Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ram Kumar Soni vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 December, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827
1 WP-20900-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
WRIT PETITION No. 20900 of 2024
RAM KUMAR SONI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri L.C. Patne - Advocate (through VC) alongwith Shri Prateek
Kulshrestha - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Rohit Shrivastava - Panel Lawyer for the State.
Shri Anil Sharma - Advocate for the respondent No.3.
Shri Ankur Mody - Advocate alongwith Shri Nitin Agrawal -
Advocate for respondent No.4.
RESERVED ON :- 09/10/2025
DELIVERED ON :- 17/12/2025
ORDER
The instant petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is preferred seeking following reliefs:
"7.1 to call for the relevant records of the case from the respondents;
7.2 to quash the impugned order dated 16.7.2024 (Annexure P/19) issued by Respondent No.5, by a writ of CERTIORARI or any other appropriate writ, direction or order;
7.3 to command the respondents to reinstate the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827
2 WP-20900-2024 petitioner back in service on the post of Head of the Department Electronics and Telecommunication Department or in the Department of Electrical Engineering by granting him all consequential and monetary benefits, by a writ of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, direction or order;
7.4 allow this petition with costs;
7.5 pass such other order(s) as may be deemed appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case, to grant relief to the petitioner."
FACTS [2] Draped with brevity, the facts necessary for adjudication of the present controversy are that the petitioner, an employee of Samrat Ashok Technological Institute, Polytechnic Vidisha (M.P.), a Government Aided Polytechnic College administered and managed by the Maharaja Jiwaji Rao Education Society and was working as the Head of the Department (HOD), Electronic and Telecommunication w.e.f. 03.10.2007, was relieved from his services which were discontinued with immediate effect on account of closure of Electronic and Telecommunication Course w.e.f. academic year 2024-25.
[3] Initially, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Lecturer on ad-hoc basis in the said College vide order dated 03.01.1989 by Respondent No.5, where the petitioner had joined his duties on 04.01.1989 (Annexure P/2). On 14.09.1995 (Annexure P/3), an advertisement was issued by NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 3 WP-20900-2024 Respondents/Institute inviting applications from eligible candidates for their appointment on the post of Lecturer in the Electrical Engineering Department, pursuant to which, the petitioner applied for the said post and threafter, stood in merit and upon recommendations made by duly constituted Selection Committee, was appointed as a Lecturer in the then AICTE pay scale of Rs.2200-75-2800-EB-100-4000/- plus dearness allowance vide order dated 17.11.1995 (Annexure P/4). Later on, the petitioner was confirmed on the aforesaid post and thus, was holding his lien on the aforesaid post at the relevant point of time.
[4] Vide order dated 15.02.2001 (Annexure P/5), the petitioner was made In-charge of the Head of Electronics and Telecommunication Department and was transferred from the Electrical Engineering Department on temporary basis. Vide order dated 06.05.2006(Annexure P/6), the petitioner was sanctioned regular pay-scale of Rs.10,000-15,200/- w.e.f. 17.11.2001 and his pay was accordingly fixed vide order dated 11.05.2006 (Annexure P/7).
[5] Again vide advertisement dated 09.02.2007 (Annexure P/8), a selection process was undertaken by Respondent/Institute for appointment on the post of Head of the Department in Electronics and Telecommunication Department. The petitioner had applied for the same and after receiving the call letter dated 05.09.2007 (Annexure P/9), he appeared in the interview and being in merit, vide order dated 03.10.2007 (Annexure P/10), he was appointed on the post of Head of the Department in Electronics and Telecommunication in the then A.I.C.T.E. pay scale of Rs.12,000 - 18,300/- NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 4 WP-20900-2024 plus admissible dearness allowances.
[6] Thereafter vide order dated 30.06.2014 (Annexure P/11), the petitioner was temporarily appointed as Principal of Respondent Institute/SATI, Polytechnic College, Vidisha as per A.I.C.T.E. guidelines and later on, vide order dated 04.07.2015 (Annexure P/12), he was appointed on contractual basis as Principal of the Institute in the then regular pay scale of Rs.37,400-67,000/- + AGP 10,000/- + special allowance of Rs.2,000/- per month for a contract period of 05 years, which was extended until further orders vide order dated 04.07.2020 (Annexure P/13).
[7] Upon selection and appointment of new Principal in the Institute, namely, Dr. Naveen Goel, vide order dated 11.04.2023 (Annexure P/14), the petitioner was called upon to handover the charge of the post of Principal to the newly appointed Principal, which was handed over by the petitioner and on 11.04.2023 itself, the petitioner submitted his joining on the post of Head of the Department in the Electronics and Telecommunication (ETE).
