Madras High Court
The Assistant Provident Fund ... vs The Presiding Officer on 19 September, 2014
Author: V.Dhanapalan
Bench: V. Dhanapalan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 19.09.2014 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V. DHANAPALAN AND THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.CHOCKALINGAM W.A.No.1976 of 2011 The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, 20, Royapettah High Road, Chennai 600 014. ... Appellant vs. 1. The Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, Camp hearing at Coimbatore. 2. M/s.Damien Foundation (I) Trust, rep. by its Authorised Officer, L.Camilus Rajkumar, Office at No.14, Venugopal Avenue, Chetpet, Chennai 600 031. ... Respondents Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 25.07.2011 passed by this Court passed in Writ Petition No.16150 of 2011. For Petitioner : Mr.K.Gunasekar For 1st Respondent : Court For 2nd Respondent : Mr.A.L.Somayaji, Advocate General, assisted by Mrs.Narmadha Sampath, for R2 Judgment reserved on : 04.08.2014 Judgment pronounced on : 19.09.2014 J U D G M E N T
V.DHANAPALAN,J.
Heard Mr.K.Gunasekar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Advocate General assisted by Mrs.Narmadha Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent.
2. This appeal is filed against the order dated 25.07.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.16150 of 2011, wherein, the order of the Tribunal, dated 28.01.2011 dismissing the appeal filed against the order passed by the 2nd respondent/Assistant P.F. Commissioner, levying damages and interest against the petitioner Trust was set aside with a direction to the 2nd respondent/Assistant P.F. Commissioner to refund the amount of Rs.24,27,204/- to the petitioner Trust within a period of four weeks and with a further observation that the order of attachment made in respect of the petitioner Trust under Section 8-F of the PF Act dated 04.03.2011 will also stand raised.
3. Before proceeding to analyse the issue in question, a perusal of the facts leading to the filing of the Writ Petition is necessary.
3.1. It is the case of the Trust that it was earlier exempted under Section 17(2-A) of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1952 (in short 'the Act') for the period from 01.04.1990 to 31.03.1993. Subsequently, during the year 1994, the Trust had decided to appoint the staff on contract system and dispensed with PF recovery w.e.f. 01.01.1994. The Trust had also sent a letter dated 02.06.1994 to the Department expressing their intention to close the account and settle the amount in respect of seven employees in whose case the PF amounts were deducted until then. It was also informed that the staff had opted to join the contract system to which the PF Act will not apply and they are voluntarily withdrawing the contribution towards PF. Subsequent to this, all the staffs employed directly by the Trust had got back their PF holdings. Though there were no employees having PF contribution, the Department was sending notices from time to time demanding PF contribution. The last such notice sent by the authorities was dated 09.09.1998, to which, the petitioner Trust sent a reply dated 11.11.1998.
3.2. It was stated that the petitioner Trust convened a meeting on 27.10.2001, wherein it had decided to cover the staff working in Chennai and Ranchi offices under the PF Scheme and to recover 12% on Basic plus DA towards PF. When this decision was informed to the PF authorities, it was informed by them that the action of the Trust that there was a change in the policy since April 1994 was not in order and fresh coverage ignoring the earlier one was not possible. Thereafter, the petitioner Trust under the understanding that their proposal was accepted, remitted a sum of Rs.23,66,593/- to the PF Department towards arrears for the period from April 1994 to December 2003 and accordingly filed the returns. Even thereafter, the Trust is continuing to file returns on time. They were also receiving the annual account slips up to the year 2007-2008 from the respondent and they are yet to receive the slips for the years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. It was informed that due to computerisation, there was a delay.
3.3. In the meanwhile, the Trust received a Show Cause Notice dated 09.07.2008 from the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner asking the Trust to remit a sum of Rs.17,55,569/- towards penal damages and Rs.6,71,635/- towards interest for the delayed payment of dues for the year 1994-1995 to 2004-2005. The Trust officials met the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner on 23.07.2008 and explained their position. During the meeting, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner informed that he had no power to cancel the order and also informed that the Trust will have to approach either the Appellate Tribunal at Delhi or the Central Board of Trustees, Delhi. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner had also issued proceedings dated 28.07.2008 demanding damages in terms of Section 14-B and interest under Section 7-Q of the PF Act. The damages worked out to Rs.17,55,569/- and the interest worked out to Rs.6,71,635/-.
