Karnataka High Court
Sri T Krishnegowda vs Sri T H Hanumanthegowda @ Shivaramu on 4 October, 2023
Author: V Srishananda
Bench: V Srishananda
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940
RFA No. 1507 of 2007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL No.1507 OF 2007(DEC/INJ)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI T KRISHNEGOWDA
S/O HOMBEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
2. SRI T D GANGADHARA
S/O DODDEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
3. SRI RAMESH
S/O NANJUNDEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
4. SRI T K RAMACHANDRA
S/O CHIKKEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF
Digitally TAREBENAHALLI VILLAGE,
signed by R
MANJUNATHA DANDIGANAHALLI HOBLI,
Location: C.R.PATNA TALUK-573 116
HIGH COURT
OF ...APPELLANTS
KARNATAKA
(BY SRI VENKATESH R BHAGAT, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI T H HANUMANTHEGOWDA @ SHIVARAMU
S/O HANUMANTHEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF TAREBENAHALLI VILLAGE,
DANDIGANAHALLI HOBLI,
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940
RFA No. 1507 of 2007
CHANNARAYAPATNA TALUK-573 116,
2. SMT JAYAMMA
W/O LATE NARAYANAIAH
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
3. SRI UMESHA
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
4. SMT NARAYANAMMA
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
SL.Nos.2 TO 4 ARE THE
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF
LATE NARAYANAIAH
DEFENDANT NO.2 AND
ALL ARE RESIDENT OF
CHOWLAGALA VILLAGE,
DANDIGANAHALLI HOBLI,
C.T.PATNA TALUK
PIN - 573 116.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VISHNU BHAT, ADVOCATE FOR R2-R4;
R1 -SERVED)
THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
96 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE DATED 13.03.2007 PASSED IN O.S.NO.54/2002 ON
THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.) CHANNARAYAPATNA,
DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND INJUNCTION.
THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL COMING ON FOR FURTHER
HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940
RFA No. 1507 of 2007
JUDGMENT
Heard Sri Venkatesh R. Bhagat, counsel for appellants.
There is no representation on behalf of respondents, despite granting sufficient opportunity.
2. The present appeal is directed against the validity of the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.54/2002 dated 13.03.2007 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Channarayapatna, Hassan District, whereunder, suit of the plaintiffs came to be dismissed with costs.
3. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred to as plaintiffs and defendants as per their original ranking before the Trial Court.
4. The facts which are utmost necessary for disposal of the appeal are as under:
Plaintiffs filed the suit against the defendants, at the first instance on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Holenarasipura, in O.S.No.85/2002, to declare the title of the plaintiffs with possession as per the registered sale deed dated 20.10.2000 in -4- NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 pursuance of the agreement of sale executed by second defendant on 11.12.1990 and to declare that the compromise decree dated 03.04.1996 in O.S.No.147/1996 and the Order dated 14.12.1999 passed in O.S.No.477/1996 on the file of the Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Channarayapatna, are not binding on the plaintiffs' right, title and interest in the suit schedule property and also for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their men from interfering with the suit property.
5. The suit schedule property is admittedly a religious inam land of Sri Kambada Narasimha Swamy of Tarabenahalli. The Land Tribunal, Channarayapatna, granted occupancy right in respect of the suit property in the name of defendant No.2 by the Order dated 05.06.1986 in INS No.491/83-84. Defendant No.2 was enjoying the suit schedule property as its owner in pursuance of the said order of the Land Tribunal. The revenue entries were mutated in his name. When matter stood thus, second defendant agreed to sell the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs herein by entering into an agreement on 11.12.1990.
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6. Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the suit property for a valuable consideration in a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- and sum of Rs.33,000/- was received by second defendant as part consideration and plaintiffs agreed to pay the balance consideration at the time of execution of the sale deed. It is contended that the second defendant delivered the possession of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs, whereby, plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property by virtue of part performance of the contract as is contemplated under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
7. When the matter stood thus, first defendant knowing fully well about the suit agreement, clandestinely entered into another agreement with the second defendant, with an intention to defeat the right of the plaintiffs and he also filed a suit against the second defendant and got the suit compromised and there is a compromise decree in favour of the first defendant. But, in pursuance of the compromise decree, the first defendant has not got the sale deed executed in his favour and therefore, suit is laid for the aforesaid relief.
