Karnataka High Court
Sri. M Krishnappa vs Sri. K T Srinivas on 12 August, 2014
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.5663 OF 2010 (CPC)
BETWEEN:
SRI.M.KRISHNAPPA
S/O. LATE MUNISWAMAPPA
RESIDING AT NO.2937/38/1
SERVICE ROAD, VIJAYANAGAR
BANGALORE ...APPELLANT
(BY SRI.AMIT DESHPANDE, ADV.,)
AND:
1. SRI.K.T.SRINIVAS
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS
S/O. LATE KABADI THANASA
2. SRI K.S.GIRIDHARI
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
S/O. K.T.SRINIVAS
3. SRI.K.S.KRISHNAMURTHY
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
S/O. SRI.K.T.SRINIVAS
4. SRI.K.S.PADMANABHA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
S/O. SRI.K.T.SRINIVASA
5. SRI.K.S.AMARNATH
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
S/O. SRI.K.T.SRINIVAS
ALL ARE RESIDING AT # H-61
SULTAN PET, BANGALAORE 560 053.
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6. SMT.H.LATHA
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
RESIDING AT # 95
B.E.M.L LAYOUT
BASAVESHWARANAGAR
BANGALORE - 560 079
7. SRI.M.HUCCHE GOWDA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
S/O. MAREGOWDA
RESIDING AT # 322
B.E.M.L. LAYOUT
BASAVESHWARANAGAR
BANGALORE - 560 079
8. SMT. NAGAMMA
W/O. SRI.PUTTEGOWDA
RESIDING AT NO.8
VIJAYANAGAR
BANGALORE - 560 040
9. SMT.P.HANUMAKKA
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
W/O. G.H.RAMACHANDRA
RESIDING AT @ 290/1
B.E.M.L. LAYOUT
HALAGE DEVARA HALLI V BLOCK
BANGALORE - 560 039
10. SRI.R.SHANKARAPPA
MAJOR
S/O. LATE RAMAKRISHNAPPA
RESIDING AT KENCHANAHALLI
BANGALORE - 560 039
11. SRI.DEVARAJU
MAJOR
RESIDING AT # 570
6TH A CROSS, 8TH MAIN
HAL III STAGE
BANGALORE - 08
12. SMT.KAMALAMMA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
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W/O. LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
RESIDING AT MALLASANDRA
DASANAPURA HOBLI
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
13. SMT.K.NIRMALA
AGED 50 YEARS
D/O. LATE MUNISWAMY
RESIDING AT NO.128
V.R.LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGAR
BANGALORE - 40
14. S.JAGADISH
MAJOR
S/O. LATE SANJEEVAIAH
RESIDING AT NO.1483
11TH A CROSS
4TH MAIN ROAD, 2ND STAGE
WEST OF CHORD ROAD
BANGALORE
15. SRI.B.KRISHNAPPA
AGED 65 YEARS
S/O. BIDDAPPA
RESIDING AT NO.11
DASAGOPANTHGALLI
SUNKALPET
BANGALORE - 22
16. K.NARASIMHA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
S/O. B.KRISHNAPPA
RESIDING AT NO.685
11TH CROSS, 4TH MAIN
M.C. LAYOUT
MAGADI ROAD
BANGALORE - 23
17. SRI.HEMANTHA KUMAR
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
S/O. SRI.MADANLAL
SUJI METAL INDUSTRIES
8TH CROSS, RIGHT SIDE
MAGADI ROAD
4
BANGALORE - 23
18. SRI.K.SRINIVASA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
S/O.B.KRISHNAPPA
RESIDING AT NO.685
11TH CROSS, 4TH MAIN
M.C.LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGAR
BANGALORE - 40
19. SRI.T.CHANDRASHEKAR
AGE 48 YEARS
S/O. THRUVANGADA SHETTY
NO.27, 8TH CROSS
MAGADI ROAD
BANGALORE - 23
20. SMT.ANURADHA
AGE 49 YEARS
W/O. SRI.T.CHANDRASHEKAR
RESIDING AT NO.27, 8TH CROSS
MAGADI ROAD
BANGALORE - 560023
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.SREEVATSA, SR.COUNSEL AND
SRI.H.S.SOMNATH, ADV., FOR R1- 5;
SRI. SHASHIKIRANSHETTY, SR.COUNSEL AND
SMT. FARAH FATHIMA, ADV., FOR R7 AND 14;
SRI. A.HANUMANTHAPPA, ADV., FOR R8;
SRI.RAGHUNATH, ADV., FOR R19;
R6, 10, 12, 16, 17 AND 20 ARE SERVED
NOTICE TO R9, 13, 15 & 18 ARE DISPENSED WITH;
APPEAL ABATED AGAINST R11 V/O DT.21.11.13)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 43 RULE 1(r)
R/W SEC. 151 OF CPC AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
29.5.2010 PASSED ON IA.NO.1 IN O.S.NO.2000/2004 ON
THE FILE OF VII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE,
BANGALORE, ALLOWING IA NO.1 FILED UNDER ORDER
39 RULE 1 AND 2 OF CPC FOR T.I.
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THIS MFA COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY,
THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Controversy in this appeal revolves around grant of temporary injunction in favour of plaintiffs by allowing I.A.No.1 and restraining defendant Nos.1, 8, 10 to 17, their agents, servants or anybody on their behalf claiming through them from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit property by plaintiffs and directing them not to put up any construction over suit schedule property during pendency of the suit. These defendants have also been directed not to put up any permanent structure in the suit property till further orders. 17th defendant being aggrieved by said order has preferred present appeal.
2. Factual matrix in brief leading to filing of this appeal can be crystallized as under;
Plaintiffs claiming to be owners of property bearing Sy.No.65 (Old No.23) measuring 6 acres 30 guntas situated at Mylasandra Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk (hereinafter referred to as "suit property" 6
for brevity) sought for an order of perpetual injunction against defendants from interfering with their possession and they are also seeking for a decree that all acts done by defendant Nos.1 to 16 are beyond the scope of General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 as without authority and ab-initio null and void, contending interalia that said property was purchased by first plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 22.08.1962 and plaintiffs are in actual and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. They also contend that second defendant had approached plaintiffs to purchase suit property and an agreement of sale was entered into between plaintiffs and second defendant on 27.01.1991 and they further pleaded that plaintiffs have incurred heavy expenditure for construction and by paying necessary conversion charges and betterment charges to concerned departments. They also specifically pleaded that defendant Nos.1 to 16 had approached them to execute a General Power of Attorney in their favour for purposes of obtaining permission from Government Departments 7 as they are not aware of legal procedures and obligations involved and in this regard, they executed a General Power of Attorney on 15.10.1992 for the purposes specifically mentioned in said General Power of Attorney. They further contended that on account of defendants not fulfilling the obligations cast on them under General Power of Attorney and as they had abandoned powers granted to them and agreement executed in their favour have not been acted upon. They also contended that defendants have no manner of right, title or interest over suit property as such, they questioned acts of defendant Nos.1 to 16 for having executed sale deed in favour of 17th defendant in the month of May 2003 on the ground that defendant Nos. 1 to 16 have no right to execute such documents. Plaintiffs further contended that immediately thereafter, they got issued a legal notice on 06.08.2003 notifying defendants not to interfere with their possession and untenable reply was sent by defendant Nos.1 to 16. They further contended that documents of sale in favour of 17th defendant is void ab-initio not binding, as such, 8 they contended that they terminated or revoked General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 executed by them in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 by issuance of notice of revocation and also by deed of revocation on 22.04.2004 and by getting it duly registered in Sub- Registrar office, Kengeri. They further contend that after such revocation defendants are attempting to interfere with plaintiffs possession and also attempting to put up construction, foundation etc., and hence they being unable to prevent the mischief of defendants, they sought for permanent injunction and in aid of main relief, they sought for grant of temporary injunction.
