Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Devender Prasad vs Delhi Development Authority on 5 August, 2009
Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench OA No. 1752/2008 New Delhi, this the 5th day of August, 2009 Honble Mr. Justice V.K. Bali, Chairman Honble Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda, Member (A) Shri Devender Prasad S/o Shri Ram Kumar R/o 55/34 Singhpurewale, Janta Colony, Rohtak Haryana. Applicant. (By Advocate: Shri Sidharth Joshi) Versus 1. Delhi Development Authority Through its Vice Chairman Vikas Sadan, INA Market New Delhi. 2. Commissioner (Personnel) Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan, INA Market New Delhi. 3. Sh. S.K. Garella Inquiry Officer Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan, INA Market New Delhi. Respondents (By Advocate Shri Rajeev Bansal) :ORDER: Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda, Member (A):
Shri Devender Prasad, the Applicant herein, a Junior Engineer (Civil) of Delhi Development Authority (DDA), has through this OA, assailed the Memorandum of charge sheet dated 2.5.2006 (Annexure-A4), Inquiry Officer (IO)s Report dated 3.12.2007 (Annexure-A2), 2nd stage advice of CVC dated 26.5.2008 (Annexure-A3), and the Notice dated 17.6.2008 (Annexure-A1). The Applicant sought the intervention of this Tribunal for interim direction to restrain the Respondent No.2 from passing the final order of penalty until order is passed in this OA. At the admission stage, Shri Sidharth Joshi, learned counsel for the Applicant prayed for stay of the proceedings, which was declined in view of the fact that Applicant had been willingly participating in the enquiry before the IO and moved this Tribunal when the IOs Report had come against him. However, on 1.9.2008, taking the totality of the case, it was ordered that any penalty advice if issued will be subject to orders in OA.
2. The facts of the case would reveal that while the Applicant was working as Junior Engineer (Civil) in the Construction Division of DDA, he was in charge of supervision of works (560 MIG houses at Pkt. A (P), Pitampura (C/o 192 MIG DUS in Group III balance work) Agreement No.3/EE/CDI/85-86). The Quality Control Cell (QCC) of DDA inspected the work on 30.4.1987 and vide its Memo dated 11.5.1987 (Annexure A7) made certain observations. It is stated that the observations of the QCC pertained to several Junior Engineers including the Applicant and the Executive Engineer submitted suitable replies to those observations on 19.8.1987 (Annexure A8). The Applicant was served with a show cause Memorandum dated 5/6.1.2004 (Annexure A9) calling for his explanations. He requested for inspection of records vide his letter dated 28.1.2004 (Annexure A10) but it is stated that he was not supplied with all relevant records/documents and he submitted his explanation vide his letter dated 11.3.2004 (Annexure A11). Consequently, the Applicant was issued a Memorandum of charges dated 2.5.2006 (Annexure A4) informing about the proposed enquiry to be held for 4 charges under Regulation 25 of the DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulation 1999. Shri S.K. Garella, Chief Engineer (Retired) was appointed as Inquiry Officer (I.O.) vide DDA order dated 31.12.2007. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was consulted on the IOs Report, who rendered 2nd stage advice dated 26.5.2008 (Annexure A3) for imposition of a suitable major penalty on the Applicant and other 2 Junior Engineers. The Disciplinary Authority vide Notice dated 17.6.2008 (Annexure A1) informed the Applicant that I.O. has held 2 charges (Article I and IV) as proved and 2 charges (Article II and III) as partly proved and sent him the IOs Report and CVCs 2nd stage advice and sought Applicants representation. On receipt of the notice, the Applicant has approached this Tribunal in this OA.
3. We issued notice to the Respondents on 18.8.2008 and the learned counsel for the Respondents submitted written reply/counter on 15.12.2008. Thereafter, though Applicant was granted sufficient time, no rejoinder was filed. We finally heard the rival parties on 14.7.2009, where Shri Sidharth Joshi the learned counsel represented the Applicant and Shri Rajeev Bansal, the learned counsel represented the Respondents.