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8. Upon service of summons, defendant No.1 appeared through his counsel and filed detailed written statement. In the mean time, the case was transferred from Holenarasipura to Channarayapatna and renumbered as O.S.No.54/2002. The second defendant, did not chose to contest the suit nor appeared before the Court at Holenarasipura or Channarayapatna and he was placed ex-parte. During pendency of the suit, second defendant also reported to be dead and legal representatives of second defendant were brought on record. The legal representatives appeared before the Trial Court by engaging a counsel, but failed to file the written statement. The first defendant maintains that he is the bonafide purchaser of the suit property and he has filed suit which got compromised and he has also filed Execution Case No.79/2000.
9. Based on the rival contentions of the parties, the Trial Court raised the following issues:
1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are the absolute owners and in possession of the suit schedule property and they acquired right, title and interest over the suit schedule property ?-7-
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2. Whether the plaintiffs further prove that the defendants are interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property ?
3. Whether the plaintiffs further proves that the Judgment & Decree passed in 0.5.No.147/96 dated 03/05/1996 and Judgment & Decree passed in O.S.No.477/96 dated 4/12/1999 on the file of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), C.R.Patna are not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs ?
4. Whether the defendant No.1 proves that he has purchased the suit schedule property from II defendant in view of the compromise arrived in o.S.No.147/96 as contended in his written statement ?
5. Whether the defendant further proves that agreement deed dated 11-12-1990 is concocted one and not binding on him?
6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as sought for ?
7. To what order or decree ?
10. In order to prove the case of the plaintiffs, plaintiff No.1 got examined himself as P.W.1, plaintiff No.3 was examined as P.W.2 and on their behalf three more witnesses viz., T.K.Kempegowda, Nanjundaswamy and N.Lingappa were examined as P.Ws.3, 4 and 5. The plaintiffs relied on 11 -8- NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 documents exhibited and marked as Exs.P.1 to 11, comprising of sale deed at Ex.P.1, original sale deed at Ex.P.2, RTC pahanis at Exs.P.3 to 5, tax receipt at Ex.P.6, order copy in O.S.No.147/1996 at Ex.P.7, plaint in O.S.No.147/1996 at Ex.P.8, compromise decree in O.S.No.147/1996 at Ex.P.9, warrant at Ex.P.10 and order sheet in O.S.No.477/2006 at Ex.P.11.
11. To counter the evidence placed on behalf of the plaintiffs, defendant No.1 got himself examined as D.W.1 and placed reliance on nine documents exhibited and marked as Exs.D.1 to D.9, comprising of certified copy of compromise decree in O.S.No.147/1996 at Ex.D.1, certified copy of the plaint in O.S.No.147/1996 at Ex.D.2, certified copy of the decree in O.S.No.147/1996 at Ex.D.3, certified copies of judgment and decree in O.S.No.201/1997 at Exs.D.4 and D.5, certified copy of the order on I.A.No.1 in O.S.No.631/2000 at Ex.D.6, certified copy of the Tahsildar Order at Ex.D.7, certified copy of the FIR in C.R.No.639/2000 at Ex.D.8 and certified copy of the charge sheet at Ex.D.9.
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12. The learned Trial Judge, after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record in a cumulative manner, dismissed the plaint of the plaintiffs.
13. Being aggrieved by the same, plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal on the following grounds:
"The trial court without considering the nature of the property and right of the appellants had erroneously dismissed the suit without applying its judicious mind.
The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the defendant No.2 owner and after his death his L.Rs. have not disputed or denied the execution of the sale deed in favour of the appellants as per registered sale deed dated 20.10.2000 for the valid consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- in pursuance to the agreement to sell dated 11.12.1990.
The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the since the registered sale deed dated 20.10.2000, the appellants are in possession of the suit schedule property and erroneously proceeded to dismiss the suit.
The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the appellants even though are not parties to O.S.No.147/1996 and O.S.No.477/1996 filed by the 2nd respondent and the late Narayanaiah respectively against each other and those proceedings are not binding on these appellants.
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the so-called compromise decree in O.S.No.147/1996 was challenged by the late Narayanaiah in O.S.No.477/1996 and disowned the compromise decree.
The trial court has failed to understand the settled position of law that a sale deed can be assailed by the executants or his L.RS. and not by a stranger.
