Delhi High Court
K.S. Bhandari vs International Security Printers Pvt ... on 22 December, 2017
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 22nd December, 2017
+ RC.REV. 18/2016
K.S. BHANDARI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Gaurav Bhardwaj & Mr. J. Mitra,
Advs.
Versus
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
PRINTERS PVT LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Sudhanshu Batra, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Rajiv Dewan & Mr.
Aditya Mishra, Advs.
AND
+ RC.REV. 204/2017 & CM No.15804/2017 (for stay)
FRONTIER SALES ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sachin Datta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Praveey Pahuja, Adv.
Versus
SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Anup J. Bhambani, Senior
Advocate with Ms.Gurmeet
Bindra, Adv.
AND
+ RC.REV. 205/2017 & CM No.15807/2017 (for stay)
FRONTIER SALES .... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sachin Datta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Praveey Pahuja, Adv.
Versus
SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD ..... Respondent
RC.Rev.Nos.18/2016, 204-08/2017, 303/2017, 318/2017, 396-97/2017 & 519-20/2017
Page 1 of 34
Through: Mr. Anup J. Bhambani, Senior
Advocate with Ms.Gurmeet
Bindra, Adv.
AND
+ RC.REV. 206/2017 & CM No.15810/2017 (for stay)
FRONTIER SALES .... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sachin Datta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Praveey Pahuja, Adv.
Versus
SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Anup Bhambani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Gurmeet Bindra, Adv.
AND
+ RC.REV. 207/2017 & CM No.15828/2017 (for stay)
FRONTIER SALES ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sachin Datta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Praveey Pahuja, Adv.
Versus
SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Anup Bhambani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Gurmeet Bindra, Adv.
AND
+ RC.REV. 208/2017 & CM No.15831/2017 (for stay)
FRONTIER SALES ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sachin Datta, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Praveey Pahuja, Adv.
Versus
SUPERIOR EXIM PVT LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Anup Bhambani, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Gurmeet Bindra, Adv.
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Page 2 of 34
AND
+ RC.REV. 303/2017 & CM No.23452/2017 (for stay)
JAI RANI & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Mr. Anurag Bindal, Adv.
Versus
LALA JOTI PERSHAD SHIV MANDIR
TRUST & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. R.S. Kela, Mr. Bharat Gupta
& Mr. Sanjeev Bindal, Advs.
AND
+ RC.REV. 318/2017 & CM No.24855/2017 (for stay)
SHANTI DEVI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. J.P. Malviya, Adv.
Versus
DIGAMBAR JAIN PANCHAYAT
SAMAJ (REGD) ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Prashant Sharma & Mr.
Kartik Khanna, Advs.
AND
+ RC.REV. 396/2017
BADI PANCHAYAT VAISH BISE
AGGARWAL (REGD) ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ajay Gupta & Ms. Surabhi
Gupta, Advs.
Versus
SUNIL GUPTA ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Amoolya Kumar Sharma &
Mr. Tanveer Ahmad, Advs.
AND
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Page 3 of 34
+ RC.REV. 397/2017
BADI PANCHAYAT VAISH BISE
AGGARWAL (REGD) ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ajay Gupta & Ms. Surabhi
Gupta, Advs.
Versus
JAI PARKASH GOYAL ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, Adv.
AND
+ RC.REV. 519/2017 & CM No.41300/2017 (for stay)
SURENDER KAUR & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Narender Bhandari, Ms.
Sweta Kakkad, Mr. Anukrit Gupta
& Ms. Pallavi Kumar, Advs.
Versus
ANOOP SINGH CHARITABLE TRUST ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Hitendra Kumar & Ms.
Surabhi Tondon, Advs.
AND
+ RC.REV. 520/2017 & CM No.41302/2017 (for stay)
SURENDER KAUR & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Narender Bhandari, Ms.
Sweta Kakkad, Mr. Anukrit Gupta
& Ms. Pallavi Kumar, Advs.
Versus
ANOOP SINGH CHARITABLE TRUST ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Hitendra Kumar & Ms.
Surabhi Tondon, Advs.
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CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. The need, if any, for referring to the Division Bench of this
Court the question of relationship and interplay between Section
14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short
„the Act‟) and qua which a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Canara
Bank v. T.T. Limited (2014) 214 DLT 526 has taken a view, is for
adjudication.
2. The question first came up for consideration on 5 th July, 2017
when Rent Control Revision Petition Nos. 204 to 208 of 2017 came up
for consideration. The said Rent Control Revision Petitions under
Section 25B(8) of the Act were filed impugning the common order
dated 29th November, 2016 of the Additional Rent Controller-02,
Central District, Tis Hazari of dismissal of applications filed by the
petitioners therein for leave to defend the five petitions for eviction
under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act filed by the respondent Superior
Exim Pvt. Ltd. therein with respect to five premises in the tenancy of
the five petitioners under the said respondent. It was on that date
enquired from the senior counsel for the respondent / landlord as to
how the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, by a
private limited company, was maintainable. The senior counsel for the
respondent / landlord drew attention to Canara Bank (supra) and to
Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. vs. P. Tandon (1981) 2 DRJ
308. My recollection of the view earlier taken being to the contrary,
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the senior counsel for the respondent therein was requested to study
the earlier judgments and to revert.