3.4. Aggrieved by the levy of damages and interest, the Trust preferred an appeal before the Tribunal under Section 7-I of the PF Act. In the memo of appeal grounds, the Trust had stated that it is a non-profitable organisation. Most of its employees were doing voluntary work on contract basis. They themselves had discontinued the coverage under the PF Act and that the impugned order came to be passed after a period of 14 years without considering their genuine hardship and difficulties. Along with the memo of appeal, they had also enclosed a copy of the Trust Deed dated 04.12.1992 as Annexure B. The Tribunal took up the appeal as ATA No.680(13)2008 and after due notice to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, heard the appeal in its Camp Sitting at Coimbatore. The appeal was rejected on the following grounds:-
(a) The applicability of the Act was not in dispute.
(b) The term "Employee" includes an employee employed through a Contractor.
(c) The dominant feature of the definition was that the person engaged by the contractor in connection with the work of the establishment are also employees of the petitioner Trust.
(d) Since the coverage under Section 7A of the Act was not in dispute, no further challenge can be made under Section 14-B of the Act. For this purpose, the Tribunal placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Amarjit Singh v. Devi Rattanam reported in 2010 1 SCC (L & S) 1108, wherein, it was held that challenging the consequential order without challenge to the basic order is not permissible. As no exemption under the Act was given, the petitioner cannot seek any exemption under the Act.
3.5. After the dismissal of the appeal by an order dated 28.01.2011, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner sent a notice in terms of Section 8-F of the PF Act.
3.6. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, in his counter, had stated that the Act provides an obligation on the part of the employer to deposit the contributions payable for this month before the 15th of the next month. The Trust came voluntarily for a coverage under Section 1(4) of the PF Act and have got themselves covered. He had further stated that under Section 14B r/w Section 7-Q of the PF Act, it is also mandatory on their part to levy damages in case of delayed payment.
3.7. Under such circumstances, the Trust had approached this Court in W.P.No.16150 of 2011 and this Court, by an order dated 25.07.2011, allowed the Writ Petition, by holding as under:
17. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the second proviso to Section 14B of the PF Act wherein, the Central Board was given power to reduce or waive the damages levied under Section 14B of the PF Act if it is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation was sanctioned by the BIFR. The parliament did not stop with giving power only to Central PF Board alone in dealing with the question of damages. By the amendment introduced by the Central Act 33/1988 also clothed the power on the EPF Tribunal to entertain appeals against the order levying damages under Section 14B of the Act. The Tribunal was not only given an appellate power but also under Section 7(2), it was also entrusted with the same power which are vested with the officers under Section 7A of the PF Act. Further, under Section 7L(1) of the PF Act, the Tribunal has also been given power either to determine, modify or annul the order appealed against. It can also refer the case back to the authority which passed the order for fresh adjudication.
18. If it is seen in this context, it must be held that the Tribunal has the power to go into all aspects of an appeal including the power to modify the orders passed by the authorities in levying damages. The question in this writ petition is whether the Tribunal had discharged its duty vested under Section 7-I of the PF Act?
19. In the present case, the respondents have not stated any particular reason for levying damages at the maximum rate. On the other hand, they did not even take into account the nature of activities done by the petitioner institution, especially the fact that they were working for the eradication of leprosy in India and taking care of the health of such patients and running the institution with public donations.
20. Once there is power vested with the Tribunal to grant relief and the Tribunal does not even address the issue even though, it was specifically raised before it, then the order of the Tribunal certainly calls for interference by this Court. The decision relied on by the Tribunal has no relevance to the case on hand. The Tribunal failed to note that there were two issues before it; one relating to the coverage and the second relating to the levy of damages and interest. Therefore, the question of any interim order getting merged with the final order as found in the decision cited in Amarjit Singh's case (cited supra) has no relevance to the facts on hand.
