Allahabad High Court
Smt. Chandrama Devi Agrahari vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. ... on 12 May, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:33962
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 8614 of 2024
Smt. Chandrama Devi Agrahari
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Lko And Another
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Rishad Murtaza, Prafulla Tiwari, Raghvendra Ojha, Sumit Kumar Srivastava, B/S1322
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
G.A., Pragati Mehrotra, Rakesh Devi Prasad Kumar
Judgement reserved on 23.04.2026 AFR Delivered and uploaded on 12.05.2026
HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.
1. The present application has been filed seeking quashing of the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No.1914 of 2023, Ghanshyam Soni @ Pappu Vs. Lallu Prasad Soni an others, under Section 420 IPC, Police Station Amethi, District Amethi and the summoning order dated 08.022024 including the bailable warrant dated 03.08.2024 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Room No.20, Sultanpur.
2. Sri Prafulla Tiwari, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that earlier the applicant consulted Sri J.N. Mishra, Advocate, for filing a criminal revision against the summoning order dated 08.02.2024, but on being advised to file an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before this Court against the summoning order, the applicant orally instructed her counsel not to file the criminal revision before the Sessions Court, but despite the aforesaid instruction, Criminal Revision No.91 of 2024 was filed by the Advocate without informing the applicant, in which no interim order was passed. He has further submitted that on 20.09.2024, the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed before this Court challenging the orders dated 08.02.2024 and 03.08.2024 and this Court stayed further proceedings of Criminal Complaint Case No.1914 of 2023, pending before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.20, Sultanpur vide order dated 26.09.2024.
3. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that instruction given by the client to his/her Advocate may be oral or written is binding on the counsel, but in the present case in spite of instruction given by the applicant, the counsel had filed the criminal revision before the Sessions Court without informing to the applicant. It is further submitted that applicant on coming to know about the pendency of the criminal revision being filed in her name through the counter affidavit filed on the behalf of opposite party no.2, which was served on her on 06.11.2024, the applicant being a bona fide litigant, moved an application for withdrawal of the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to pursue the remedy of criminal revision on 20.11.2024. However, this Court vacated the interim order granted without deciding the application for withdrawal of the application.
4. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that it is a settled law that a client/litigant cannot at all be made to suffer for the mistake committed by his/her counsel. He has also submitted that the withdrawal application dated 20.11.2024 filed by the applicant is still pending adjudication before this Court and it deserves to be allowed by permitting the applicant to pursue the remedy of criminal revision.
Legal submissions of counsel for the applicant:
5. The contention of counsel for opposite party no.2 that the declaration in terms of Rule 3(5) Chapter XVIII, Part-III of the Allahabad High Court Rules, have not been made by the applicant and there has been material concealment by her in not declaring the pendency of the criminal revision falls on its face as the applicant herself got to know about the pendency of the criminal revision only when she was served the counter affidavit by opposite party no.2 on 06.11.2024 and immediately thereafter the applicant moved an application for withdrawal of the application on 20.11.2024. Therefore, there is no concealment, suppression of material fact or misstatement made by the applicant in terms of Rule 3(5) of Chapter XVIII, Part-III of the Allahabad High Court Rules as the applicant has no knowledge about the pendency of criminal revision at the time of filing the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as she had specifically instructed her counsel not to file the criminal revision against the impugned order dated 08.02.2024. In fact, the applicant shows her bona fide conduct as she herself moved an application for withdrawal of the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 20.11.2024 immediately after she came to know about the pendency of the criminal revision.
6. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the applicant is not seeking adjudication of her claim on merits and instead she is seeking withdrawal of the present application as she is now in knowledge of the fact that a criminal revision against the impugned summoning order dated 08.02.2024 is pending before the District and Sessions Judge, Sultanpur and she wishes to pursue the same. He has further submitted that allegation of opposite party no.2 that the interim order dated 26.09.2024 was communicated to the trial court by J.N. Mishra. Advocate is unsustainable as the application by means of which the interim order dated 26.09.2024 was communicated to the trial court was preferred by Sri Nagendra Pratap, Advocate as is evident from the application dated 01.10.2024 annexed as Annexure A-1 to the application dated 16.12.2024 filed by the applicant. Even the Vakalatnama filed on behalf of the applicant is in the name of Sri Nagendra Pratap, Advocate. He has, therefore, submitted that there is no concealment of material fact, omission or misstatement on the part of the applicant and there is no violation of Rule 3(5) of Chapter XVIII, Part-III of the Allahabad High Court Rules, rather the applicant to show her bona fide conduct, she herself moved an application for withdrawal of the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 20.11.2024 immediately after she came to know about the pendency of the criminal revision, therefore, the application for withdrawal of application may kindly be allowed, so that the applicant may pursue her remedy before the Sessions Court in criminal revision.
7. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that for the fault of the Advocate, the client (applicant) should not suffer because the applicant had instructed her Advocate on the next morning not to file the criminal revision, but he filed the same, therefore, in view of the judgement of the Hon?ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society Vs. Balwan Singh and others, (2015) 7 SCC 373, the applicant may not be held to be responsible. (Paras 22, 23, 31 and 32).
8. To buttress his argument, counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the following judgements:-
1. Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society Vs. Balwan Singh and others, (2015) 7 SCC 373;
2. Ganesh Patel Vs. Umakant Rajoria, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050;
3. Asit Kumar Vs. State of West Bengal and others, (2009) 2 SCC 703;
4. Vishnu Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. and another, (2011) 14 SCC 813;
5. Jaspreet Singh Garewal Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2019 SCC OnLine All 3579
6. Keshav Prasad and others Vs. Consolidation Commissioner, Lucknow and others, 2024 SCC OnLine All 8146; and
7. Vikram Bakshi and others Vs. R.P. Khosla and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783.
9. On the other hand, Sri Rakesh Devi Prasad Kumar, assisted by Mr. Narendra Chaunan, counsel for opposite party no.2 has submitted that opposite party no.2 is owner of House No.230, which was earlier numbered as House No.163, Ward No.7, Raipur Fulwari, Town area, Amethi, District Amethi. Mr. Lallu Prasad Soni, Lalji Soni, Pujari Lal Soni and Sangam Lal Soni, residents of the same locality, filed Civil Suit No.1375 of 2013 in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), Sultanpur against opposite party no.2 and his brothers and after hearing the parties, the said Suit was dismissed with costs by the Civil Judge, Sultanpur vide judgement dated 17.12.2018. Feeling aggrieved with the said judgement, Mr. Lallu Prasad Soni, Lalji Soni, Pujari Lal Soni and Sangam Lal Soni filed Civil Appeal No.08 of 2019 in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Sultanpur. During the hearing of the aforesaid appeal, Lallu Prasad Soni, Lalji Soni, Pujari Lal Soni and Sangam Lal Soni produced a certificate allegedly issued by the Nagar Panchayat. Opposite party no.2 has alleged that the said certificate was forged and prepared by the said Lallu Prasad Soni, Lalji Soni, Pujari Lal Soni and Sangam Lal Soni in collusion with the applicant and the then Executive Officer of the Nagar Panchayat. In the said certificate, boundary of the house of opposite party no.2 i.e. House No.230 was shown as the boundary of House No.292. The said certificate was signed by the applicant in the capacity of Chairperson of the Nagar Panchayat, Amethi.
10. Counsel for opposite party no.2 has further submitted that after making the necessary complaint to the police authorities, opposite party no.2 filed Criminal Case No.1914 of 2023, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur against Mr. Lallu Prasad Soni, Lalji Soni, Pujari Lal Soni and Sangam Lal Soni, including the applicant, on which the Magistrate after considering the complaint and the statement of the complainant, issued summons against the applicant and other accused order dated 08.02.2024. However, despite issuance of the summoning order, applicant and other accused persons did not appear before the Magistrate, therefore, bailable warrant dated 03.08.2024 was issued against them. Feeling aggrieved with the summoning order, applicant filed Criminal Revision No.91 of 2024, under Section 397/399 Cr.P.C. on 07.03.2024 in the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, on which the revisional court passed order on 07.03.2024, whereby the revision was admitted the notices were issued to opposite parties for hearing on stay application and posted the matter to 22.03.2024.
