Tripura High Court
Smt. Rekha Das vs The Union Of India And Ors on 7 September, 2021
Bench: Akil Kureshi, S G Chattopadhyay
Page - 1 of 22
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA No.183/2021
Smt. Rekha Das, Scientist (Level -10), W/o Sri Himanshu Priyadarshi,
resident of Manakkolil House, Illathuparambu Road, P.O - Kochi-682041,
Kerela, India. Presently residing at - Quarter Type IV, B-I, College of
Fisheries, P.O. Lembucherra, P.S - Lefunga, District- West Tripura.
.............. Appellant(s).
Vs.
1. The Union of India and Ors., represented by the Secretary, Ministry of
Women and Child Development, A-Wing, Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra
Prasad Road, New Delhi - 110001.
2. The Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Krishi
Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi -110001
3. The Secretary Appellate Authority under the Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013,
Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Krishi Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra
Prasad Road, New Delhi - 110001.
4. The Director, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Umiam, Umroi
Road, Meghalaya - 793103.
5. The Joint Director, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Tripura
Centre, Lembucherra, P.O - Lembucherra, Lembucherra, P.S. Lefunga,
District - West Tripura
6. Dr. Basant Kumar Kandpal, Joint Director, ICAR Research Complex for
NEH Region, Tripura Centre, P.O. Lembucherra, P.S - Lefunga, District -
West Tripura.
.............. Respondent(s).
Page - 2 of 22
_B_E_ F_O_R_E_
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI
HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. S G CHATTOPADHYAY
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. S Bhattacharaya, Advocate,
Ms. Swarupa Chisim, Advocate,
Mrs. Riya Chakraborty, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Biduyt Majumder, Asstt. S. G.
Date of hearing & judgment : 7th September 2021.
Whether fit for reporting : Yes.
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
(Akil Kureshi, CJ).
This appeal is filed by the original petitioner to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17th May 2021 passed in WP(C) No.243/2021. A short prayer of the petitioner for expeditious disposal of her appeal against the report of the Internal Complaints Committee (―ICC‖ for short) under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred to as ―the Act of 2013‖), has run into jurisdictional debate. In order to decide whether this seemingly innocuous prayer of the petitioner can be granted by the High Court, we shall have to cross the threshold question of maintainability of her petition.
[2] As briefly as possible, the relevant facts may be narrated :
Page - 3 of 22 The petitioner is employed as a Scientist in the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), a Government of India organization. The respondent No.6 is the Joint Director of the same organization (hereinafter to be referred to as ―the private respondent‖). On 5th December 2018, the petitioner made a complaint to the Director of ICAR against the respondent No.6 making detailed allegations of her mental and physical harassment by the said respondent. She gave details of certain incidents during which according to her, the behaviour of the private respondent was abusive. In short, this complaint was in the nature of sexual harassment at the workplace by the private respondent. The complaint of the petitioner was thereupon placed before the ICC. Under a communication dated 9th April 2019, a copy of the report submitted by the Committee was furnished to the petitioner. In the report, the ICC had exonerated the private respondent of all charges. The petitioner had several issues with respect to the report of the Committee. She, therefore, filed an appeal under Section 18(1) of the Act of 2013 on 12th July 2019. Despite reminder from the petitioner since this appeal was not disposed of, she filed the above mentioned petition in which she had requested for a direction for early disposal of the appeal. [3] This petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment holding that the proceedings and the report of the Page - 4 of 22 ICC has to be treated as a service matter, more so when the private respondent is the employee of the ICAR. Referring to the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be referred to as ―the said Act of 1985‖), the learned Single Judge formed an opinion that the subject matter of the writ petition can be entertained by the Administrative Tribunal set up under the said Act and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in case of L Chandrakumar Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261, the High Court at the first instance, would not entertain the writ petition. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the grievance of the petitioner falls within the ambit of ―disciplinary matters‖ as referred to in the definition Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985.