4. Shri Sidharth Joshi, the Learned Counsel for the Applicant raised many contentions in support of the OA. (1) He contended that the impugned Charge Memo was served upon the Applicant after about 19 years of the inspection by QCC and the Respondents having not furnished the explanation for delay, the entire disciplinary proceeding was to be treated as illegal. He relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh versus Bani Singh (AIR 1990 SC 1308. (2) Further, he highlighted the delay between the calling for explanation (6.1.2004) and framing/issuing of charge memo (2.5.2006) which was violative of the CVC Circular dated 23.5.2000 stipulating specified time frame. The period of 2 years was enough for the Applicant to believe that the allegations/charges were dropped. Shri Joshi laid his reliance on the judgment in the case of E. S. Antaraman versus Commissioner, HR & CE (AIR 1971 Madras 170). (3) His contention was that the charges were based on mere suspicion and presumption that the Applicant was responsible for non recovery from the contractor whereas the counter claims filed by the Respondents against the contractor were considered and dismissed by the Arbitrator. The Respondents, he claims, cannot go against the judicial findings. Reliance was laid on the Honble Supreme Court decision in the Union of India versus H. C. Goel (AIR 1964 SC 364). (4) After a long lapse of time and not providing him all relevant documents and statements, the Applicant was unable to remember the facts of so many years old. (5) He also contended that prejudice was being caused against the Applicant in view of the fact that the Applicant was kept under constant fear for so many years and charged on the verge of promotion which was with malafide intention. The judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Kundan Lal versus Delhi Administration and Others (1976 SLR 133) was relied on. (6) His another contention is that the alleged charges were not assigned duties of JE (Civil) as per CPWD Manual (Appendix XXVI of Volume I) but those were AEs duties. (7) Shri Joshi cited judgments of this Tribunal in case of S. V. Sharma versus Delhi Developmetn Authority and 2 others (TA 182 of 2007 decided on 21.5.2008) and C. D. Sharma versus Delhi Development Authority and 2 others (TA 126 of 2007) decided on 15.5.2008 to highlight that all charges were quashed and set aside. The Applicant in the current OA and the Applicants in the cited 2 TAs were Junior Engineers working in the same works and he being similarly placed, the charges against him needed to be quashed.
5. Per contra, Shri Rajeev Bansal, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents, opposed Shri Joshis contentions and submitted that the Applicant failed to get the works in question rectified during his tenure and the DDA could not recover the amount from the contractor, as a result, DDA incurred financial loss to the tune of Rs.388645. After identifying the officers responsible, the charge memo was issued. He drew our attention to the chronological events stated in the counter reply (Page 133) to contend that there was no delay on the part of DDA. With regard to the decisions of this Tribunal in TA No.126 of 2007 and TA No.182 of 2007 cited in support of Applicants averment, Shri Bansal submits that Respondents are processing to file Writ Petition against the Tribunal orders in Honble High Court of Delhi. Shri Bansal argued that financial loss to DDA is a serious misconduct and the Applicant is liable for the same and pleaded to dismiss the OA.
6. Having heard the rival contentions and perused the pleadings, we may examine the nature of charges framed against the Applicant. He was charged with 4 Articles of charges and pleaded not guilty of the charges contained in the charge sheet dated 2.5.2006 (Annexure-4). The statement of imputation of misconduct in support of Articles of charge read as follows :-
Sh. Devender Prasad, while working as Jr. Engineer in C.D.-I/ND-I during the period 25.11.85 to 10.8.88, was in charge of the work C/o 560 MIG houses at Pkt. A (P) Pitampura SH: C/o 192 MIG DUs in Group-III (Balance work) Agency:-M/s Mohan Construction Co. Agreement No.3/EE/CD-I/85-86. Sh. Devender Prasad Has committed following lapses/irregularities while supervising and recording the bills for payments for above mentioned work.
Article-I Sh. Devender Prasad was JE Incharge of the work during the period 25.11.85 to 10.10.88 and bill No. 7th to 17th were paid during his tenure. In the 17th running bill which was paid to the agency in October 1988 on the basis of measurement recorded by Shri Devender Prasad, JE the stipulated material which remained unused at site had neither been immediately taken over from the contractor nor recovery thereof had been made/effected by sh. Devender Parshad, JE with the result recovery amounting to Rs.1,95,045.56 could not be made from the agency, as the arbitrator rejected the counter claim in the arbitration, thus DDA, has been put to a loss of Rs.1,95,045.56.