21. Though the second respondent had taken a stand that he had no power to grant waiver of damages and interest and the parties must either approach the Tribunal or Central Board of Trustees, the first respondent being an Appellate Authority, empowered to entertain the appeal under Section 7-I even against the order passed under Section 14-B had not applied its mind and rendered proper findings on the levy of damages and interest.
22. As to the scope of levy of damages and interest came to be considered by the Supreme Court in its decision in Employees' State Insurance Corporation Corporation v. HMT Ltd., reported in (2008) 3 SCC 35. In paragraphs 25 and 26, it was held as follows :-
"25.The statute itself does not say that a penalty has to be levied only in the manner prescribed. It is also not a case where the authority is left with no discretion. The legislation does not provide that adjudication for the purpose of levy of penalty proceeding would be a mere formality or imposition of penalty as also computation of the quantum thereof became a foregone conclusion. Ordinarily, even such a provision would not be held to providing for mandatory imposition of penalty, if the proceeding is an adjudicatory one or compliance with the principles of natural justice is necessary thereunder.
26.Existence of mens rea or actus reus to contravene a statutory provision must also be held to be a necessary ingredient for levy of damages and/or the quantum thereof."
23. Further, as noted in the Hindustan Times's case (cited supra), the second respondent, though being a quasi-judicial authority failed to consider that the levy of damages and interest was not necessarily proportionate to the loss incurred by the employees.
24. In view of the above, the writ petition stands allowed. The order of the Tribunal, dated 28.01.2011 dismissing the appeal filed against the order passed by the second respondent levying damages and interest against the petitioner Trust is set aside. Since the second respondent recovered the amount in terms of Section 8-F of the PF Act, the second respondent is hereby directed to refund the amount of Rs.24,27,204/- to the petitioner Trust within a period of four weeks. The order of attachment made in respect of the petitioner Trust under Section 8-F of the PF Act dated 04.03.2011 will also stand raised. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. Aggrieved by the said order, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner has preferred this appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would strenuously contend that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the levy of damages and interest under Sections 14B and 7Q of the Act were levied as per the Rule and that there is no discrimination of the provisions of the Act or the benefits available to the employees merely on the basis of its mode of application. He would further contend that every employer is liable to pay interest under Section 7Q at the rate of 12% per annum for any sum due payable by him till the date of actual payment, as the said provisions have been introduced only with effect from 01.08.1998 and that the levy of interest under Section 7Q is an in-built mechanism of the Act itself to compensate the loss of interest owing to delayed investment of Trust monies owing to the default on the part of the employer.
5. It is also his contention that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the facts that the amount of penal damages under Section 14B of the Act cannot exceed the actual amount remitted belatedly. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner cannot levy damages exceeding the amount in default and remitted belatedly by the employer even by applying the maximum rate of damages i.e. 37% per annum prescribed in the Schemes. Further, he would submit that the waiving of damages in full, will cause irreparable loss to the fund and such an approach would put sustenance of the fund in danger. In support of his case, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following decisions:
(i) 1986 II LLJ 411 (The Venkataramana Dispensary and Ayurvedic College vs. Union of India and another) "2. I have carefully gone through the order of the first respondent and also the pleadings in this case. For the purpose of disposing of the writ petition, it is unnecessary to find out as to whether the petitioner is running a commercial establishment for preparing and selling ayurvedic medicine. In order to attract the provisions of the Act, it is necessary to find out as to whether the establishment such as the petitioner comes under any one of the categories mentioned in the First Schedule to the Act. S. 1(3)(b) of the Act reads as follows :
"Subject to the provisions contained in S. 16, it applies :-
a. xx xx xx b. to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf."
