Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manish Kalani vs Housing And Urban Development ... on 30 January, 2018
1
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
SINGLE BENCH : RAJEEV KUMAR DUBEY, J
M.Cr.C.No.16285/2016
Manish Kalani & Another
Vs.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO)
& Another
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Shri Sumit Nema, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Mukesh
Agrawal, advocate for the applicants.
Shri Sankalp Kochar, learned counsel for non-applicant No.1.
Shri BP. Pandey, learned G.A.for non-applicant No.2/State.
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ORDER
Reserved on 18/01/2018 Delivered on 30/01/2018 This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the order dated 08/07/2016 passed by IX Additional Session Judge, Bhopal in Criminal Revision No.59/2016, whereby learned Additional Session Judge set aside the order dated 04/12/2015 passed by Judicial Magistrate, I Class, Bhopal in Regular Criminal Case No.4826/2012, whereby learned JMFC rejected the application filed by non-applicant No.1 (complainant) under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for brevity "the Act") read with Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. and allowed the non-applicant No.1/complainant to amend the cause title of the complaint by impleading the name of Company i.e. M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island Pvt. Ltd. formerly known as M/s Entertainment World Jabalpur Pvt. Ltd. as accused.
2. Brief facts of the case which are relevant for just disposal of the petition is that the non-applicant No.1/complainant Housing and Urban 2 Development Corporation Limited (HUDCO) had sanctioned loan and disbursed a sum of Rs.66 crore to the applicant No.2 M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island Pvt. Ltd. The applicant No.1 Manish Kalani was the Managing Director of the aforesaid company. In order to repay the said loan, applicant No.1 issued a cheque No.464768 dated 01/11/2011 amounting to Rs.1 crore drawn on Dena Bank Ltd., Branch Navlakha, Indore in favour of the non- applicant No.1. The said cheque was presented by non-applicant No.1 for encashment, but the same was dishonoured due to insufficiency of fund. The non-applicant No.1, therefore, served notice on the applicant No.1 through his counsel calling upon him to pay the cheque amount. Since, the non- applicant No.1 failed to pay the cheque amount within the prescribed period, the non-applicant filed a written complaint before the learned JMFC, Bhopal under Section 138 of the Act. On that complaint, learned Magistrate vide order dated 27/06/2012 took cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Act and issued process against applicant No.1.
3. The applicant No.1 has challenged the validity of the order dated 27/06/2012 passed by learned Magistrate by filing Cr.R.No.1132/2013 before this Court on the ground that the questioned cheque was issued by the Director of the company on behalf of Company i.e. M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island Pvt. Ltd. (applicant No.2), so the complaint under Section 138 of the Act against the Director (applicant No.1) is not maintainable for fastening vicarious liability without impleading company as a party in the complaint. During pendency of that Criminal Revision before this Court the non- applicant has filed an application under Section 141 of the Act read with Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. before the trial Court for impleading the name of applicant No.2 i.e. M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island Pvt. Ltd. in the cause title of the complaint and also taking cognizance against it. In reply, the respondent No.1 opposed the application. Learned trial Court observing that the provisions of Section 142(b) of the Act has not been complied with, therefore, cognizance cannot be lawfully taken against the company and rejected the non-applicant's application, against which non-applicant No.1 filed Criminal Revision No.59/2016. Learned ASJ vide order dated 3 08/07/2016 set aside the order passed by the trial Court and allowed the application and permitted non-applicant No.1 to amend the cause title of the complaint by impleading the name of company i.e. M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island Pvt. Ltd. Being aggrieved by the impugned order applicants has preferred this revision.
4. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the order dated 04/12/2015 passed by the learned trial Court is an interim order, against which revision is not maintainable. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly entertained the revision against the said order. Even the Court is not empowered to review its order. In this regard learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Bhaskar Industries Ltd. Vs. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., 2001(7) SCC 401 ,Sethuraman Vs. Rajamanickam, (2009) 5 SCC 153 and Adalat Prasad Vs Rooplal Jindal (2006) 2 SCC (Cri)1.