[4] It is this view of the learned Single Judge which the petitioner, has questioned in this writ appeal. Appearing for the appellant-original petitioner learned senior counsel Mr. Somik Deb raised two folds contentions. His first contention was that the term ―service matter‖ defined in Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985 concerns only the service matter of the petitioner. In the present case, the issue concerns the private respondent and even if the issue can be described as a service matter, the petitioner cannot be relegated before the Administrative Tribunals Act since it is not her service matter which is under consideration. Second contention of the counsel was that in any case, Page - 5 of 22 the dispute is not covered under the definition ―service matter‖ as defined in Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985 since what is at the centre of the controversy is the correctness of the report of the ICC, its repercussions are not yet at issue. In this context, counsel drew our attention to various provisions contained in the Act of 1985 as well as the Act of 2013. He referred to certain decisions, reference to which would be made at the appropriate stage. [5] On the other hand, learned Assistant Solicitor General Mr. Bidyut Majumder, appearing for the respondents, opposed the appeal and supported the decision of the learned Single Judge. He submitted that the petitioner has raised a service dispute which has to be examined at the first instance by the Administrative Tribunal. Counsel submitted that the definition of term ―service matter‖ contained in the Act of 1985 is very wide and includes within its sweep all kinds of issues and disputes which has even indirect relation to service conditions of an employee. He contended that when the statute contains specific and general provisions, the specific provision must prevail. In support of this contention, he has relied on certain decisions. However, since we do not dispute this proposition, though we do not agree with its application in the present case, it is not necessary to refer to these decisions.
Page - 6 of 22 [6] A short question, which is not possible of a short answer, is, has the petitioner in the process of asking her appeal to be decided expeditiously, raised a service dispute? This question has to be answered in the background of the statutory provisions contained in the Act of 1985 and the Act of 2013. In exercise of powers under Article 323A of the Constitution, the Act of 1985 was framed for constitution of Administrative Tribunals to deal with the service matters concerning the Union of India and other local authorities. Administrative Tribunals were established under Section 4 of the Act. Section 14 vests jurisdiction, power and authority in the Central Administrative Tribunal all jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before the appointed day by all Courts except the Supreme Court in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to All India Services and civil services and all service matters concerning the employees of such services. As per Section 28 of the Act of 1985, on and from the date on which the jurisdiction, power and authority becomes exercisable under the Act by the Tribunals, no Court except the Supreme Court or the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court will be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to such matters. Under Section 29 of the Act of 1985, all suits and proceedings pending immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal, would be transferred to the Tribunal.
Page - 7 of 22 [7] Combined reading of Sections 14, 28 and 29 of the Act of 1985 would show that upon establishment of the Administrative Tribunal, the same would have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with service matters of the employees of Union of India and the matters concerning recruitment in the services under the Union of India and other notified organizations. Section 3(q) which defines the term ―service matter‖ therefore becomes significant. The said section reads as under:
―3(q) ―service matters‖, in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government, as respects --
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever.‖ [8] This definition thus provides that the service matter in relation to a person means all matters relating to conditions of service in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State or local authority etc., as respects the Page - 8 of 22 five categories enumerated in the said definition clause. Sub-clauses (i) to
(iv) are specific and descriptive. Sub-clause (v) is general and expansive when it refers to ―any other matter whatsoever‖. We may also recall, the definition is expressed in the form of ―means‖ and not ―includes‖ and therefore for an issue to be called ―service matter‖, it must fall in any one of the five sub-clauses of section 3(q).
[9] This definition of ―service matters‖ contained in Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985, is thus both restrictive as well as expansive at the same time. In sub-clauses (i) to (iv), when it refers to specific categories of disputes, it is restrictive. In sub-clause (v) when it refers to ―any other matter whatsoever‖ it tends to expand the definition. However, the sub-clause (v) is not meant to cover all or any of the disputes concerning a person even if the same has no connection with the condition of his service. Sub-clause (v) must take the colour of the preceding four sub-clauses which are illustrative in nature, the fundamental requirement of a matter being treated as a service matter is that it must have relation to the conditions of the service of a person. In other words, there may be several issues which may have indirect relation with the condition of service of a person, unless and until it falls under any of the sub-clauses of Section 3(q) and can also be categorised as an issue relating to the conditions of the service of the person concerned, Page - 9 of 22 such a dispute would not be covered within the definition of ―service matters‖. Any and every proceeding which may have indirect bearing on a person's service condition is not covered within this definition. By way of illustration, one can think of a criminal investigation or an inquiry if it ultimately results into an adverse decision against an employee, may have a direct repercussion on his service. Upon conviction for a criminal offence he may be visited with departmental penalty. Even the pendency of a criminal case may expose him to an order of suspension and debar him from seeking promotion. However, the criminal proceedings cannot take the colour of service matter. The effect of pendency or conclusion of the criminal case on his service conditions is indirect.
[10] With this clarity, we may refer to the provisions contained in the Act of 2013. Though the instances of sexual harassment of women at workplace were existing since time immemorial, there was no legislative response to this peculiar and sensitive problem. The Supreme Court in case of Vishaka and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241 took cognizance of the difficulties faced by women at workplace and gave several directions and issued guidelines in order to prevent sexual harassment of women at workplace. These guidelines included initiation of Page - 10 of 22 criminal or disciplinary action and setting up of mechanism for examining complaints of sexual harassment.
