Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Kuldeep Bhakar vs State Of Rajasthan on 13 March, 2019
Author: Arun Bhansali
Bench: Arun Bhansali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ No. 19166/2018
Kuldeep Bhakar S/o Shri Umed Singh, Aged About 21 Years, By
Caste Jat, R/o Village Bhakara, Post Radha Chhoti, Tehsil
Rajgarh, District Churu.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Home
Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Director General Of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
3. Inspector General Of Police (Rcruitment), Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
4. Superintendent Of Police, Churu.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ No. 19121/2018
Atma Ram S/o Shri Sahab Ram, Aged About 20 Years, Resident
Of Chak 8 Kkm, Vpo Nyolakhi, Tehsil Rawatsar, District
Hanumangarh.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department, Of
Home, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. The Director General Of Police, Headquarter, Jaipur.
3. Commandant, 3Rd Battalion, R.a.c., Bikaner.
----Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ No. 1180/2019
Rakesh Singh S/o Shri Pal Singh, Aged About 24 Years, Resident
Of Resident Of Vpo Khopra Tehsil Nohar District Hanumangarh.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of
Home, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. The Direcotr General Of Police, Head Quarter, Jaipur.
3. Commandant, 2Nd Battalion, R.a.c., Kota.
(2 of 6) [CW-19166/2018]
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. S.K. Poonia
Mr. Ganga Ram
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Kailash Choudhary for
Mr. Manish Vyas, AAG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI
Order 13/03/2019 These writ petitions arise out of the orders dated 27.11.2018, 11.12.2018 and 18.12.2018 passed by the respondents in respective petitions, whereby, on account of acquittal of the petitioners giving them benefit of doubt by the criminal courts in proceedings held against them, their candidature has been rejected by the respondents on the ground that they have not been honourably acquitted.
Learned counsel for the petitioners made submissions that the respondents have themselves issued circular/guidelines dated 28.02.2017, inter alia, indicating the matters, in which benefit of acquittal even based on benefit of doubt/compromise would not be taken as a disqualification, however, the orders impugned have been passed mechanically without dealing with the cases of the petitioners based on the existing Circular.
Further submissions have been made that this Court in Lokesh Meena v. State of Raj. & Ors. : S.B.C.W.P. No. 18212/2018, decided on 20.02.2019, in similar nature matter, came to the conclusion that as the reason indicated was only that the acquittal was not honourable, the same was not sufficient in terms of the guidelines laid down in the case of Avtar Singh v.
(3 of 6) [CW-19166/2018] Union of Nidia & Ors. : (2016) 8 SCC 471 and, as such, the issue stands covered by judgment in the case of Lokesh Meena (supra).
Learned counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish the judgment in the case of Lokesh Meena (supra) by relying on judgment in the case of Dy. Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. S. Samuthiram : (2013) 1 SCC 598 and Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. v. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. :
(2018) 1 SCC 797.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record.
This Court in the case of Lokesh Meena (supra) after considering the Circular dated 28.02.2017 and judgment in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), inter alia, came to the following conclusion:-
"A perusal of Circular dated 28.02.2017 reveals that the respondents have indicated the categories, in which, the candidates would be eligible for appointment, which includes acquittal by the Court on according benefit of doubt and acquittal based on compromise between the parties.
In view thereof, as in both the cases the petitioner has been given benefit of doubt/acquitted based on compromise, the case of the petitioner would be covered by the said Circular.
So far as the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) are concerned, the relevant portion of the directions, read as under:-
"(c) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee."
(emphasis supplied) A perusal of the above direction would reveal that Hon'ble Court directed that if acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving mortal turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a (4 of 6) [CW-19166/2018] case of clean acquittal or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
A perusal of the order impugned i.e. 29.11.2018, whereby, the candidature of the petitioner has been rejected, the respondents have observed as under:-
"2- vkids fo:) pkyku la[;k 16@2015 /kkjk 147]149]341]323]427 Hkknl esa U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 02-07-18 }kjk /kkjk 147 Hkknl esa lansg dk ykHk nsdj nks"keqDr fd;k x;k ,oa 341]323]427]149 Hkknl esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij nks"keqDr fd;k x;kA 3- fcUnq la[;k 2 esa mYysf[kr izdj.k esa vkidks U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 02-07-2018 }kjk /kkjk 147 Hkknl esa lansg dk ykHk nsdj nks"keqDr fd;k x;k ,oa 341]323]427]149 Hkknl esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij nks"keqDr fd;k x;k gSA tks llEeku cjh ugha gSA vr% vki fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr ds ik= ugha gSA"
(emphasis supplied) As noticed hereinbefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in a case where acquittal is not clean or benefit of doubt has been given, the employer is required to consider all relevant facts available as to the antecedents and take an appropriate decision. However, in the order passed by the respondents the same has been passed mechanically by merely indicating that the acquittal is not clean neither the antecedents nor the relevant facts with regard to acquittal of the petitioner have been considered by the respondents and, therefore, the order dated 29.11.2018 (Annexure-10) passed by the respondents cannot be sustained."
