Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Vijaya Kumar S/O Late Shri K.V. ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) (Through ... on 6 June, 2007
ORDER Mukesh Kumar Gupta, Member (J)
1. MA 1507/2006 under Rule 4 (5) (a) of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 for joining together in one single application is allowed.
OA 1801/2006:
2. Four applicants, initially appointed as Senior Computer in pay scale of Rs.1200-2040/- in the years 1987-1988 in this OA filed under Section 19 of A.T. Act challenge communication dated 13.09.2005 rejecting their representation for placement in EDP Grade-A, pay scale Rs.1600-2660/- w.e.f. 1.1.1986 or from the date of their appointment. They also seek extension of benefit of judgment of this Tribunal dated 18.12.2003 in OA No. 553/2003 (Shri R.K. Sharma and Ors. Union of India and Ors.) and order dated 19.05.2006 in OA No. 2587/2005 (Smt. Shama Kaul and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.).
3. Their grievance is that though they were initially appointed as Senior Computer in pay scale of Rs.1200-2040/- on different dates in the years 1987 & 88 and thereafter they were re-designated as Data Processing Assistant Grade A as per Office Orders dated 8.1.1991 and 6.12.1994. At present all of them are working as Programmer after their promotion. Similarly situated officials filed OA No. 553/2003 (R.K. Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.) seeking placement against lower grade/pay scale of DPA - Grade A (Rs.1600-2660/-), as some of their juniors were placed in higher grade/pay scale of DPA Grade-B (Rs.2000-3200/-) based on qualification. Aforesaid OA was allowed on 18.12.2003, following earlier judgment in B.N. Sharma v. Union of India (OA 1741/1997) dated 13.10.1998 though applicants fulfilled all educational & other qualifications as well as experience mentioned in Office order dated 6.12.1994, and were senior most employees. Yet respondents failed to grant them new E D P Pay scale of Rs.1600-2660. They made representations seeking extension of the benefit of Judgment dated 18.12.2003, reiterated vide order dated 19.05.2006 in OA 2587/2005 (Smt. Shama Kaul and Ors. v. UOI and Ors.), yet Respondents rejected it vide impugned communication dated 13.09.2005, endorsed to them on 21.09.2005 stating that:
the replacement of the concerned officials have been done correctly as per the terms of Govt. letters issued in this regard from time to time read in conjunction with various related Court judgments. As such there is no wrong implementation of promotion policy of DPA 'A'. The MPR Division has also opined that amending the relevant Govt. letters, the last being dated 06 Dec 1994, is not possible at this stage and status quo be maintained in this aspect
4. Shri P.K. Sharma, learned Counsel strenuously urged that applicants being senior to those who were applicants in aforesaid OA are entitled to similar treatment. Reliance was placed on a host of judgments.
5. Respondents, on the other hand, by filing detailed reply contested the claim laid raising the plea of limitation as well as contesting on merits. Shri A.K. Bhardwaj along with Shri D.S. Jagotra, appearing on behalf of Respondents strongly urged that issue raised in present case is precisely adjudicated in a recent judgment dated 19.05.2007 of this very Bench in OA No. 1778 of 2006 & other (Shri M.R. Satyarthy v. Union of India and Ors.) & urged that since identical issue is raised in present OA, the same needs to be dismissed.
6. We heard learned Counsel for parties and perused pleadings carefully.
7. We may note that Judgments relied upon by both sides are same, which had been noticed and considered by this Tribunal in aforementioned order dated 19.05.2007. It would be expedient at this stage to notice extracts of said judgment, which read as under:
22. In view of the diverse contentions, the issues, which need consideration in these applications, are three fold, namely:
i) Whether benefits of a judgment extended to similarly situated person is also subject to the law of limitation. ?
ii) Whether the benefit of a judgment is extended to a case automatically?
iii)Whether settled service position be altered/disturbed after passage of sufficient & reasonable period?
23. We heard Ld. Counsel for parties at great length and perused host of judgments/Orders cited in support of rival contentions. We have also given our thoughtful consideration to all aspects.
24. As far as first issue is concerned, we may note that Bhoop Singh v. UOI , Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is expected of a Govt. servant who has a legitimate claim to approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a reasonable period, assuming no fixed period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for years. Inordinate & unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. Article 14 or the principles of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not be alien to that concept.
25. The ratio laid down in the said judgment is that if the claim is belated, it would be inequitable to grant relief rather than being discriminatory to reject the relief. Similarly in High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahesh Prakash took similar view. Hon'ble Court calculated the period of delay and laches in filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution from June 1976, when the first representation of the Judicial Officer was considered by the Full Court and rejected, even though the second representation, made 4 years thereafter, was again considered by the Full Court and rejected. The ratio of said judgment is that merely because, a subsequent representation is considered by the authority and rejected, limitation does not get extended, if the claim is already barred by limitation.
