Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Uppala Ramasatyanarayana vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others on 3 February, 2026
Reserved on: 23.12.2025
Pronounced on: 03.02.2026
APHC010659772025 [3552]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1342 of 2025
Uppala Ramasatyanarayana, ... Appellant
Vs.
The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ... Respondent(s)
**********
Advocate for Appellant: Mr.P R K AMERANDRA KUMAR
Advocate(s) for Respondent(s): Mr.K GANI REDDY,
GP FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
CORAM : THE CHIEF JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR
SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
DATE : 03rd February, 2026
ORDER:(per Hon'ble Sri Justice Challa Gunaranjan) This intra-court Appeal is directed against the order dated 07.10.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No.38074 of 2018. By the said order, learned Single Judge has relegated the appellant/writ petitioner to avail alternative remedy of preferring appeal before the appellate authority within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order and in turn, the appellate authority was directed to dispose the same within six months thereafter, after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing for both parties concerned and till such time, the parties were directed to maintain status quo.
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CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025
2. The brief facts of the case in a nutshell are as under:
(a) The subject property admeasuring Acres 0.97 cents in R.S.No.330/1/1, Acres 0.44 cents in R.S.No.331/2 and Acres 4.46 cents in R.S.No.331/3 of Koya Rajahmundry Village, Buttaigudem Mandal, West Godavari District, (hereinafter, 'subject land') falls under notified schedule/agency area. The lands falling in the said area are governed by the provisions of The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 (Regulation No.I of 1959), as amended by Regulation No.1 of 1970.
(b) Initially, the subject land stated to be owned by Smt.Podium Doolamma, a tribe community. She stated to have secured permission from the Assistant Agent to Government, Kovvuru, vide proceedings in D.Dis.No.908/1943, dated 13.09.1943, for alienation and accordingly, the same has been alienated in favour of Maddu Pentayya, non-tribal, through registered sale deed No.980/1943, dated 23.10.1943. The said non-tribe, in turn alienated the subject land in favour of Uppala Siva Ramaiah, through registered sale deed vide Document No.445/1950, dated 27.05.1950. Since then, Uppala family has been in continuous possession and occupation of the subject land and presently, 3 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 appellant/writ petitioner claims to be in possession and enjoyment as legal heir.
(c) Previously, one Smt.Punam Pakeeramma, wife of Pentayya, along with two others made complaint under Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation I of 1959 before the Special Deputy Collector, Tribal Welfare, Eluru, alleging that the subject land has been transferred in favour of Uppala family, non-tribe, in contravention to the Regulation I of 1959 r/w Regulation I of 1970. The enquiry in S.R.No.34/1978 eventually stated to have ended in favour of Uppala family and by order dated 30.09.1978, the Tribunal has dismissed the petition by holding that the subject land was alienated by Podium Doolappa, Koya tribe, in favour of Uppala family after securing prior permission from Assistant Agent to Government, Kovvur, in proceedings vide D.Dis.No.908/1943, dated 13.09.1943, issued under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917. Therefore, there was no contravention as alleged.
(d) Subsequently, yet again second complaint came to be instituted by the Special Deputy Tahsildar, K.R.Puram, on very same set of allegations that the initial transfer from Podium Doolappa, tribe community, in favour of Uppala family was without any prior permission, the Tribunal after enquiry dismissed the 4 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 complaint vide S.R.No.68/2004 on 20.05.2005 by holding that it has no jurisdiction to reopen the case once again which earlier ended in favour of Uppala family on appreciation of the evidence on record as the same amounted to res judicata.
(e) That being so, in third round, the unofficial respondent stated to have made yet again a complaint under Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation I of 1959 with similar allegation that the subject land has been transferred from Tribe to Non-Tribe in contravention to the provisions. The Tribunal once again embarked on enquiry, however, it has now allowed the complaint in S.R. No.26/2016, vide order dated 28.08.2018. The Tribunal has come to conclusion that the permission stated to have been granted under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917, dated 13.09.1943, since has not been produced, the sale would otherwise rendered null and void and the certificate that was produced from Divisional Revenue Officer, Kovvur, intimating the destruction of records which included file in D.Dis.No.908/1943, dated 13.09.1942, would not annure to the benefit of respondent therein.