The trial court has failed to apply the presumption of execution of valid sale deed in favour of the appellants in the absence of any denial by the 2nd defendant and when the said sale deed is not challenged by the 1st defendant before any court having competent jurisdiction.
The trial court while answering issue No.2 has erroneously held that the defendant No.1 has proved his title and possession over the suit schedule property by virtue of the judgment and decree in O.S.No.147/1996 ignoring the essential ingredients of title.
The trial court has failed to understand the principles of proof of a registered document as contemplated under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The trial court has failed to take note of the contents of Ex.P1 - sale deed, which was proved by the appellants in accordance with law.
The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the judgment and decree in O.S.No.147/1996 is a collusive compromise decree that too in a suit for specific performance of the contract, which does not declare the title of the parties or confer any title over the suit
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 schedule property, but only declaration of the right to get a registered sale deed.
The impugned judgment and decree are otherwise opposed to law, facts, probabilities and equities in the case.
The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the so-called original agreement based on which the compromise decreed was obtained in O.S.No.147/1996 is neither produced before the trial court or in the suit to prove the factum of agreement in favour of the 1st defendant and admission in this regard and order dated 9-08-06 restricting the 1st defendant to use the agreement.
The trial court has failed to take note of the fact that the agreement dated 11-12-1990 and sale deed dated 20-10- 2000 are proved by examining the attesting witnesses."
14. Sri Venkatesh R.Bhagat, learned counsel for appellants/ plaintiffs, reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memorandum, contended that the Trial Court failed to note that once the second defendant has entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs, again entering into agreement with the first defendant in respect of the suit schedule property, without terminating the contract entered into by second defendant with the plaintiffs has resulted in miscarriage of justice and it could not have been countenanced in law. He further argued that the
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 Trial Court has mislead itself into said aspect of the matter and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs resulting in miscarriage of justice and sought for allowing the appeal.
15. He further contended that, even assuming that the decree has been obtained by the first defendant against the second defendant, since the decree is not executed, and sale deed is not obtained by the first defendant in pursuance of the decree, the Trial Court ought not to have dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs.
16. In this regard, counsel for appellants places reliance on the following judgments. The relevant portions of said judgments are culled out hereunder for ready reference.
(i) Mrs.Christine Pais vs. K.Ugappa Shetty and another reported in AIR 1966 MYSORE 299.
9. Now, I will consider the decision cited on behalf of the respondent. Mr. Holla, the learned Advocate for the respondent contended that possession and title flow from the sale deed and not from the decree. In support of his contention he referred to Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah [A.I.R. 1938 All. 432.], Janardhan Kishore Lal v. Girdhari Lal [A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 701.], Ramlingam v. G.R. Jagadammal [A.I.R.1957A.P961.], Ramakrishnayya v. Viraraghavayy a [1954 (11) M.L.J. Andhra 11.] . Allahabad High Court in its decision in Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ulla [A.I.R. 1938 All. 432.] laid down--(1) that a decree for specific performance only declares the right of the decree-holder to have a transfer of the property covered by the
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 decree executed in his favour. (2) that a decree by itself does not transfer title, (3) that it, i.e., the decree, gives the right to have the deed executed and (4) that on his failure, to have the sale deed executed by the court on behalf of the judgment debtor. This is what was observed by Iqbal Ahmed, J., who spoke for the Bench at page 433:
".................. A decree for specific performance only declares the right of the decree-holder to have a transfer of the property covered by the decree executed in his favour. The decree by itself does not transfer title. That this is so apparent from the fact that in order to get title to the property, the decree holder has to proceed in execution in accordance with the provisions of 0.21 of the Code. So long as the sale deed is not executed in favour of the decree-holder either by the defendant in the suit or by the Court the title to the property remains vested in the defendant and till the execution of the sale deed the decree-holder has no right to the possession of the property. It is only the execution of the sale deed that transfers title to the property."
It was further observed:
"The sale deed executed by a court in pursuance of a decree for specific performance is a transfer by the Court on behalf of the judgment-debtor and it is the title of the judgment-debtor to the property that is transferred by the sale deed executed by the Court."
In a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Janardhan Kishore Lal v. Girdhari Lel [A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 701.] , it is observed:
"Before the document was registered, the decree-holder had no right to be put in possession of the property leased; it was only when the document was registered that he got title to the property leased, and to the possession thereof ............"
