the doctor by a blunt weapon only. Keeping in view the sharp contrast in between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence" .
The principle laid down in this case totally fits in this case. According to the witnesses the deceased was killed by using a dagger and fire arm while there is no injury of dagger in the shape of punctured wound and there is no injury of fire arm. Hence, there was no occasion for the learned trial Court to convict the accused persons.
Even in inquest (Ex. Ka-5) punch/witness have said that the deceased appear to be died due to fire-arm injuries. Thus, it is again established that till the time of inquest, the prosecution was of the opinion that the deceased was killed by fire arm injury. While no injury of fire arm was found in the post mortem report.
In Uma Shankar Chaurasia Vs. State of U.P., 2004 (50) ACC 152 (All... LB) (DB) and State Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652, it has been held that-
"when there is conflict between the injury report and Post Mortem Report, the Post Mortem Report should be preferred over the injury report."
In Sunil Kundu Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2013) SCC (Cri) 427, it has been held that -
"General rule is that when there is a cogent and reliable ocular evidence, it will have primacy over medical evidence. However when eye-witness account is totally inconstant with medical evidence and there is reason to believe that improvements were made in Court to bring prosecution case in conformity to post-mortem notes. The contradictions between oral and medical evidence cannot be ignored. In this case major lacuna in prosecution case was that alleged use of fire arms by the accused was not proved as no fire arm injuries were found on deceased. Hence accused were held entitled to benefit of doubt. "
In Chanali Maddilety Vs. State of A.P. (20110 SCC (Cri) 445, "Accused AI and A2 alleged to have used stone and stick. The deceased suffered 13 incised and stab wounds. No injury was caused by blunt object like stick or stone. As injuries did not correspond to the weapons allegedly used by A1 and A2. The Trial Court acquitted the accused A1 and A2.
In Devatha Venkata Swamy @ Ramgaiah Vs. Public Prosecutor High Court, 2004 SCC (Cri) 963, " The witness in his evidence clearly stated that the appellant pierced the forehead of the deceased once, but the medical report shows that the injuries caused to the forehead of the deceased was by the use of a blunt weapon and that too by repeated blows. So there was direct conflict between the medical evidence and ocular evidence. Hence the prosecution case was not believed. "
Consequently this Court concludes that according to the I.O. and the witnesses of the fact the deceased was killed by fire arm while as per the medical report, the injuries were caused by sharp edged weapon and blunt object, hence, post mortem report would prevail and in view of the report and evidence of the post mortem doctor, the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses is false, incorrect and untrustworthy.
The I.O., P.W.-6- Yashpal Singh, has admitted that informant in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that accused persons had killed his son by fire arm but after receiving the post mortem report, he again recorded the statement of informant. Statement of P.W. 2, Iqbal Hussain, was also recorded only after receiving post mortem report. This witness in his cross-examination has accepted that statement of the informant was recorded in the night of 14.7.2004. Informant has also accepted in his cross-examination that first of all he had stated to the I.O. that accused persons had killed his son from gun and country made pistol. He has also accepted that he had instructed the scribe Ramesh Chandra regarding killing of the deceased by firing from the gun. It has already been concluded that the F.I.R. is ante-timed and it is again concluded that the I.O. has tried his best to make the case in conformity with the post mortem report and accordingly he recorded the statement of witnesses of the fact. This finding also find support from the statement of the informant-P.W.-1, given to the I.O. first time on the date of occurrence. Further, the statement of the informant was recorded by the I.O. on 29.7.2004 after receiving the post-mortem report only to make the prosecution case in accordance of the injuries but even then he could not succeed. Thereafter, making an improvement, the informant- P.W.1 also changed his evidence and in the Court he deposed that the deceased was killed by sharp edged weapon and blunt object. Learned trial Court has found the illegal and unacceptable improvement and this Court also is in agreement with the finding of the learned trial Court.
It is also noteworthy that P.W.4, Dr. Arvind Agrawal, in his cross-examination has insisted that dagger is a thin and long weapon. Cut wound present on the dead body may occur only from the sharp edged weapon like Gadasha or Tabal or sword.
It is noteworthy that when P.W.2, Iqbal Hussain, was very much present on the spot and at his house then why his statement was not recorded along with the statement of the informant and why statement was recorded after 15 days on 29.7.2004. This witness also deposed in the same manner like the informant that the deceased was killed by dagger and butt part of the gun while as per P.W.4 all the injuries were caused from sharp edged weapon like tabal, Gadasha, sword and by using blunt object.
In Maruti Rama Naik Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2003 0 Supreme (SC) 863, it has been held that -
"In this case P.W.-3, injured, had not named the appellants as assailants in his statement to the police despite opportunity to record his evidence after one day's delay his statement was recorded. It was held that without corroboration the evidence of this witness was not liable to be relied on. P.W.-4 was the close friend of the deceased but he did not inform the police or anybody else and he went to his workplace. There was unexplained delay in recording his statement."
Hence, statement of witness was not relied upon.
Thus, in the same manner the evidence of P.W.-2 is also not reliable and trustworthy.
Accused Ram Chandra has also been charged for Section 25 of the Arms Act. According to the prosecution version a country made pistol and empty cartridges used in commission of crime were recovered from his possession on 21.7.2004. Learned trial Court has concluded that if the accused Ram Chandra was arrested from public place like Faiznagar Tiraha and confessed to get the country made pistol recovered used in commission of the crime and if the same was recovered near the sugarcane farm then why no public witness was taken and why the declaration of the accused was not recorded. More so, the country made pistol is not connected from commission of crime as there is no firearm injury to the deceased. So far as licensed gun of the accused is concerned, if it was used in the crime and the licensed gun was taken into custody, why the procedure to cancel the license was not initiated is also questionable.