5. He further submitted that it is settled that where cheque was issued by the Director of the company on behalf of Company, the complaint under Section 138 of the Act against the Director is not maintainable for fastening vicarious liability without impleading company as party in the complaint. While initially, complainant/ non applicant No.1 filed the complaint without impleading company as an accused, so the complaint is not maintainable. In this regard he placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661. He further submitted that in case of dishonor of cheque mere dishonour of a cheque would not give rise to cause of action unless the payee makes a demand in writing to the drawer of the cheque for the payment and the drawer fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee within stipulated period after receiving the notice. While in this case non applicant did not send any notice to applicant no.2, therefore, cognizance cannot be lawfully taken against the company only on the basis of the application filled by the non-applicant no.1 before trial court. Learned counsel further submitted that initially, non applicant No.1 filed the complaint without impleading company as an 4 accused. In the Cr.P.C. there is no provision except under Section 319 to array the accused in the complaint. While under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. the application filed by the non-applicant No.1 taking cognizance against the applicant No.2 company is not maintainable, because that application has been filed after lapse of two years from the date of taking the cognizance by the trial Court against the applicant No.1. In this regard learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of N. Harihara Krishnan Vs. J. Thomas, AIR SC 2017 4125 and submitted that learned revisional Court without appreciating all these facts wrongly allowed the non-applicant's application.
6. On the other hand learned counsel for the non-applicant No.1 submitted that the non-applicant No.1 did not file the application under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. for taking cognizance against new accused. The non-applicant No.1 has filed an application only for permitting it to amend the cause title of complaint and in private complaint the complainant has a right to amend the complaint. In this regard he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court passed in the case of Pandit Gorelal & Another Vs. Rahul Panjabi, 2009 (5) MPHT 323, wherein this Court has held that the complainant is entitled to amend his complaint. Learned counsel further submitted that in the instant case there is no need to send a separate notice to the company under Section 138 of the Act, because non-applicant No.1 had sent the notice to applicant no.1 the Director of the Company, who is the signatory of the cheque, which shows the compliance of provision of Section 142(b) of the Act. In this regard he also placed reliance on the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of M/s Bilakchand Gyanchand Co. Vs. A. Chinnaswami, AIR 1999 SC 2182 and Rajneesh Aggarwal Vs. Amit J. Bhalla, AIR 2001 SC 518.
7. Learned counsel for the non-applicant No.1 further submitted that in the complaint, the name of the accused/applicant no.2 company and the basis of its accusation were already mentioned, but due to some typographical error its name was left to be written in the cause title of the 5 complaint, which can be corrected. So, revisional Court did not commit any mistake in allowing the non applicant's application.
8. This Court has gone through the record and arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the parties.
9. As for as maintainability of revision under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. against the order dated 04/12/2015 passed by the learned JMFC in Cri.Case No.4826/2012 is concerned, learned trial Court rejected the non- applicant's application observing that the provisions of Section 142 (b) of the Act have not been complied with and, therefore, cognizance cannot be lawfully taken against the company. The order of learned trial Court refusing to take cognizance against the applicant no.2 company comes under Section 203 of the Cr.P.C. and the same is revisable.
10. The facts of the cases relied by the learned counsel of the applicants i.e. Bhaskar Industries Ltd. Vs. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., Subramanium Sethuraman Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr and Adalat Prasad Vs Rooplal Jindal (Supra) do not match with the present case, so these judgements do not help applicants much. In the instant case non-applicant no.1/complainant neither filed the application before trial for reviewing its earlier order, nor against the cognizance earlier taken by the trial Court vide order dated 27/06/2012 against the applicant no.1, but filled the application for permitting it to amend the complaint by incorporating the name of applicant no.2 (company) in the cause-title of the complainant and for prayer that in addition cognizance should also be taken against the applicant No.2/company. Learned trial Court not only rejected the prayer of the applicant for permitting it to amend the complaint, but also refused to take cognizance against the applicant no.2/company. The order of learned trial Court refusing to take cognizance against the applicant no.2 company comes under the purview of provisions of Section 203 of Cr.P.C. and the same is revisable.
11. Even Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Urmila Devi Vs. Yudhvir Singh reported in (2013) 15 SCC 624 after considering its innumerable decisions declared the legal position in Para No. 22 as under:-
6(i) The order issued by the Magistrate deciding to summon an accused in exercise of his power under section 200-204 Code of Criminal Procedure would be an order of intermediary or quasi-final in nature and not interlocutory in nature.
(ii) Since the said position viz., such an order is intermediary order or quasi-final order, the revisionary jurisdiction provided under section 397 either with the District Court or with the High Court can be worked out by the aggrieved party.
(iii) Such an order of a Magistrate deciding to issue process or summons to an accused in exercise of his power under section 200-204 Code of Criminal Procedure, can always be subject matter of challenge under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.
12. In view of the latest position of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Urmila Devi (supra), even the order passed by the JMFC issuing process to the accused can also be challenged by way of revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. before the Sessions Court.