[11] In case of Medha Kotwal Lele and Ors Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2013) 1 SCC 297 further directions were issued by the Supreme Court in this respect. In particular, in Para-44.1 it was provided that the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report in a disciplinary action under the Service and Conduct Rules. The disciplinary authority shall treat the report/findings of the Committee as findings in a disciplinary inquiry against the delinquent employee and shall act on such report accordingly. It was provided that the findings and the report of the Complaints Committee shall not be treated as a mere preliminary findings or report in an inquiry into the misconduct of the delinquent. This was reiterated in a subsequent judgment in case of Seema Lepcha Vs. State of Sikkim and Ors. reported in (2013) 11 SCC 641. [12] The Act of 2013 was framed in the background of such decisions of the Supreme Court and was brought into force w.e.f 9th December 2013. The term ―aggrieved woman‖ in relation to a workplace is defined under Clause (a) of Section 2 as a woman of any age whether employed or not who alleges to have been subjected to any act of sexual harassment by the respondent. Term ―sexual harassment‖ has been defined in Section 2(n) Page - 11 of 22 which would include any one or more unwelcome acts or behaviour enumerated in sub-clauses (i) to (v) thereof such as physical contact and advances, demand or request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured remarks etc. The term ―workplace‖ has been defined in Section 2(o) which includes any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment etc. owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government. [13] Section 4 of the Act of 2013 pertains to constitution of Internal Complaints Committee. Under sub-section (1) of Section 4, every employer of a workplace is required to constitute a Committee called Internal Complaints Committee. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 prescribes the members who would form such a Committee.
[14] Chapter IV of the Act of 2013 pertains to complaint. Under sub- section (1) of Section 9 contained in the said chapter, any aggrieved woman can make a complaint in writing of sexual harassment at workplace with the ICC. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 provides that where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a complaint on account of her physical or mental incapacity or death or otherwise, her legal heir or such person as may be prescribed may make such a complaint. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the ICC would conduct an inquiry as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 11 which would be in accordance with the provisions of the service Page - 12 of 22 rules applicable to the respondent and if prima facie case exists, forward the complaint to the police for registering the case under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and any other relevant provisions of the Code where applicable. Second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 11 provides that where both the parties are employees they shall be given an opportunity of being heard during the course of the inquiry and a copy of the findings shall be made available to both of them enabling them to make representation against the findings of the Committee. Sub-section (3) of Section 11 clothes the ICC with the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure while trying the suit in respect to summoning and enforcing attendance of a witness and examining him on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents and any other matters which may be prescribed.
[15] Chapter V of the Act of 2013 pertains to inquiry and complaint. Section 12 contained in the said chapter pertains to action during pendency of inquiry. Under sub-section (1) of Section 12, during pendency of an inquiry on a request made by the aggrieved woman, the Committee may recommend her transfer, grant of leave or grant of such other relief as may be prescribed. As per sub-section (3) of Section 12, the employer would Page - 13 of 22 implement the recommendations of the Committee made under sub-section (1).
[16] Section 13 pertains to inquiry report. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 provides that on completion of an inquiry the ICC or the Local Committee, as the case may be, would provide a report to the employer or the District Officer within ten days of the completion of the inquiry and the same would also be available to the concerned parties. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 provides that where the Committee arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall recommend the employer that no action is required to be taken in the matter.
Sub-section (3) of Section 13 which is of importance reads as under :
―(3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been proved, it shall recommend to the employer or the District Officer, as the case may be -
(i) to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent or where no such service rules have been made, in such manner as may be prescribed;
(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service rules applicable to the respondent, from the salary or wages of the respondent such sum as it may consider appropriate to Page - 14 of 22 be paid to the aggrieved woman or to her legal heirs, as it may determine, in accordance with the provisions of section 15:
Provided that in case the employer is unable to make such deduction from the salary of the respondent due to his being absent from duty or cessation of employment it may direct to the respondent to pay such sum to the aggrieved woman:
Provided further that in case the respondent fails to pay the sum referred to in clause (ii), the Internal Committee or as, the case may be, the Local Committee may forward the order for recovery of the sum as an arrear of land revenue to the concerned District Officer.‖ [17] Section 15 pertains to determination of compensation and reads as under :
―15. Determination of compensation. - For the purpose of determining the sums to be paid to the aggrieved woman under clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall have regard to -
(a) the mental trauma, pain, suffering and emotional distress caused to the aggrieved woman;
(b) the loss in the career opportunity due to the incident of sexual harassment;
(c) medical expenses incurred by the victim for physical or psychiatric treatment;
(d) the income and financial status of the respondent;
(e) feasibility of such payment in lump sum or in instalments.‖ Page - 15 of 22 [18] Section 18 is an appeal provision and enables a person aggrieved by the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of Section 13 or sub-
section (3) of Section 13, beside others, to prefer an appeal to the Court or Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person.
