Madras High Court
Daivid John Hopkins vs The Union Of India And Others on 28 July, 1997
Equivalent citations: AIR1997MAD366, AIR 1997 MADRAS 366, (1997) WRITLR 681
Author: A.R. Lakshmanan
Bench: A.R. Lakshmanan
ORDER A.R. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The Writ Appeal is directed against the order of S. Jagadeesen, J., dated 31-8-1995 in W.P.No. 11063 of 1995 ().
2. W.P.No. 11063 of 1995 was filed by the appellant, who is acitizen of United Kingdom, for a declaration that Section 14(1) of the Citizenship Act, 1956 (Act 57 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which embodies the rule of law, and void.
3. The case of the appellant, as putforth in the writ affidavit is, in short, as follows :-- The appellant come to India in 1970, mainly with the idea of making India his permanent home and spend his time in Ashrams for meditation and learning Indian philosophy. Initially, he stayed at Swami Vivekananda Sevashratns and Swami Vivekananda Home of Renunciation and Service, Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh. According to the appellant, he lived in the Ashram as Sanyasi for nearly 14 years, i.e., between 1970 and 1985 studying Mahabharai, Ramayan and like scriptures, reading the works of modern saints like Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo, receiving spiritual instructions from his Guru and rendering service to the lepers. The appellant originally gave up his English name and took an Indian name on 11-6-1985. He assumed the Hindu name Swami Shivapranananda. Subsequently, he gave up the assumed name on 22-3-1988 and reverted back to his original name.
4. The appellant applies for Indian citizenship on 1-2-1985 under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act, which reads thus :
"Subject to the provisions of this section and such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed, the prescribed authority may, on application made in this behalf, register as a citizen of India any person who is not already such citizen by virtue of the Constitution or by virtue of any of the other provisions of this Act and belongs to any of the following categories :
(a), (b). (c) and (d) x x x x
(e) person of full age and capacity who are citizens of a country specified in the First Schedule.
Provided that in prescribing the conditions and restrictions subject to which persons of any such country may be registered as citizens of India under this Clause, the Central Government shall have due regard to the conditions subject to which citizens of India may, by law or practice of that country become citizens of that country by registration."
5. In his application, the appellant has stated several reasons for his strong desire to make India as his permanent home and to acquire Indian citizenship. Subsequently, he wrote a letter dated 25-3-.1985 to the Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, regarding the submission of advance copies of his application for registration as an Indian citizen under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. The appellant received a letter dated 6-4-1985 from the 2nd respondent, which stated as follows :
"No. 26017/4/85/1C Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home Affairs/Grih Maniralaya New Delhi, the 6th April, 1985.
To Shri David John Hopkins (known as Swami Shivaparananda), Dr. Ram Swaroop Colony, Moradabad-18, Uttar Pradesh.
Sub :-- Registration as Indian citizen under Section 5(1)(e) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
Sir, With reference to your letter dated the 25th March, 1985, on the subject mentioned above, I am directed to say that rules have not so far been framed for registration of British Citizens as Indian Citizens under Section 5(1)(e) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. As such, your application for such registration does not lie and cannot be considered.
Yours faithfully.
(Sd.) P. Vijayaraghavan, Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India
6. The appellant made his repeated attempts to get the Indian citizenship but the concerned authorities refused to give effect to the existing law of registration. Therefore, the appellant filed W.P.No. 11063 of 1995 for a declaration that Section 14(1) of the Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
7. The writ petition was dismissed by S. Jagadeesan, J.. by observing as follows :
"So far as the petitioner is concerned, on any account, it cannot be said that he has got a right to get citizenship of this country, lt is only a privilege that can be confermed on him by the action of either the prescribed authority or the Govt. of India. Of course, the Citizenship Act governs and the procedure that should be followed in dealing with the application for registration for the Indian citizenship. No foreigner can have a fundamental right or muchless a right to register himself as Indian citizen. If that would be the position, then no right of the foreigner, like the petitioner is involved and as such it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the provisions of the enactment as ultra vires of the Constitution of India."
Aggrieved by the order of S. Jagadeesan, J., the petitioner has preferred the above Writ Appeal.