3. In the interregnum, several other Rent Control Revision
Petitions against orders, mostly of eviction, in petitions for eviction
filed by landlords, who in contradistinction to a natural person, were a
juristic person and / or of dismissal of their petitions for eviction under
Section 14(1)(e) of the Act came up before this Court and were also
posted for hearing along with the petitions aforesaid in which the
question had first been raised.
4. During the hearing on 11th August, 2017, it was enquired from
the counsels for the landlords that if it were to be held that besides
Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, Section 22 can also be invoked by a
landlord, who as distinct from a natural person is a juristic person, and
the legislature having provided a summary procedure under Section
25B of the Act only with respect to petition for eviction under Section
14(1)(e) and not with respect to petition for eviction under Section 22
of the Act, whether such a landlord can in its own discretion choose a
ground of eviction, procedure wherein is to the detriment of the tenant.
5. Since then, several other petitions entailing the same question
came up before this Court and all of which were also tagged.
6. All the counsels who choose to be heard have been heard.
7. Before proceeding further, it is deemed appropriate to, for
convenience, reproduce herein Section 14(1)(e), Section 14(6),
Section 19 and Section 22 of the Act, to all of which a reference was
made during the hearing. The same are as under:
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14. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree
for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be
made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord
against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made
to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of
the following grounds only, namely: --
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a
residence for himself or for any member of his family
dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any
person for whose benefit the premises are held and that
the landlord or such person has no other reasonably
suitable residential accommodation;
Explanation. - For the purposes of this clause, "premises
let for residential purposes" include any premises which
having been let for use as a residence are, without the
consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial
or other purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by
transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of
such premises shall lie under sub-section (1) on the
ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto,
unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of
the acquisition.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
19. (1) Where a landlord recovers possession of any
premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made
under clause (e) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section
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14, the landlord shall not, except with the permission of
the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let
the whole or any part of the premises within three years
from the date of obtaining such possession, and in
granting such permission the Controller may direct the
landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the
premises.
(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises
as aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the
landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises
are held, within two months of obtaining such possession,
or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time
within three years from the date of obtaining possession,
re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without
obtaining the permission of the Controller under sub-
section (1) or the possession of such premises is
transferred to another person for reasons which do not
appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller
may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such
evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed,
direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the
premises or to pay him such compensation' as the
Controller thinks fit.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
22. Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any
company or other body corporate or any local authority
or any public institution and the premises are required for
the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a
public institution, for the furtherance of its activities,
then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 or
any other law, the Controller may, on an application made
to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord
in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the
tenant and every other person who may be in occupation
thereof, if the Controller is satisfied -
(a) that the tenant to whom such premises were let
for use as a residence at a time when he was in the
service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to
be in such service or employment; or
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(b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the
terms, express or implied, under which he was
authorised to occupy such premises; or
(c) that any other person is in unauthorised
occupation of such premises; or
(d) that the premises are required bona fide by the
public institution for the furtherance of its activities.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, "public
institution" includes any educational institution, library,
hospital and charitable dispensary."
8. All the aforesaid Sections are to be found in Chapter III, titled
"Control of Eviction of Tenants", of the Act. Besides the aforesaid
provisions, Section 25B of the Act under Chapter IIIA titled
"Summary Trial of Certain Applications" was also referred and is
relevant but it is not necessary to reproduce the same here. Suffice it
to state that the same provides for a summary procedure for disposal
of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement
and is applicable to application by a landlord for eviction of tenant on
the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and in Sections
14A, 14B, 14C and 14D of the Act and is not applicable to the
application for eviction under Section 22 of the Act. Under the said
summary procedure, as distinct from the tenant being required to file a
written statement on service of notice of the petition for eviction and
the matter then being put to trial, the tenant, within 15 days of receipt
of notice, is required to apply for leave to defend and which is to be
granted to the tenant only if it discloses such facts as would disentitle
the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession under
Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. If such application is not filed within 15
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days or if such application does not disclose facts disentitling the
landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of
the Act, an order of eviction follows.
9. At this stage, another development may be noticed. Though
Section 14(1)(e) as per its language permits petition for eviction
thereunder to be filed only with respect to premises let for residential
purposes and required by the landlord for occupation as a residence
for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and
when the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation available to him, but Supreme Court in Satyawati
Sharma (Dead) by LRs vs. Union of India & Anr. (2008) 5 SCC 287
has held Section 14(1)(e) to be violative of the doctrine of equality
embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India in so far as it
discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-
residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the
landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family
dependent on him and restricts the latter‟s right to seek eviction of the
tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. Thus, now
a petition for eviction of tenant under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act can
be filed even with respect to premises let for non residential purpose
and when the requirement of the landlord is for use of premises for
non-residential purposes of himself or of any member of his family
dependent on him.