[8] On 16.01.2024 (Annexure P/16), Respondent/Institute issued an order based upon resolution passed by Respondent No.4 and the petitioner's joining on the post of Head of the Department in the Electronics and Telecommunication was accepted.
[9] Despite of the fact that the course of Electronics and Telecommunication was going on in the respondent/Institute, the impugned order dated 16.07.2024 (Annexure P/19) was issued by the respondent/Institute for closure of the course of Electronics and Telecommunication for the academic year 2024-25, and in consequence NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 5 WP-20900-2024 thereof, discontinued the services of the petitioner with immediate effect alleging that due to poor admission status in the last 10 years, huge losses had been incurred by the respondent/Institute, therefore, the Board of Governors vide resolution dated 09.07.2024 had decided to close the course of the Electronic and Telecommunication with immediate effect, which was in gross violation of Provisions of Clause 33 of Statute 30 of respondent/Institute, as it was issued without approval of the Executive Council of Respondent No.3/University. Thus, being aggrieved, the present petition has been filed.
ARGUMENTS [10] The first and foremost of the arguments which has been raised on behalf of the applicant is that the impugned order dated 16.07.2024 is per se illegal, arbitrary and malafide as it has been passed without jurisdiction, without approval of the Executive Council of Respondent No.3/Universtiy and on false and frivolous grounds of closure of the course of Electronics and Telecommunication, which is in gross violation of Provisions of Clause 33 of Statute 30 of the Respondent No.3/University.
[11] Learned counsel has argued before this Court that the Respondent No.5/Instiute is a 100% Government Aided Educational Institute administered by Respondent No.6/Society. Initially, the Institute was receiving 100% maintenance grant from the State Government equivalent to the net loss according to their budget rights since inception till Academic Year 2001-02 and thereafter, the maintenance grant was replaced by the block grant, w.e.f. 22.08.2000 by virtue of an amendment made in Madhya NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 6 WP-20900-2024 Pradesh Ashaskiya Shiksnan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karamchariyon Ke Vetano Ka Sanday) Adhiniyam, 1978 [for short ''Adhiniyam, 1978'']. The constitutionality of the said amendment was challenged by the various stakeholders in the matter of Dr. Sharique Ali vs. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2002 (1) MPHT 315 , wherein the said amending Act converting the maintenance grant to block grant was declared unconstitutional. However, in the appeal preferred by the State Government before the Apex Court, the Apex Court initially vide its order dated 12.12.2013 reported in 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1402 (State of M.P. & Others v. Dr. Sharique Ali) by taking on record the affidavit filed by the State Government proposing to give grant in-aid to the employees, who were still in service at the existing approved scale till their superannuation, held that the pay scale of the teaching and non-teaching staff employed in the private aided schools/colleges shall be at par with the teaching and non- teaching staff of the Government schools/colleges and later on, while disposing of the matter finally, vide order dated 07.01.2014 in the case of State of M.P. & Others v. Dr. Sharique Ali reported in (2020) 20 SCC 450, has declared the law by a judgment in rem holding that the Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha Adhiniyam, 1978 , as amended by the Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya Karmcharyon Ke Vetno Ka Sandaya) Sanshodhan Adhiniyam, 2000 shall not be made applicable to the respondents and other similarly situated persons therein, with a further clarification that the amended Act would be applicable to those Teachers/Lecturers/Non-teaching staffs, who were appointed by the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 7 WP-20900-2024 private aided educational institutions in the State of Madhya Pradesh, after promulgation of the amended Act, thus, it was quite evident that the amended Act of 2000 was not applicable in the case of the petitioner, who was an appointee in the respondent/Institute before 22.08.2000, i.e. the date of promulgation of the Act of 2000, and thus, for the payment of the petitioner's salary, the provisions pertaining to maintenance grant were applicable whereby the State Government was liable to release 100% grant to the respondent/Institute for the payment of salary to the petitioner and other teaching and non-teaching staff. It was, thus, argued that the Respondent No.5/Institute was responsible for not getting grant from the State Government.
[12] While referring to an order dated 30.05.2025 (as appended alongwith the petition as Annexure P/29), it was argued that maintenance grant to the Respondent/Institute had now been restored and for getting such grant, proposal sent by Respondent/Institute bare the name of the petitioner as sanctioned staff of the Institute for the purpose of financial assistance of the State Government.
[13] He further argued that the similar orders have been passed on 20.03.2025 (vide Annexure P/31 appended alongwith the petition) whereby maintenance grant was sanctioned in installments for the financial year 2024- 25, in compliance of the order passed by the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Bidkar & Others v. Iqbal Singh Bains [Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 1241-1242/2023 in C.A. No.6415/2004, dated 19.3.2025].