11. It has been submitted by counsel for opposite party no.2 that during the pendency of the aforesaid criminal revision, the applicant filed the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 18.09.2024 i.e. after six months from the date of filing of the aforesaid criminal revision before this Court for quashing the proceedings of Complaint Case No.1914 of 2023, summoning order dated 08.02.2024 and the order of bailable warrant dated 03.08.2024 issued by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur by making following statement on oath in paragraph-3 of the application, which reads as under:-
"That no other petition under Section-482 of Cr.P.C. Now under Section-528 of BNSS, 2023 is being filed on behalf of the petitioner before this Hon'ble Court and no other petition is being filed on behalf of the petitioner before Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad or here at Lucknow Bench, Lucknow on the same set of facts and subject matter"
12. Counsel for opposite party no.2 has further invited the attention of the Court towards Sub-Rule (5) of Rule-3 (Chapter-XVIII, Part-III), of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, which reads as under:-
?(5) In first paragraph of application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., criminal revision, transfer application or writ petition (or supporting affidavit thereof) it should be mentioned that no earlier application/criminal revision/writ petition has been filed in Allahabad High Court or Lucknow Bench against the impugned order (if any) on the same or related cause of action or seeking the same or related reliefs, and no such criminal revision or transfer application for the same reliefs, and no such criminal revision or transfer application for the same relief was pending in the lower court. If any such application was pending, details of the same are to be furnished. Any substantial omission or misstatement on these facts would result in dismissal of the petition, imposition of costs and prosecution for perjury.?
13. It has been submitted by counsel for apposite party no.2 that in the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant deliberately omitted and did not disclose the pendency of Criminal Revision No.91 of 2014 challenging the same summoning order dated 08.02.2024, which has been challenged in the present application, as such the applicant has violated the provisions of Sub-Rule (5) of Rule-3 (Chapter-XVIII, Part-III), of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.
14. It has further been submitted by counsel for apposite party no.2 that applicant by suppressing the material fact of pendency of criminal revision, in which no interim order was passed, persuaded this Court to pass an interim order in her favour on 26.09.2024 in the present application. Opposite party no.2 filed counter affidavit dated 04.11.2024 annexing a copy of Criminal Revision No.91 of 2024 along with the order-sheet and the order dated 07.03.2024 passed in it, which was served upon the applicant on 06.11.2024. It is submitted that applicant having realized the fraud, omission and misstatement made by her in the present application, filed an application for withdrawal of application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 20.11.2024 mentioning the brief particulars in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the application, in order to mislead this Court. Opposite party no.2 filed reply to the application for withdrawal of application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 27.11.2024, specifically denying the averments made by the applicant in the application for withdrawal dated 20.11.2024 and has specifically mentioned in paragraph-5 that Sri J.N. Mishra, Advocate has filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of the applicant in Criminal Case No.1914 of 2023 on 21.08.2024 i.e. prior to filing of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on 18.09.2024 and he has neither withdrawn his Vakalatnama nor has given ?No Objection Certificate? for filing Vakalatnama by any other Advocate as on 01.10.2024. The applicant has filed her rejoinder affidavit on 16.12.2024 to the reply filed by opposite party no.2 on 27.11.2024.
15. It has further been submitted by counsel for apposite party no.2 that applicant in order to hide her own fraud, omission, misstatement, suppression of facts and documents, filed an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 379 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 making allegation that opposite party no.2 is continuously trying to mislead this Court by way of submitting false affidavits without any particulars and has not come with clean hands before this Court, hence he is liable to be punished by this Court under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 379 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. It is submitted that in the said application, the applicant has nowhere stated that Sri J.N. Mishra, Advocate is not representing her in Criminal Case No.1914 of 2023 before the Magistrate and further she has not stated anywhere that as on 26.09.2024 (the date of interim order passed by this Court) or as on 01.10.2024, Sri J.N. Mishra, Advocate has given his ?No Objection Certificate? to the applicant and was not representing her in the said criminal case. Therefore, the aforesaid application filed by the applicant Under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 379 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 deserves to be rejected.