3. On service of suit summons defendant Nos.4 and 6 appeared before Trial Court and filed their written statement denying averments made in the plaint. They specifically contended that subsequent to execution of sale agreement dated 27.01.1991 plaintiffs had also executed an agreement of sale and General Power of Attorney on 15.10.1992 and these two documents came into existence on the same day. They also contended 9 that they have paid necessary conversion charges to the jurisdictional revenue authorities including betterment charges for conversion of suit property from agricultural to non-agricultural - residential purposes. They also further pleaded that as per registered agreement of sale deed dated 15.10.1992, plaintiffs have received full sale consideration from defendant Nos.1 to 16. They claimed to have taken possession of suit property from plaintiffs. They also specifically contended that agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992 and General Power of Attorney of even date are two contemporaneous documents having came into existence on the same day and Power of Attorney executed by plaintiffs is an agency coupled with interest. Hence, on these grounds and as pleaded in the written statement, they sought for dismissal of suit. They adopted the written statement as objections to I.A.No.I.
4. 17th defendant who is a subsequent purchaser and who is appellant in this appeal had also appeared on suit summons being served and has filed 10 his written statement denying averments made in the plaint and contended that he is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice. It was contended that agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992 and Power of Attorney of even date has been duly executed by plaintiffs in favour of 1st defendant and by virtue of said authority he along with defendant Nos.2 to 16, had executed a sale deed dated 22.05.2003 in his favour and as such, revocation of Power of Attorney subsequently on 22.02.2004 would have no effect on sale transaction entered into between defendant Nos.1 to 16 on one hand and 17th defendant on the other hand. Hence, for reasons pleaded in his written statement, 17th defendant sought for dismissal of suit. Defendants also filed a Memo that written statement filed by them be construed as objections to application I.A.No.1 filed by plaintiffs seeking temporary injunction.
5. Trial Court after considering the pleadings of parties and after appreciating the contents raised by 11 respective learned advocates appearing for parties formulated following points for its consideration.
(i) Whether the plaintiffs have made out a strong prima facie case?
(ii) In whose favour the balance of
convenience lies?
(iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for temporary injunction?
(iv) What order?
6. After evaluating pleadings and upon
deliberating contentions raised by learned advocates, Trial Court allowed I.A.No.1 and granted an order of temporary injunction in favour of plaintiffs and at the same time has also put the plaintiffs also on terms namely has directed plaintiffs also should not to put up any construction over suit property during pendency of suit. In other words, it has directed both parties to maintain status-quo. Reasons assigned by Trial Court for granting an order of temporary injunction in favour of plaintiff is that conversion order dated 17.07.1992 12 which defendants as well as plaintiffs produced relating to suit property evidencing conversion of said land from agricultural to non-agricultural-residential purposes is in the name of plaintiffs and as such, it has to be presumed that plaintiffs have applied for conversion of land vide Paragraph 16 of the order under challenge.
Trial Court also has held that there is no prima facie material to show that defendants have paid entire consideration to plaintiffs as agreed to under Agreement of Sale dated 17.01.1991 and as such, it accepted the say of plaintiffs that sale transaction is incomplete and still defendants are due to plaintiffs and balance amount of Rs.23,18,535/- is payable by defendant Nos. 2 to 16 and it is prima facie probable and acceptable plea. Trial Court also found that Clause 8 of General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 does not specifically authorize or empower defendants 2 to 16 to alienate or sell or encumber suit property, as such, it has held there is no specific and valid authority under General Power of Attorney in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 to sell the property. It also accepted the plea put forward 13 by the plaintiffs that General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 has also been revoked by a registered document on 22.02.2004 which is binding on defendants. Trial Court also held that sale transaction between defendants 1 to 16 and 17th defendant has taken place after revocation of GPA i.e., on 22.02.2004 and after filing of the suit in March 2004 and validity thereof will have to be considered at the time of trial and as such it had granted an order of temporary injunction. It found that construction is yet to commence and as such, it has held at Paragraph 28 of its order that it would be appropriate and proper to direct both parties to maintain status-quo by concluding that there is a prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of plaintiffs. Hence, it has allowed the application for grant of temporary injunction vide order dated 29.05.2010 which is under challenge in this appeal.