The Central Government Notification added several items in the First Schedule to the Act. One such item added by Notification S.R.P. No. 2026, dated 3rd September, 1956 reads as follows :
"Heavy and fine chemicals including -
(i) Fertilizers,
(ii) Turpentine,
(iii) Rosin,
(iv) Medical and Pharmaceutical preparations,
(v) Toilet preparations,
(vi) Soaps
(vii) Inks
(viii) Intermediates, dyes, colour lacs and toners,
(ix) Fatty acids, and
(x) Oxygen, acetylene and carbon-dioxide gases industry."
In Gangatharan Vaidyan v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Kerala [1966-II L.L.J. 216] the Kerala High Court had occasion to consider the item 'Heavy and fine chemicals including medical and Pharmaceutical preparations, mentioned in the First Schedule to the Act. The Kerala High Court dealing with this aspect of the case held as follows : "The petitioner's argument was that manufacture of ayurvedic preparations would not fall within the entry in the schedule, 'heavy and fine chemicals 'not even within the inclusive part of it, 'medical and pharmaceutical preparations."
After referring to the arguments of the Government Pleader, and also to the dictionaries, the Kerala High Court came to the conclusion that medical and pharmaceutical preparations would take in Ayurvedic medicines also. This decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In my view, the same will apply to the present case if it attracts. S. 1(3) read with the First Schedule to the Act referred to above. The question as to whether the petitioner is a charitable institution or a commercial institution is outside the purview of discussion while deciding the applicability of the Act. It is clear from the facts of the present case, as admitted by the petitioner himself in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, that there is a dispensary mainly run to impart practical training analogous to house surgeoncy, in the regular allopathic medicines, that in the course of the practical training, medicines are prepared under the advice and guidance of doctors teaching in the college and that such medicines are given to patients who come to the dispensary for treatment. It is further admitted in the affidavit that such medicines are given freely to the patients and only those who can afford can pay for it. This is enough to judge as to whether the Act is attracted to the petitioner's institution. As I have stated in paragraph supra, the petitioner is an establishment attracting the provisions of S. 1(3)(b) of the Act. The First Schedule to the Act clearly takes in the ayurvedic medicines prepared by this institution Hence, it is clear that the provisions of the Act are attracted to the petitioner's institution also. Therefore, I am in complete agreement with the findings of the first respondent herein.
(ii) (2010) II LLJ 517 (Mad.) (India Cements Limited vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II and another) "13. As per Section 7Q of the EPF Act, the employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under the Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment, provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank. With regard to recovery of damages, Section 14B of the EPF Act provides that where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Fund (Pension Fund) or the Insurance Fund or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-section (2) of Section 15 [or sub-section (5) of Section 17] or in the payment of any charges payable under any other provision of the Act or of any scheme or Insurance scheme or under any of the conditions specified under Section 17, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf] may recover [from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceeding the amount of arrears, as may be specified in the Scheme], provided that before levying and recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; provided further that the Central Board may reduce or waive the damages levied under this section in relation to an establishment which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction established under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986), subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified in the Scheme].
14. In the instant case, the coverage intimation was issued in November 2001 and the petitioner was directed to remit the Provident Fund dues from 01.09.1999, but the petitioner had remitted the dues in March 2002 only, after a lapse of 5 months. Therefore, as per the provisions of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, the petitioner is liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum or at such higher rates as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under the Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment. Accordingly, the respondents have exercised their powers and levied the amount of interest for the period and therefore the petitioner is liable to pay such dues. However, the only grievance of the petitioner appears to be that if at all there is any delay, it is only from 22.12.2001 to 26.02.2002, for which this court cannot go into the calculation of the period of delay and it has to be represented before the respondents.
6. On the other hand, learned Advocate General appearing for the 2nd respondent would contend that the Trust had appointed the staff on contract system for which the provisions of the Act do not apply and, therefore, the levy of penalty and interest is illegal. He has relied on the following decisions:
(i) (1979) 4 SCC 573 (Organo Chemical Industries and another vs. Union of India and others) 13. The contention that section 14B confers unguided and uncontrolled discretion upon the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose such damages 'as he may think fit' is, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Nor can it be accepted that there are no guide-lines provided for fixing the quantum of damages. The power of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages under s. 14B is a quasi-judicial function. It must be exercised after notice to the defaulter and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The discretion to award damages could be exercised within the limits fixed by the Statute. Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable under s. 14B and the consequences that ensue therefrom, an order under s. 14B must be a 'speaking order' containing the reasons in support of it. The guide-lines are provided in the Act and its various provisions, particularly in the word 'damages' the liability for which under s. 14B arises on the 'making of default'. While fixing the amount of damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration, as he has done here, various factors viz. the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. The word 'damages' in s. 14B lays down sufficient guidelines for him to levy damages.