16. It is further submitted by counsel for opposite party no.2 that considering the omissions, misstatements, suppression of material facts and documents by the applicant, opposite party no.2 filed an application on 06.02.2025 under Sub-Rule-5 of Rule-3 of Chapter-XVIII, Part-III of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Section 379 and Section 215 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for prosecution of the applicant.
Legal Submissions of counsel for opposite party no.2
17. Counsel for opposite party no.2 has submitted that under Sub-Rule-5 of Rule-3 of Chapter-XVIII, Part-III of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, it was mandatory for the applicant while filing the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to disclose specifically that no such criminal revision or transfer application for the same reliefs was pending in the lower court. It was mandatory for the applicant under the said Rule to specifically disclose the pendency of Criminal Revision No.91 of 2024 filed against the summoning order, which was also challenged in the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the said non-disclosure, omission and misstatement on the part of the applicant is in clear violation of the said Rule, which clearly provides that any substantial omission or misstatement of the facts as mandated in the said Sub Rule-5 would result in dismissal of the petition making observations about the substantia omission or misstatement, imposition of costs and prosecution for perjury and in the present case all the aforesaid facts are apparent from the record and the pleadings of the applicant herself.
18. It is further submitted that as mentioned above, the applicant has taken the entire judicial process for granted and having failed to obtain any relief from the Sessions Court, she approached this Court by suppressing the material facts and documents pertaining to criminal revision filed by her before the Sessions Court and at the same time, making omission and misstatement in the present application in violation of the mandatory provisions of Sub Rule-5 of Rule-3 of Chapter-XVIII, Part-III of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. It is submitted that applicant is not an illiterate person and at the relevant time, she was Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Amethi. It is submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again held that no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice by suppressing material facts and documents and by omission or misstatement.
19. To buttress his arguments, counsel for opposite party no.2 has placed reliance upon the following judgments:
1. S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others (1994) 1 SCC 1;
2. Ramjas Foundation and others Vs. Union of India and others, (2010) 14 SCC 38; and
3. Keshav Prasad and others Vs. Consolidation Commissioner, Lucknow and others, 2024 SCC OnLine All 8146.
20. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
21. After hearing the parties? counsel and going through the record, it is evident that summons were issued against the applicant on 08.03.2024 by the trial court. Thereafter, Criminal Revision No.91 of 2024, under Section 397/399 Cr.P.C. was filed on 09.03.2024 against the summons, in which no interim order was passed. The applicant filed the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. during the pendency of the aforesaid criminal revision after six months i.e. on 18.09.2024. Sub-rule (5) Rule 3 of Chapter XVIII, Part-III of the Rules of the Court postulates that criminal revision, transfer application or writ petition (or supporting affidavit thereof), it should be mentioned that no earlier application/criminal revision/writ petition has been filed in Allahabad High Court or Lucknow Bench against the impugned order (if any) on the same or related cause of action or seeking the same or related reliefs, and no such criminal revision or transfer application for the same reliefs, and no such criminal revision or transfer application for the same relief was pending in the lower court. It is thus clear that it was mandatory for the applicant to disclose the pendency of Criminal Revision No.91 of 2024 in the Sessions Court, in the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in view of the aforesaid Rule of the Allahabad High Court Rules.
22. It is also to be noted that in the aforesaid criminal revision no interim order was granted. The applicant filed the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before this Court and got an interim order on 26.09.2024. The applicant has taken a plea that the Advocate, who was instructed to file criminal revision before the Sessions Court, was orally instructed not to file the criminal revision, but the same was filed on 09.03.2024 in the morning. It is evident that when opposite party no.2 filed counter affidavit disclosing the fact that the aforesaid criminal revision was filed on 08.03.2024 by the applicant, she has filed an application on 20.11.2024 for withdrawal of the present application in order to suppress the fraud, omission misstatement made by her in the present application. Therefore, the act of the applicant is in clear violation of Sub-rule (5) Rule 3 of Chapter XVIII, Part-III of the Rules of the Court.