[19] Combined reading of the above noted provisions would show that the very purpose of enabling an aggrieved woman to make a complaint of sexual harassment and of providing a mechanism for inquiring into and deal with such complaints is to provide a safe workplace for all women to guard their human rights and the right of gender parity. The prime purpose of the Act is not to hand down departmental penalties on the respondent against whom the allegations of sexual harassment have been proved. It may be an ultimate outcome in some cases, it is not the prime purpose of the enactment of the Act. The purpose of enactment of the law is to deal with such allegations swiftly by providing a mechanism where such complaints can be dealt with effectively and thereby provide a redress to a woman in distress. The possible imposition of a departmental punishment on the respondent is just one of the outcomes of a complaint of sexual harassment. For example, as provided under Section 11, upon receipt of the complaint of sexual Page - 16 of 22 harassment and finding prima facie case existing, such complaint would be forwarded to the police for registering case under Section 509 of Indian Penal Code which pertains to word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman. As per Section 12, during the pendency of the inquiry on a request by the aggrieved woman, she may be transferred to another workplace, may be granted additional leave up to three months or granted such other relief as may be prescribed.
[20] Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provides that where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee arrives at a conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been probed, it would recommend to the employer (i) to take action for sexual harassment as misconduct in accordance with the service rules and (ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service rules applicable to the respondent, from his salary such sum as it may consider appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman or her heirs in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 15. In turn, Section 15 lays down the circumstances which will be taken into consideration by the Committee for determining the sum that should be paid to the aggrieved woman.
[21] It can thus be seen that besides a possible imposition of punishment under the service rules, the complaint of sexual harassment at Page - 17 of 22 workplace has many other repercussions. If prima facie case is found, the same would be forwarded to the police for registration of a case under Section 509 of IPC. During the pendency of the inquiry into the complaint, the complainant may make a request for being transferred or being granted leave or may be granted such some other relief as may be prescribed. Even upon the conclusion of the inquiry which results into a finding that the allegations are correct, punishment of imposition of penalty on the respondent as per the service rules is not the only consequence. The employer may deduct from the salary or wages of the respondent appropriate sum so as to pay the same to the aggrieved woman which sum would be determined in terms of Section 15 taking into account various factors such as the mental trauma, pain and suffering that has been caused to her, the loss in carrier opportunity due to the incident of sexual harassment and so on. [22] Recovery of amount to be paid to an aggrieved woman from the salary and emoluments of an employee is not part of the normal penal mechanism in service jurisprudence. It is a special provision enacted under the Act of 2013 for giving swift relief to a woman who has been harassed at the workplace and her allegations of harassment have been found to be true and which may have resulted into mental trauma, pain or suffering including emotional distress, loss of carrier opportunity or resulted into medical Page - 18 of 22 expenditure etc. In short, what we are trying to project is that lodging of a complaint for sexual harassment does not have sole correlation with the service conditions of the respondent. It has many other repercussions and consequences, imposition of departmental punishment being just one of them.