10. As would be obvious from above, both, Section 14(1)(e) &
Section 22 make „requirement of the premises for self use of the
landlord‟ a ground of eviction. While Section 14(1)(e) does not
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restrict the category / class of „landlord‟ who can invoke the same,
Section 22, as per its language, restricts invocation thereof only by a
landlord which / who is a „company or other body corporate or any
local authority or any public institution‟.
11. The doubts which arose in my mind and which led to the
hearing and to this adjudication may be succinctly listed as under:
(a) Whether Section 14(1)(e), by use of the words "himself
or for any member of his family dependent upon him" therein is
restricted to only landlords who are natural persons and cannot
be invoked by a landlord who is a juristic person, viz. a
company or other body corporate or any local authority or any
public institution.
(b) Whether landlords, who are juristic persons as distinct
from natural persons, if require premises in occupation of
tenant, can only invoke Section 22 and not Section 14(1)(e).
(c) Whether the landlords who are juristic persons and to
whom ground of eviction under Section 22 is not available,
even if have requirement of the premises in occupation of their
tenant, have no ground of eviction available to them.
(d) Whether there can be requirements of landlords who are
juristic persons beyond those on which eviction is permitted
under Section 22 of the Act and if so, whether not the Act
discriminates between landlords who are natural persons and
landlords who are juristic persons and whether not such
discrimination will come in the way of transfer/holding of
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properties in the juristic entities and which in turn may come in
the way of economic development of the country.
(e) If it were to be held that to a landlord who is a juristic
person, Section 14(1)(e) is also available, then whether not it
will confer a choice in such landlord to either invoke Section
14(1)(e) or invoke Section 22 for evicting the tenant and
whether not the same would be prejudicial to the tenant for the
reason of Act providing summary procedure only for petition
for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) and not for petition for
eviction under Section 22 of the Act.
12. Before recording the contentions of the counsels, it is also
deemed expedient to record some of the judgments cited on the
subject.
A. Chuni Lal vs. University of Delhi 1970 RCR (Rent) 742
a. The question for consideration before the Court was, whether
University of Delhi being a body corporate and a public
institution could, for eviction of its tenant, proceed only under
Section 22 of the Act or also had available to it grounds of
eviction under Sections 14(1)(b), 14(1)(d) and 14(1)(h) of the
Act. (Sections 14(1)(b), (d) and (h) of the Act entitle the
landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of the
tenant, i) having sublet, assigned or parted with possession of
the tenancy premises without consent in writing of the landlord;
ii) the tenant or any member of his family, for a period
preceding six months immediately before the date of filing of
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the application for eviction, having not resided in the premises;
and, iii) the tenant having acquired vacant possession of or
having built or allotted a residence.
b. It was held that (i) Sections 14 and 22 are both parts of the same
Act and ordinarily it is not practice of the legislature to repeal
one provision of the Act by enacting a repealing provision in the
same Act; (ii) that if Section 22 had not been enacted at all, the
definition of „landlord‟ in Section 2(e) of the Act would have
admittedly included juristic entities like a company, a body
corporate, local authority or a public institution and these
landlords would have been able to apply for eviction of their
tenants under Section 14, like any other landlord who might be
natural persons; (iii) the landlord who happens to be a company,
a body corporate or a public institution still continues to be
covered by the definition of „landlord‟ in Section 2(e) and
therefore all provisions of the Act concerning the landlord are
applicable to them; and (iv) the words "notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 14" were incorporated in Section
22 so that the absolute prohibition against eviction of tenants
under Section 22 does not apply to a landlord applying under
Section 22 and so the landlord applying under Section 22 is not
restricted merely to the grounds enumerated in Section 14(1) of
the Act but is enabled to avail himself of additional grounds
mentioned in Section 22.
c. There is no direct contradiction between Section 14 and Section
22 - it is only an incidental inconsistency.
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d. The subject matter of Section 14 and Section 22 are distinct;
normally the application of Section 22 would not in any case
involve any opposition of Section 14.
e. A corporate body or a public institution is similar to natural
persons in many respects.
f. There is no reason why a corporate body or a public institution
should not be able to apply under Section 14 of the Act for
eviction of their tenants.
g. It is only in so far a body corporate or a public institution is
different from natural persons that additional grounds of
eviction have been provided for them by Section 22.
h. The relationship of Sections 14 and 22, therefore, is that all
landlords are able to apply under Section 14 but only the
landlords who are corporate bodies or public institutions are
entitled to apply under Section 22.
i. Such corporate and public institution landlords have been given
the ordinary grounds under Section 14 and additional grounds
under Section 22.
j. Impersonal institutions are less likely to evict their tenants on
flimsy grounds than would be the case with ordinary landlords;
these impersonal institutions would have certain special reasons
why they would like to evict their tenants through special
reasons which would not be available to ordinary landlords; the
distinction between the two is based on intelligible differentia.
k. The Act does not give any arbitrary discretion to choose a
remedy by Section 22 as had been given to the Government in
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Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Punjab AIR
1967 SC 1581 as the grounds of eviction under Section 22 are
different from those under Section 14 and it could not be said
that the institutional landlord has been given the right of
choosing to apply either under Section 14 or under Section 22
on one and the same ground of eviction; such a landlord would
be compelled to apply either under Section 14 or under Section
22 accordingly as the ground is covered by the former or by the
latter.
l. A landlord who has available grounds of eviction under Section
14 as well as under Section 22 does not practice any
discrimination against the tenant by availing of both.
m. Such a landlord cannot avail himself of Section 22 unless the
special grounds of eviction mentioned therein are present.
B. Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. (supra)
a. The question for consideration was, whether the ground of
eviction under Section 14(1)(e) was available to a private
limited company. The contention of the tenant was that Section
14(1)(e) and Section 22 operate in the same sphere and since
Section 22 is confined only to specific category of landlords,
Section 22 must prevail.
b. It was held that (i) whenever a company, body corporate or
local authority or a public institution requires the premises for
use of their employees, it is Section 22 alone which would be
applicable and not Section 14(1)(e); (ii) this however does not
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mean that other provisions of Section 14 cannot be invoked by
such a landlord; (iii) as held in Chuni Lal (supra), the grounds
under Section 14 are in addition to the grounds under Section
22; (iv) Section 22 is concerned only with specific type of
cases, namely, where the premises are required by a company
for use of its employees; (v) Section 22 is not concerned with
other grounds which are available under Section 14; (vi) that
some circumstances may exist where a company may require
premises not for its employees but still for its residence; (vii) in
such a case, Section 14(1)(e) can also be invoked; (viii) one
such case can be where the premises are required for residence
of company‟s chairman who may not be regarded as an
employee of the company; (ix) in such a case, the company
would be entitled to invoke Section 14(1)(e); (x) however,
where the company requires the premises for its employees,
only the provision of Section 22 which has been specifically
enacted for this purpose would be attracted; (xi) that as long as
facts exist on record, it is immaterial whether in the application,
the petitioner has written Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22; (xii) it
would be open to the landlord even at the stage of appeal or
revision to invoke the provisions of Section 22 even if the
petition for eviction had been filed under Section 14(1)(e); and
(xiii) though Section 22 does not use the expression „bona fide‟,
but it is evident that the requirement for the use of employees
by the employer must be bona fide.
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C. Sudhan Singh vs. University of Delhi (1986) 1 SCC 611
a. The consistent findings of the Rent Controller, Rent Control
Tribunal and this Court, of the landlord Delhi University
requiring the premises for use of its employees and allowing the
petitions for eviction under Section 22 of the Act were under
challenge.
b. It was held that (i) in invoking Section 22, a public institution is
not subject to the restrictions imposed by Section 14 or by any
other law; and (ii) use of the building for residence of the
employees is intimately linked with the activities of the
university.
D. Ram Partap Vs. Birla Cotton and Spinning and Weaving Mill
1987 1 RCJ 493
a. In this case, the order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the
Act in favour of the respondent/landlord company was set aside
following Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and
holding that since the requirement pleaded was for the dwelling
house for the employees, Section 22 was available and Section
14(1)(e) could not be invoked.
E. Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham
Lal ILR (1973) Del 144
a. The question for consideration was, whether the landlord Birdhi
Chand Jain Charitable Trust was a public institution within the
meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether the requirement
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pleaded was in furtherance of the activities of such public
institutions.
b. It was found that the trust deed brought into existence public
charitable trust.
c. It was held i) that a public trust comes into existence when
property is transferred for charitable and public purposes, but a
public institution cannot be said to exist unless organized
activity is undertaken to carry out such public purposes; ii) that
while a trust is primarily a legal concept, a mode of transfer of
property and of holding property, on the other hand, an
institution is primarily a social concept and not at all a legal
concept; iii) that only when the trust so created starts carrying
on the activity for carrying on which it has been created, would
it become a public institution; iv) reasoning, that Birdhi Chand
Jain Charitable Trust had only been created and had not started
carrying on the activities for which it was created, it was held
that it was a not a public institution within the meaning of
Section 22 of the Act; and, v) that it could not be the intention
of the legislature that any landlord who is unable to evict his
tenants under Section 14 may create a public trust of the
property and then get the tenants evicted and for this reason
only, the benefit of Section 22 had been given only to public
institutions.
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F. Canara Bank v. T.T. Limited (supra)
a. The court was concerned with an order of eviction under
Section 14(1)(e) of the Act for the reason of the leave to defend
having not been filed within the prescribed time.
b. In the light of Prithipal Singh vs. Satpal Singh (2010) 2 SCC
15, it was held that the delay in filing leave to defend could not
be condoned.
c. The contention of the tenant however was that since the
landlord T.T. Limited was a company, it was not entitled to
invoke Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
d. The question for consideration was, whether Section 22 of the
Act was available to a company when the requirement was the
residential use of its employees.
e. It was held, that (i) to a company, sub-section (d) of Section 22
is not available; (ii) sub-section (a) of Section 22 is also not
available when the tenant is not the employee of the landlord
company; (iii) that the landlord company thus did not have
available to it Section 22 of the Act; iv) that a landlord company
which needs the tenancy premises for residential need of its
employees cannot be left remediless; (v) once Section 22 was
not available, the general entitlement for eviction of tenant
under the grounds mentioned in proviso to Section 14(1) would
apply; and, (vi) it would be very incongruous to accept the
argument that a landlord company can neither invoke Section
22 nor can apply under Section 14(1)(e).