13. It is admitted that the questioned cheque was issued on behalf of company by its Director and it is also settled as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) that in the situation where cheque was issued on behalf of the company without impleading company as an accused, the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act is not maintainable. So, firstly it has to be seen that initially when the complaint was filed by the non-applicant No.1 before the trial Court, whether the name of the company is mentioned in the complaint as an accused or not. It is admitted that initially when non-applicant No.1 had filed that complaint before the trial Court the name of Company was not mentioned in the cause title of the complaint.
14. Learned counsel for non-applicant No.1 submitted that in the body of the complaint it is clearly mentioned that the offence was committed by the non-applicant No.1 as well as by the company/applicant no.2, so it cannot be said that initially when the applicant had filed the complaint, the name of the company was not mentioned in the complaint as an accused. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that initially when the complaint was filed by the non-applicant No.1 the name of the company as an accused was not mentioned in the cause title of the 7 complaint, so it cannot be said that initially the complaint was also filed against the Company.
15. The definition of 'complaint' and the model format of the complaint is not mentioned in the Negotiable Instrument Act. In these circumstances, the definition of the complaint will be seen from Section 2
(d) of the Cr.P.C., which reads thus :-
"Complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
16. From the perusal of Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. it is evident that in a complaint if any allegation against any person is mentioned, with a view to take action against him, he will be deemed as an accused of the complaint. From the definition of 'complaint' it does not appear that only when the name of person is mentioned in the cause title of the complaint, then only that person shall be treated as accused of that complaint.
17. In the case of Mohd. Yousuf Vs. Smt. Afaq Jahan & Anr. 2006 CRI.L.J. 788 (Supreme Court), the Hon'ble Apex Court opined that there is no particular format of a complaint. A petition addressed to the Magistrate containing allegations that the offence has been committed and ending with a prayer that the culprits be suitably dealt with, can be treated as a complaint. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhimappa Basappa Bhu Sannavar v. Laxman Shivarayappa Samagouda, AIR 1970 SC 1153 observed that "the word 'complaint' has a wide meaning since it includes even an oral allegation. It may, therefore, be assumed that no form is prescribed which the complaint must take. It may only be said that there must be an allegation which prima facie discloses the commission of an offence with the necessary facts for the Magistrate to take action".
18. From the definition of complaint and above pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex Court it is apparent that if name of accused and the basis of its acquisition is mentioned in the body of complaint there is no effect of not mentioning his name in the cause title of the complaint. He will be deemed 8 to be an accused for that complaint and Court can take cognizance against him even his name is not mentioned in the cause title of the complaint.
19. If we see the averment of the complaint in the light of above discussion, the complaint filed by the non-applicant reads as under:-
1. That, the complainant is a body corporate constituted under the Companies Act, 1956 having its Regional office at HUDCO Bhawan, IHC Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003, one of its Regional Office for the state of Madhya Pradesh at Paryavas Bhawan, Jail Road, Bhopal.
2. That, Dr. Tripti M. Dixit is presently working as Senior Manager (Law) in the complainant's office. She being the principal law officer of the said office is authorised to sign, verify the present complaint as also to do all other acts necessary for the proper prosecution or defence of legal proceeding.
3. That, the complaint on the request of the accused on his application sanctioned & disbursed Loan to the tune of Rs.66 Crores under the scheme for Construction of Shopping-cum-
Multiplex Mall Treasure Island at Jabalpur (scheme No.19373) hence the accused are the borrower of the complaint.
4. That, the accused agreed to repay the loan together with agreed rate of interest to the complainant as per the term of the agreement executed by the accused in favour of the complainant as also have signed and issued the cheque in favour of the complainant on behalf of the accused in discharge of the legal liability towards the repayment of the loan amount.
5. That, the accused being Director of M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island and incharge of and responsibility for the conduct of business of the said company is being headed by accuse in the capacity of Directors and the cheques in question have been issued by accused in the capacity of the Directors of the accused company hence the both of accused responsible for the act of dishonour of cheque.
6. That, the accused has issued cheque No.464768 dated 01/11/2011 for Rs.100,00,000=00 (Rupees one crore only) drawn on Dena Bank Ltd. Navlakha Branch, Indore 452001 in favour of the complainant.
7. That, the complainant presented the aforesaid cheque on the assurance of the accused for encashment within its validity period but the said cheque could not be honoured by the banker of the accused for the reason "Funds Insufficient" as shown in the cheque return memo.
8. That, the complainant, looking to the conduct of the accused was left with no option except to issue notice to the accused through Regd. A.D. on 16/11/2011 on the above mentioned address.