22. The expression 'damages' occurring in Section 14-B is, in substance, a penalty imposed on the employer for the breach of the statutory obligation. The object of imposition of penalty under Section 14-B is not merely 'to provide compensation for the employees'. We are clearly of the opinion that the imposition of damages under Section 14-B serves both the purposes. It is meant to penalise defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. It is not only a warning to employers in general not to commit a breach of the statutory requirements of Section 6, but at the same time, it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries i.e. to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by them. There is nothing in the section to show that the damages must bear relationship to the loss which is caused to the beneficiaries under the Scheme. The word 'damages' in Section 14-B is related to the word 'default'. The words in Section 14-B are 'default in the payment of contribution' and, therefore, the word 'default' must be construed in the light of para 38 of the Scheme which provides that the payment of contribution has got to be made by the 15th of the following month and, therefore, the word 'default' in Section 14-B must mean 'failure in performance' or failure to act'. At the same time, the imposition of damages under Section 14-B is to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees.
(ii) 1994 Supp (3) SCC 690 (Prestolite (India) Ltd. vs. Regional Director and another) 5. It however appears to us that the contention of Mr. Goswami in the facts of the Case, should not be accepted. Even if the regulations have prescribed general guidelines and the upper limits at which the imposition of damages can be made, it cannot be contended that in no case, the mitigating circumstances can be taken into consideration by the adjudicating authority in finally deciding the matter and it is bound to act mechanically in applying the upper most limit of the table. In the instant case, it appears to us that the order has been passed without indicating any reason whatsoever as to why grounds for delayed payment was not to be accepted. There is no indication as to why the imposition of damages at the rate specified in the order was required to be made. Simply because the appellant did not appear in person and produce materials to support the objections, the employee's case could not be discarded in limine. On the contrary, the objection ought to have been considered on merits. We therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned orders. The Regional Director is directed to dispose of the representation of the appellant by indicating reasons after taking into consideration the grounds for delayed payment. Since the matter is going to be reheard, the appellant is permitted to make personal representation at the hearing of the show cause proceeding. As the matter is pending for a long time, the representation should be considered and disposed of within three months from the date of the receipt of the order by giving notice of the date of hearing in advance to the appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. By way of abundant caution it is made clear that we have not considered the case of the appellant on merits.
(iii) (1998) 2 SCC 242 (Hindustan Times Ltd. vs. Union of India and others) "29. From the aforesaid decisions, the following principles can be summarised: The authority under Section 14-B has to apply his mind to the facts of the case and the reply to the show cause notice and pass a reasoned order after following principles of natural justice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard; the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of default and the amounts involved; default on the part of the employer based on pleas of power cut, financial problems relating to other indebtedness or the delay in realisations of amounts paid by the cheques or drafts, cannot be justifiable grounds for the employer to escape liability; there is no period of limitation prescribed by the legislature for initiating action for recovery of damages under section 14B. The fact that proceedings are initiated or demand for damages is made after several years cannot by itself be a ground for drawing an inference of waiver or that the employer was lulled into a belief that no proceedings under section 14B would be taken; mere delay in initiating action under section 14B cannot amount to prejudice inasmuch as the delay on the part of the department, would have only allowed the employer to use the monies for his own purposes or for his business especially when there is no additional provision for charging interest. However, the employer can claim prejudice if there is proof that between the period of default and the date of initiation of action under section 14B, he had changed his position to his detriment to such an extent that if the recovery is made after a large number of years, the prejudice to him is of an "irretrievable" nature: he might also claim prejudice upon proof of loss of all the relevant records and/or non-availability of the personnel who were, several years back in charge of these payments and provided he further establishes that there is no other way he can reconstruct the record or produce evidence; or there are other similar grounds which could lead to "irretrievable" prejudice; further, in such cases of "irretrievable" prejudice, the defaulter must take the necessary pleas in defence in the reply to the show cause notice and must satisfy the concerned authority with acceptable material; if those pleas are rejected, he cannot raise them in the High Court unless there is a clear pleading in the writ petition to that effect."
