Allahabad High Court
Executive Engineer vs P.O. on 21 January, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 501
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD RESERVED A.F.R. Court No. - 38 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 9616 of 1991 Petitioner :- Executive Engineer Respondent :- P.O. Counsel for Petitioner :- B.Dayal,A.K. Mehrotra,P.N.Rai,Sandeep Kumar Srivastava,Ms. Usha Kiran Counsel for Respondent :- J.S.Audichya,A.K.Gupta,A.K.Misra,H.D.Singh,Indra Sen Singh Vatsa,J.N.Mishra,Pankaj Misra,Prakash Chandra Shakya,S.C.,U.K.Misra Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.
1. This writ petition has been instituted by the Executive Engineer, U.P. State Electricity Board, Division-1, Farrukhabad and the U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow through its Chairman, challenging an award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 2nd, Kanpur dated 23.08.1990 (published on 20.11.1990), made in Adjudication Case No. 56 of 1988 between the two petitioners and their workman, Data Ram, respondent no. 2, now represented by his heirs and legal representatives, respondent Nos. 2/1, 2/2, 2/3.
2. It is common ground between the parties that the U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow which was a body corporate during the relevant period of time has since been dissolved and reorganized by virtue of the U.P. Electricity Reforms Act, 1999. Now, the former U.P. State Electricity Board is replaced and renamed as the U.P. Power Corporation Limited and all its officers are now officers of the U.P. Power Corporation Limited. Accordingly, on an impleadment application made on behalf of the U.P. Power Corporation, the description of the petitioners has been permitted to be made in the manner that petitioner no. 1 has been rearrayed as the Executive Engineer, U.P. Power Corporation Limited, Electricity Division, Farrukhabad and petitioner no. 2 as the U.P. Power Corporation Limited, Lucknow through its Chairman.
3. The two petitioners together are hereinafter referred to as ''the Employers whereas respondent Nos. 2/1, 2/2 and 2/3 shall be called 'the workman'. It appears that for the benefit of the workman the Workers' Union, to wit, the Hydro Electric Employees Union, 7 Sarojni Nagar, Lucknow raised an industrial dispute which in due course was referred by the State Government under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (for short, 'the Act') to the adjudication of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 2nd, U.P., Kanpur vide a reference order dated 13.09.1988 in the following terms (translated into English from Hindi vernacular) :
"Whether the Employers are obliged to designate their workman Dataram s/o Sri Jalim Prasad as Routine Grade Clerk with effect from 01.01.1988? If yes, with what particulars?"
4. On the basis of the aforesaid reference, Adjudication Case No. 56 of 1988 was registered on the file of the Labour Court, 2nd, U.P. Kanpur on 01.10.1988 and summonses were issued to the Employers and the workman requiring them to enter appearance and file their written statements, together with documents on 08.11.1988. Both parties appeared before the Labour Court on 28.11.1988 to which the proceedings were adjourned on 08.11.1988, as on the latter date the Presiding Officer was on leave. A written statement dated 03.12.1988 was filed on behalf of the Employers whereas the workman filed his written statement, which is a document dated 15.12.1988. The workman filed a rejoinder statement dated 01.02.1989.
5. The case of the workman pleaded in his written statement, in substance, is to the effect that he is working with the Employers on daily wage basis as a Routine Grade Clerk, but against a sanctioned post since the year 1977. He has been assigned all kinds of duties which a Routine Grade Clerk may discharge. The workman has done his Masters (M.A.) and is the member of a Scheduled Caste. It is pleaded that the Employers had decided that workmen on daily wages, who have been working on the post of a Routine Grade Clerk, would not be retrenched. It is also a plea in the written statement that between the Employers and the Government decisions have been taken from time to time that workmen employed on the muster roll and workmen already in harness of the Employers, ought be accorded priority in the matter of appointment.