23. Hon?ble Supreme Court has deprecated such practice in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) and it has been held that a litigant to approach the Court is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. Paragraphs 1, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgement are quoted below:-
?1. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.
7. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that "there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
8. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants- defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.?
24. Hon?ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramjas Foundation and others (supra) has held that the materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court proceedings. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belonged to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the Courts have, from time to time evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tented hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. Paragraphs 10 and 14 of the aforesaid judgement are quoted below:-
?10. We have considered the respective submissions. In our view, the appeal deserves to be dismissed because the appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands. In Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, acquisition of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd was challenged on the ground of violation of Section 5-A of the Act and also on the ground that land in question is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property. Another plea taken by appellant No.1 was that if the land belonging to educational and charitable institutions established by Hindus and non- Muslims is not treated as Wakf property, then the exemption clause (d) is liable to be declared void for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. While rejecting the argument that the acquisition proceedings were vitiated due to violation of Section 5-A of the Act, this Court noted that the appellants had made a patently incorrect statement on the issue of denial of opportunity of personal hearing and observed:
?As regards the objection of the violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 5-A of the Act in not affording an opportunity of personal hearing while deciding such objections, we granted an opportunity to the learned Additional Solicitor General to place material after examining the original record. We granted this opportunity to the respondents on account of the reason that the writ petition had been dismissed by the High Court in limine without issuing notice to the respondents and as such the respondents had not been given any opportunity before the High Court to place any material to refute the allegations made by the appellants in this regard. The Additional Solicitor General during the course of the hearing of the matter placed an order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi dated February 23, 1968 which has been taken on record and for the purposes of identification has been marked as Annexure `X'. A copy of the said Annexure `X' was also given to the learned counsel for the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order dated March 22, 1968 clearly shows that the Ramjas Foundation Society was represented through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who was given a personal hearing. From a perusal of the aforesaid document Annexure `X' dated February 23, 1968 it is clear that full opportunity of hearing through counsel was afforded to the Ramjas Foundation. It has been further mentioned in this order that the Ramjas Foundation Society was also allowed to file fresh objections if so desired, but Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, learned Advocate for the petitioner Society declined and stated that there was nothing more to add in the previous objection petition. After bringing the said document Annexure `X' to the notice of the learned counsel for the appellants, no satisfactory explanation or argument came forward on behalf of the appellants. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect of the objections filed under Section 5-A the Act was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible. It is well settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections filed under Section 5-A the Act was one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in the special leave petition filed before this Court and ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the special leave petition was filed in 1978 itself.
It may be further noted that a common objection petition under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated in Mubarikabad as well as in Sadhurakhurd was filed on December 11, 1959 through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate. The said objections were heard in the presence of Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate and disposed of by one common order Annexure `X' and we cannot believe an ipse dixit explanation made orally during the course of arguments on behalf of the appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal hearing being given to Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate. It is also important to note that no such objection was taken in respect of land in Mubarikabad.?
(emphasis supplied) The Court also criticized appellant No.1 for playing a game of hide and seek and observed:
?It may be noted that the reference with regard to suit No. 451 of 1971 decided on March 21, 1977 is in respect of the land of petitioners situated in Mubarikabad. It is surprising that though the opportunity was sought for filing a fresh suit, the appellants again filed a Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 in the High Court on January 7, 1978 which was ultimately dismissed by the High Court in limine on January 31, 1978 by a Division Bench comprising T.P.S. Chawla and Awadh Behari, JJ. In this Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 the appellants conveniently omitted to mention that the permission to withdraw the Petition No. 213 of 1973 was granted on the statement of Shri M.C. Gupta that his clients reserved the liberty to file a fresh suit and not writ. Thus no liberty was sought or given for filing a fresh writ petition. In any case there were no fresh ground or circumstances available to the appellants to file a fresh Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 on January 7, 1978 on identical grounds when the earlier Writ Petition No. 213 of 1973 had been dismissed as withdrawn on March 30, 1977. Nothing had happened between March 30, 1977 and January 7, 1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to the appellants to file the Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978. Awadh Behari, J. had dismissed the suit No. 451 of 1971 by order dated March 21, 1977 in regard to the lands in Mubarikabad and he was also one of the Judges of the Division Bench who passed the impugned order dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ petition in limine as he was fully aware of the entire background of this litigation. The appellants are themselves responsible for creating confusion in initiating separate proceedings at different periods of time in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to the acquisition proceedings was on common grounds. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of such conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In case, as sought to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior counsel for the appellants, the appellants were depending on the result of the civil suit filed in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the Writ Petition No. 213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed on March 21, 1977. We find no justification for filing the writ petition in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on March 30, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on January 7, 1978 instead of suit."