Article-II That the said Sh. Devender Prasad, Jr. Engineer in (CD-1/ND-I) during the period 25.11.85 to 10.10.88. The Quality Control Wing of DDA inspected the work on 30.4.87 and observation memo was issued on 11.5.87. The work was executed under the supervision of Sh. Devender Prasad JE during his tenure was defective/substandard as pointed out by QC Cell in their inspection report vide para No.2.1.6,2.2.1,2.1.3, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.6, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.6.7, 2.7.1, 2.5.3, & 2.8.2 and he did not get rectified the defective/substandard work in such a long period of 17 months after the same was pointed out by Q. C. Cell. Hence Sh. Devender Prasad, JE is responsible for acceptance of defective work.
Article-III That the said Sh. Devender Prasad, JE incharge of the work in (CD-I/ND-I) during the period 25.11.85 upto 10.10.88. Sh. Devender Prasad who remained JE in charge of the work for a period of about 17 months after the same was pointed out by QC Cell neither got rectified the defective work nor made recovery by initiating RIS and getting it sanctioned from the competent authority. The R.I>S. was subsequently initiated by EE/ND-I on 8.5.91 which was sanctioned by SE/CC-7 on 30.8.91. Since Sh. Devender Prasad failed to take timely action the recovery of R. I.S. amounting to Rs.1.91 lacs which could not be made from the agency as the final bill was in minus thereby causing financial loss to the Deptt.
Article-IV Shri Devnder Prasad, Jr. Engineer failed for not insisting labour report from the contractor while recording the R/A bills for payment. As per Clause-19 D of the agreement, the contractor was required to submit the fortnightly labour report on 4th & 10th of each month. Neither contractor submitted the labour report nore the recovery for the non-submission of the labour report @Rs.50/- per fortnight of each default was proposed. With the result, recovery of Rs.2600/- which could not be made from the agency as the counter claim was rejected by the arbitrator. Thus, causing a financial loss of Rs.2600/- to the authority.
That the said Sh. Devender Prasad, Jr. Engineer, by his above act exhibited lack of devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of an employee of the Authority thereby violating sub-rule (I) & 1(iii) of Regulation 4 of the DDA Conduct, disciplinary and Appeal Regulation, 1999.
7. The Applicant worked as Junior Engineer from 25.11.1985 to 10.10.1988 when he was in charge of the Works, which were inspected by QCC in March 1987. He averred that all of sudden the Respondents served on him a Memorandum dated 6.1.2004 after a gap of about 19 years of the period to which the matter pertained. He alleged that the Respondents maintained an eerie silence for such long 19 years. Such delay, it is stated, is not only illegal but against the directions of CVC dated 23.5.2000 (Annexure-A/2). The Respondents in their written submission had submitted that DDA suffered financial loss due to the Applicants negligence. Had he initiated the RIS and its recovery effected from the contractor bill in time during his tenure, he could be able to save the Department from bearing financial loss to the tune of Rs.3,88,645. The Respondents have given a list of events in chronological order in support of their claim. We have gone through the pleadings and provide below the important events and the dates relevant to this OA in a chronological manner:-
Prior to March Works in question for which Applicant was in charge 1987 of supervision.
30.3.1987 QCC inspected the works.
11.5.1987 QCC submitted its observation.
19.8.1987 Executive Engineer sent his reply to the QCC observation.
29.11.2000 Chief Engineer (NZ) and Vigilance Office were endorsed the QCC report and other materials.
7.12.2001 CE(QC) needed investigation in the case.
14.2.2003 After lot of persuation CE(NZ) submitted his report indicating officers responsible for the lapses.
5.1.2004 Memo was issued to the Applicant along with 6 others calling for their explanation.
28.1.2004 The Applicant asked to peruse certain records.
24.2.2004 The Applicant was reminded.
11.3.2004 The Applicant submitted his explanation.
8.7.2005 Respondents found that there was prima facie lapses on the part of the Applicant.
6.10.2005 The Disciplinary Authority decided to initiate penalty proceedings.
6.1.2006 1st stage advice of CVC was received.
2.2.2006 Respondent accepted the CVC advice.
2.5.2006 Major penalty charge memo was issued.
7.7.2006 IO/PO were appointed.
31.12.2007 IO submitted his report.
18.1.2008 IOs Report was accepted by the Competent Authority.
26.5.2008 2nd stage advice of CVC was received.