8. Notice of motion was ordered on 23-1-1996. On 6-2-1996, Standing Counsel for the respondents put in their appearance. W.P.No. 1257 of 1995 filed by the appellant was also directed to be posted along with the Writ Appeal.
9. A common counter affidavit was tiled by the respondents through their Under Secretary. Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi in the Writ Appeal us well as in the Writ Petition.
10. We have heard Dr. K. P. Krishna Shelly learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. V. T. Gopalan, learned Senior Central Govt. Standing Counsel for the respondents. Our attention was drawn to the various provisions of the Act, the documents filed in the writ petition and also to the order of the learned Judge impugned in the Writ Appeal.
11. The appellant has raised the following points in W.P.No. 11063 of 1995
(a) Criticising the order of the 2nd respondent dated 6-4-1985 that since the rules have not so far been framed for registration of British citizens as Indian citizens under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act, the application of the appellant cannot be considered, Mr. K. P. Krishna Shetty submitted that the executive have failed to frame the necessary rules even after thirty years and that the failure of the Government to frame the rules would render the statutory provisions ineffective.
(b) According to Mr. K.P.Krishna Shetty the statutory provision is clear regarding the grant of Indian citizenship to citizens of Common Wealth Countries, who are persons of full age and capacity. That being so, failure to consider the appellant's application for Indian citizenship on the ground of non-framing of Citizenship Rules is unreasonable and illegal.
(c) Mr. K. P. Krishna Shetty contends that Section 14 (SIC) which gives an unrestricted power to refuse citizenship without assigning any reason whatsoever, is antithetic to liberal democratic order and the authorities take shelter under that provision.
(d) The appellant has a statutory right to be registered as a citizen of India when he fulfils the terms and conditions of the statutory provisions of Section 5(1)(c) of the Act, which enables the preseri bed authority to register persons of full age and capacity, who are citizens of United Kingdom as citizens of India, subject, of course, to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed.
(e) A proviso appended to Section 5(1)(e) of the Act speaks about prescribing conditions and restrictions on citizenship registration in India based on reciprocity on the matter of registration of Indians as citizens in other Common Wealth countries. The relevant part of the Proviso states as follows :
'the Central Government shall have due regard to the conditions subject to which citizens of India may. by law or practice of that country become citizens of that country by registration'.
(f) The British Nationality Act, 1948. provides for the require recriprocity, for it made provisions for registering Indian citizens as citizens of the United Kingdom. Section 1(3) of the British nationality Act mentions the names of the Common Wealth Countries, including India. Section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act reads thus:
'(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of this section, a citizen of any country mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of this Act or a citizen of Eire, being a person of full age and capacity, shall be entitled, on making application therefor to the Secretary of State in the prescribed manner, to be registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies if he satisfied the Secretary of State either-
(a) that he is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and has been so resident throughout the period of twelve months, or such shorter period as the Secretary of State may in the special circumstances or in any particular case accept, immediately preceding his applicaiion; or
(b) that he is in crown service under His (Her) Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.'
(g) As the Indian Law viz., Section 5(1)(e) of the Act and its Proviso lay emphasis on the reciprocity in Common Wealth Countries as far as the conditions for citizenship registration, the appellant fulfils all the conditions stipulated in the law and that Section 5(1)(e) of the Act and its Proviso read with S. 6(1) of the British Nationality Act, 1948, are clear that a citizen of the United Kingdom may be registered as a citizen of lndia if he fulfils the following three conditions :
(i) Person of full age and capacity;
(ii) He is ordinarily resident in India: and
(iii) has been so resident in India throughout the period of twelve months immediately preceding his application for registration.
(h) According to the appellant, he fulfils all the conditions stipulated in the law and therefore, on his fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in the law for registration, he acquires the right to be registered as a citizen of India, which may be denied only on weighty and reasonable grounds,
(i) The refusal to consider the appellant's application, as stated in the impugned order, is arbitrary and illegal.
(j) Section 14(1) of the Act empowers the Government to refuse citizenship without assigning any reason, which means that right to reside and change nationality, which is part of the right to life, could be denied to non-citizens without assigning any reason. Hence, the impugned Section 14(1) of the Act is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
(k) Section 14(1) of the Act confers unguided and unrestricted discretionary power on the prescribed authority and the Central Government to refuse an application under Section 501 Section 6 of the Act without assigning any reason. Section 14(1) runs thus :
14(1) The prescribed aulhority or the Central Government may, in its discretion, grant or refuse an application under Section 5 or Section 6 and shall not be required to assign any reason for such grant or refusal.'