(emphasis supplied)
11. In S.L.P.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected matters, appellant No.1 had specifically raised a plea that its property is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property, but failed to convince the Court to nullify the acquisition proceedings on that ground.?
25. Similarly, in the case of Keshav Prasad and others (supra), this Court while considering the judgments rendered by the Hon?ble Supreme Court in the cases of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu and Ramjas Foundation and others (supra) held that the petition is vague, no personal cause of action has been made out coupled with the fact that the Petition suffers from the concealment of material facts and is an attempt to waste the precious time of the Court by resorting to filing a frivolous petition and if the State Counsel and the Gaon Sabha would not have brought the facts to the notice of the Court, the petitioners would have had a leverage by getting away with concealment and non- disclosure of material facts. Paragraphs 22 and 26 of the aforesaid judgement are quoted below:-
?22. What has been brought on record is an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court wherein the present petitioners had filed a PIL bearing No.667 of 2024 and the Division Bench of this Court by means of order dated 07.08.2024 noticing that the present petitioners had not filed their objections to the basic year Khatauni, hence their case in the shape of a PIL was not maintainable. However, liberty was granted to seek remedy as may be prescribed in law. It is thus urged that all the aforesaid facts which gave a cause of action ought to have been disclosed, hence non-disclosure leads to misrepresentation and petitioners have definitely not come before the Court with clean hands. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be rejected.
26. This Court had the opportunity to examine such an issue in Bhagwan Das Chela Balram Das Vs. District Magistrate Ambedkarnagar and others, 2023 (1) ADJ 342 [LB] wherein this Court with the aid of decision rendered by the Apex Court relating to the issue of concealment of material facts had noticed as under:-
?In Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi and others; (2003) 8 SCC 319 the Hon?ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud as is well-known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwells together.
16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by word or letter.
17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentations may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.
18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.
19. In Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 A.C. 337, it was held:
In an 'action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false.
A false statement, made through carelessness and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not render the person make it liable to an action of deceit."
20. In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, at page 23, it is stated:
"The true and only sound principle to be derived from the cases represented by Slim v. Croucher is this: that a representation is fraudulent not only when the person making it knows it to be false, but also when, as Jessel, M.R., pointed out, he ought to have known, or must be taken to have known, that it was false. This is a sound and intelligible principle, and is, moreover, not inconsistent with Derry v. Peek. A false statement which a person ought to have known was false, and which he must therefore be taken to have known was false, cannot be said to be honestly believed in. "A consideration of the grounds of belief", said Lord Herschell, "is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that he did so."
21. In Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyances at page 1, it is stated:
"If on the facts the average man would have intended wrong, that is enough."
It was further opined:
"This conception of fraud (and since it is not the writer's, he may speak of it without diffidence), steadily kept in view, will render the administration of the law less difficult, or rather will make its administration more effective. Further, not to enlarge upon the last matter, it will do away with much of the prevalent confusion in regard to 'moral' fraud, a confusion which, in addition to other things, often causes lawyers to take refuge behind such convenient and indeed useful but often obscure language as 'fraud upon the law'. What is fraud upon the law? Fraud can be committed only against a being capable of rights, and 'fraud upon the law' darkens counsel. What is really aimed at in most cases by this obscure contrast between moral fraud and fraud upon the law, is a contrast between fraud in the individual's intention to commit the wrong and fraud as seen in the obvious tendency of the act in question."