(f) In consequence to the said order, notice dated 15.10.2018 was issued by the 4th respondent herein directing the Mandal Revenue Officer, Buttaigudem, to take possession of subject land 5 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 after conducting proper panchanama, therefore, the appellant/writ petitioner was constrained to immediately file the writ petition challenging the orders of the 3rd respondent. Initially, while issuing notices to respondents, this Court passed interim order staying the operation of the orders passed by 3rd respondent, including the eviction of petitioner from subject property, pending further orders. It is also stated that the appellant/writ petitioner preferred appeal before the District Collector, the Appellate Authority, however, in view of pendency of the writ petition, the same came to be withdrawn on 19.01.2019.
(g) The appellant/writ petitioner instituted the writ petition on the ground that when two successive enquiries in S.R. Nos.34/1978 and 68/2004 concerning the same subject land since ended in dismissal by orders dated 30.09.1978 and 20.05.2005, in the absence of any specific provision in Regulation I of 1959, the third complaint could not have been entertained by the 3rd respondent and reviewed the earlier orders, which otherwise attained finality. Therefore, the very entertaining of the third complaint itself is without jurisdiction. The unofficial respondent, however, opposed the writ petition. 6
CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025
(h) Eventually, learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition, relegating the appellant/writ petitioner to avail alternative remedy of appeal. That is how the present appeal is before us.
3. Heard Mr.P.R.K.Amarendra Kumar, learned counsel for appellant, learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare for official respondents and Mr.Sitaram Chaparla, representing Mr.K.Gani Reddy, learned counsel for unofficial respondent.
4. Learned counsel for appellant mainly contended that when successive enquiries that were initiated under Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation I of 1959 ended in dismissal by confirming that the subject land has been validly transferred from Tribe to Non-tribe after seeking necessary prior permission as required under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917, the 3rd respondent ought not to have even entertained the third complaint at the instance of unofficial respondent, which otherwise clearly amounted to res judicata. He also contended that when statute does not provide or confer any power to review the orders or decisions made earlier to, the 3rd respondent is precluded from entertaining the third complaint and reviewing the earlier orders. 3rd respondent being creature of a statute do not possess any inherent powers as such to exercise review powers. Though there is an alternative remedy of appeal 7 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 against the impugned orders passed by 3rd respondent, learned counsel contends that inasmuch as the order passed by 3rd respondent is clearly without jurisdiction, the appellant/writ petitioner is justified in approaching the writ court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. In support of above submissions, reliance has been placed on the following judgments:
(i) Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Chintalapati Ramalinga Raju v. District Collector, Eluru, W.G.District and another1
(ii) Order of the Single Bench of this Court in Bondala Reddiyya v. Agent to Government, District Collector, W.G.District, Eluru and others2
5. On the other hand, both learned Government Pleader as well as learned counsel for unofficial respondent vehemently opposed the above submissions and inter alia contended that the order of learned Single Judge does not call for any interference, inasmuch as appellant/writ petitioner was merely relegated to avail alternative remedy which is more efficacious. They further contended that in earlier round of enquiries, the contesting Uppala family never produced the copy of order dated 1 2000 (4) ALD 443 (DB) 2 2007 (6) ALD 165 8 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 13.09.1943, by which permission was granted by Assistant Agent to Government purportedly in exercise of powers under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917, which would go to the root of the matter and mere mentioning of the same as a recital in the principal sale deed dated 23.10.1943, ipso facto would not mean that such permission existed, therefore, the 3rd respondent was justified in holding that non-production of the said document would belie the claim that there existed prior permission. Since the Uppala family is claiming that the subject property was purchased from Tribe to Non-tribe after securing prior permission, the burden lies on them to prove the same. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the order of learned Single Judge of this Court in Yandapu Satyavati and another v. Secretary to Government (Tribunal Welfare) of A.P., Hyderabad and others3.
6. We have given anxious consideration to the respective submissions made on either side.
7. The admitted scenario of the case is that initially the subject land was held by Podium Doolappa, who was tribe community. He alienated the said land by way of registered sale deed dated 13.09.1943 in favour of Maddu Pentayya, who was a non-tribe 3 2007 (5) ALD 769 9 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 community. Smt.Maddu Rattamma, w/o.Pentayya, later alienated the subject land in favour of Uppala Sivaramaiah, through registered sale deed dated 27.05.1950. After the demise of Uppala Sivaramaiah, his wife and son stated to be in possession and enjoyment of the property. That being so, at the behest of Smt.Pakeeramma and two others, first complaint came to be filed vide S.R.No.34/1978 under Section 3(2) of Regulation I of 1959 alleging that Uppala family had acquired the subject property from a Tribe which otherwise was prohibited and therefore, such transfer would render null and void and consequently, sought for ejectment of the respondents therein.