(l) Entrustment of such unguided, unrestricted and absolute discretionary power to the Executive is antithetic to rule of law embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(m) Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees fundamental right to all persons, citizens and non-citizens. It states.
'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.'
(n) Right to reside is an essential pan of the right to life. Without the right to residence, the right to life is a meaningless and empty right.
(o) Therefore, the appellant prayed for a declaration that Section 14(1) of the Act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
12-13. Mr. K. P. Krishna Shetty, learned counsel for the appellant, has reiterated the above grounds in the writ appeal also. In support of his contention, he cited the two decisions reported in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, and National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, .
14. Mr. V. T.Gopalan, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, in reply to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Writ Appeal is liable to be dismissed for the very reasons contained in Section 14(1) of the Act. He submitted that it is entirely the discretion of the Central Government to grant or refuse an application under Section 5 or Section 6 of the Act without assigning any reason therefore and that Section 14(2) of the Act makes the decision of the Central Government a non-justiciable issue that cannot be called in question in any court. This is because, the foreign nationals do not have any fundamental right guaranteed for grant of citizenship of India. As such, the appellant does not have the right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, which right is available only to the citizens of India. Mr. V.T. Gopalan further submitted that the Proviso to Section 5(1)(e) of the Act envisages reciprocal arrangements to be made between the Govt. of India and the Govt. of countries mentioned in Schedule I. The Govt. of India and the Govt. of Singapore and the Govt. of Canada have made reciprocal arrangements. Rules 16-A. 16-Band 16-C of the Citizenship Rules contain the provisions in this regard. As no reciprocal arrangements have been made between the Govt. of India and the Govt. of United Kingdom, the citizens of United Kingdom cannot be considered for grant of citizenship under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act.
15. We wholly agree with the submissions made by Mr. V. T. Gopalan in this regard since his argument is fully supported by the following decisions cited by him in this regard, reported in Louis De Raecll.v. Union of India, and Gilles Preiffer v. The Union of India, 1996 Writ LR 386.
16. In , three foreign nationals have challenged the order dated 8-7-1987 of the Union of India whereby their prayer for further extension of the period of their stay in India was rejected and they were asked to leave the country by 31-7-1987. They claimed that the impugned order being arbitrary should be quashed and the authority should be directed to permit them to stay on. The main ground urged by them is based on Article 5 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the petitioners' case cannot be rejected merely for the reason that they are holding foreign passports and that even a foreigner who comes on the strength of a foreign passport, in case of his overstaying, has to be heard before he can be thrown out and this has been denied to the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, it must be shown that the person concerned had a certain state of mind, the animus manendi, and if he claims that he acquired a new domicile at a particular time, he must prove that he had formed the intention of making his permanent home in the country of residence and of continuing to reside there permanently and that residence alone, unaccompanied by this state of mind, is insufficient. While rejecting the contention that the foreigners also enjoy some fundamental rights under the Constitution of this country, the Supreme Court has observed as follows :
"The fundamental right of the foreigner is confined to Article 21 for life and liberty and does not include the right to reside and settle in this country, as mentioned in Article 19(1)(e), which is applicable only to the citizens of this country. It was held by the Constitution Bench in Hans Muller of Nurcnburg v. Superintendent. Presidency Jail, Calcutta, that the power of the Government in India to expel foreigners is absolute and unlimited and there is no provision in the Constitution fettering this discretion. It was pointed out that the legal position on this aspect is not uniform in all the country but so far the law which operates in India is concerned, the Executive Government has unrestricted right to expel a foreigner. So far the right to be heard is concerned, there cannot be any hard and fast rule about the manner in which a person concerned has to be given an opportunity to place his case and it is not claimed that if the authority concerned had served a notice before passing the impugned order, the , petitioners could have produced some relevant,; material in support of their claim of acquisition of citizenship, which they failed to do in the absence of a notice."
