Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Lokesh Meena vs State Of Rajasthan on 20 February, 2019
Author: Arun Bhansali
Bench: Arun Bhansali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ No. 18212/2018
Lokesh Meena S/o Shri Mangla Meena, Aged About 21 Years,
Village Undari Kalan, Tehsil Girva, District Udaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Secretary, Department Of
Home, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur
2. Director General Of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur
3. Superintendent Of Police, District Udaipur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Hapu Ram Vishnoi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manish Vyas, AAG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI
Order REPORTABLE 20/02/2019 This writ petition had been filed by the petitioner aggrieved against action of the respondents in not according appointment to the petitioner pursuant to his selection on the post of Constable General duty in Constable Recruitment, 2018.
During pendency of the writ petition by way of additional affidavit the petitioner has placed on record order dated 29.11.2018 as Annexure-10, whereby, the respondents have rejected the candidature of the petitioner on account of criminal proceedings against the petitioner.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner was tried for the offences under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323 and 427 IPC, wherein, he was given benefit of doubt and (2 of 5) [CW-18212/2018] acquitted and in another matter under Sections 341, 323, 427 and 149 IPC he was acquitted based on compromise. However, in the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10), the respondents by observing that as in one case benefit of doubt was given and another case was settled through compromise, the same are not clean acquittals and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for appointment.
It is submitted that vide Circular dated 28.03.2017 (Annexure-9) pertaining to examination of cases of this nature the respondents had provided that in cases where the benefit of doubt has been given and acquittals have taken place based on compromise, the said candidates would be eligible and the stipulation pertaining to the offence under Section 147 IPC pertains to the case of under trial or conviction and, therefore, even as per the said Circular, the petitioner is entitled for being accorded appointment and the rejection of petitioner's candidature by the respondents on account of the fact that the acquittal is not clean is unsustainable.
Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents supported the order impugned. It was submitted that in the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. : (2016) 8 SCC 471 Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that if the acquittal is not clean pertaining to involvement in the case of moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, despite acquittal, appointment can be refused and, therefore, the respondents are justified in rejecting the candidature of the petitioner.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record.
(3 of 5) [CW-18212/2018] A perusal of Circular dated 28.02.2017 reveals that the respondents have indicated the categories, in which, the candidates would be eligible for appointment, which includes acquittal by the Court on according benefit of doubt and acquittal based on compromise between the parties.
In view thereof, as in both the cases the petitioner has been given benefit of doubt/acquitted based on compromise, the case of the petitioner would be covered by the said Circular.
So far as the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) are concerned, the relevant portion of the directions, read as under:-
"(c) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee."
(emphasis supplied) A perusal of the above direction would reveal that Hon'ble Court directed that if acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving mortal turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
A perusal of the order impugned i.e. 29.11.2018, whereby, the candidature of the petitioner has been rejected, the respondents have observed as under:-
"2- vkids fo:) pkyku la[;k 16@2015 /kkjk 147]149]341]323]427 Hkknl esa U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 02-07-18 }kjk /kkjk 147 Hkknl esa lansg (4 of 5) [CW-18212/2018] dk ykHk nsdj nks"keqDr fd;k x;k ,oa 341]323]427]149 Hkknl esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij nks"keqDr fd;k x;kA 3- fcUnq la[;k 2 esa mYysf[kr izdj.k esa vkidks U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 02-07-2018 }kjk /kkjk 147 Hkknl esa lansg dk ykHk nsdj nks"keqDr fd;k x;k ,oa 341]323]427]149 Hkknl esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij nks"keqDr fd;k x;k gSA tks llEeku cjh ugha gSA vr% vki fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr ds ik= ugha gSA"
(emphasis supplied) As noticed hereinbefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in a case where acquittal is not clean or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer is required to consider all relevant facts available as to the antecedents and take an appropriate decision. However, in the order passed by the respondents the same has been passed mechanically by merely indicating that the acquittal is not clean neither the antecedents nor the relevant facts with regard to acquittal of the petitioner have been considered by the respondents and, therefore, the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) passed by the respondents cannot be sustained.
In view of the above discussion, as the petitioner is entitled as per the Circular dated 28.03.2017 (Annexure-9) of the respondents, based on the acquittals and the order Annexure-10 does not fulfill the requirement of directions given in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) and the action of the respondents in denying the appointment to the petitioner cannot be sustained.
Consequently, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to accord appointment to the petitioner pursuant to his selection vide select list dated 19.08.2018 (Annexure-4/Annexure-5). The petitioner (5 of 5) [CW-18212/2018] would be entitled to notional benefits from the date appointment has been accorded to the candidates lower in merit to the petitioner. However, actual monetary benefits would be paid to the petitioner from the date of appointment. Needful be done within a period of four weeks.
(ARUN BHANSALI),J 22-AK Chouhan/-
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