8. The competent authority, after detailed enquiry, having considered the both oral and documentary evidence ultimately dismissed the petition by holding that the initial sale affected by Podium Doolappa in favour of Maddu Pentayya was with prior permission from Assistant Agent to Government as envisaged under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917, therefore, the transfer was absolutely legal and not hit by Section 3(2)(i) of Regulation I of 1959 and as amended by Regulation I of 1970. In the said context, it is appropriate to refer to aforesaid specific finding from the order dated 30.09.1978, which reads as under: 10
CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 "It is clear from the recitals in Ex.B2 that the petition schedule land belongs to Podium Doolappa, a Koya, who sold them to the father of RW1 on 23.10.1943 after obtaining permission from the Asst. Agent to Govt., Kovvur in D.Dis.No.908/43, dated 13.09.1943. Further, the land in question stands registered in the name of Podium Doolappa in RSR of the Village. It is therefore clear that Podium Doolappa had a valid right and title over the lands in question and he sold them to the predecessor in title of the respondent after obtaining permission from the Agency authorities, as required under Rule 4(1) of the Agency tracks, interest and land transfer Act, 1970. Hence, the transfers of the land in question are not hit by Sec.3(2)(a) of the A.P.S.A.L.T. Reg.1/59 as amended by Reg.1/70."
9. Nearly after about two and half decades, a second complaint came to be made under Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation I of 1959 bearing S.R.No.68/2004 before the competent authority. This time the complaint was instituted by none other than Deputy Tahsildar with same set of allegations that the initial transfer of subject land by Podium Doolappa, a tribe community, in favour of non-tribe, was hit by the prohibition contained under the Regulations. The competent authority, by order dated 20.05.2025, yet again dismissed the complaint. This time the competent authority observed that it did not have jurisdiction to 11 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 reopen the case, which otherwise came to be disposed of by the very same authority in first enquiry and considering that the subject land and the respondent against whom allegations were made being one and the same, it also observed that proceeding with the matter would clearly amounted to res judicata. The relevant observations from aforesaid order are extracted as under:
"It is settled law that the Special Deputy Collector (T.W.) has no jurisdiction to re-open case which was disposed off by the same court previously. The respondent and the petition schedule land are one and the same in the present case and the S.R.No.34/78.
In the circumstances explained above the claim filed by the Special Deputy Tahsildar (T.W.)., K.R.Puram in respect of petition schedule land is hereby dropped to avoid resjudicata."
10. Both these orders were unchallenged and attained finality. In this admitted background, the unofficial respondent once again makes an attempt by instituting yet another complaint. This is third round of enquiry on the same set of allegations. The 3rd respondent though being appraised of the previous orders passed in S.R.No.34/1978 and S.R.No.68/2004, nevertheless allowed the petition by holding that the initial sale affected by tribe 12 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 in favour of non-tribe was null and void as being hit by Regulation I of 1959 as amended by Regulation I of 1970. The only reason assigned for coming to such conclusion was that the purchasers have not produced the copy of proceedings vide D.Dis.No. 908/1943, dated 13.09.1943, by which prior permission as contemplated under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917 was secured before the sale came to be affected. The said order has been assailed in the writ petition.
