Karnataka High Court
Smt. Lalitha Nagappa Naik vs The Deputy Commissioner, Karwar, ... on 14 June, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(6)KARLJ92
Author: Manjula Chellur
Bench: Manjula Chellur
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal involves an important question of law pertaining to the application of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition on Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1979 (in short, the 'S.C.S.T. Act') to lands which had been acquired by a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as an occupant under Section 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (in short, the 'K.L.R. Act').
2. The present dispute pertains to Survey No. 375/1A1 measuring 11 guntas of Hegde Village, Kumta Taluk, Uttara Kannada District. The facts giving rise to the above question are all admitted. One Sri Bete Yanku Mukhri, being a member of Scheduled Tribe, had acquired occupancy rights in respect of the land in question under Section 45 read with 48A of the K.L.R. Act. On 23-7-1996, he sold the land to one Sri Raghavendra Kamat. On 8-5-1997, the present appellant purchased the land from the said Raghavendra Kamat. The Assistant Commissioner, having learnt about the said transfer, after issuing notice to the appellant, resumed the land under Section 5 of the S.C.S.T. Act on the ground that the transfer made by Bete Yanku Mukhri, the original allottee/grantee, was void as per Section 4(2) of the Act. An appeal to the Deputy Commissioner filed before this Court failed.
3. In order to examine as to whether the transfer made in favour of the vendor of the present appellant was hit by the provisions of the S.C.S.T. Act, or not, one has to look at the definition of the expression 'granted land' as set out in Section 3(b) of the Act which reads as under:
" 'Granted land' means any land granted by the Government to a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and includes land allotted or granted to such persons under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to agrarian reforms or land ceilings or abolition of inams, other than that relating to hereditary office or rights and the word 'granted' shall be construed accordingly".
From the above definition, it is quite clear that the word 'granted land1 not only includes land granted by the Government under the provisions of land grant rules, but it also includes lands allotted or granted to persons belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe under the laws relating to agrarian land reforms, which will certainly include grant of occupancy right under Section 45 read with Section 48A of the K.L.R. Act. Though the word 'occupant' or 'occupancy right' has not been defined under the K.L.R. Act, but the residuary clause contained in Section 2 of this Act clearly spells out that the words and expressions used in the said Act but not defined shall have the meaning assigned to it under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. The latter Act, in Sections 99, 100 and 101, speaks of rights of occupants and declares that occupancy right will be transferable and heritable.
4. In the above view of the matter, it has to be unhesitantly held that the grant of occupancy right to a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and registering him as an occupant under Chapter III of the K.L.R. Act titled as 'conferment of ownership on tenants' will be covered by the statutory definition of the expression 'granted land' as set out in the S.C.S.T. Act. Having reached this conclusion, it can safely be held that the transfers effected in the present case in favour of the vendor of the present appellant was ab initio void as per Section 4 of the S.C.S.T. Act since admittedly, the transfer was not effected with the previous permission of the Government.
5. Moreover, Section 11 of the S.C.S.T. Act which is an overriding clause, declares that:
"The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or any decree or order of Court, Tribunal or other authority".
The above being the resultant inference, no fault can be found with in either initiation of resumption proceedings under Section 5 of the S.C.S.T. Act or the passing of the impugned orders by the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and the learned Single Judge.
6. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ appeal is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.