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G. Ravinder Kumar Verma vs. Laxmi Narayan Mandir
Nirman Sabha 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6024
a. Referring to an earlier judgment in Bhim Sen Batra vs.
Shreyans Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 221 DLT 413 it was held
that the earlier judgments rendered prior to the dicta of the
Supreme Court in Satyawati (supra) which made Section
14(1)(e) applicable to commercial tenancies also, would not
apply.
H. Judgment dated 10th March, 2015 in R.C. Rev. No.391/2013
titled Prabhu Dayal Batra vs. Shreyansh Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.
a. In this case, the order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) on the
ground of requirement of the tenanted premises for carrying on
business of the landlord company was upheld.
b. Section 22 of the Act was held to be not available for the said
requirement.
c. It was held that even if employees sit in the office, it cannot be
said that the premises are required for the use of the employees
inasmuch as the use pleaded was of the landlord company itself.
13. Let me now set out the kind of juristic entity the landlord in
each of the petitions is and the requirement pleaded.
14. M/s Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. in R.C. Rev.No.204 to 208 of 2017
is a private limited company and the requirement pleaded is for the
residence of its employees.
15. Lala Joti Prasad Shiv Mandir Trust in R.C. Rev. No.303/2017 is
pleaded to be a trust managing a public temple and the requirement
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pleaded is for storage of footwear and belongings of the devotees
visiting the temple and for holding the other festivals celebrated in the
temple.
16. International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd. in R.C. Rev.
No.18/2016 is a private limited company and the requirement pleaded
is for residence of its directors.
17. Digambar Jain Panchayat Samaj (Regd.) in R.C. Rev.
No.318/2017 is a society engaged in preserving Jain traditions,
customs and working towards upliftment of Jain Samaj by running
and managing Jain Temples and the requirement pleaded is for
construction of toilet-cum-bath complex for the Jain Temple and
Dharamshala and for the residence of the visiting Jain munis.
18. Badi Panchayat Vaish Bise Aggarwal (Regd.) in R.C. Rev.
Nos.396/2017 and 397/2017 is a registered society under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860, engaged in various charitable activities, inter
alia, of providing food, clothes and financial assistance to widows,
providing medical help to all without discrimination of caste, age and
sex. The requirement pleaded of the ground floor premises is for the
sake of avoiding inconvenience of climbing stairs to its old patrons. \
19. Anoop Singh Charitable Trust in R.C. Rev. Nos. 519/2017 and
520/ 2017 is a trust created for charitable purposes which has not been
able to commence its charitable dispensary as per its aims and the
requirement pleaded is for the purposes of setting up a dispensary to
provide allopathic, homeopathic and Unani treatment to its patrons.
20. Mr. Anup J. Bhambhani, senior advocate for Superior Exim
Private Limited aforesaid argued (i) that Section 14(1)(e) and Section
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22 are distinct and have different requirements for suing thereunder;
(ii) that while under Section 14(1)(e), the person suing besides being
the landlord is required to be the owner also, there is no such
requirement under Section 22 of the Act; (iii) while to Section
14(1)(e), Section 19 (supra) is also attracted, there is no such
restriction qua Section 22; (iv) in Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) (though overruled in Maganlal Chhaganlal Vs. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay (1974) 2 SCC 402), in the context of
the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery)
Act, 1959, it was held that if a law were to provide for differential
treatment amongst persons similarly situated, it violates equality
clause of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (v) that
discrimination would result if there are two available procedures - one
more drastic or prejudicial to the party concerned than the other and
which can be applied at the arbitrary will of the authority; (vi)
however, the minority view of Bachawat, J. in the said judgment also
was that the law may allow a litigant a free choice of remedy
proceedings and tribunals for the redressal of his grievance and the
plaintiff being dominus litis has the option of suing in one of the
several courts having concurring jurisdiction; (vii) example was given
of courts of different territorial jurisdictions having concurrent
jurisdiction and a plaintiff having a choice whether to file an ordinary
suit or a suit under Order 37 of the CPC; (viii) the law does not violate
Article 14 because it gives an aggrieved party the free choice of
remedies and proceedings for the redressal of his grievance; (ix)
election of remedies is an option very frequently given by law to a
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person entitled to an action; (x) the unauthorized occupant has full
authority of being heard and of producing his evidence before the
Collector; (xi) in Magan Lal Chhagan Lal Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the
majority view in Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was
overruled and the minority view of Bachawat, J. accepted; (xii) thus,
merely because Section 14(1)(e) as well as Section 22 may be
available to a landlord which is a juristic entity and because a petition
under Section 14(1)(e) is to be tried under a summary procedure while
a petition under Section 22 is to be tried under the regular procedure
would not make the statute arbitrary; attention was invited to Olive
Marques Vs. Union of India (2013) 199 DLT 727 holding the
summary procedure under Section 25B to be not onerous; (xiii) that
Section 22 was not available to Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. for the
requirement pleaded of the premises for residence of its employees.