17.6.2008 Applicant was issued notice along with IOs report and CVC advice for his representation.
7.8.2008 This OA was filed.
8. It is undisputedly admitted fact that the Respondents have not taken action from 11.5.1987 up to 29.11.2000-over 13 years. It is also admitted that the Applicant was JE in charge of those works up to 10.10.1988. Since the QCC gave its observation in May 1987 and the concerned EE offered his views and observation in August 1987, what prevented the Respondents to analyse the same and frame charges against the Applicant during the period he was still working there (upto 10.10.1988). Respondents did not attach importance to the QCC Report and did not take action against the Applicant who continued in the same position over a year. The Respondent-1 and 2 slept over the matter for more than 13 years (19.8.1987-29.11.2000) and referred the same to Chief Engineer (NZ) and to the Vigilance Office. The chronology of events reveal that the disciplinary case is moving at a slow pace and has already taken 21 years since the alleged misconduct seem to have taken place. We find that the Applicant has been prejudiced since he has been expecting promotion. With the fading memory of the Applicant, we feel, the disciplinary case will not grant him a fair and reasonable chance to defend his case. The inordinate delay without reasonable justification in issuing the charge sheet by the Respondent, in our opinion, cannot be condoned.
9. The Learned Counsel for the Respondent raised an issue that the Applicant had already submitted to the disciplinary proceeding, the IOs Report and CVC advice had been received and when all these had been communicated to the Applicant, he had rushed to the Tribunal. Shri Joshi, the Learned Counsel for the Applicant fairly stated that the Applicant had been raising the issue of belated action right from 2000 but the Respondents did not heed to the plea. We examined the issue. We have carefully considered the facts to note that the disciplinary case against the Applicant has so far taken 21 years, his memory in the matter is fading and he is prejudiced since his promotion is likely to be affected by the adverse decision by the Disciplinary Authority. Even if we presume that the Applicant has not come to the Tribunal and the Disciplinary Authority imposes some penalty on him, he will come up before us with the same ground of delayed action and we have to consider the same grounds for adjudication. At the pace the action in the case is moving, finalization of the case will take few more years and the Applicant will be further prejudiced. We are, therefore, of the considered view that this issue raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent is not acceptable. Therefore, we cannot delay the case any further but to adjudicate the OA.
10. Now we examine the legal aspects of the issues involved in this OA.
11.1. In a disciplinary proceeding, the nature of charge and the alleged misconduct generally holds the field. There are 2 types of misconducts-viz. serious, and grave misconduct involving corruption etc. and the second type are procedural and supervisory lapses.
11.2. In case of the grave charges, the Courts and Tribunals would generally tend not to prevent the disciplinary case of the delinquent officials. Honble Supreme Court considered a case of disproportionate pecuniary resources case in B. C. Chaturvedi versus Union of India (1995 (6) SCC 749) held that delay was considered not fatal since collecting and collating entire evidence to establish the essential links between the public servant and sources of pecuniary benefit would be time consuming process. In such cases, the long hand of law would need considerable time to link the nexus. Further, Honble Apex Court, while observing that the Tribunal had committed grossest error in exercise of judicial review, held in Secretary to Government Prohibition & Excise Department versus L. Srinivasan (1996 (3) SCC 157) that case involving embezzlement and detection of false record, authorities would take long time to detect the links and need to enquire in secrecy, the quashing and setting aside of the charge memo on the ground of delay was found to be untenable and irrational. In Food Corporation of India versus V. P. Bhatia [JT 1998 (8) SC 16] where investigation involved tedious process and involvement of certain external agencies, the delay was not found to be a justifiable ground for quashing the disciplinary proceeding.
11.3. The case of the Applicant is not serious or grave. The disciplinary case in the present OA revolves round the supervisory lapses of the Applicant.
12. In Delhi Development Authority and others versus D. P. Bambah and Another (LPA 39/1999) decided on 29.9.2003, Honble High Court of Delhi has dealt very extensively the delayed action in disciplinary cases and laid down certain parameters which we consider very much relevant in this case and thus we take extract of Para 15 of the judgement:-
15. In our opinion the legal position, when an action is brought seeking quashing of a charge sheet on grounds of issuance of the charge-sheet or grounds of inordinate delay in completion of the disciplinary inquiry may be crystallized as under:-
Unless the statutory rules prescribe a period of limitation for initiating disciplinary proceedings, there is no period of limitation for initiating the disciplinary proceedings.