In Ramalingam v. G.R. Jagadammal [A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 560.] what was held was:
".............. that the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of the property or the profits thereof on the execution of the contract of sale and it was only on the execution of the sale deed that the title to the property and the right to possession vested in
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 him. In view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act there is no room for the contention that the purchaser became in equity the owner of the estate under the contract of sale and the vendor held the property in trust for him.................... It cannot be said that the possession of the vendor was wrongful or that he was bound to account to the purchaser for profits till the sale deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff."
10. These decisions, in my opinion, clearly support Mr. Holla's contention. They establish that the title to the property passes only on the execution of the sale deed. On these decisions, I have little difficulty in accepting the contention of Mr. Holla, the learned Advocate for the appellant, that the title passes with the execution and registration of the sale deed and it does not flow from the decree. The last contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that from the time of the contract for sale of immoveable property, the vendor becomes a trustee for the property of the vendee. In support of this proposition he relied on a number of cases and contended that by the provisions contained in the Specific Relief Act relied upon by him, the respondent who is the representative of the vendor will be deemed to hold the property as a trustee for the appellant who is admittedly the vendee in the case. Mr. Holla argued that this particular point, namely, that the respondent No. 1 is the representative of the vendor, was not raised either in the court below or in the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant in this court, and submitted that no point which is not taken before the lower appellate court or in the grounds of appeal in this court, should be urged at the hearing in this Court. Alternatively, he argued that when once it is held that the provisions of law, namely, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable to the case, there is no scope for the applicability of equitable principles or of the provisions of Sections 91 and 95 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1862, to the case. He submitted that
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act is itself a bar to their applicability. In support of his contention, he has also cited some rulings. The contention with regard to the 1st respondent being the representative of the vendors, as argued by Mr. Holla, or he being the representative of the estate of the deceased J.P. Fernandes, as contended on behalf of the appellant, was not taken either before the lower appellate court or in the Memorandum of appeal filed in this court on behalf of the appellant. On the other hand, it is clear from the judgment of the lower appellate court that the only point which was argued in that court was to the effect that the title to the suit property passed immediately after the appellant deposited the balance of the purchase money in court. This is what is stated in para 6 of the judgment:
"The only point that was urged before me by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the title to suit property passed to the appellant--immediately after he deposited the balance of the purchase money into court as per the decree, i.e., on 23rd March 1957 and consequently the appellant is entitled to the rents and profits of the suit property from 23rd March 1957 onwards."
That being so, there appears to be much substance in the argument of the learned Advocate for the respondent that the appellant should not be allowed to take up that ground when it has been specifically raised in the lower court or in the memorandum of appeal filed in this court. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to express any opinion with regard to the last contention advanced on behalf of the appellant and I have not considered the same.
(ii) Gurdial Singh and others vs. Sewa Singh and others reported in AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 254.
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 "9. If the matter is looked at from another angle, that is after the decree for specific performance was granted and the sale was executed in consequence of the said decree, the said sale would relate back to the date of the agreement and in that situation the sale would have to be deemed to be effected, in the eyes of law on the date of the agreement. It is not denied that the respondents were the tenants on the date of the agreement. It was held in a case reported in Dina v. Gujaba AIR 1926 Nag 95, that the title of the vendee in the case of a decree for specific performance relates back to the date of the agreement on which the suit is based and the decree cannot be rendered nugatory by intermediate conveyance. In A. Tomlinson v. W.F. Harding AIR 1930 Lah 131, it was held that from the time of the contract for the sale of immovable property the vendor becomes a trustee of the property for the vendee, and the vendee becomes a trustee for the vendor in respect of the purchase money. It is, therefore, clear that the title of the vendee relates back to the date of the execution of the agreement to sell. The learned counsel for the appellants relies on the authorities reported in Mrs. Christine Pais v. K. Ugappa ShettyAIR 1966 Mys 299. In which it was held that the title to the vendees passes; with the execution and registration of sale deed and does not flow from decree. Similarly in Hakim Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah Khan, AIR 1938 All 432, it was held that the execution of the deed transfers the title and till then the property vests with the judgment-debtor. Similar view was taken in the case reported in Shewantabai v. Vishwasrao Goviindrao. AIR 1953 Nag 167, and it was held that the decree for specific performance does not confer a title. It is only the subsequent sale deed alone which passes the title. But none of these authorities discussed the question as to whether after the sale deed recording the transfer of the property is executed in obedience to a decree for specific performance, it relates back to the date of the agreement or not. Therefore, none of these authorities is of any help to the learned counsel for the appellants. In my opinion the said transfer dates back from the date of the agreement as it is on the basis of the
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 agreement itself that a suit for specific performance has been decreed as a consequence of which the sale deed is executed. The basis is the agreement and the moment the sale is executed, it dates back to the date of the agreement. Thus from whatever angle this appeal is looked, it is liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed with costs."