[14] While referring to the judgment passed by this Court in the matter NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 8 WP-20900-2024 o f Maharaja Jiwaji Rao Education Society & Another vs. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2006 (4) MPLJ 403 , it was contended that the Respondent No.6/Society, which is the founder society of the Respondent No.5/Institute is in receipt of financial aid from the State Government and in a decision passed in the matter of the same Society reported in 2008 (2) MPLJ 99, the applicability of the Act of 1978 on the Respondent/Institute was acknowledged by the Respondent/Institute itself and that was precisely for this reason that the State Government has sanctioned a sum of Rs.6 crores as State grant for development of infrastructure in the respondent/Institute vide order dated 28.03.2025.
[15] Learned counsel further submitted that not only this, the Respondent No.5/College being a college admitted to the privilege of the University is bound by the provisions of Clause 3 of Statute No.30. Similarly, Proviso to Clause 8 casts an obligation upon Respondent No.6/Society to maintain and run the College in accordance with provisions of Act of 1978 and the Rules made thereunder. Further, Clause 15 provides that the Governing body has to exercise powers in accordance with provisions of Adhiniyam, Statute and Ordinances of the University.
[16] He further submitted that Clause 21(1) of the said Statute provides that the Selection Committee of the grantee college defined under Section 2(f) shall be such as provided in Rule 14 of Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha Adhiniyam, 1979 framed under the provisions of Act of 1978, thus, the stand taken by the Respondent/Institute regarding the respondent No.5 being a non-aided institute was palpably false. NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 9 WP-20900-2024 [17] Learned counsel also argued that the contention on behalf of the respondents No.4 and 5 by placing reliance on Notification dated 13.08.1978 that all non-Government Polytechnic Institute in the State are exempted from the provisions of the Act of 1978 is quite fallacious for the reasons that the petitioner's appointment was approved by the Respondent No.1 & 2 and he was paid all financial up-gradations under the orders passed by Respondent No.1 & 2 from time to time, besides regular monthly salary and allowances and the grant in-aid, be it maintenance grant or block grant, was released in favour of the Respondent No.5/Institute for payment of salary and allowances of the petitioner under the provisions of Act of 1978 itself, which was acknowledged by the Respondent No.6/Society in the matter of Majaraja Jiwaji Rao Education Society, Vidisha & Another v. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2008 (2) MPLJ, thus, once the Respondent No.5/Institute was receiving maintenance grant as well as block grant from the State Government under the provisions of Act of 1978 and Rules made thereunder, it doesn't lie in their mouth to deny applicability of the Act of 1978 over it.
[18] So far as the contention of the respondent No.5 with regard to maintainability of the petition, it was argued that the said contention runs contrary to the settled proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court from time to time including in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani , reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 and not only this, the act of imparting education being a sovereign function of the State, performed by Respondent No.5/Institute after receiving grant in-aid, therefore, in the light of the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 10 WP-20900-2024 decisions of the Apex Court in the matters of K. Krishnamacharyulu & Others v. Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering & Another reported in (1997) 3 SCC 571; Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab & Others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331, Dr. Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University & Others reported in (2015) 16 SCC 530; Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P. && Others reported in (2019) 6 SCC 441 and Marwari Balik Vidyalaya v. Asha Shrivastava & Others reported in (2020) 14 SCC 449 , the present writ petition is very well maintainable, even against non- aided private institutions.
[19] Learned counsel while refuting the reliance relied upon by the respondents in the matter of Ramkrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya reported in (2019) 16 SCC 303 submitted that the said decision, in fact, supports the claim of the petitioner with regard to maintainability of the writ petition against the Respondent No.5/Institute, as there the contract of service of an employee was governed and regulated by statutory provision of law, which is the case herein, therefore, the writ petition would be maintainable. Also, in the instant case, the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner is structured, regulated and governed not only by the Act of 1978, but also by the Statute 30 framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 38(1) read with Section 37 of the Rajeev Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1998 and as the services of the petitioner have been discontinued contrary the statutory provisions of law contained in Statute 30 as well as the Act of 1978 and the Rules made thereunder, the writ petition against Respondent No.5/Institute is quite maintainable. NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 11 WP-20900-2024 [20] On merits of the impugned order dated 16.7.2024, it was argued that the impugned order of discontinuation of petitioner's services on account of closure of the course of Electronics and Telecommunication from the Academic Year 2024-25 by making payment of 03 months' salary was wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the Provisions of Clause 33(1) of Statute 30, as the said Clause provides termination of service only on account of any misconduct committed by the employee, including wilful neglect of duty, a breach of the terms of contract, physical or mental unfitness, incompetence provided that plea of incompetence would not be used after 02 years of his confirmation and abolition of the post with prior approval of the Executive Council, thus, when closure of any course of study, as in the instant case, has not been specified as a ground for termination of a confirmed teacher, the termination of the petitioner's services on account of closure of course of Electronics and Telecommunication cannot be countenanced.