7. I have heard the arguments of Sri.Amit Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for appellant, 14 Sri.Sreevatsa, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri. H.S.Somnath for respondent Nos.1 to 5 and Sri.Shashikiran Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.7 and 14. Other respondents namely respondent Nos.6, 10, 12, 16, 17 and 20 are served and not represented. Notice to respondent Nos.9, 13, 15 and 18 has been dispensed with. Appeal against respondent No.11 has stood abated.
8. It is the contention of Sri.Amit Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for appellant that plaintiffs are guilty of suppression of facts namely they have not sated anything with regard to agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992, though defendants have pleaded specifically about said fact in Paragraph Nos.4 and 6 of their written statement and contends non-consideration of this vital aspect by trial Court has resulted in great prejudice to appellant. He would also drawn the attention of Court to the date of filing of the suit in question which was on 15.03.2004 and contends there 15 was no order of temporary injunction operating till status quo or temporary injunction came to be passed on 29.05.2010 and this itself would indicate that no hardship or inconvenience would have been caused to plaintiffs, if temporary injunction had been refused. He would also submit that agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992 and General Power of Attorney of even date executed by plaintiffs in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 are two contemporaneous documents having come into existence on the same date and agency created by plaintiffs in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 is an agency coupled with interest and revocation of same is impermissible under Section 202 of the Contract Act. He would contend that revocation of Power of Attorney by notice dated 22.02.2004 is much later to execution of sale deed by defendant Nos.l to 16 in favour of 17th defendant on 22.05.2003 and as such revocation of GPA by plaintiffs is of no consequence. He would also submit that Trial Court having held that 9th defendant has expired and his legal representatives having not been brought on record, it ought to have 16 held that cause of action does not survive inasmuch as, it was a joint and inseparable cause of action pleaded in the suit and as such, suit itself ought to have been dismissed. He would also elaborate his contentions by contending that Trial Court having held that layout work is in progress, it ought to have formulated material point for its consideration namely, with regard to irreparable loss and injury and non formulation of said point itself has vitiated the Order under challenge, as such, he prays for allowing of the appeal and dismissal of application and he also submits that balance of convenience as well as irreparable loss and injury that would be caused by continuing temporary injunction would be more to 17th defendant and subsequent purchasers who purchased from 17th defendant more than 104 sites and non consideration of this vital aspect by trial court has resulted in occasioning a great failure in administration of justice. Hence, he prays for allowing the appeal and prays for dismissal of I.A.No.I filed by plaintiffs before trial Court. 17
9. Per contra, Sri.Sreevatsa, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiffs ie., respondent Nos.1 to 4 would support the order under challenge and contends that very agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992 which is now propounded by 17th defendant did not see its light before Trial Court and as such, plaintiffs did not have opportunity to rebut the same. Hence, he submits that non consideration of these documents by Trial Court was just and proper and Trial Court was fully justified in not examining the said document and there is no fault committed by the Trial Court in this regard. He would also submit that conversion order undisputedly was on 07.07.1992 i.e., subsequent to agreement of sale dated 27.01.1991 and before General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 and during this interregnum period, plaintiffs had spent huge amounts by remitting conversion and betterment charges to revenue authorities, as such, Trial Court having noticed these facts has rightly held that plaintiffs have a prima facie case in their favour. He would also elaborate his contentions by contending that construing two 18 documents namely agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992 as well as General Power of Attorney of even date to be construed as contemporaneous documents would not arise for the reason that there is no reference in agreement to General Power of Attorney or vise-versa, and as such, it cannot be construed that there exists nexus to these documents to be construed as contemporaneous documents. Hence, he supports the order passed by Trial Court. He would also further contend that even accepting or assuming that two documents came to be entered into between parties namely two Agreements of Sale dated 27.01.1991 and 15.10.1992 consideration amount shown in these two documents are different and this aspect not having been explained by first defendant gives scope for doubting these two documents and as such, it is a fit case where during the pendency of trial status-quo has to be preserved in the interest of justice. He would also contend that General Power of Attorney which has been relied upon very heavily by defendant No.17 did not authorize defendant Nos.1 to 16 to sell suit property in 19 favour of 17th defendant and Clause 8 would not specifically empower the attorney to sell suit schedule property in favour of 17th defendant and words which are not found in the Clause cannot be read into by taking recourse to other recitals in the documents and as such, finding given by Trial Court in this regard does not suffer from either irregularity or patent illegality. Hence, he prays for dismissal of the appeal.