11. The learned Single Judge refrained to go into merits of the matter and rather rejected appellant/petitioner to avail alternative remedy of appeal. We are of the opinion that probably learned Single Judge would have been justified in adopting such course of action, had it been a case of mere first enquiry going against the appellant/writ petitioner. Peculiarly in the present case, the 1st complaint and enquiry initiated in S.R.No.34/1978, which was nearly after 35 years of sale, ended in dismissal by detailed and reasoned order, which attained finality. Nearly, after 25 years thereafter, yet again a second complaint and enquiry was initiated at the instance of Deputy Tahsildar, which also came to be dismissed on the ground that continuing second enquiry would tantamount to res judicata. Merely because successive 13 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 complaints are being made, the competent authority is not obligated to embark on deciding the same again and again, subjecting the parties to inconvenience, such a course of action is permissible only in exceptional cases where plea of fraud has been raised and that too even in such cases only a second enquiry would probably be permissible but definitely not a third enquiry. This issue as to whether a second enquiry with respect to same set of allegations is permissible fell for consideration of this Court in couple of occasions. Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.A. No.1419 of 2008, after considering various previous precedents of this Court, has summarized aforesaid proposition succinctly as under:-
"9. It is settled, in matters concerning transaction from a tribal to a non-tribal, based on an allegation of fraud, that second enquiry is permissible when first enquiry remained inconclusive or findings in the first enquiry against the tribal were recorded due to his incapacity to produce evidence. However, when the first enquiry did not suffer from any lacunae, the 2nd enquiry would be barred under the principle of res judicata. This principle has been laid down by this Court in Gaddam Raghavulu (supra) in the following words:
"The principle of res judicata or a principle analogous thereto shall be applied with caution and 14 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 circumspection in dealing with a case arising under the Regulation meant for the protection of the tribes. If the proceedings were dropped earlier for the reason that the 3rd respondent-tribal could not produce sufficient evidence, it does not preclude a subsequent enquiry. Hence, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel in this regard."
11. Although the principle of res judicata was not specifically dealt with in the Division Bench judgment in Chintalapati Ramalinga Raju v. District Collector, Eluru, W.G. District - 2000 (4) ALD 443(DB), it was specifically observed therein that when a judgment is rendered under the Regulations, it becomes final and there is no review of the same; resultantly, if there is no review under the Regulations, maintainability of the subsequent proceedings would be barred by res judicata subject to the limitations, as held by this Court in Gaddam Raghavulu (supra)".
12. Even in the present case, as could be seen from the extracts of the orders passed in S.R.Nos.34/1978 and 68/2004, specific findings have been recorded by competent authority that the sale affected by tribal in favour of non-tribe was with prior permission. Nothing has been pleaded either before the competent authority nor even before this Court, which attributes an element of fraud for invalidating or disbelieving the earlier 15 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 orders on the issue. When the findings and conclusions arrived at in earlier enquiries attained finality, unless an allegation of fraud is made, no further enquiry would be permissible. The enquiry now so undertaken by 3rd respondent in pursuance to the complaint of unofficial respondent virtually amounted to reviewing the view earlier expressed by the very same authority, which is clearly impermissible. For whatever reason, when successive orders of the very same authority were staring at, the least expected of the 3rd respondent was to just stay off from the proceedings but rather it chose to rehear the entire issue by appreciating the evidence on record once again which is wholly impermissible and beyond its jurisdiction.
13. Apparently as the 3rd respondent embarked on entertaining third complaint on very same set of facts, despite being made aware of the two earlier enquires resulting in dismissal, virtually tantamounted to exercising a power of review which otherwise not conferred on it, clearly it exceeded the jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the self-imposed restriction of exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 in cases where an alternative remedy is available would not come in way of deciding the present case. We, therefore, are not in 16 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in relegating the petitioner to avail alternative remedy.
14. Though learned counsel for the unofficial respondent tried to address the Court that until and unless the copy of the permission granting exemption under Section 4(1) of Act I of 1917 is produced, the burden caste on appellant/writ petitioner do not get discharged to conclusively establish that the transfer was valid, in our opinion has no substance and it is too late to raise such objections particularly when the issue has already been decided by holding that the sale was absolutely in accordance with the provisions of Regulations.
15. The correctness or otherwise of the finding and decision arrived at by competent authority way back in the year 1978 and 2005 cannot now be reopened by the competent authority under the guise of further enquiry. The competent authority at the very first instance has rendered finding that the very recital in the sale deed dated 23.10.1943 categorically stated that the sale was being executed after obtaining prior permission from Assistant Agent to Government and has provided the proceedings details by referring to D.Dis.No.908/1943, dated 13.09.1943. Merely because the proceedings could not be traced out at this length of 17 CGR, J W.A. No.1342 of 2025 time, no presumption can be drawn that the said permission never existed at all. Therefore, the objection of counsel for unofficial respondent cannot be countenanced.
16. We hereby allow the writ appeal by setting aside both the orders of learned Single Judge as well as the orders passed by the 3rd respondent.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending in this case, if any, shall stand closed.
DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J ss