6. In this connection, a reference is made to the report of a certain Tandon Committee and further decisions taken by the Employers, and the Government, in consequence of which with effect from 01.01.1988, several hundred workmen have been regularized. It is also pleaded that the Employers had issued an order that reservation quota for the Scheduled Castes may not be filled up by recruitment of outsiders. Instead, the workmen already on muster roll, or those working on an adhoc basis or part time, including those engaged in leave vacancies, may be considered for recruitment under the said quota. It is also asserted by the workman that the Employers have vacancy in their establishment and on that account too, the workman ought to be designated as a Routine Grade Clerk and paid his salary in the regular scale.
7. The further case of the workman is that he has turned overage and ineligible for employment elsewhere. The workman has rendered regular service for the past many years, putting in more than 240 days in each year. The workman has pleaded that under orders of the Employers a workman who has completed 240 days of services, is entitled to regularization. It is also pleaded that a large number of workmen junior to the workman, and also of comparatively feeble merit, have been appointed Routine Grade Clerks. On the basis of a case to the above effect, the workman has asked to be designated as a Routine Grade Clerk and placed in the regular pay-scale.
8. It must be remarked here that, in substance, the workman has asked for a relief of regularization in service as a Routine Grade Clerk that has been cast in an unfamiliar mould, to say that the workman may be designated as a Routine Grade Clerk, and given that pay-scale. Thus, the industrial dispute that the workman has raised, is, in substance, a claim for regularization.
9. The Employers in the written statement have pleaded that the workman never worked for them after 20.07.1979, and on that basis taken an objection that the industrial dispute is one raised after a long delay of nine years. It is a stale claim and on that ground deserves to be rejected. It is pleaded that the Employers are a State corporate establishment under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Under Section 79 (c) of the Act, last mentioned, the Employers are empowered to frame service conditions for their employees. The workman was hired from time to time, according to requirement and availability of work by the Electricity Commercial Division, Farrukhabad as a workman borne on the muster roll - engaged against leave vacancies. The contingent requirement of work came to an end on 20.07.1979, whereafter the workman was not engaged. It was also disputed that the workman ever completed 240 days service on the post of a Routine Grade Clerk. It is asserted that appointment on the post of a Routine Grade Clerk is made through a process of selection by the Electricity Services Commission, after due advertisement of vacancies in newspapers. In paragraph no. 8 of the written statement there is a specific plea taken that no employee under the administrative control of the Superintending Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division, Farrukhabad borne on the muster roll has been absorbed in the regular establishment. As such, the workman has no right to ask for designation as a Routine Grade Clerk, with effect from 01.01.1988, which in any case, would not be in accordance with law.
10. In his rejoinder of the statement, the workman has pleaded to the objection regarding the claim being belated, where he has refuted the objection. He has asserted that there is no limitation prescribed for the purpose of raising an industrial dispute under the law. Also, the dispute has been raised after the Employers decided to regularize other workman. It is asserted that the contents of paragraph no. 3 of the written statement of the Employers are denied and that the workman had all along been functioning against a permanent post. In every year, the workman is claimed to have worked more than 240 days and more. It is also pleaded that the workman claims on the basis of his rights under the Act, where selection by the Electricity Services Commission has no relevance.
11. Again, assertions in paragraph no. 7 of the Employer's written statement have been denied and it is pleaded that it is not a case of direct appointment for the workman, but one of regularization. It must be remarked here that by this pleading in paragraph no. 7 of the rejoinder of the statement, the rather unconservative description of the workman's claim, described as designation for the workman as a Routine Grade Clerk and grant of pay-scale, stands demystified to transparently show by the workman's pleading that it is afterall, a claim for regularization.
12. The workman has filed some 19 documents. Most of these documents are Board Orders, one is a Government Order, still another a Report, one is an Office Memorandum of the Board carrying the report of the Tandon Committee dated 2nd September, 1976. These documents do provide about rights of regularization in service to workmen borne on the muster roll, including Routine Grade Clerks, subject to the Clerks passing the prescribed examinations and typing tests etc. But, most of these do not relate to the workman's record of engagement with the Employers, except for a few of these documents which are relevant. It must also be noticed here that of the documents that are relevant directly to the workman's rights, there is on record a certificate from the Executive Engineer, Electricity Commercial Division, Farrukhabad dated 31.08.1982, indicating the period of the workman's engagement as a Routine Grade Clerk and as a Class IV employee, put together, between 30.09.1977 to 28.02.1979. This document alone has been exhibited by the Labour Court and taken into consideration. About this evidence and its impact on the rights of parties, more would be said later.