17. The decision reported in 1996, Writ LR 386, is a judgment rendered by Shivaraj Patil. J, That writ petition was tiled by a French citizen holding a French Passport issued by the French Consulate at Pondicherry. He applied for extension. His application for extension had been turned down and he was directed to leave the country within fifteen days. On 1-11-1995, he was served with the impugned letter from the 3rd respondent in the writ petition. The efforts of the petitioner and the working committee to have personal hearing were without any success. Under the circumstances, he filed the writ petition contending that the impugned order is illegal and arbitrary and is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and that the order is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It was also contended that the non-observation of the principles of natural justice has resulted in miscarriage of justice and that the petitioner had not been afforded any opportunity to rebut the undisclosed and uncommunicated charges. He also challenged the impugned order as bad as it does not disclose any reason for rejection. It was contended on behalf of the Union of India that the petitioner being a foreign national, has no right to claim that he would continue to stay in India and that even in a case where a person' is asked to leave the country prematurely when his behaviour has come to the adverse notice of the Government, such a person cannot have a right to stay and that he cannot have any right to claim an extension of stay. No fundamental right of the petitioner has been violated and particularly when the petitioner is admittedly a foreign national. Rejecting the contentions of the petitioner, the learned Judge has observed in his judgment as follows :
"The learned counsel further submitted that the proceedings were taken up, and the impugned order was passed: there is no question of reading down the provisions of the Act. 1946 as claimed by the petitioner in the writ petition; he being a foreign national, has no right to say or claim that he should continue in India : even in a case where the person is asked to leave the country before the expiry of the period of stay grained, noticing adverse behaviour cannot claim any right to stay after the expiry of the period for which permission of stay in India was granted to the petitioner, he cannot claim extension of May as a matter of right; This Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 may not consider the disputed questions of fact about the allegations made against the petitioner and the contentions of the petitioner refuting them. He emphasised that the petitioner being a foreign national cannot claim violation of fundamental rights; the notice given to him to leave the country under Section 3 of the Act, 1946 need not disclose the grounds or reasons asking the petitioner to leave India. The power of the Central Government in this regard is absolute and unlimited. He submitted that as can he seen from the records, the 1st respondent look adverse notice against the petitioner. In a matter like this whether extension of stay should or should not be granted to a foreigner is in the very nature of things, to be considered by the Central Government having regard to the various aspects including the security and safety of the country in the national interest. He submitted that even the right available to persons under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be extended to a case like this. Where a person enters the country without permission or remains in the country without permission after the expiry of the period of stay, such a person can be deported without anything more ; in other words, such persons cannot claim that there has been violation of principles of natural justice or that they should be given opportunity to have their say in the matter. The provisions of the Act. and the objects of it, have nothing 10 do relating to the subject of granting permission to a foreigner to stay in the country. The provisions of the Act. 1946 and the Act are both independent serving different purposes. Neither there is a conflict between the provisions of the two Acts nor there is need to harmonise the provisions of both the Acts.....
The Supreme court in Louis De Racdt. v. Union of India, dealing with a case of domicile of choice having regard to Article 5(c) of the Constitution of India, and as to availability of fundamental rights to foreigners, has taken the view that the fundamental right of the foreigner is confined to Article 21 relating to life and liberty and does not extend to a foreigner the right to reside and setlle in India as stated in Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution, and referring to the case of Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, (supra), has held that the Executive Government has unrestricted right to expel a foreigner, and that there cannot he any hard and fast rule so far as the right to be heard is concerned ..... The Division Bench of this Court in Ananda Bhavanani alias Swami Geethanando, Ananda. Ashram, Pondicherry v. The Union of India rep. by Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi (1991 LW (Crl) 393), dealing with a plea of violations of the principles of natural justice and violation of human rights vis-a-vis order of deportation passed against a foreigner, referring to some decisions including the case of 'Hans Muller of Nurenburg' of the Supreme Court aforementioned, has negatived the contention that the order of deportation passed without affording an opportunity to the person to make his say was in violation of the principles of natural justice. The two judgments viz., (1) P. Mohammad Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the Secretary of Government, Home Department, Hyderabad (1978 (II) Andhra Weekly Reporter 408) and (ii) Tudor Gimasekhar Jayavardene v. The Govt, of India represented by the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. (1992 LW (Crl) 175), relied on by the learned counsel for the pefitoincr herein, were ferred to and distinguished by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforementioned decision. It is further held therein that the Act. 1956 is a piece of significant legislation, and a play of its own. Considering the policy behind and the object of the Act, there may be many exigencies which would impel quick and lighting action to be taken under the Act, failing which the very security of the nation may be jeopardised. Under the said Act, the Central Government is vested with the absolute and unfettered discretion; and a foreigner can be expelled without any formality beyond the making of the order."