17. This Court perused the material on record meticulously in view of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants, including the principles of law enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, in the light of facts and circumstances of the present case.
18. On such perusal of the material on record, the following points arise for consideration:
(i) Whether appellants have made out a case that they are entitled to be the owners of the suit property by virtue of agreement of sale dated 11.12.1990, pursuant to which, sale deed came to be executed by second defendant on 20.10.2000 and therefore, his suit needs to be decreed?
(ii) Whether the impugned judgment is suffering from legal infirmity and perversity and thus calls for interference by this Court?
(iii) What Order?
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19. Regarding Point Nos.1 and 2: In the case on hand, agreement executed by second defendant in favour of plaintiff on 11.12.1990 by receiving Rs.33,000/- as earnest money in respect suit property for valuable consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- is not in dispute. Further, suppressing the said agreement, second defendant entered into another agreement of sale with the first defendant on 20.04.1994. The first and second defendant colluded with each other and got filed O.S.No.147/1993 on the file of the Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), Channarayapatna and got the suit disposed by compromise decree whereunder, second defendant agreed to sell the property in favour of the first defendant. The said compromise came to be effected on 03.04.1996. Suppressing the said compromise, second defendant received the balance money from the plaintiff and executed a registered sale deed on 20.10.2000. In other words, it is the second defendant who is mischief monger who gained not only from the plaintiff but also from the first defendant.
20. The fact remains that the plaintiffs being put into possession of the suit property in pursuance of the agreement
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 dated 11.12.1990 continued to be in suit property initially as part performance the of contract and subsequently his title got confirmed by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 20.10.2000. When there was interference by the first defendant in respect of suit property, left with no alternative, plaintiff had to approach the jurisdictional Court at Holenarasipura, initially in O.S.No.85/2002 and it was transferred to the Court of Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Channarayapatna and renumbered as O.S.No.54/2002 against both the defendants.
21. The learned Trial Judge, however, on contest, came to the conclusion that since there is a decree already passed in O.S.No.147/1996, dated 03.04.1996 suit relief could not be granted to the plaintiffs and therefore, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs.
22. Taking note of the legal principles enunciated in the case of Mrs.Christine Pais vs. K.Ugappa Shetty and another reported in AIR 1966 MYSORE 299 which was followed by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Gurdial Singh and others vs. Sewa Singh and others
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 reported in AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 254, supra, resultant legal position is that unless sale deed is executed in pursuance of the compromise decree said to have been executed by the second defendant in favour of first defendant in O.S.No.147/1996, no rights have been transferred in favour of first defendant by second defendant in respect of suit property. Accordingly, it is the plaintiffs who are entitled to get the suit decreed inasmuch as execution of sale deed on 20.10.2000 by second defendant would relate back to the date of agreement being 11.12.1990. The said aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned Trial Judge in the impugned judgment in its proper perspective.
23. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation whatsoever in holding that the plaintiffs have made out a case that he is entitled to become the owner and entitled for an order of injunction as prayed for in the suit. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered in the affirmative.
24. The Trial Court having not appreciated the principles of law in its proper perspective and misdirected itself in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation
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NC: 2023:KHC:35940 RFA No. 1507 of 2007 in holding that the impugned judgment is suffering from legal infirmity and perversity. Hence, point No.2 is answered in the affirmative.
25. Regarding Point No.3: In view of the findings of the Court on point Nos.1 and 2 as above, the following:
ORDER
(i) Appeal is allowed.
(ii) The impugned judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.54/2002 dated 13.03.2007 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Channarayapatna, is hereby set-aside.
(iii) The plaintiffs' suit is decreed as prayed for with costs throughout.
Sd/-
JUDGE kcm List No.: 1 Sl No.: 40