21. I had enquired from Mr. Bhambhani, senior advocate whether
not the ingredient, cited by him in Section 14(1)(e) of the landlord
being requirement to be owner also, and which is not to be found in
Section 22, had been diluted in Shanti Sharma Vs. Ved Prabha
(1987) 4 SCC 193 where it has been held that the requirement in
Section 14(1)(e) of being the owner is not of absolute ownership but
merely of something more than a tenant. It was further enquired,
whether not what prevailed with Bachawat, J. in his minority view in
Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was the factum of the
person against whom the proceedings were directed being an
unauthorized occupant and having no equity in his favour and whether
the same could be said of tenants for whose protection the Delhi Rent
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Control Act had been enacted. It was further enquired, whether the
reason that prevailed with Bachawat, J. in his minority opinion and is
spelled out therefrom was that if the Act were to be struck down, it
would give free charter to unauthorized occupants to continue in
occupation thereof for an indefinite period during the pendency of a
civil suit. It was yet further enquired whether not the reasoning in the
minority opinion, of a Collector being also equally competent to
adjudicate as a civil court is not contrary to the specific judgment of
the Constitution Bench in Union of India Vs. Madras Bar
Association (2010) 11 SCC 1 qua the necessity to have judicial
member in the tribunals. Attention of Mr. Bhambhani was also
invited to the differences in the procedure to be followed in a petition
for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) and in a petition for eviction under
Section 22 of the Act; while to a petition under Section 22 of the Act,
Section 37, requiring an opportunity to lead evidence to be given, is in
full play, it is not so in Section 14(1)(e) till leave to defend is granted.
Though Section 25B(7) also refers to Section 37, but Supreme Court
in para 19 of Precision Steel & Engineering Works Vs. Prema Deva
Niranjan Deva Tayal (1982) 3 SCC 270 has held the same to be not
entitling an opportunity to lead evidence to be given at the leave to
defend stage. It was yet further enquired from Mr. Bhambani as to
how it could be urged that clauses (b) and (c) of Section 22 were not
available to Superior Exim Pvt. Limited; Superior Exim Private
Limited as the landlord can always claim the tenants to have acted in
contravention of the terms implied under which they were authorized
to occupy such premises and the position of the tenant having become
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unauthorized, by issuing a notice of determination of tenancy under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
22. Mr. Bhambani contended that Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act is not applicable to Rent Control proceedings.
23. I am afraid that is not correct. All that Supreme Court in V.
Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214 held was
that determination of tenancy by a notice under Section 106 is not
necessary for instituting a petition for eviction under the Rent Control
Act. It was not held that the Transfer of Property Act does not apply
to the premises covered by the Rent Control Act. It is always open to
a landlord of a premises covered by the Rent Control Act to serve on
the tenant a notice of determination of tenancy and after which date
the tenant continues in possession of premises by virtue of protection
afforded by the Rent Control Act but not under a contractual
agreement. Without such notice, even in the absence of a registered
lease deed, a contract between a landlord and tenant is deemed to be
renewed month by month when the tenant tenders the rent and the
landlord accepts the same.
24. Mr. Sudhanshu Batra, Senior Advocate for International
Security Printers Pvt. Ltd. contended that the requirement pleaded of
the premises for residence of the directors was not within the ambit of
Section 22 inasmuch as the director is not an employee of a company.
Reference was made to Satnam Kaur Vs. Ashlar Stores Pvt. Ltd.
MANU/DE/0258/2009 (where 14(1)(e) of the Act was held to be
available for requirement for residence of Chairman and Directors)
and to Chuni Lal (supra).
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25. It was however enquired from Mr. Sudhanshu Batra, Senior
Advocate, whether not it was his plea that the Director was an
Executive Director and drawing salary from International Security
Printers Pvt. Ltd. and whether not such a Director is also an employee.
26. Mr. Batra, fairly did not contradict the same.
27. Mr. R.S. Kela, Advocate for Lala Joti Prasad Shiv Mandir Trust
contended that the said trust was not covered by Section 22 and the
Explanation to Section 22 expressly excluded private trust. A copy of
the trust deed was also handed over in the Court. Reliance was placed
on Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust (supra).
28. Mr. Ajay Gupta, advocate for Badi Panchayat Vaish Bise
Aggarwal (Regd.) stated that the memorandum of the society was not
on record and in the subsequent hearing, handed over the same and to
which objection was taken by the counsel for the tenant.
29. Mr. Hitendra Kumar, Advocate for Anoop Singh Charitable
Trust contended that the trust deed was on record and the trust has one
property only and its activities are still to be commenced.