13. The workman also examined himself in support of his case and has been cross examined by the Employers. The Employers, on the other hand, have filed four documents through a list bearing Paper No. 17D but they could not lead any evidence as the proceedings were set down ex parte on 21.05.1990 and adjourned to 25.06.1990 for address of arguments. On 25.06.1990, an effort was made through an application to set aside the order dated 21.05.1990, ordering the proceedings to go ex parte but that application, bearing Paper No. 24D, was rejected by an order of that day. Arguments were heard on 25.06.1990 on behalf of the workman and judgment reserved, permitting the Employers to address the Court within a week, if they so desired.
14. Again, it has to be remarked here that permitting address of arguments to the Employers after reserving judgment formally on the ordersheets, is not only something odd but unlawful by all standards. Still, this Court thinks that in the domain of industrial adjudication which is far more informal than proceedings in Court, the aforesaid matter would remain an oddity that would not vitiate the award.
15. The Labour Court by means of the impugned award has answered the reference in favour of the workman, and has awarded, that the workman shall be entitled to be designated as a Routine Grade Clerk with effect from 01.01.1988 and the employers shall, accordingly, designate him. It has further been awarded that the workman would be entitled to his salary from the said date. Costs in the sum of Rs. 100/- have also been awarded. This Court, while entertaining this writ petition vide order dated 01.04.1991, issued notice pending admission and by an interim order of the said date, directed that the operation of the impugned award shall remain stayed, subject to the workman being reinstated by the Employers within one month of the order and payment of future wages, regularly. The writ petition was, lateron, admitted to hearing vide order dated 20.04.1992.
16. This Court has carefully perused the impugned award and also the records of the adjudication case, that were summoned from the Labour Court.
17. A perusal of the findings of the Labour Court shows that the Labour Court has concluded from the document filed as Exhibit W-1 that between the years 1977-78 and 1978-79, the workman did not put in 240 days of service in a year, but worked for 367 days, in all. This finding is based on a document issued by the Employers, and cannot, therefore, be possibly disputed by them. But, the other part of the workman's case that after those 367 days of work that he rendered with the Employers, he has been in their engagement as a Routine Grade Clerk, is based entirely on parole evidence of the workman, speaking for himself, without any corroboration by evidence aliunde. The Labour Court has concluded from the document which is a certificate by the Employer, marked as Exhibit W-1 and his oral evidence, to the effect that after July, 1979 he is working with the Electricity Distribution Division-1, Fatehgarh and that the workman is in regular employment as a Routine Grade Clerk. This conclusion from the evidence has been drawn by the Labour Court in the face of the Employers being set ex parte, where their right to lead evidence was closed, not for a very convincing reason and an application to recall the order, setting down proceedings ex parte, too was rejected. Though, the Employers appear to have supplied a number of documents that the workman has filed, on his application to summon those documents, still the Labour Court has held that the Employers have not supplied the required documents that the workman sought, to establish the time period and nature of his engagement. It is not at all clear as to what those documents are, that the Employers have not supplied.
18. The Labour Court has also observed much in error that it was the duty of the Employers to have established their case by producing documents in evidence, which they have not discharged. This part of the Labour Court's finding is manifestly illegal inasmuch as the Employers being ex parte, they certainly had no avenue to lead evidence that the Labour Court closed for them; and that too, in error, in the considered opinion of this Court. Moreover, the document that the workman has filed as Exhibit W-1, clearly depicts the Employers' case that the workman has served in broken spells, as a dailywager on muster roll, from 30.07.1977 to 28.02.1979. During all this period of time, the workman has been engaged as a muster roll employee, both as a Routine Grade Clerk and a Class-IV employee (peon). Most of these engagement have been in leave vacancies, and some to meet other contingencies. There is no independent evidence led by the workman to lend support to his case that until time when reference was made, or even thereafter, he was still retained by the Employers as a Routine Grade Clerk, working at Fatehgarh. A mere self serving testimony in the witness box with no corroborative independent evidence, cannot be held to prove the workman's case which the Labour Court has accepted, even with the Employer remaining ex parte. The conclusions drawn by the Labour Court from the evidence on record are perverse.