10. Sri.Shashkiran Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.7 and 14 would also support the appellant namely 17th defendant and contends that for nearly 6 years there was no order of temporary injunction operating in favour of plaintiffs and this very fact itself would indicate that there is neither balance of convenience nor prima facie case in favour of plaintiffs and no irreparable loss and injury would have been caused to plaintiffs, if such an order was not passed in favour of plaintiffs. Hence, he would also pray for allowing the appeal by supporting 17th respondent.
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11. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for parties and on perusal of order under challenge and after considering rival contentions, following points would arise for my consideration;
(i) Whether order passed by Trial Court on 29.05.2010 allowing I.A.No.1 filed by plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 by granting an order of temporary injunction in favour of plaintiffs and also directing plaintiffs not to put up any permanent structure in the suit schedule property till further orders is to be affirmed or reversed?
(ii) What order?
RE-POINT NO.(I):-
12. Facts as pleaded by respective parties in their respective pleadings have already been delved upon herein above. If this Court to re-state the said fact, it would amount to repetition of facts and as such, this court will delve upon the pleadings of parties. 21
13. The necessary ingredients which requires to be considered by Courts while considering an application for grant of temporary injunction as held by Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court are; (1) Prima facie case (2) Balance of convenience (3) irreparable loss and injury. These three ingredients are necessarily required to be considered, examined and adjudicated by Courts while considering an application for grant of temporary injunction. Keeping this in mind, let me examine as to whether plaintiffs have established or proved that these three ingredients are present in their favour for granting of an order of temporary injunction against defendants.
14. At the out set, it requires to be noticed that plaintiffs have admitted in their plaint that there was an agreement of sale executed by them in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 on 15.07.1991 vide Paragraph 6.
They also admit receipt of consideration as reflected in said agreement. Suit in question has been filed on 15.03.2004 and along with plaint an application for grant of temporary injunction has been filed. Said 22 application was not pressed for a period of 8 years i.e., order under challenge came to be passed in 2014. In other words, it would clearly indicate that there was no hardship caused to plaintiffs by non-granting of ad- interim order of temporary injunction. 15. Be that as it may. Defendant Nos.4 and 6 who appeared on service of suit summons filed their written statement and contended that subsequent to execution of agreement dated 15.07.1991, same was abandoned and subsequently another agreement of sale came into existence i.e., on 15.10.1992. It has been specifically contended in Paragraph 3 of written statement to the following effect:
"3. These defendants submit that plaintiffs as the owner of the schedule property executed the Regd. General Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant Nos.1 to
16 to look after, maintain, and alienate the suit schedule property and same has been registered as document No.133/1992-93 Book IV, ADR Volume 12, pgs. 17 to 22 dtd.
15.10.92 and Sale Agreement dtd.