30. Mr. Kartik Khanna, Advocate for Digambar Jain Panchayat
Samaj (Regd.) stated that he was not prepared.
31. I will hereafter summarize the contentions of the counsels for
the tenants.
32. Mr. Sachin Datta, Senior Advocate for the tenants of Superior
Exim Pvt. Ltd. contended that (i) Chuni Lal (supra), though held that
Section 22 is in addition to Section 14, but Section 14(1)(e) was not
for consideration therein; (ii) the subsequent judgments in Madan
Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Birla Cotton (supra)
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unequivocally held that for requirement of employees, Section
14(1)(e) is not available and only Section 22 is applicable; (iii) in
Canara Bank (supra) also though eviction was sought for requirement
of its employees, inconsistently with the earlier judgments, it was held
that Section 14(1)(e) is available; and, (iv) Supreme Court in Magan
Lal Chhagan Lal (supra), as a matter of fact, found the procedure to
be not drastic and which is not so in the present case.
33. Mr. Gaurav Bhardwaj, advocate for the tenant of International
Security Printers Pvt. Ltd. contended that the requirement of
International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd. was also for Executive
Director who is an employee and thus what has been argued by the
Senior Counsel for the tenants of Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. applies
equally to his case.
34. Mr. Anurag Bindal, advocate for the tenant of Lala Joti Prasad
Shiv Mandir Trust contended that (i) the said Trust has been held to be
a public trust and the landlord has admitted so; (ii) reliance was placed
on Shanti Devi Vs. State AIR 1982 Del 453; (iii) that Section 22(d)
would be rendered redundant if Section 14(1)(e) were to be applicable;
and (iv) that the non-obstante clause with which Section 22 begins
ousts Section 14.
35. Mr. J.P. Malviya, advocate for the tenant of Digambar Jain
Panchayat Samaj (Regd.) contended that the requirement pleaded in
that case was for expansion, for construction of Dharamshala and a
toilet and was covered by Section 22(d) and „specific overrules
general‟.
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36. Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, advocate for the tenant of Badi
Panchayat Vaish Bise Aggarwal (Regd.) contended that (i) the
landlord was a public institution carrying on charitable activities and
the requirement pleaded was for expansion of its activities which
requirement was expressly covered by Section 22(d) of the Act; (ii)
that Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 are not merely procedural
provisions but substantive provisions affecting rights of the landlords
and tenants; (iii) Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sitar Ram Goel
MANU/DE/3889/2012 does not lay down any ratio and was of
dismissal of a petition preferred against grant of leave to defend; (iv)
reliance was placed on Jain Ink Manufacturing Company Vs. Life
Insurance Corporation of India (1980) 4 SCC 435 to contend that the
scope and object of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unautorized
Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Rent Control Act has been held to be
different and the Rent Control Act has been held to be of much wider
application than the Public Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all
private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions
indicated in Section 2 of the Public Premises Act and (v) thus, the
principle in Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Magan Lal
Chhagan Lal (supra) relating to Public Premises Act would not apply
to Rent Control Act.
37. Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, senior advocate for tenants of Anoop
Singh Charitable Trust contended that (i) the gamut of each ground of
eviction in the Act is different and there are different jurisdictional
requirements for invoking each of the said grounds; (ii) it is not as if
the landlord has been vested with any choice; (iii) that a company
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incorporated under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 equivalent
to Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 may also be a public
institution; (iv) that the Explanation to Section 22 is inclusive and not
exclusive or exhaustive; (v) that every Section of the Rent Control Act
entitling the landlord to evict the tenant is distinct; (vi) special
provision is made for the requirement of landlords falling in Sections
14A to 14D even though their cases would have been covered by
Section 14(1)(e); (vii) that Chuni Lal (supra) was not concerned with
Section 14(1)(e) and thus this Court in that judgment had no occasion
to consider Section 14(1)(e) vis-a-vis Section 22; (vii) that the word
„employee‟ would cover even a non-executive director; and (viii) that
though for filing a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act with
respect to premises situated in slum areas, the permission under the
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 is not required,
but the same will be required for a petition for eviction under Section 22.
38. I had enquired from Mr. Chandhiok, whether it was his
contention that a landlord which is a company can never sue under
Section 14(1)(e).
39. Mr. Chandhiok replied that a landlord which is a company can
sue Section 14(1)(e) if the requirement is for setting up of a factory
and it would not be covered by Section 22. It was however clarified
that if such company is a company incorporated under Section 25 or
Section 8 (supra) and a public institution, then for such requirement
also, it cannot sue under Section 14(1)(e).
40. Mr. Anup J. Bhambani, senior advocate in rejoinder contended
that there may be requirements of a landlord which is a juristic entity
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where both Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 will be attracted and
contended that the choice in such case would be of the landlord.
41. I have considered the rival contentions only from the
perspective of whether any reference to a larger Bench is required or
not.
