Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manoj Kumar Chaturvedi vs High Court Of M.P. on 13 August, 2015
W.P.No.2006/2015
1
13.08.2015
Petitioner appears in person.
Shri Ashish Shroti, Advocate for the respondents.
Heard the petitioner and counsel for the respondents on admission.
This petition takes exception to the notification dated 23.11.1994 issued by the Governor. In furtherance of which, Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva (Bharti Tatha Seva Sharten)Niyam, 1994 came into force. The petitioner in the first place is challenging the validity of Rules 6 and 7 of the said Rules providing for reservation, relying on Rule 3(5) of the Madhya Pradesh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Janjatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994. Indeed, Section 3(5) of the said Act exempts application of the provisions of the said Act to the appointments made to the M.P. Higher Judicial Services. As a necessary corollary, it means that the said law is not on the said subject. Further, that provision cannot limit the sweep of Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of 1994, which are especially framed to deal with the issue of recruitment in the Higher Judicial Services in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Therefore, it is not possible to countenance the argument that these Rules would become repugnant to the provisions of the Act of 1994 as such. Notably, no provision of the Act of 1994 is brought to our notice which expressly or even impliedly prohibits W.P.No.2006/2015 2 framing of separate Rules in exercise of powers conferred under Article 233 read with proviso to 309 of the Constitution.
Suffice it to observe that the argument that Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of 1994 are ultra-vires the provisions of the Act of 1994, cannot be countenanced. For, the fields occupied by both these provisions are independent. The purpose for which Rules of 1994 have been framed are specific to the recruitment to the post of Higher Judicial Services in the State; and framing of such Rules has not been prohibited by the Act of 1994. It is one thing to exempt the application of the provisions of the Act, but that exemption cannot preclude the State from enacting statutory Rules especially for the purpose of recruitment to Higher Judicial Services in the State. The Act of 1994 is of general application to the establishments in the State and vacancies in public service and posts in the establishment defined in Section 2(b) of the Act. Accordingly, this contention deserves to be stated to be rejected.
The second argument canvassed before us is that Article 233 does not envisage appointment by promotion to Higher Judicial Services. We fail to understand as to how that contention is available to the petitioner, who had appeared in the examination pursuant to the public notice inviting applications for direct recruitment. None of the post notified W.P.No.2006/2015 3 in terms of public notice dated 28.11.2014, is earmarked as promotional post. All the posts are for appointment by direct recruitment process. Accordingly, we decline to entertain the argument of the petitioner, under consideration.
That takes us to the third argument of the petitioner. He submits that examination process is not only cumbersome, but the officials involved in the examination are interested in ensuring that members of the Bar do not succeed in the said examination. That happens because the question papers are assessed by none-else but the District or Additional District Judge / Judicial Officers. We cannot entertain this argument, which has no foundation and does not find place in the writ petition for want of material facts in that behalf.
Notably, the petitioner has failed to come within the number of candidates, who are likely to be called for viva voce from amongst the successful candidates who had appeared in the written examination. The petitioner has secured only 78 marks as against the cut off 95 marks secured by the last candidate amongst the three times the number of vacancies, in the ratio of 1:3. Thus understood, the petitioner has no locus to challenge the selection process in question. The petition must fail on this count alone, but we have already dealt with the arguments, which were canvassed on merits. No other argument has been canvassed, as a result, this petition is dismissed.
W.P.No.2006/2015 4After this order is dictated, the petitioner, who appears in person, submits that the subjects on which the Rules of 1994 have been framed are ascribable to the topics already covered by the M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958. Since the said Act has been brought into force after the assent of the President even for the Rules of 1994, similar assent of the President should have been obtained and for which reason entire Rules of 1994 are unconstitutional. The Rules of 1994 have been framed in exercise of powers conferred under Article 233 read with proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Being special Rules dealing with subject of recruitment and appointment to the post of Higher Judicial Services, the general provisions in the Act of 1958 will be of no avail, much less obligate the Rule Making Authority to obtain assent of the President for introducing the Rules so framed in exercise of power under Article 233 read with proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Hence, even this argument does not commend to us.
Petition is dismissed.
(A. M. Khanwilkar) (J.K.Maheshwari)
Chief Justice Judge
shukla