Since delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings of concluding the same are likely to cause prejudice to the charged employee, courts would be entitled to intervene and grant appropriate relief where an action is brought.
If bone fide and reasonable explanation for delay is brought on record by the disciplinary authority, in the absence of any special equity, the court would not intervene in the matter;
While considering these factors the court has to consider that speedy trial is apart of the facet of a fair procedure to which every delinquent is entitled to vis-`-vis the handicaps, which the department may be suffering the initiation of the proceedings. Balancing all the factors, it has to be considered whether prejudice to the defence on account of delay is made out and the delay is fatal, in the sense, that the delinquent is unable to effectively defend himself on account of delay.
In considering the factual matrix, the court would ordinarily lean against preventing trial of the delinquent who is facing grave charges on the mere ground of delay. Quashing would not be ordered solely because of lapse of time between the date of commission of the offence and the date of service of the charge sheet unless, of course, the right of defence is found to be denied as a consequence of delay.
It is for the delinquent officer to show the prejudice caused or deprivation of fair trial because of the delay.
The sword of Damocles cannot be allowed to be kept hanging over the head of an employee and every employee is entitled to claim that the disciplinary inquiry should be completed against him within a reasonable time. Speedy trial is undoubtedly a part of reasonableness in every disciplinary inquiry.
13. The Honble Supreme Court in catena of judgments held that if there was no justification as to the inordinate delay in initiating enquiry, the departmental proceeding would be illegal. We rely on P. V. Mahadevan versus M. D. T. N. Housing Board (2005 SCC (L&S) 861), M. V. Bijlani versus Union of INdia and Others (2006 (3) SLR SC 105), and the State of Andhra Pradesh Versus N. Radhakrishnan (1988 (4) SCC 154). The Apex Court in its judgment in Radhakrishnans case (supra) held that no predetermined principles would be possibly laid down applicable for all cases where delay had occurred in deciding the disciplinary cases. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows :-
It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant facts and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice than an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.
14. This Tribunal decided an OA similar to the present OA in a case between Shri Om Prakash versus Delhi Development Authority and Another (OA No.2104/2008). Facts of the case revealed that a charge memo dated 24.3.2008 was issued against the Applicant on the basis of inspection report of QCC on 14.7.1995 for the alleged irregularities which took place during 1993-95. One of the grounds in allowing the OA and quashing and setting aside the charge memo was delay of 13 years in framing the charges. In the present OA, the chronology of events would reveal that the Respondents took 13 years to send the report of the QCC along with Executive Engineers remark to the Chief Engineer (NZ) and Vigilance office. Thereafter, Respondents took more than 3 years to call for Applicants explanation and major penalty charge memo was issued more than 2 years thereafter. Thus, we find that more than 18 years have been taken to issue a charge memo against the Applicant. The Respondents have not furnished the reasons as to why they took so many years to frame charges. The long hand of law is to make the officials responsible for commission of misconduct accountable provided there are reasons to convince that long hand of law took expandable time to book the delinquent. In the present case, we find that there is even no whisper by the Respondent less to speak of the reasons for delay of 13 years (19.8.1987 to 29.11.2000) for sending QCC Report with Executive Engineers reply to Chief Engineer (NZ) and Vigilance Office.
15.1 As per the QCC Report dated 11.5.1987, the inspection was held on 30.4.1987 covering the works started on 21.3.1985 where the progress was 93%. At the said work place along with the Applicant, 2 other Junior Engineers (S. V. Sharma and C. D. Sharma) were also in charge of supervision. All three of them faced charges arising out of the QCC Report. Common Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed against three of them since they were similarly involved. However, there was stay from Honble High Court of Delhi in case of S. V. Sharma and the I.O. proceeded against the Applicant and C. D. Sharma. In case of Shri C. D. Sharma, Honble High Court passed interim order in the CM that the Inquiry Proceedings would be subject to the orders of the Honble High Court. Both the Writ Petitions were transferred to this Tribunal from Honble High Court of Delhi.