22. Recently this Court by an order dated 3rd September, 2003 in Ram Preeti Yadav vs. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education & Ors. reported in JT 2003 (Supp. 1 ) SC 25 held:
"Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (See Derry vs. Peek [1889] 14 A.C. 337 ) In Lazarus Estate vs. Berly [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1149 the Court of Appeal stated the law thus:
"I cannot accede to this argument for a moment "no Court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything". The Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever."
In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath 1994 (1) SCC 1 this Court stated that fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal."
23. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
24. In Arlidge & Parry on Fraud, it is stated at page 21:
"Indeed, the word sometime appears to be virtually synonymous wit "deception", as in the offence (now repealed) of obtaining credit by fraud. It is true that in this context "fraud" included certain kind of conduct which did not amount to false pretences, since the definition referred to an obtaining of credit "under false pretences, or by means of any other fraud". In Jones, for example, a man who ordered a meal without pointing out that he had no money was held to be guilty of obtaining credit by fraud but not of obtaining the meal by false pretences: his conduct, though fraudulent, did not amount to a false pretence. Similarly it has been suggested that a charge of conspiracy to defraud may be used where a "false front" has been presented to the public (e.g. a business appears to be reputable and creditworthy when in fact it is neither) but there has been nothing so concrete as a false pretence. However, the concept of deception (as defined in the Theft Act 1968 ) is broader than that of a false pretence in that (inter alia) it includes a misrepresentation as to the defendant's intentions; both Jones and the "false front" could now be treated as cases of obtaining property by deception."
25. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application f any equitable doctrine including res-judicata.
26. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan vss. M/s. Shaw Brothers 1992 AIR(SC) 1555 ], it has been held that:
"Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct."
27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya vs. Jagannath [ 1994 (1) SCC 1 ] this Court in no uncertain terms observed:
"...The principles of "finality of litigation" cannot be passed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court- process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.... A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of security something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage... A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him, which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party."
28. In Indian Bank vs. Satyam Fibers (India) Pvt. Ltd. [ 1996 (5) SCC 550 ], this Court after referring to Lazarus Estates (supra) and other cases observed that 'since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, that the Courts have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by practising fraud upon the Court, and that where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order".
It was further held:
"The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers, which are resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business."
29. In Chittaranjan Das vs. Durgapore Project Limited & Ors. 99 CWN 897, it has been held:
"Suppression of a material document which affects the condition of service of the petitioner, would amount to fraud in such matters. Even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied within such a situation.
It is now well known that a fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Thus, even if the date of birth of the petitioner had been recorded in the service returns on the basis of the certificate produced by the petitioner, the same is not sacrosanct nor the respondent company would be bound thereby.""
In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others Vs. Government of A.P. and others; (2007) 4 SCC 221 the Hon?ble Supreme Court has held as under:
?21. Now, it is well settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed; "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal".
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502, Lord Denning observed:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand, if it has been obtained by fraud."
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was 'mistaken', it might be shown that it was 'misled'. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
25. It has been said; Fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT 1994 (6) SC 331, this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court upheld the contention and dismissed the application. The High Court, however, set aside the order of the trial court, observing that "there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". B approached this Court.
28. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as 'wholly perverse', Kuldip Singh, J. stated:
"The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation".
(emphasis supplied)
29. The Court proceeded to state: "A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party".
30. The Court concluded: "The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants".
31. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550 : JT 1996 (7) SC 135, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated;
"22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business".
(emphasis supplied)
32. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others., (2000) 3 SCC 581 : JT 2000 (3) SC 151, by practising fraud upon the Insurance Company, the claimant obtained an award of compensation from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. On coming to know of fraud, the Insurance Company applied for recalling of the award. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no power to review its own award. The High Court confirmed the order. The Company approached this Court.
In K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and others; (2008 12 SCC 481, the Hon?ble Apex Court has held as under:
?34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R.V. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136 in the following words:
"...it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts- it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it; the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement".