[23] Viewed from this angle, the disputes pertaining to a complaint of sexual harassment made by a women at the workplace, cannot be included within the definition of ―service matter‖ as defined in Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985. It may have indirect consequences on the respondent in relation to his service conditions, but the same is a matter of different consideration. Learned senior counsel Mr. Deb rightly pointed out that the term ―service matters‖ has a special connotation. His reliance in this respect in case of Dr. H Mukherjee Vs. S K Bhargava reported in (1996) 4 SCC 542 is perfectly justified. It was a case in which a Government servant had filed a civil suit against his superior for damages for harassment on account of what he alleged was vindictive and mala fide orders passed by them. A question arose whether the suit was maintainable in view of the Act of 1985. In this respect, the Supreme Court held and observed as under :
―7. The Tribunals under the Act are thus conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before the appointed day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to Page - 19 of 22 the matters set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 14 The question is whether the present suit does fall under any of the said clauses. We do not think that it does. The suit appears to be one based on alleged tortuous acts of the defendant committed with a view harass the plaintiff and cause him mental pain and injury. At this stage, it is not our province to say whither the allegations are true or false. We have to take the plaint allegations as they stand. We also assume for the purpose of this appeal that such a suit does lie according to law since no contention to the contrary has been urged before us nor was urged before the civil court or the High Court. This is a pure action for damages for deliberately harassing the plaintiff by passing several vindictive and mala fide orders and proceedings and also by fabricating official records. Such a suit for damages is certainly not within the province of Section 14.‖ [24] He is also correct in bringing to our notice a decision in case of Lieutenant Colonel Vijaynath Jha Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2018) 7 SCC 303 in which referencing to sub-clause (iv) referring to ―any other matter whatsoever‖ of Section (3)(q) the Supreme Court refused to read the said expression in isolation without having regard to the preceding sub-clauses. Following observations may be noted :
―17. The provision excludes certain matters. The present case is not covered by excluded categories, hence that part of the provision is not relevant for the present case. The definition of service matters is an inclusive definition. A look into the enumerations as contained in Section 3(o) indicates that they all relate to matters relating to the conditions of the service of persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950. Last enumeration, i.e., (iv) is ―any other matter whatsoever‖, at first blush; it appears that Page - 20 of 22 the said enumeration is very wide which may cover all other residual categories. But, the phrase ―any other matter whatsoever‖ is to take colour from the other three enumerations and the main provision of Section 3(o). The pre-condition of a matter to be a service mater has to be relating to the conditions of their service. Thus, for a matter to be treated as a service matter, it must relate to the conditions of their service.‖ [25] Similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of Karnata High Court in case of Union of India & other Vs. D N Srojadevi reported in 2015 STPL 417 Karnataka. It was the case in which the dispute pertained to eviction proceedings initiated against the employee. In an order passed by the competent authority under the provisions of Public Premises Act in the context of the question whether such a dispute can be stated to be a service matter or not, the Court made following observations :
―13. A perusal of this provision makes it clear that what is defined in Section 3(q) is 'service matter' in relation to a person. It provides that all matters relating to conditions of service come within this definition. In other words, to qualify as a 'service matter', it has to be a condition of service or must have proximate nexus to a condition of service. Secondly, the nexus to the conditions of service must be in respect of the five categories of matters specified in the clauses. After specifying four specific conditions of service in clause (i) to (iv), the residuary clause speaks of 'any other matter whatsoever'. Though the language employed is wide, it is not possible to infer that the Parliament intended to bring in every matter without any qualification. The said expression is qualified and takes its colour from the expression 'all matters relating to the conditions of service' employed Page - 21 of 22 in the first part of the definition clause. As this general clause occurs after enumeration of different specific conditions of service, the principle of ejusdem generis is attracted. 'Ejusdem generis' is a rule of legal construction that general words of following enumeration of particulars are to have their generality limited by reference to the preceding particular enumeration and to be construed as including only all other articles of the like nature and quality. Having regard to the setting and context, the expression 'any other matter whatsoever' means 'condition of service in respect of any other matter whatsoever'.
14. The procedure for eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises is provided in the Public Premises Act. The Tribunal is not conferred with the power or authority to consider the legality of the proceedings initiated against the Government servant in respect of a Government quarters in his/her unauthorized occupation. The expression 'any other matter' in Section 3(q)(v) would not confer jurisdiction to the Tribunal to consider the validity of the proceedings initiated or the order passed by the competent authority under the provisions of Public Premises Act.‖ [26] We are prima facie not convinced by the contention of Mr Deb that what is referred to in Section 14 read with Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985 is a service matter concerning the person who approaches the Court, be the Tribunal or any other Court and not the respondent in such proceedings.
There is nothing in the language used in Section 14 or Section 3(q) which would justify this interpretation. However, since the outcome of this petition does not turn on our acceptance or non-acceptance of this contention of the Page - 22 of 22 counsel, we leave it open to be judged in a future case when the need so arises.
[27] In conclusion, we find that the learned Single Judge committed an error in refusing to entertain the writ petition. The writ petition did not involve a subject matter which would lay before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The prayer of the petitioner is only for expeditious disposal of her appeal. It is, therefore, not necessary to place the matter back before the Single Judge after hearing this jurisdictional question. While disposing of the appeal therefore the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Respondent No.3 the appellate authority shall decide the appeal of the petitioner within 2(two) months from today. This decision shall be communicated to the said authority by the counsel for the respondents.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
( S G CHATTOPADHYAY, J ) ( AKIL KURESHI, CJ ) Sukehendu