15/10/1992 vide Regd. No.4697/1992-93, 23 Book No.1 respectively both the documents registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Kengeri, Bangalore. These defendants submit that after the Agreement of Sale, as a G.P.Holder for the plaintiffs have applied for conversion of Bangalore District, Bangalore. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore accorded the said conversion. These defendants along with other defendants have paid the necessary conversion charges with Taluk Treasury vide Challan No.SLR.6 & 7 dated 4-5-1992. after the payment of conversion charges to the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District.
Bangalore issued official Memorandum/Conversion Sanction
Certificate vide B.DIS.ALN.SR(S) 394/91-92 dated 7/7/1992 for Non-Agricultural residential purposes. These defendants submit that as per Regd. Power of Attorney dated 15/10/1992, Clause 8 of the G.P.A. , the defendants 1 to 16 have authority and execute any Deed, document or instrument with liberty to file present, produce or admit the same before any authority as may be found necessary. These defendants have given full authority to alienate or admit the same before any authority by the plaintiffs. 24
These defendants submit that as per Regd. Agreement of Sale dated 15th Oct. 1992 the plaintiffs have received the full sale consideration from the defendants 1 to 16, and delivered the vacant possession of the schedule property to the defendants 1 to 16. These defendants submit that the Power of Attorney and Agreement of Sale are coupled with agency of interest and now the plaintiffs have already lost the right, title and interest over the Schedule property. The plaintiffs having parted the possession of the schedule property with the defendants 1 to 16, the plaintiffs cannot seek any relief from the hands of this Hon'ble Court. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed ib-limine."
16. Defendants have also pleaded in the very same Paragraph that these two documents have been duly registered in office of Sub-Registrar on the very same day. However, plaintiffs did not rebut said plea for reasons best known. The fact that plaintiffs have executed these two documents namely, Agreement of sale and GPA on 15.10.1992 also cannot be disputed for yet another reason. These two documents have been 25 registered on same day in the same office of Sub- Registrar for registration. Signatures found on both documents would prima facie indicate to be one and same. The order under challenge would also clearly indicate that learned counsel who had appeared on behalf of plaintiffs before Trial Court had admitted execution of agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992. This finding is recovered by trial Court at Paragraph 17 of its order which reads as under:
"The Counsel for the plaintiff also admits the agreement dated 15.10.1992. But, he contends that the cheques numbers xxxxxxx incomplete.
17. Having noticed the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for plaintiffs, Trial Court has categorically held as under:
"Thus, it goes without saying that execution of special general power of attorney and agreement is an admitted fact."
18. Thus, unrebutted plea in the written statement as well as finding recorded by Trial Court 26 would clearly indicate that these two documents namely Agreement of Sale and GPA dated 15.10.1992 have been admitted by the plaintiffs.
19. When it is not disputed that both agreement of sale and General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 have come into existence on same day and it duly registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Kengeri, it has to be necessarily held that recitals in a registered document would prevail over any other recital found in any other document. Section 92 of the Evidence Act is clear and unambiguous in this regard and as such finding recorded by trial Court to doubt the genuineness of these two documents at this stage cannot be sustained.