The I.O. of the 25 Arms Act is the subordinate to the S.H.O., P.W.-6, Yashpal Singh, hence, he was having no option but to submit the charge-sheet against the accused Ram Chandra without obtaining any F.S.L. report. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly concluded that the F.I.R. is anti-timed and there is illegal and unnatural improvements by the I.O. and the witnesses of fact have not witnessed the incident, they were not present on the spot, therefore, their statement is not consistent.
In the F.I.R. the informant has put a motive that deceased did not listen to the accused that is why the accused have killed him. This fact is not explained by the prosecution and it can not be a ground to kill a person by another. There is no need to prove the motive if there is direct evidence. Though motive and mens-rea may arise at any point of time even at the time of occurrence also. There is some importance of motive in cases of circumstantial evidence though if chain of the circumstances is complete, there is no need to prove the motive but in this case it is not proved that the witnesses of fact were present on the spot, therefore, there is variation in their statement and there is contradiction between the ocular and the medical evidence. That's why evidence of the witnesses of fact does not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court, hence, their evidence has been rejected. Thus the case remains a case of circumstantial evidence. In that case the prosecution is duty bound to prove the motive and that the chain of the circumstances is complete. As per the F.I.R. it is not a case of circumstantial evidence. Neither motive nor extra judicial confession nor last seen or recovery of any incriminating item has been proved.
Another golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocent, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. ( See: Kali Ram Vs. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808; State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa & Ors Vs. State of Karnataka, 2007 4 SCC 415: Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 and Golbar Hussain & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Anr. (2015) 11 SCC 242).
Direct evidence means that from which the existence of a given thing or fact is proved either by its actual production, or by the testimony or admissible declaration by someone who has perceived it. In the case of circumstantial evidence certain facts are proved, from which the existence of a given fact is inferred. The two forms are equally admissible. " Superiority of the former is that whilst it contains fallibility of assertion and perception as source of error the latter has in addition, fallibility of inference. " Circumstantial evidence must always be direct, i.e. the facts from which the existence of fact in issue is to be inferred must be proved by direct evidence."
Addressing the context of circumstantial evidence, Ian Dennis in the treatise " The Law of Evidence" has propounded:
" Where the case against the accused depends wholly or partly on inferences from circumstantial evidence, factfinders cannot logically convict unless they are sure that inferences of guilt are the only ones that can reasonably be drawn. If they think that there are possible innocent explanations for circumstantial evidence that are not" merely fanciful", it must follow that there is a reasonable doubt about guilt. There is no rule, however, that judges must direct juries in terms not to convict unless they are sure that the evidence bears no other explanation that guilt. It is sufficient to direct simply that the burden on the prosecution is to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt, or so that they are sure.
The very high standard of proof required in criminal cases minimizes the risk of a wrongful conviction. It means that someone whom, on the evidence, the fact finder believes is " probably" guilty, or "likely" to be guilty will be acquitted, since these judgments of probability necessarily admit that the fact finder is not "sure". It is generally accepted that some at least of these acquittals will be of persons who are in fact guilty of the offences charged, and who would be convicted if the standard of proof were the lower civil standard of the balance of probabilities. Such acquittals are the price paid for the safeguard provided by the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard against wrongful conviction. "
In State of U.P. Vs. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114, it has been laid down that:
"There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this court as far back in 1952."
Thus, one of the earliest cases, where the proposition related to circumstantial evidence has been laid down is Hanumant Govind Nargundkar Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343.
The principle enunciated therein has been reiterated in a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and specifically mention may be made of Sharad Birdichand Sards Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622; (1984) 2 SCC 116. The conditions precedent in the words of the Hon'ble Court before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence must be fully established. The conditions are:
1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established.
2. The fact so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
3. The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency.
4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except that one to be proved.
5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
These conditions have been called as the 'five golden principles' or to say' constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.' Recently, in Nathiya Vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police, Bagayam Police Station, Vellore, (Crim. Appeal No. 1015/2010, date of judgment 08.11.2016), the Hon'ble Court has approvingly referred to Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 and Raja @ Rajendra Vs. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 43. The proposition laid down is to the effect that in scrutinizing the circumstantial evidence, a court is required to evaluate it to ensure that the chain of events is established clearly and completely, to rule out any reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. Whether the chain is complete or not would depend on facts of each case emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick should ever be attempted.
More recently in Ganpat Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 159, it has been reiterated that circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established. The circumstances taken cumulatively, should form a change so complete, that there is no escape from the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was committed by accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of guilt of accused and inconsistent with his innocence.
Motive must be proved in a case of circumstantial evidence : But in relation to criminal trials based circumstantial evidence only, the Supreme Court has, in the cases noted below, laid down different law on the point of motive and has clarified that prosecution should prove motive as well if it's case is based on circumstantial evidence.
In view of Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police Krishnagiri, AIR 2011 SC 1249, in this case the motive is neither grave nor acceptable and it appears to be unreasonable and insufficient to commit the alleged crime. No independent witness has been examined in support of the alleged motive.
No F.S.L. Report in respect of blood stained and plain soil has been produced and it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt that deceased was actually killed on the alleged place of occurrence.
Thus, from all the four corners this Court is also of the opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused persons. Hence, revision lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. Lower Court's record be sent back along with a copy of this judgment.
Order Date :- 23.11.2022 S.Verma (Umesh Chandra Sharma,J.)