42. In my view, vis-à-vis a landlord which is a company, reference
is indeed required inasmuch as the view taken in Canara Bank (supra)
where the requirement pleaded was for residence of its employees,
petition under Section 22 has been held to be not maintainable when in
the earlier judgment in Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. (supra),
it was unequivocally held that whenever any landlord which is a
company requires the premises for use of its employees, it is Section
22 alone which would be applicable and not Section 14(1)(e). There
is thus an inconsistency in the two judgments of Coordinate Benches
of this Court.
43. I am also, with respect, unable to agree with the reasoning given
in Canara Bank (supra) for Section 22 to be not available to such a
landlord i.e. of neither of the clauses of Section 22 being applicable.
As enquired by me during the hearing and recorded above, I am of the
view that such a landlord can avail of clauses (b) and (c) of Section
22, by terminating the contractual tenancy of the tenant by service of a
notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and
whereupon the tenant would be in contravention of the implied term
under which he was authorized to occupy the premises and/or would
be in unauthorized occupation of the premises.
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44. Though in Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it was
also held that this Court can treat the case as under Section 22 of the
Act, but I am unable to do so for the reason of the difference in
procedure prescribed for deciding an application under Section
14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the Act as discussed above. Moreover,
against an order of eviction under Section 22, the remedy available
would be of an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal.
45. We are in this bunch of cases concerned with two other kinds of
landlords which are a juristic entity, namely, trusts and society. The
next question is whether any reference to a larger Bench is required
for such cases also.
46. As the narrative aforesaid would show, the only reported
judgment qua Trusts and Society is Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable
Trust supra. It is deemed appropriate that once the Division Bench of
this Court is seized of the aforesaid controversy, it may consider the
matter qua the said aspect as well.
47. Even otherwise, Section 22, as per its language, applies to a
landlord who / which is a „company‟ or „other body corporate‟ or „any
local authority‟ or any „public institution‟. Though a trust may not
qualify as a „other body corporate‟ and for which reason Section 22 of
the Act may not be applicable to it but a society would certainly
qualify as a „other body corporate‟ within the meaning of Section 22
of the Act. A question may however arise, whether a public charitable
trust carrying on organized activity, though not a „other body
corporate‟, would qualify as a „public institution‟.
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48. I am unable to find any pari materia provision to Section 22 in
the Rent Control Laws of any other State. In the absence of such a
provision, it has been held that a company or a trust or a society, for
their requirement for their own use of premises let out by them, are
entitled to invoke the same provision for eviction as available to
landlords who are natural persons, for their requirement of premises
for own use. Reference in this regard may be made to B.M. Lall Vs.
Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. AIR 1968 SC 175, Gur Narain
Jagat Narain & Co., Lucknow Vs. Motor & General Sales Ltd. 1980
SCC OnLine All 165, Manick Lal Ghosh Vs. Gokuldas Mundra
1991 SCC OnLine Cal 187 (DB), Umed Singh Vs. Arya Samaj Sewa
Sadan (2006) 5 SCC 437 and Speedline Agencies Vs. T. Stanes &
Company Ltd. (2010) 6 SCC 257.
49. I am thus satisfied that a need for referring to the Division
Bench of this Court, the questions as aforesaid, indeed exists.
50. On the basis of the above and for the sake of convenience, I
hereinbelow list the questions which may be answered by the Division
Bench:
(i) Where the landlord is a company or other body corporate
or any local authority or any public institution and the
premises are required for the use of employees of such
landlord, whether such landlord has a choice, whether to
invoke Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act.
(ii) Whether the Chairman, Directors, Trustees, members of
the governing body and office bearers, of a company or
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other body corporate or any local authority or any public
institution qualify as „employees‟, within the meaning of
Section 22 of the Act and if not whether such landlord for
requirement of such persons is entitled to invoke Section
14(1)(e) of the Act.
(iii) Whether the tenant of such a landlord can be construed as
having acted in contravention of the terms under which
he was authorized to occupy the premises or be construed
as in unauthorized occupation of the premises, within the
meaning of Section 22(b) and (c) of the Act, on
continuing in occupation after determination of his
tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of property
Act, 1882.
(iv) Whether the commercial or industrial or other
requirement of a landlord, which / who is a company or
other body corporate or any local authority or any public
institution, of premises, by allowing its employees to
work or carry on its activities therein is within the ambit
of Section 22 of the Act and if not, whether for such
requirement such a landlord can invoke Section 14(1)(e)
of the Act.
(v) Whether a public charitable trust carrying on public
activities qualifies as a public institution.
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(vi) Whether a deity in a temple owning properties or a trust
or a society managing a place of worship qualifies as a
public institution.
(vii) Whether the choice if any with such a landlord, to invoke
either Section 14(1)(e) or Section 22 of the Act, is to the
detriment of the tenant and if so to what effect.
51. The aforesaid questions are only illustrative and it will be open
to the counsels to urge any other question for consideration of the
Division Bench of this Court.
52. The matters be placed before Hon‟ble the Chief Justice for
constituting a Bench for consideration of the aforesaid questions.
53. Subject to orders of Hon‟ble the Chief Justice, list before the
appropriate Bench on 29th January, 2018.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
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