26. In Ramesh Chand Sharma etc. v. Udham Singh Kamal and Ors., following earlier judgment in Secretary to Govt. of India and Ors. v. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad 1995 Suppl (3) SCC 231, it was held that it absence of any application under Sub section (3) of Section 21 praying for condonation of delay, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to admit and dispose of OA on merits.
27. The aforesaid conclusion is also fortified by the observations made in 2002 (5) SLR SC, E. Pramasivan v. Union of India, wherein the view taken by this Tribunal dismissing the claim filed by 15 retired officers of MES regarding fixation of pay had been rejected on the ground of limitation, stating that they should have raised objections regarding the anomaly when they were in service.
28. As far as second question framed hereinabove is concerned, this issue is no more res-integra. In , A.P. Steel Re-rolling Mill Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Ors. , Hon'ble Supreme Court considered identical issue & held that:
The benefit of a judgment is not extended to a case automatically. While granting relief in a writ petition, the High Court is entitled to consider the fact situation obtaining in each case including the conduct of the petitioner. In doing so, the Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the writ petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and then wake up after the decision of this Court. If it is found that the appellant approached the Court after a long delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. (See Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh ).
29. So far as the last issue is concerned, we may note that it is trite that settled service position should not be unsettled after a reasonable passage of time. It is not denied that applicant in OA No 1778/2006 had been appointed to post of Statistical Assistant in pay scale of Rs.1400-2300/- on 05.02.1987 as a direct recruit on certain terms & conditions of service. If at this stage i.e. almost after passage of two decades, his request if allowed, it would not only change his initial terms & conditions of appointment, but would also unsettle the settled service position. Similarly it is not in dispute that all applicants in OA No 2230 of 2006 had already retired in between 1989 to 2000. All of them not only ceased to be in service, but also accepted their retrial benefits without any demur. Matter simply does not rest here as we may note that all these applicants had not made any representation prior to year 2005. Applicant in OA NO 1778/2006, made first representation on 30.5.2005, while in OA No 2330/06 it was dated 10.1.2006, in OA NO 2388/06 it was dated 6.3.2006. In OA NO 1981/2006 a legal notice was stated to be sent to department on 25.9.2003, but in fact from pleadings & record we noticed that it was dated 16.4.2006. As such it is clear that all these representations were made just few days prior to filing present OAs, which is certainly an afterthought act. We would also like to observe that representation highlighting grievance (s) cannot be made at any point of time depending on mere wish of the concerned delinquent. Such steps have to be taken at an earliest opportunity. A bare perusal of facts noticed hereinabove on these aspects would establish that applicants made representation just immediately prior to institution of present cases.
How those who have already retired, settled thereafter, or earned promotions in their service career and had never felt aggrieved, be allowed to unsettled service position, which remained prevalent in the last two decades? Would it not create total chaos in the administration?. We may note that no explanation what to talk of satisfactory explanation was offered by any of applicants as to why they choose to sat over the matter and woken up at this belated stage. Any direction issued at this belated stage would not only require re-fixation of their pay, recalculation of retrial benefits, but in turn would also involve enormous exercise. Under civil law there is some limitation prescribed for laying their claim. If the applicants prayer is accepted, even the issue, which has become time-barred would stand revive, which had never been the object and intent of any judicial pronouncement.
30. We may also note another contention raised regarding that we are bound by judgment(s) rendered by co-ordinate Bench(s) of this Tribunal. There cannot be dispute to this proposition that ordinarily, a co-ordinate Bench is bound by judgment & Order as precedent. But this Principle has got certain exceptions. One of such exceptions is that an Order/Judgment or Precedent should lay down certain 'ratio'. Mere order without discussing any law or issue (s) certainly cannot be termed as precedent in law.
8. We may also note that judgments cited by applicants as well as respondents were noticed under Paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 of aforesaid order respectively. This Tribunal had also noticed Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in 2004 (6) SCC 186 wherein it has been emphasized that 'Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed'. Even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. After noticing number of judgments on the question of construction of rules & judgments, the Coordinate Bench ultimately concluded as follows:
if we examine & peruse the judgments/Orders cited by applicants, we would find that most of the Orders neither lay down any ratio nor constitute any Precedent in law. Most of them simply issued directions noticing earlier Orders. As such, in view of settled law noticed herein-above, we are of the considered view, such Orders are simply not binding on us.
37. Taking an overall view of the matter & in the light of detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that judgments/Orders relied upon by applicants are quite distinguishable & not applicable in the facts & circumstances of present cases. We do not find justification and substance in the contention raised by applicants. Finding no merits, OAs are dismissed. However, there shall be no order to costs.
9. On bestowing our careful consideration to the pleadings raised arguments advanced, judgments relied upon and the relief sought for, we find that all these aspects are same, as considered by this Tribunal in afore-mentioned judgment dated 19.05.2007. The said being a judgment of this Bench, we are bound by the said judgment and following the same, we find no merit in the claim laid. Accordingly OA is dismissed. No costs.