99. That, the accused have received the notice and despite the valid service, the accused has failed to make the payment of the aforesaid cheques to the complainant within the statutory period, thus has given cause to the present complainant, hence this complaint.
10. That, the accused knowingly with malafide intention to cheat the complainant have purposely issued the cheque which he knew that the same cannot be honoured thus has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
11. That, the complainant is a Public Sector Enterprise thus signatory to this complainant is a public servant as defined under Section 21 of the IPC is exempted from personal appearance in the Court to present the complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.
12. That, the complaint is being filed within limitation alongwith the documents as per list and prescribed Court fee.
PRAYER It is, therefore, prayed that the Hon'ble Court may in the interest of justice be pleased to take cognizance against the accused on the present complaint, punish them as per law and out of the penalty and compensation, the cheque amount be ordered to be the complainant, which will met the ends of justice.
20. From perusal of the complaint it is clear that in Para-5 of the complaint it is mentioned that the cheque in question has been issued by the accused in the capacity of the Directors of the accused company, hence the body of accused is responsible for the act of dishonour of cheque and in the prayer clause it also mentioned that "to take cognizance against the accused on the present complaint, punish them as per law" which clearly shows that from the beginning the non-applicant No.1 had filed complaint before Judicial Magistrate not only against the applicant No.1, but also against the Company i.e. M/s Jabalpur Treasure Island Pvt. Ltd.
21. So, only on the ground that when complaint was filed the name of the company was not mentioned in the cause title of the complaint, it cannot be said that initially when the complaint was filed by the non- applicant No.1 before the trial Court, he did not make the company as accused in the complaint. The only default of the non-applicant No.1 is that he has not mentioned the name of the Company as an accused in the cause 10 title of the complaint, so the non-applicant No.1 filed application for impleading the name of company as an accused in the cause title by way of amendment.
22. The complainant is entitled to amend his complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act as held by this Court in the case of Pandit Gorelal (supra) and also by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.R.Sukumar Vs. S.Sunaad Raghuram, (2015) 9 SCC 609, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that "what is discernible from U.P. Pollution Control Board case [(1987) 3 SCC 684 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] is that an easily curable legal infirmity could be cured by means of a formal application for amendment. If the amendment sought to be made relates to a simple infirmity which is curable by means of a formal amendment and by allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be caused to the other side, notwithstanding the fact that there is no enabling provision in the Code for entertaining such amendment, the court may permit such an amendment to be made.
23. Although, non-applicant No.1 filed the application before the trial Court under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C read with Section 141 of the Act, wherein neither in Section 141 of the Act, nor in Section 319 of the Cr.P.C provisions for permitting complainant to amend the complaint are mentioned, but it is a settled position of law that a mere non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision in an application is not a ground to reject an application as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Adv. Kaptan on Challamane Huchha Gowda v. M.R. Tirumala,(2004) 1 SCC
453.
24. Although there is no provision in the Act and Code of Criminal Procedure to permit the applicant to amend the complaint, but there is no bar in the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as in the Negotiable Instrument Act against permitting the complainant to amend his complaint. Where, there is no bar in the Act and in the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court in the interest of justice may permit the complainant to amend the complaint, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.R.Sukumar vs. S.Sunaad Raghuram(supra).
1125. Although, it is admitted that non-applicant No.1 had not sent notice to the Company before filing of the complaint, but prima facie it appears that before filing the complaint non-applicant No.1 gave notice to the applicant No.1 Manish Kalani, the Managing Director of the Company, who issued the questioned cheque on behalf of the company. So, the notice sent by non-applicant No.1 to applicant No.1 Manish Kalani is also notice to the company as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Bilakchand Gyanchand Co.(supra) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that notice under Section 138 of the Act sent to the Managing Director of the Company who is signatory of the cheque in question, the complaint is not liable to be quashed on the ground that the notice was not served upon the company. Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajneesh Agrawal (supra) also held that the demand notice issued in the name of Director, who has signed the cheque is notice to the drawer Company, therefore the prosecution of non-applicant No.2 Company for the offence under Section 138 of the Act would not be invalid for the reason that the notice was not served upon the Company.
