Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi
Lipi Data Systems Limited vs Commissioner Of Central Excise on 10 August, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001(130)ELT91(TRI-DEL)
ORDER
K. Sreedharan, J. (President)
1. The issues raised in these three appeals are identical. So, we consider it advantageous to dispose of all of them by a common order.
2. Appellants, namely, M/s. Lipi Data Systems Ltd., are engaged in the manufacture of 'computer line printers'. They have their factory at Udaipur and depot at Mumbai. They were clearing the goods from their factory on payment of duty at the price prevailing at the depot on the date of clearance. The goods were ultimately sold at the depot at the same, higher or lower price. Till October 1997, whenever the goods cleared from the factory were sold from the depot at a higher price, they used to pay the differential duty. From 1997, the appellants intimated the department that they have been paying differential duty by oversight and that the payment of duty at the time of stock transfer on the basis of price prevailing at the depot should be the correct method. The department issued show cause notices proposing to demand differential duty on the goods sold from the depot at higher prices. The notices proceeded on the ground that the price at which the duty was paid by the appellants cannot be considered as a normal price. Detailed objections were filed against the action proposed in the show cause notices. Circular issued by CBEC dated 14-10-1996 was also placed before the adjudicating authority as to how goods sold from the depot are to be assessed. Adjudicating authority, namely, the Assistant Commissioner confirmed the demand made in the notices by levying duty on the value at which goods were sold at the depot. Assessee took up the matter in appeal, without success. Hence, these appeals.
3. When goods are removed from the factory to the depot and sales were effected at the depot, how duty is to be calculated is not an issue res Integra. It is covered by Circular dated 14-10-96 issued by CBEC also. Adjudicating authority, in his order, observed "I therefore, cannot persuade myself to agree with the assessee's contention that CBEC Circular date 14-10-1996 is applicable in their case". From this, it appears, he is not happy with the provision contained in the Circular and he wants to take a view contrary to the provisions contained in it. The provision contained in the Circular is in conformity with the law stated by this Tribunal in Castrol India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi [2000 (118) E.L.T. 35 Tribunal]. Referring to the duty liability of goods removed from the factory and sold from depot, this Tribunal observed "So, in the case of removal of goods from depot the time of removal should be the time at which such goods were cleared from the factory. In other words, time and place of removal provided by Section 4(1)(a), in relation to goods removed from the depot will be the factory gate and depot, respectively. Whenever goods are removed from depot, such goods are to be valued with reference to the time when it was removed from the factory". As per this decision, whenever the goods manufactured by the appellants at their factory at Udaipur were removed for subsequent clearances from Mumbai, they have to be assessed at the price prevalent on that date of removal from the factory. Instead of assessing the goods on this basis, the adjudicating authority and the appellate authority resorted to the method of fixing the value of the goods at the time of its actual sale from the depot. This method was clearly against the CBEC Circular and the decision referred to earlier. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the exercise undertaken by the adjudicating authority was contrary to law. The appellate authority, while confirming that order, has not given any legal sanctity to the proceedings resorted to by the adjudicating authority either. In such a situation, the only course that is open to us is to set aside all the orders passed by the adjudicating authority and the appellate authority. Appeals are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside.
4. Learned counsel representing the appellants in these cases submitted that the department recovered the entire amount covered by the orders set aside in these cases. In such a situation, we direct the department to return the entire amount recovered pursuant to the impugned orders as ex-peditiously as possible at any rate within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.