We respectfully concur with the opinion expressed by Shivaraj Patil, J.
18. The judgments cited by Mr. K. P. Krishna Shetty, learned counsel for the appellant will be of no assistance to him. The decision was cited, with particular reference 10 paragraph 199 at page 166 and paragraph 264 at page 199. The Supreme Court in that case concluded that Regulation 9(b). which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice terminaling the services or by making payment in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the impugned order is wholly arbitrary, uncanaliscd and unrestricted violating the principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The above passage was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his case. We are of the view that the above judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand since it deals with the rights of an employee, who is acitizen of India. A foreigner cannot claim equal right as that of an Indian national.
19. The decision , cited by Mr. K.P. Krishna Shetty, learned counsel for the appellant, deals with the case of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In that case. National Human Rights Commission filed the writ petition seeking to enforce the rights of about 65,000 Chakma/Hajong tribats under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was alleged that these Chakmas, settled mainly in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. are being persecuted by sections of the citi/cns of Arunachal Pradesh. On 2-11-1995. the Supreme Court issued an interim order directing the State of Arunachal Pradesh to ensure that the Chakmas situated in its territory arc not ousted by any coercive action, not in accordance with law. The State of Arunachal Pradesh in its counter contended before the Supreme Court that the allegations of violation of human rights are incorrect and that it has taken bona fide and sincere steps towards providing the Chakmas with basic amenities and has. to the best of its ability, protected their lives and properties. It was also contended that since Chakmas arc foreigners, they are not entitled to the protection of fundamental rights except Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court refused to accept the contention of the State of Arunachal Pradesh that no threat exists to the life and liberty of the Chakmas guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and that it has taken adequate steps to ensure the protection of the Chakmas. The Supreme Court also held that there exists a clear and present danger to the lives and personal liberty of the Chakmas after referring to the judgment in (Louis De Racdt. v. Union of India), and Khudiram Chakma's case where in the Supreme court has held that foreigners arc entitled to the protection of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. By virtue of their long and prolonged stay in the State, the Chakmas, who migrated to and those horn in the State, seek citizenship under the Constitution read with Section 5 of the Act. The Supreme Court issued certain directions to the authorities constituted under Rule 8 of the Rules, which empowered to register a person as a citizen of India. In the concluding portion the Apex Court has heId as follows :
"We are a country governed by the Rule of Law. Our Constitution confers certain rights on every humanbeing and certain other rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So also, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Thus the State is hound to protect the life and liberty of every humanbeing. be he a citizen or otherwise."
The above judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant will he of no assistance to the appellant since the whole case centres round the entitlement of the foreigners the protection under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. For the foregoing reasons, we arc of the view that the Government of India have got unrestricted power to refuse citizenship without assigning any reason whatsoever and the appellant being a foreign national cannot claim equal rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India with that of the Indian Nationals. We are of the further view that Section 14(1) of the Act is not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India because the foreign nationals do not have any fundamental right guaranteed for the grant of citizenship of India. The Writ Appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.
21. Now we will deal with W.P.No. 1247 of 1996, which was filed for the following prayer :
To issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to process within the stipulated period the petitioner's application dated 11-2-1985 and the petitioner's review application dated 29-9-1995 for registering the petitioner as citizen of India in accordance with the existing law regarding the grunt of citizenship.
22. A common counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents. Mr, V. T. Gopalan, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. He submitted that since orders have already been passed on the petitioner's application dated 11 -2-1985 and the review application dated 29-9-1995. the prayer asked for has become infruciuous. We see much force in the contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents.