(iv) (2006) 4 SCC 46 (Halwasia Vidya Vihar (Sr. Sec. School), Haryana vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner 6. Therefore, reduction or waiver can be done in the indicated circumstances. In S.D. College's case (supra) this Court took note of the fact that by order dated 29th January, 1988 the respondent-college authorities were directed to deposit the contribution with the appellant-Commissioner thereby there could be compliance of statutory obligation to deposit the amount in the manner as directed, from February 1988 onwards. But the college authorities continued to deposit the amount with the University. It is to be noted that the factual background in that case was somewhat different. In the instant case there was no allegation that there was any delay in making the deposit with the Government under the scheme which was being followed by the appellant. Even otherwise in S.D. College's case (supra) also this Court did not maintain the levy of damages at 100% and reduced it to 25%. Taking into account the special features involved, we direct that the damage imposed shall be restricted to 25% of the amount levied by the respondent-Commissioner.
(v) (2008) 3 SCC 35 (Employees' State Insurance Corporation vs. HMT Ltd. and another) 21. A penal provision should be construed strictly. Only because a provision has been made for levy of penalty, the same by itself would not lead to the conclusion that penalty must be levied in all situations. Such an intention on the part of the legislature is not decipherable from Section 85B of the Act. When a discretionary jurisdiction has been conferred on a statutory authority to levy penal damages by reason of an enabling provision, the same cannot be construed as imperative. Even otherwise, an endeavour should be made to construe such penal provisions as discretionary, under the statute is held to be mandatory in character.
24. We agree with the said view as also for the additional reason that the subordinate legislation cannot override the principal legislative provisions.
25. The statute itself does not say that a penalty has to be levied only in the manner prescribed. It is also not a case where the authority is left with no discretion. The legislation does not provide that adjudication for the purpose of levy of penalty proceeding would be a mere formality or imposition of penalty as also computation of the quantum thereof became a foregone conclusion. Ordinarily, even such a provision would not be held to providing for mandatory imposition of penalty, if the proceeding is an adjudicatory one or compliance of the principles of natural justice is necessary thereunder.
26. Existence of mens rea or actus reus to contravene a statutory provision must also be held to be a necessary ingredient for levy of damages and/or the quantum thereof.
7. Perused the materials available on record after giving due consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side.
8. In the above factual scenario, coupled with the background of pleadings, the statutory provisions that are necessary for deciding this appeal are Sections 1 (4), 2 (f), 7-A, 7Q, 14-B and 17 of the Act. The said provisions are extracted hereinbelow :
8.1. Section 1 (4) :
"(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of this section or sub-section (1) of Section 16, where it appears to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner, whether on an application made to him in this behalf or otherwise, that the employer and the majority of employees in relation to any establishment have agreed that the provisions of this Act should be made applicable to the establishment, he may, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of this Act to that establishment on and from the date of such agreement or from any subsequent date specified in such agreement."
8.2. Section 2 (f) :
(f) employee means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person
(i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment;
(ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961, or under the standing orders of the establishment;
(ff) exempted employee means an employee to whom a Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be] would, but for the exemption granted under Section 17, have applied;
(fff) exempted establishment means an establishment in respect of which an exemption has been granted under Section 17 from the operation of all or any of the provisions of any Scheme, or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be] whether such exemption has been granted to the establishment as such or to any person or class of persons employed therein."
8.3. Section 7-A :
"7-A. Determination of moneys due from employers.(1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Fund Commissioner, any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order,
(a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute; and
(b) determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the [Pension]3 Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be, and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary."