20. This takes me to not issue as to whether prima facie, revocation deed dated 22.02.2004 executed by plaintiffs is to be held as a good ground for granting an order of temporary injunction in favour of plaintiffs since, Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 having been revoked by the principals namely plaintiffs revoking 27 Power of attorney granted in favour of D-1 to D-16. Power of revocation of an authority granted by the principal to agent could be found in Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 202 mandate that the acts done by the agents pursuant to that agency granted in his favour cannot be terminated by Principal when such agent has an interest in subject matter. Section 203 of the Contract Act would indicate that principal can revoke the authority given to his agent at any time before such authority has been exercised so as to bind the principal. Section 204 of the Act would clearly indicate that principal cannot revoke the authority given to his agent after such authority been partly exercised sofar as regards such acts and obligations as arise or the acts already done by such agency. Section 206 provides for a reasonable notice to be given thereby resulting to the principal or agent the damage that may occur on account of such revocation. Section 207 would indicate that revocation or renunciation may be expressed or implied in the conduct of the principal or agent respectively. Keeping 28 these statutory provisions in mind let me examine two documents pressed into service by defendants namely Agreement of Sale and General Power of Attorney dated 15.10.1992 when so examined, it would indicate that these two documents have been executed by plaintiffs in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 on the same day. It has been presented for registration on the same day in the same Sub-Registrar office and scribe of these two documents are Sriyuths D.H.Ramachandra and A.Ramaiah. Said documents having been executed on 15.10.1992 was revoked by plaintiffs after issuance of notice in the year 2004 and by executing a deed of revocation on 22.02.2004 i.e., after lapse of 12 years. As to what transpired during this interregnum period, nothing has been stated by plaintiffs. This would itself disentitle the plaintiff for grant of any equitable relief. By virtue of principal having granted an authority in favour of agent and said authority being alive upto the date of revocation has been acted upon by the agents on 22.05.2003 itself, namely defendant Nos.1 to 16 in whose favour principal had granted agency namely had 29 executed Power of Attorney have acted upon it and conveyed the suit schedule property in favour of 17th defendant under a registered sale deed dated 22.05.2003. Thus, it is a completed act of agent by virtue of authority granted by principal. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered view that principal could not have revoked the agent's authority inasmuch as Principal had simultaneously executed agreement of sale in favour of the Agent. Even otherwise, it has to be held that such revocation would recede to the background since agent had exercised his authority in view of Section 204 of the Contract Act and said provision would come to the rescue of agent or persons claiming through agent inasmuch as, by virtue of such authority granted to agent, they had acted upon even before revocation and 3rd party rights had been created namely agents on behalf of principal had sold the suit schedule property in favour of 17th defendant and as such, authority to revoke if any in favour of plaintiffs would not come to their rescue to contend that they have prima facie case.
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21. It is also to be noticed that in the order under challenge, Trial Court has completely ignored or failed to consider the point viz., as to whether either of the parties to suit would be put to irreparable loss and injury. There is not even a point formulated by the Trial Court in this regard for its adjudication. This is one of the main ingredient required to be examined by a Court while considering the prayer for grant of temporary injunction and this fact may tilt in favour of either of parties. This I say so, for the reason, that on one hand defendants 1 to 16 contend that by virtue of authority granted by principal in their favour, they have sold the suit schedule property in favour of 17th defendant and he inturn had formed a residential layout and sold sites of various dimensions to 103 persons namely 3rd party right had crept in. On the other hand plaintiffs contend by virtue of Power of Attorney having been revoked defendants 1 to 16 could not have sold the suit schedule property. To unsettle the settled things would definitely cause hardship to 3rd parties and as such 31 issue of irreparable loss and injury was one of the relevant and important point which was required to be considered by the Trial Court and this aspect having been lost sight of by Trial Court has resulted in great failure of administration of justice and order passed by Trial Court on this ground also cannot be sustained.
22. Perusal of the order of Trial Court would indicate that judgments relied upon by learned advocates for defendants though having been noticed by Trial Court namely having extracted list of authorities it seems to have not taken note of, namely, it has not discussed as to how the principles enunciated in those judgments have are applicable or otherwise to facts of the present case. It has been observed by trial Court that these judgments can be looked up during final disposal of suit which finding is clearly erroneous. Merely because plaintiffs are contending that agreement of sale entered into by them with defendant Nos.1 to 16 did not materialize itself is not a ground to grant an order of temporary injunction partly when they have 32 utterly failed to establish their bonafides either by taking reasonable steps as expected of a prudent person namely they did not raise their little finger with regard to agreement of sale dated 27.01.1991 till they issued notice of revocation during February 2004. It is only when defendants 1 to 16 executed a sale deed during May 2003 in favour of 17th defendant they woke up from their deep slumber to revoke the power of attorney.