23. The writ petition was filed for a mandamus directing the respondents to process the application of the petitioner dated 11-2-1985 and the review application dated 29-9-1995 within the stipulated period. This prayer, in our view, is misconceived since the petitioner's application dated 11-2-1985 has already been considered by the respondents and orders were passed on 6-4-1985, which has already been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment.
24. The application dated 11-2-1985 for grant of citizenship under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act was made by the petitioner to the Central Government direct and not through the Collector as required by Rule 7 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956. This application was made from Moradabad in Uttar Pradesh and the rejection letter dated 6-4-1985 was also sent to the said address. It is stated in the counter affidavit that as per the records available in the office of the Chief Immigration Officer. Madras, the petitioner has not registered with this office. As per the Registration of Foreigners Rules, all foreigners staying in India for over 180 days arc required to register themselves with the nearest Foreign Registration Office and as per the address given by the petitioner, he should have registered with the Chief Immigration Officer. Madras. After the dismissal of W.P.No. 11063 of 1995. by this Court on 31-8-1995 (Reported in AIR 199 ft Madras 314), the petitioner made an application from Madras for revision against the rejection of his application under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act to the Central Government direct. This was considered and the rejection letter dated 25-1-1996 was sent to the Government of Tamil Nadu with a request to advise the petitioner that his request has been considered by the Govt, of India carefully and that he should make an application under Section 6(1) of the Act provided he fulfils , the statutory requirements under Section 6(1) of the Act. The letter dated 25-1 -19% in No. 26018/ 12/94-I.G. II of the Government of India. Ministry of Home Affairs. New Delhi, addressed to the Secretary, Home (Citizenship) Department, Government of Tamil Nadu. Madias, reads thus :
"Sub :- Request for a revision under Section 15 of the Citizenship Act, 1955. of the decision dated 6-4-1985. not to consider the application for Indian citizenship, dated 11-2-1985 of Shri David John Hopkins.
Sir.
I am directed to refer to the copy of the letter dated 29th September, 1995 along with its enclosures received from Shri David John Hopkins. resident of 234. A-4. Second Street, Shanti Colony, Anna Nagar. Madras-600 040, on the above cited subject.
2. the Government of India have considered his request carefully, but the same cannot be acceded to as he has not fulfilled the statutory stay condition specified under Section 6(1) of the Citizenship Act. 1955. However, Shri David John Hopkins max he advised to apply for citizenship under Section 6(1). after he fulfils the required statutory requirements under Section 6(1) of the Citizenship Act. 1955.
Yours faithfully.
(Sd.) x x x x For Under Secretary to the Government of India,"
25. The Government of India have also passed another order on 6-8-1985 with reference to the petitioner's letter dated 25-3-1985. The said letter written by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. New Delhi, in No. 26017/4/85-1C to the petitioner reads thus :
"Sub :-- Regisiration as an Indian citizen under Section 5(1) of the Citizenship Act. 1955.
Sir, I am directed to refer to your letter dated 25th March, 1985. addressed to the Prime Minister of India regarding your application for grant of Indian citizenship. As already intimated to you vide this Ministry's letter of even number dated the 6th April, 1985, that you are not eligible for the grant of Indian citizenship for the reason that in Section 2(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, there is provision that all the Commonwealth countries mentioned in Schedule First of the Citizenship Act, 1955, have (o make a request to the Govt. of India to declare by notification in the official gazette their nationality of law as an enactment making provision for the citizenshipor nationality of that country.
This provision has not been complied with by the Govt. of United Kingdom so far. Govt. of United Kingdom have not make any request till date. As such, application of the British nationals are not entertained for the grant of Indian citizenship."
26. Now that orders have been passed by the Govt. of India on 6-4-1985, followed by 6-8-1985 arid lastly on 25-1-1996, the writ petition has become infructuous and therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed. Under the letter of the Govt. of India dated 25-1-1996, the petitioner was advised to apply for citizenship under Section 6(1) of the Act. therefore, the petitioner can move the Central Government through proper channel by making an application under Section 6(1) of the Act if he so desires, and if any such application is filed, the respondents are at liberty to consider the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
27. For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Appeal and the Writ Petitionary dismissed. Consequently, C.M.p.No. 869 of 1996 and W.M.P.No. 1973 of 1996 are also dismissed as no longer necessary. However, there will be no order as to costs.
28. Order accordingly.