19. Now, once the workman has been out of employment since 28.02.1979, an industrial dispute raised in the year 1988, nine years after workman's exit from the Employer's establishment, is certainly a stale claim where it cannot be said that there was an industrial dispute still surviving at that distance of time. To raise this kind of a dispute under the circumstances, after nine years, leads to an inference that either the workman, and more likely the sponsoring union have contrived to create a ghost dispute to champertous ends, or it is all utterly ill-advised.
20. An authoritative statement of the law in regard to stale claims under the Industrial Disputes Act is to be found in the guidance of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nedungadi Bank Ltd vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and others, (2002) 2 SCC 455, where it has been held:
6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.
19. Even otherwise, the post of a Routine Grade Clerk was required to be filled up in accordance with Regulation 5(d) of the U.P. State Electricity Board Ministerial Establishment (Offices of the Chief Engineer and Other Subordinate Offices) Regulations, 1970 which mandates direct recruitment to be made on the basis of a competitive examination, conducted by the Electricity Services Commission. There is thus no other channel envisaged for the recruitment of Routine Grade Clerks in the service of the U.P. State Electricity Board. There is no way the statute would permit regularization of a casual hand on a post that is to be strictly filled up in accordance with statutory rules through a competitive examination.
20. In matters of the appointment under the State, after the decision of the Constitution Bench of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, there is absolutely no space, consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to secure through the mechanism of regularization, appointment as the one here, to a post under the State, borne on the public exchequer. It has been held in Umadevi (supra) thus:
"34. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [(2004) 7 SCC 112 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 918] a three-Judge Bench made a survey of the authorities and held that when appointments were made in contravention of mandatory provisions of the Act and statutory rules framed thereunder and by ignoring essential qualifications, the appointments would be illegal and cannot be regularised by the State. The State could not invoke its power under Article 162 of the Constitution to regularise such appointments. This Court also held that regularisation is not and cannot be a mode of recruitment by any State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or any body or authority governed by a statutory Act or the rules framed thereunder. Regularisation furthermore cannot give permanence to an employee whose services are ad hoc in nature. It was also held that the fact that some persons had been working for a long time would not mean that they had acquired a right for regularisation.
37. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this aspect. It is only necessary to refer to one or two of the recent decisions in this context. In State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 190] this Court after referring to a number of prior decisions held that there was no power in the State under Article 162 of the Constitution to make appointments and even if there was any such power, no appointment could be made in contravention of statutory rules. This Court also held that past alleged regularisation or appointment does not connote entitlement to further regularisation or appointment. It was further held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to frame a scheme by itself or direct the framing of a scheme for regularisation. This view was reiterated in State of Karnataka v. KGSD Canteen Employees' Welfare Assn. [(2006) 1 SCC 567 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 158 : JT (2006) 1 SC 84]
38. In Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela [(2006) 2 SCC 482 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 339 : (2006) 2 Scale 115] this Court answered the question, who was a government servant and stated: (SCC p. 490, para 12) "12. Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words ''employment' or ''appointment' cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation, etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution (see B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute [(1983) 4 SCC 582 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 26 : AIR 1984 SC 363])."
40. At this stage, it is relevant to notice two aspects. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1] this Court held that Article 14, and Article 16, which was described as a facet of Article 14, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The position emerging from Kesavananda Bharati [(1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1] was summed up by Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for a Bench of three Judges in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [(2000) 1 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 1 : 1999 Supp (5) SCR 229] . That decision also reiterated how neither Parliament nor the legislature could transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16(1) is a facet. This Court stated: (Indra Sawhney case [(2000) 1 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 1 : 1999 Supp (5) SCR 229], SCC p. 202, paras 64-65) "64. The preamble to the Constitution of India emphasises the principle of equality as basic to our Constitution. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [(1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1] it was ruled that even constitutional amendments which offended the basic structure of the Constitution would be ultra vires the basic structure. Sikri, C.J. laid stress on the basic features enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution and said that there were other basic features too which could be gathered from the constitutional scheme (para 506-A of SCC). Equality was one of the basic features referred to in the preamble to our Constitution. Shelat and Grover, JJ. also referred to the basic rights referred to in the preamble. They specifically referred to equality (paras 520 and 535-A of SCC). Hegde & Shelat, JJ. also referred to the preamble (paras 648, 652). Ray, J. (as he then was) also did so (para 886). Jaganmohan Reddy, J. too referred to the preamble and the equality doctrine (para 1159). Khanna, J. accepted this position (para 1471). Mathew, J. referred to equality as a basic feature (para 1621). Dwivedi, J. (paras 1882, 1883) and Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) (see para 2086) accepted this position.