15.2 This Tribunal heard the case of Shri C. D. Sharma in TA No.126/2007 and decided on 15th May 2008 as follows :-
3. Of course, learned counsel for respondents submits that a number of officers were proceeded against and necessarily this took time and the basic reasons for initiating action could not have gone unnoticed. But a balanced view is to be taken. We fully agree with the reasoning given by the High Court that it may be difficult for an employee to effectively defend himself in a case where the chargesheets are issued after decades of inaction. Although the learned standing counsel submits that the delay is satisfactorily explained a long period of 17 years is gaping and we see that the quality Control Department themselves had noticed the defaults decades back. A domestic enquiry at this point on time, cannot lead to any satisfactory conclusion. Taking notice of the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think that respondents are justified in, at least in the present case to initiate proceedings.
4. The impugned orders, namely, charge sheet are, therefore, quashed and set aside. The officer is to be set free of all allegations as highlighted there. Follow up proceedings are, therefore, to be issued in consonance with observations made above. No costs. 15.3 The Delhi Development Authority went on appeal against the said judgment before the Honble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (Civil) No.366/09, which was decided by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 21.01.2009, dismissing the Writ Petition in limine. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are extracted below, which will guide us in adjudicating the present OA:-
10. Thus, the purported irregularity came to the notice of the petitioner/DDA in the year 1987 itself. However, there is no explanation as to why the department took 13 years in referring the matter to the Vigilance Department. It is, however, revealed that even when the Vigilance Cell had made its observation in the year 2001, charge sheet was issued three years thereafter on 6.1.2004. There is no explanation for consuming abnormal period in serving the charge sheet. Thus, it is amply borne from the record that no explanation for taking up such a delayed action is coming forth.
11. As pointed out above, charge against the respondent was that he was responsible for defective work, as pointed out by the CE(QC). The respondent was working as Junior Engineer at that time. Leveling the allegation of defective work and asking the employee to defend such an action 17 years after the execution of the work would itself create prejudice.
12. We are, thus, satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the nature of charges leveled against the respondent, delay has caused prejudice to the respondent and, therefore, it would amount to denial of principles of natural justice. We, therefore, do not want to interfere with the impugned judgment in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed in limine. 15.4 The case of Shri S. V. Sharma was also transferred by the Honble High Court of Delhi to this Tribunal which was decided in TA No.182 of 2007 decided on 21.5.2008. Following the decision of this Tribunal in TA No.126 of 2007, the following orders were passed :-
4. All the circumstances that needs to be looked into have been extensively explained by the Honble Supreme Court in number of decided cases. Therefore, following the decision in TA 126 of 2007, the applicant is entitled to the relief as prayed for. Orders passed by the authorities and disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant are quashed and set aside. 15.5 We find that the Applicants case in the present OA is identical to the case in TA No.126/2007 and TA No.182/2007 (a) in facts, (b) the same QCC Report was the basis of identical charges and (c) the works they supervised are similar in nature and in the same location. In both the TAs, the disciplinary proceedings against them have been quashed and set aside. They have been set free of all allegations. In one of the cases Respondents DDA had filed appeal against the judgment of this Tribunal which was dismissed by Honble High Court. The treatment for the Applicant rationally should be same as received by 2 of his colleagues in TA No.126/2007 and TA No.182/2007.
16. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case; well settled legal position, we come to the considered conclusion that this is a fit case where the Respondents could not convince us with reasons for the delays at different stage, and in the result the delayed disciplinary action has caused prejudice against the Applicant. Normally in this case the disciplinary proceedings being in very advance stage we should not be interfering but taking into account the fact that in case of two co-delinquents the charge sheets and inquiries have already been quashed and set aside by this Tribunal and in one of those cases Honble High Court has upheld the judgment of this Tribunal, it would be a futile exercise in this case to allow the Respondents to continue with disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the Charges framed against the Applicant in the Memorandum dated 2.5.2006, IOs Report dated 3.12.2007 and the notice dated 17.6.2008 are quashed and set aside. The Respondent No.1 and 2 are directed to take steps to issue consequential order and free the Applicant of the charges. They are also directed not to initiate any further departmental action against the Applicant on the same charges. The Original Application succeeds and is, therefore, allowed. There is no order as to costs.
(Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda) (V. K. Bali)
Member (A) Chairman
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