[21] It was further argued that the aforesaid Provision further provides that services of a confirmed teacher cannot be terminated without approval of the Executive Council and as it is not the case of abolition of the course, rather closure of course of studies, instead of terminating the services of the petitioner, he should have been relegated to serve in the Department of Electrical Engineering, which was still going on and from where, his salary was being drawn right from the date of his initial appointment till termination of his services.
[22] With regard to availability of alternative remedy of approaching NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 12 WP-20900-2024 to Tribunal as per Clause 42 of the College Code is concerned, it was argued that in every case, alternative remedy is no bar moreso where the impugned action challenged was on the ground of jurisdiction and violation of statutory provisions of law. In this regard, reliance was placed in the matters of Alok Kumar Choubey v. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2021 (1) MPLJ 348 (DB) and Sandeep Jain v. State of M.P. & Others [W.P. No.13260/2020, decided on 01.03.2021].
[23] Thus, summarising, it was submitted that impugned order dated 16.07.2024 being without jurisdiction, without any authority of law, inasmuch as no approval of Executive Council of Respondent No.3/University has been obtained as required under Clause 33(1) of Statute 30, there is no ground of closure of course of study under Statute 30 for terminating the services of a confirmed teacher and since the petitioner's appointment, financial up-gradations, payment of regular monthly salary and allowances all were regulated under the orders passed by the Respondent No.1/Department, therefore, services of the petitioner could not have been dispensed with in an arbitrary manner. It was therefore, prayed that the impugned order herein be quashed and the reliefs as sought be granted.
[24] Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.5 has argued that discontinuation of service of the petitioner with 03 months' notice is permissible under clause 33(2) of the College Code, as it is not a case of abolition of post covered under Clause 33(1)(v) of the College code, instead, it is the case of closure/abolition of the programme on account of diminishing student strength shown and under the college code, Clause NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 13 WP-20900-2024 12(14)(iii), the governing body is empowered to introduce new course and abolish new departments of studies and after due intimation to the AICTE, RGVP and Directorate of Technical Education.
[25] It was further argued that the respondent/Institute was not receiving 100% grant in-aid, which even the State Government in its reply had confirmed and besides that, the post of HOD in the Electronics and Telecommunication Department, where the petitioner was freshly appointed against vacant post on 03.10.2007 was a self-financed course where no funding was given by the State Government, which had also been accepted by the State Government in its reply, thus, when no funding was being received for the course of Electronics and Telecommunication from the State Government either full or partial, the closure of the said course and discontinuance of the services of the petitioner cannot be said to be bad in law.
[26] Learned cousel further submitted that in the year, 2000 the respondent No.5 was granted approval by AICTE for diploma course of Electronic and telecommunication with the intake permission of 60 seats (course duration three years). The said program was funded by the College itself and no grant in the form of aid or block grant was received from the Government, therefore, in the year 2002, permission was sought from the Board of Governors (Governing Body) of the College for sanction of posts for faculty for Electronic and telecommunication Diploma Course. Vide Minutes of Meeting dated 20.07.2002 sanction for faculty was granted for the total seats 180 seats for three years, which were as under:
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827
14 WP-20900-2024 a. HOD - 01 b. Lecturer Technical - 12 c. Lecturer nontechnical - 04 d. Instructor - 01 e. Maintenance Technician - 01 f. LDC - 01 g. Skilled Assistant - 01 h. Lab Assistant - 03 i. Peon - 02 [27] In the aforesaid backdrop, the program of diploma and Electronic and telecommunication came to be started in the respondent No.5/College.