(emphasis supplied)
36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done". The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax Commissioner, Viscount Reading, C.J. observed:
"...Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the applicant was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit".
(emphasis supplied)
38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play `hide and seek' or to `pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the Court knows law but not facts".
In Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others; (2010) 2 SCC 114 Hon?ble the Supreme Court has held as under:
?1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e., `Satya' (truth) and `Ahimsa' (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
2. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations:
"It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterizes as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked."
4. In Welcome Hotel and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. AIR 1983 SC 1015, the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.
5. In G.Narayanswamy Reddi and other v. Governor of Karnataka and another AIR 1991 SC 1726, the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed:
"2. ?? Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special Leave Petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions."
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others JT 1993 (6) SC 331, the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449, it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 K.B. 486, and observed:
"In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible."
In Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and others Vs. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others; (2013) 11 SCC 531 the Hon?ble Supreme Court has held as under:
?42. While dealing with the conduct of the parties, we may also notice the submission of learned counsel for respondent No.1 to the effect that the petitioners are guilty of suppression of a material fact from this Court, namely, the rejection on 2nd May 2003 of the first application for extension of time filed by the trustees and the finality attached to it. These facts have not been clearly disclosed to this Court by the petitioners. It was submitted that in view of the suppression, special leave to appeal should not be granted to the petitioners.
43. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no material facts have been withheld from this Court. It was submitted that while the order dated 2nd May 2003 was undoubtedly not filed, its existence was not material in view of subsequent developments that had taken place. We cannot agree.
44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the Court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2nd May 2003 in the order dated 24th July 2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2nd May 2003 was passed or that it has attained finality.
45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows:
?It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent.
46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation vs. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 38 the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the Court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said:
?The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case.??
26. The judgement cited by the counsel for the applicant in the case of Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society (supra), it has been held that Lawyers are perceived to be their client's agents. The law of agency may not strictly apply to the clarinet-lawyer's relationship as lawyers have certain authority and certain duties. In the present case, the said judgement would not be applicable for the reason that applicant has filed the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No.1914 of 2023 and the summoning order and for the same cause of action, she had already filed a criminal revision before the Sessions Court. Therefore, filing of the present application is in clear violation of Sub-rule (5) Rule 3 of Chapter XVIII, Part-III of the Rules of the Court. Thus, the applicant is guilty of misrepresentation, fraud and concealment of material facts. It is settled law that fraud vitiates all proceedings and one who has committed fraud, cannot claim any relief. Other judgements cited by the counsel for the applicant are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is liable to be rejected with exemplary cost.
27. Accordingly, application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is rejected with exemplary cost of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh). Out of the said amount, Rs. 30,000/- shall be paid to opposite party no.2 after due verification and the remaining amount of Rs.70,000/- shall be paid in the account of the State Legal services Authority. The cost shall be deposited by the applicant within two months from the date of pronouncement of the judgment, failing which the same shall be realized as areas of land revenue.
28. Since the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is rejected on merit, IA No.2 of 2024 (Application for withdrawal of petition) and IA No.5 of 2025 (Application under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. read with Section 379 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) filed by the applicant are rejected as infructuous. Consequently, IA No.3 of 2025 (Application on behalf of opposite party no.2 under sub-rule(5) of Rule 3 of Chapter XVIII Part-III of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Section 379 and Section 215 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for prosecution of applicant is partly allowed.
29. Before parting with, it is to be noted that in most of the applications filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court has noticed that only pendency of earlier application/criminal revision/writ petition filed in Allahabad High Court or Lucknow Bench against the impugned order (if any) on the same or related cause of action or seeking the same or related reliefs, has been mentioned, whereas according to Rule 3(5), Chapter XVIII Part-III of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, pendency of such criminal revision or transfer application for the same reliefs pending in the lower court, should also be mentioned as like the present application.
30. In view of the aforesaid, Registry is directed to strictly adhere to Rule 3(5), Chapter XVIII Part-III of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 while passing the applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in future without fail.
(Brij Raj Singh,J.) May 12, 2026 Rao/-