26. The judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of N. Harihara Krishnan Vs. J. Thomas (supra) relied by the learned counsel for the applicants also does not help much to the applicant. In this case Hon'ble Apex Court in pera 32 and 33 of judgement observed as thus :-
32. The scheme of the prosecution in punishing under Section 138 of THE ACT is different from the scheme of the CrPC. Section 138 creates an offence and prescribes punishment. No procedure for the investigation of the offence is contemplated. The prosecution is initiated on the basis of a written complaint made by the payee of a cheque. Obviously such complaints must contain the factual allegations constituting each of the ingredients of the offence under Section 138. Those ingredients are: (1) that a person drew a cheque on an account maintained by him with the banker; (2) that such a cheque when presented to the bank is returned by the bank unpaid; (3) that such a cheque was presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date it was drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (4) that the payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the cheque the payment of the amount of money due under the cheque to payee;
and (5) such a notice of payment is made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. It is 12 obvious from the scheme of Section 138 that each one of the ingredients flows from a document which evidences the existence of such an ingredient. The only other ingredient which is required to be proved to establish the commission of an offence under Section 138 is that in spite of the demand notice referred to above, the drawer of the cheque failed to make the payment within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the demand. A fact which the complainant can only assert but not prove, the burden would essentially be on the drawer of the cheque to prove that he had in fact made the payment pursuant to the demand.
33. By the nature of the offence under Section 138 of THE ACT, the first ingredient constituting the offence is the fact that a person drew a cheque. The identity of the drawer of the cheque is necessarily required to be known to the complainant (payee) and needs investigation and would not normally be in dispute unless the person who is alleged to have drawn a cheque disputes that very fact. The other facts required to be proved for securing the punishment of the person who drew a cheque that eventually got dishonoured is that the payee of the cheque did in fact comply with each one of the steps contemplated under Section 138 of THE ACT before initiating prosecution. Because it is already held by this Court that failure to comply with any one of the steps contemplated under Section 138 would not provide "cause of action for prosecution". Therefore, in the context of a prosecution under Section 138, the concept of taking cognizance of the offence but not the offender is not appropriate. Unless the complaint contains all the necessary factual allegations constituting each of the ingredients of the offence under Section 138, the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence. Disclosure of the name of the person drawing the cheque is one of the factual allegations which a complaint is required to contain. Otherwise in the absence of any authority of law to investigate the offence under Section 138, there would be no person against whom a Court can proceed. There cannot be a prosecution without an accused. The offence under Section 138 is person specific. Therefore, the Parliament declared under Section 142 that the provisions dealing with taking cognizance contained in the CrPC should give way to the procedure prescribed under Section 142. Hence the opening of non-obstante clause under Section 142. It must also be remembered that Section 142 does not either contemplate a report to the police or authorise the Court taking cognizance to direct the police to investigate into the complaint".
27. While in the instant case in the complaint above-mentioned all the five ingredients are pleaded regarding applicant No.2 company and name of the applicant No.2 company is also mentioned as discussed above.
1328. In that case Hon'ble Apex Court rejected the complainant's application on the ground of delay observing that "No doubt Section 142 authorises the Court to condone the delay in appropriate cases. We find no reason to condone the delay. The justification advanced by the respondent that it is during the course of the trial, the respondent realized that the cheque in question was drawn on the account of DAKSHIN is a manifestly false statement. On the face of the cheque, it is clear that it was drawn on account of DAKSHIN."
29. While in the instant case there is no delay on the part of complainant/non-applicant No.1. Because, complainant had already mentioned the name of applicant no.2/company in the complaint from the beginning and prayed to the Court that cognizance be taken against the applicant no.1 as well as against the applicant no.2/company, which clearly appears from the prayer clause of the complaint as discussed above.
30. Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. would operate in a situation where during the trial and enquiry, it appears to the trial Court whether as a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge that some other persons are also involved in the commission of the offence, for which he is holding the trial, he could invoke Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. for summoning them to be arrayed as an accused. It is not the case where applicant earlier did not mention the name of the company as an accused and basis of its acquisition and for the first time by means of application it mentioned the name of the company as an accused and pray the Court to take cognizance against it.
31. So, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the application filled by the applicants for taking cognizance against applicant No.2 company comes under the purview of Section 190 (1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. and not under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. Because the name of the applicant No.2/company as an accused and the basis of its accusation were already mentioned in the complaint at the time of its filling. It is the fault of the trial Court which only took cognizance against the Director and did not take cognizance against the company, which can be cured by the trial Court at any time. There is no bar under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. that once the 14 process is issued against some accused, on the next date, the Magistrate cannot issue process to some other person against whom there is some material on record.
32. So, in the considered opinion of this Court learned Additional Session Judge did not commit any mistake in allowing the application filled by the non-applicant No.1.
33. Accordingly, petition has no merit and is hereby dismissed.
(Rajeev Kumar Dubey) JUDGE as/-
Digitally signed by ANURAG SONIDate: 2018.01.30 13:07:19 +05'30'