65. What we mean to say is that Parliament and the legislature in this country cannot transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16(1) is a facet."
21. The Supreme Court in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Workmen, (2007) 1 SCC 408 again dealing with the regularization of services of daily rated ad hoc or casual employees, on posts under the State or one of its instrumentalities have spoken for judicial restraint in such matter matters and held:
"40. The courts must, therefore, exercise judicial restraint, and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain. Orders for creation of posts, appointment on these posts, regularisation, fixing pay scales, continuation in service, promotions, etc. are all executive or legislative functions, and it is highly improper for Judges to step into this sphere, except in a rare and exceptional case. The relevant case-law and philosophy of judicial restraint has been laid down by the Madras High Court in great detail in Rama Muthuramalingam v. Dy. Supdt. of Police [AIR 2005 Mad 1] and we fully agree with the views expressed therein.
47. We are of the opinion that if the court/tribunal directs that a daily-rated or ad hoc or casual employee should be continued in service till the date of superannuation, it is impliedly regularising such an employee, which cannot be done as held by this Court in Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] and other decisions of this Court.
48. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the orders of the Labour Court as well as the High Court were wholly unjustified and cannot be sustained for the reasons already mentioned above. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgments of the High Court and the Labour Court are set aside and the reference made to the Labour Court is answered in the negative. There shall be no order as to costs."
22. Again in a consistent vain, in a matter arising under the Labour Law, it has been held by the Supreme Court in BSNL v. Bhurumal, (2014) 7 SCC 177:
"34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] ]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose.
23. To the same effect are other decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chandra Shekhar Azad Krishi Evam Prodyogiki Vishwavidyalaya vs. United Trades Congress, (2008) 2 SCC 552 and Deputy Executive Engineer vs. Kuberbhai Kanjibhai, (2019) 4 SCC 307.
24. The Labour Court, while writing the impugned award has completely ignored from consideration this very pertinent aspect of the matter, though it was raised as a plea before it on behalf of the Employers.
Now, the workman is no more and this petition, directed as it is against the impugned award is defended by his legal heirs. There is no issue about reinstatement. The workman, however, was reinstated in service pending this petition, in consequence of the conditional stay order passed by this Court on 01.04.1991. He served in the respondent's establishment from 29.10.1991 until his death on 26.04.2010. While he was in service, he had received emoluments as a Routine Grade Clerk by dint of the interim order passed by this Court. The workman has rendered services to the Employer, under whatever circumstances, and that fact is not in dispute. In view of the said circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the impugned award cannot be sustained, there is no basis to order recovery from the workman's heirs, or so to speak, from the estate of the workman in the hands of his heirs.
25. It goes without saying also that recovery proceedings initiated by the workman through an application made on 28.01.2010 under Section 6H of the Act (incorrectly described as Section 33 (C) in the record of proceedings) before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court-II, U.P. Kanpur, would fall with the impugned award.
26. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award dated 23.08.1990 passed by the Presiding Officer-II, U.P. Kanpur in Adjudication Case No. 56 of 1988, published on 20.11.1990, is hereby quashed. Costs shall go easy.
27. The Office is directed to return the Labour Court records forthwith to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court-II, U.P., Kanpur Nagar.
28. Let a copy of this order shall also be certified to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court-II, U.P., Kanpur forthwith.
Order Date :- 21.01.2020 Deepak, BKM/-