In the present case also, the operative portion of orders impugned, reads as under:-
(S.B.C.W.P. No. 19166/2018) dated 27.11.2018 (Annexure-7) "vr% mijksDr fcUnqvksa ds vk/kkj ij bl ftys esa dkfu- HkrhZ 2018 esa p;fur fdUrq vkijkf/kd izdj.k ds dkj.k fu;qfDr ls oafpr vH;kFkhZ Jh dqynhi Hkkdj iq= Jh mEesn flag jksy uEcj 3107305 xzke Hkkdjk iksLV jk?kk NksVh rglhy jktx<+ ftyk pq: dks vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa llEeku cjh gksus ds dkj.k fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr ds fy;s vik= fd;k tkrk gSA "
(S.B.C.W.P. No. 19121/2018) dated 11.12.2018 (Annexure-12) "3- fcUnq la[;k 2 esa mYysf[kr vkijkf/kd izdj.k ds vuqlkj vH;FkhZ dks /kkjk & 323 325 341 34 vkbZihlh esa ekuuh; U;k;ky; fu.kZ; 26-11- 2016 }kjk tfj;s jkthukek nks"keqDr fd;k gS tks llEeku cjh ugha gSA blfy;s vH;FkhZ fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr dk ik= ugha gSA "
(S.B.C.W.P. No. 1180/2018) dated 18.12.2018 (Annexure-10) "¼3½ fcUnq la[;k 2 es mYysf[kr vkijkf/kd izdj.k pktZ'khV uacj 103@16 /kkjk 452] 323] 34 Hkk-na-la- esa ekuuh; U;k;ky; fu.kZ; fnukad 24-01-2018 ds }kjk vkns'k ikfjr dj vfHk;qDr dks /kkjk 323@34 Hkk-na-la-
esa tfj;s jkthukek o /kkjk 452 Hkk-na-la- esa lk{; ds vHkko esa nks"keqDr
(5 of 6) [CW-19166/2018]
fd;k x;kA vH;FkhZ ds fo:) ntZ /kkjk 452 vkbZihlh rqPN izd`fr (Trivial in Nature) dh Js.kh esa ugha gS] vfirq xEHkhj /kkjkvksa esa U;kf;d dk;Zokgh dh xbZ gSA blfy, vH;FkhZ fu;ekuqlkj fu;qfDr dk ik= ugha gSA"
A perusal of the above reasons indicated in the orders impugned clearly indicates that the orders have been passed mechanically by merely indicating that the acquittal is not clean. Neither the antecedents nor the relevant facts with regard to acquittal of the petitioners have been considered by the respondents.
So far as the judgment in the case of S. Samuthiram (supra) cited by learned counsel for the respondents is concerned, the said judgment would have no application to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, by respondent department's own Circular dated 28.02.2017 the parameters have been laid down wherein candidates acquitted from criminal charges based on compromise or grant of benefit of doubt have been held eligible for grant of appointment.
Similarly, in the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra), a perusal of the judgment would indicate that the respondents therein had indicated the reasons for coming to the conclusion that despite acquittal, the candidates were not entitled for appointment. Further in the said case also there was no circular/guidelines like Circular dated 28.02.2017 issued by the Department therein providing for eligibility in case of acquittals.
In view of the above, the judgments cited and the attempt made by learned counsel for the respondents to distinguish the judgment in the case of Lokesh Meena (supra)/seek reconsideration of judgment in the case of Lokesh Meena (supra) has no substance.
(6 of 6) [CW-19166/2018] In view of the above discussion, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are allowed. The impugned orders dated 27.11.2018 (Annexure-7), 11.12.2018 (Annexure-12) and 18.12.2018 (Annexure-10) passed by the respondents in respective petitions are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to accord appointment to the petitioners pursuant to their selections, if they are otherwise eligible. The petitioners would be entitled to notional benefits from the date appointment has been accorded to the candidates lower in merit to the petitioners. However, actual monetary benefits would be paid to the petitioners from the date of appointment.
Needful be done within a period of four weeks.
(ARUN BHANSALI),J 7,8-9-AK Chouhan/-
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)