8.4. Section 7-Q :
"7-Q. Interest payable by the employer.The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment :
Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank."
8.5. Section 14-B :
"14-B. Power to recover damages.Where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Fund, the Pension Fund or the Insurance Fund or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-section (2) of Section 15 or sub-section (5) of Section 17 or in the payment of any charges payable under any other provision of this Act or of any Scheme or Insurance Scheme or under any of the conditions specified under Section 17, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceeding the amount of arrears, as may be specified in the Scheme:
Provided that before levying and recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard:
Provided further that the Central Board may reduce or waive the damages levied under this section in relation to an establishment which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction established under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986), subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified in the Scheme."
8.6. Section 17 :
"17. Power to exempt.(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, exempt, whether prospectively or retrospectively, from the operation] of all or any of the provisions of any Scheme
(a) any establishment to which this Act applies if, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the rules of its provident fund with respect to the rates of contribution are not less favourable than those specified in Section 6 and the employees are also in enjoyment of other provident fund benefits which on the whole are not less favourable to the employees than the benefits provided under this Act or any Scheme in relation to the employees in any other establishment of a similar character; or
(b) any establishment if the employees of such establishment are in enjoyment of benefits in the nature of provident fund, pension or gratuity and the appropriate Government is of opinion that such benefits, separately or jointly, are on the whole not less favourable to such employees than the benefits provided under this Act or any Scheme in relation to employees in any other establishment of a similar character.
Provided that no such exemption shall be made except after consultation with the Central Board which on such consultation shall forward its views on exemption to the appropriate Government within such time limit as may be specified in the Scheme."
9. Keeping the above provisions in mind, if we examine the present case, it is not controverted that the second respondent Trust was covered by the Act under Section 1 (4) towards payment of P.F.Contribution Scheme for its employees. Accordingly, the Trust also paid arrears of contribution. Though the Trust was granted exemption from payment under Section 17 (2-A) for certain periods as there was remittance of Employees' Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme Premium, the same was not extended thereafter and the P.F.Contribution for the Scheme fell in arrears, the same having not been remitted by the Trust. The reason assigned by the Trust for not paying the contribution was that the Trust had appointed the staff on contract system for which the provisions of the Act did not apply and, therefore, they withdrew the contribution towards Provident Fund.
10. In this connection, in order to examine whether the contract workers are the employees and covered under the Act or not, Section 2 (f) extracted above is necessary. As per the said Section, employee means, any person ,who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment and (ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961, or under the standing orders of the establishment. Therefore, it is unambiguous that the persons engaged by a contractor in connection with the work of an establishment are the employees under the Act. Hence, the contention of the Trust in this regard cannot be sustained.
11. Since the contribution was not paid by the Trust, the appellant authority imposed penalty and interest, which, according to the Trust, is illegal.
12. Here again, to examine whether the imposition of said penalty and interest on the Trust is legal or not, Section 14-B is relevant, which stipulates that where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Fund, the Pension Fund or the Insurance Fund or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-section (2) of Section 15 or sub-section (5) of Section 17 or in the payment of any charges payable under any other provision of this Act or of any Scheme or Insurance Scheme or under any of the conditions specified under Section 17, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf, may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceeding the amount of arrears, as may be specified in the Scheme ; provided that before levying and recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; and provided further that the Central Board may reduce or waive the damages levied under this section in relation to an establishment which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction established under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (1 of 1986), subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified in the Scheme.