23. Thus, entire facts having been re-
appreciated and reconsidered by this Court and discussed hereinabove, it has been found that plaintiffs have deliberately and erroneously failed to prove either prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss or injury that would be caused to them if an order of temporary injunction is not granted or they would suffer more injury, than what the defendants would suffer. On the other hand, by virtue of Power of Attorney executed by plaintiffs in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 16 they have sold or conveyed suit property in favour of 17th defendant on 22.05.2003 under a 33 registered sale deed and he inturn has got the suit schedule property converted to residential purposes and formed a layout and sold sites formed in the said layout to 3rd parties namely 103 persons. Thus, 3rd party right has also crept in. These aspects have not at all been considered by the Trial Court. Thus it has resulted in material irregularity which calls for interference at the hands of this Court. Though Mr.Sreevatsa, learned Senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs has vehemently contended that even assuming that defendant Nos.1 to 16 had a General Power of Attorney in their favour said Power of Attorney did not expressly confer power on them to alienate the property cannot be accepted at this stage, for the simple reason that agreement of sale dated 15.10.1992 indicate that possession has been delivered and defendant Nos.1 to 16 have been permitted to form a residential layout in suit schedule property and they have also been authorized to enter upon the land and carry out all civil works required for formation of lay-out. It is in this back ground, Clause 8 of Power of Attorney dated 34 15.10.1992 requires to be looked into. Said clause reads as under.
"8. It is made clear that non mention of any specific item of work in this power of attorney in relation to the purpose for which, it is given, shall not be deemed to limit the authority or power of attorney to do any act, deed or thing which according to subjective satisfaction of power of attorney acting in good faith deem fit, necessary or proper. In this connection our aforesaid attorney shall have authority and power to execute any necessary deed, document or instrument, with liberty to file present produce or admit the same before any authority as may be found necessary."
24. A perusal of said clause would clearly indicate that agent has been granted unlimited authority to do any act or deed or act to their subjective satisfaction and it has been specifically provided that "Attorney will have power to execute necessary deed, document or instrument with liberty to file present or produce or admit the same before any authority as may be necessary." In that view of the 35 matter, it cannot be said that at this stage namely at the stage of consideration of prayer for grant of temporary injunction that said document did not empower the attorney to sell suit property. Judgment in the case of ADAIKAPPA VS. THOMAS COOK & SON (LORD ATKIN) reported in AIR 1933 PRIVY COUNCIL 78 relied upon by the learned Senior counsel Mr. Sreevatsa would not come to the rescue of plaintiffs inasmuch as, in the said judgment, it has been held that general words used in the subsequent clauses of a Power of Attorney must be read with the special power given in the earlier clauses and cannot be construed so as to enlarge restricted powers therein mentioned. In the case on hand, this Court is faced with such a situation where two documents of even date registered on the same day namely agreement of sale and General Power of Attorney has been relied is being considered. These two documents are contemporaneous documents and they are supplementary and complementary to each other. They cannot be read disjunctively but conjunctively. Thus, it would be for the parties to 36 explain during the course of trial as to the need or necessity as to why these two documents came into existence on the same day and their presentation for registration before jurisdictional Sub-Registrar Office. Hence, I am of the considered view that judgment relied upon by Mr. Sreevatsa, learned senior counsel appearing for plaintiffs would not come to the rescue of plaintiffs. Accordingly, point No.1 formulated by this Court is answered in the negative by holding that Trial Court was not correct and justified in granting an order of temporary injunction by allowing I.A.No.1 filed by plaintiffs.
RE-POINT NO.2:
For the reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass following;
ORDER
(i) Appeal is hereby allowed.
(ii) Order passed by VII Additional City
Civil Judge, Bangalore in
O.S.No.2000/2004, dated 29.05.2010
37
is hereby set-aside and I.A.No.1 is
hereby dismissed.
(iii) Parties to bear their respective costs.
(iv) Trial Court shall not be influenced by any observations made by this Court during the course of this Order which is examined for the limited purpose of considering correctness of order passed by trial Court on I.A.No.1.
Sd/-
JUDGE GH