13. The above provision clearly empowers the authority to recover from the employer by way of penalty not exceeding the amount of arrears, subject to the condition that before levying and recovering such penalty, the employer should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Therefore, in levying the penalty from the Trust, whether the Trust was given an opportunity or not is to be tested. For this purpose, the stand of the Trust before the learned single Judge was that, the Trust received a Show Cause Notice, dated 09.07.2008 from the second respondent, who is the appellant herein, asking the petitioner/Trust to remit a sum of Rs.17,55,569/- towards penal damages and Rs.6,71,635/- towards interest for the delayed payment of dues for the years from 1994-1995 to 2004-2005 and the Trust officials met the second respondent on 23.07.2008 and explained their position. During the meeting, the appellant informed that he had no power to cancel the order and that the petitioner Trust would have to approach either the Appellate Tribunal at Delhi or the Central Board of Trustees, Delhi. Therefore, it is apparent that the Trust was given sufficient opportunity of being heard, before levying the penalty. While penal damages were imposed by the authority under Section 14-B, interest was charged under Section 7-Q, which stipulates that the employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment, provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank. It was not the case of the Trust that the said levy of penal damages and interest was on higher side. Its only stand was that the Trust was involved in eradication of leprosy and tuberculosis and it was working in tribal areas, bordering Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and, that it, being a Charitable organisation, ought not to have been mulcted with payment of penalty and interest. It would also take a stand that it applied for exemption, but the same was not granted by the appellant.
14. On the above point, Section 17 is relevant. Under Sub-section (1), the appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, exempt, whether prospectively or retrospectively, from the operation of all or any of the provisions of any Scheme (i) any establishment to which this Act applies if, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the rules of its provident fund with respect to the rates of contribution are not less favourable than those specified in Section 6 and the employees are also in enjoyment of other provident fund benefits which on the whole are not less favourable to the employees than the benefits provided under this Act or any Scheme in relation to the employees in any other establishment of a similar character; or (ii) any establishment, if the employees of such establishment are in enjoyment of benefits in the nature of provident fund, pension or gratuity and the appropriate Government is of opinion that such benefits, separately or jointly, are, on the whole, not less favourable to such employees than the benefits provided under this Act or any Scheme in relation to employees in any other establishment of a similar character, provided that no such exemption shall be made except after consultation with the Central Board, which, on such consultation, shall forward its views on exemption to the appropriate Government within such time limit as may be specified in the Scheme. Therefore, it is only the appropriate Government and the Central Board, that have powers to exempt the establishment from the operation of any of the provisions of the Scheme under the Act, but not the appellant herein. Accordingly, the Trust was not granted exemption. It cannot be that just because the Trust had applied for exemption, it must be let off from payment.
15. We do not agree to the obiter dicta of the learned single Judge, that, "in the present case, the respondents have not stated any particular reason for levying damages at the maximum rate. On the other hand, they did not even take into account the nature of activities done by the petitioner institution, especially the fact that they were working for the eradication of leprosy in India and taking care of the health of such patients and running the institution with public donations." In our considered opinion, the first respondent/Appellate Tribunal had dealt with the matter on merits as to the coverage of the Scheme so also the levy of penalty and interest and rightly dismissed the appeal, filed by the second respondent Trust. Therefore, it was also wrong on the part of the learned single Judge to say that the Tribunal failed to note that there were two issues before it; one relating to the coverage and the second relating to the levy of damages and interest. We also add that the objects of the Trust may be noble, but the same cannot be a reason for waiver of penalty and interest, when the same are in arrears for default, which, if waived, the very purposes of Sections 14-B and 7-Q will be defeated.
16. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is allowed, setting aside the order of the learned single Judge. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.No.1 of 2011 is closed.
17. However, this order shall not preclude the Trust from approaching the appropriate Government or the Central Board to exempt it from the operation of the provisions of the Scheme, as the said authorities alone are empowered to take a decision in the matter, claiming that it was involved in eradication of leprosy and tuberculosis and it was working in tribal areas, bordering Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and, that it, being a Charitable organisation, ought not to have been mulcted with payment of penalty and interest, and such an approach shall be in the manner as contemplated under the Act.
Index : Yes (V.D.P.,J.) (G.C.,J.)
Internet : Yes 19-09-2014
abe/dixit
To
The Presiding Officer,
Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal,
Camp hearing at Coimbatore.
V.DHANAPALAN,J.
AND
G.CHOCKALINGAM,J.
abe/dixit
Pre-delivery Order
in
W.P.No.1976 of 2011
Dated: 19.09.2014