[28] It was further argued that apart from the aforesaid program, the College also runs other diploma programs, which are self-financed, namely, Automobile Engineering, Chemical Engineering and Integrated Circuit Manufacturing (now closed) and the College also runs diploma programs for which the set up was provided by the Government and the College receives partial aid in the form of block grant for running only those courses and these programs are Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Computer Science Engineering and Electrical Engineering and against these programs, a meagre sum of block grant was received, which looking to the expenditure, is insignificant and though the aforesaid fact is not relevant for deciding the present controversy, it assumes importance for the reason that the program of Electronic and Telecommunication was not funded by the State Government, rather was a self-financed course. NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 15 WP-20900-2024 [29] It was further submitted that for the diploma course of Electronic and Telecommunication, the appointment of HOD was advertised in the year 2007, against which the petitioner was given appointment vide order dated 03.10.2007 and after completion of probation period, the services of t h e petitioner were confirmed on the said post with a condition that his services could be terminated with three months' notice or three months' salary in lieu of notice thereof, and as the performance of Electronic and Telecommunication diploma program was not very promising in the last ten years inasmuch as the student strength of all three years from 169 in the year 2015 came down to 16 in the year 2024 with the breakup of 05 students in the first year, 01 student in the second year and 10 students in the final year and final year's students having already graduated by successfully completing the diploma course in June 2024, also, the remaining students though promoted in the second year, but were not willing to continue in the Electronic and Telecommunication program and had placed their request for transfer into other diploma branches and only one student was left in the second year, who after successfully completing the said year, was into final year and was to be taught by the faculty of the sister concern, thus, there was no purpose in continuing with the said course.
[30] It was further submitted that from the aforesaid scenario, it could be gathered that the burden of maintaining the department including the salary expenditure of the faculty since was growing high, therefore, the Board of Governors of the College vide resolution dated 09.07.2024 resolved to close down the diploma program in Electronic and Telecommunication NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 16 WP-20900-2024 and discontinue the services of the faculty/ies by giving three months notice or advance salary in lieu of notice just to safeguard the precious financial condition of the College and it was resolved that no new admission shall be taken w.e.f. academic session 2024-25 and in pursuance to the aforesaid resolution, vide letter dated 15.07.2024, the respondent No.5 informed the A.I.C.T.E. about the decision of the Board of Governor to close down Electronic and Telecommunication diploma program and the seats in the said program were surrendered w.e.f. academic session 2024-25. Similarly, a letter dated 25.07.2024 was issued to the RGPV informing about closure of t h e Electronic and Telecommunication diploma program w.e.f. academic session 2024-25 and NOC was requested for the same. Further, the Department of Technical Education (DTE) was also informed vide letter dated 25.07.2024, which was duly acknowledged vide its letter dated 29.07.2024 wherein the course of Electronic and Telecommunication Diploma was shown to be closed. Thus, it was submitted that the decision of the Board of Governors vide letter dated 16.07.2024 to discontinue the services of the petitioner was due to closure of the program after making payment of three months to the petitioner.
[31] Apart from the submissions made on merits, it was further contended that the present petition, at the instance of the petitioner, is not maintainable. It was argued that respondents No. 4 and 5 are private entities and not public bodies, and therefore, are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court, as they cannot be regarded as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 17 WP-20900-2024 petitioner has not demonstrated the violation of any legal right or the breach of any legal or statutory duty owed to him by the said respondents, and consequently, no writ relief can be sought against them.
[32] It was further submitted that since the offending action complained of in the writ petition is purely in the realm of private law and does not entail public law element; as such, no cause of action accrues to the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, the petition being not maintainable deserves to be dismissed.
[33] It was further submitted that the petition is not maintainable for another reason of alternate remedy as provided under Clause 42 of the Statue 30 wherein different forum is provided for settlement of the disputes of the kind referred to in the petition, thus, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed being not maintainable without any merits.
[34] Learned counsel for the respondent No.3 has raised a limited ground that since the petitioner is relying on Statute 30 i.e. College Statute stating that before terminating his services, prior approval of Executive Council has not been taken, as per Clause 21 of College Code, it was required by the College to report the respondent No.3 immediately if there was any change in teaching staff, but since there was no reporting of the appointment of the petitioner made by the College, his termination was also not required to be reported and since such type of appointments is the business of the College, the respondent No.3 has no any role to play in the aforesaid termination.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 18 WP-20900-2024 [35] Further, it was argued that the respondent/institute is a private institute and the course in question was self-funded course and no fund was provided by either the Government or respondent No.3 and after its closure, it has also not been recognized by it and as such, the course has already been closed and there was no requirement of faculty, hence, such employees in the said Department for the said course have no right to continue and since the respondent No.3 has nothing to do with the appointment or termination of the petitioner, no relief as such can be claimed against the respondent No.3. It was thus submitted that the present petition be dismissed.
[36] Learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2/State had raised similar grounds with regard to maintainability of the present petition alleging that no public element is involved in the matter, also since the respondent No.5/institute is not owned and controlled by the State. It was submitted that the respondent No.5 is an autonomous body and is run by private trust/Society which is responsible to manage its affairs and the service conditions of the employees working in said institute are also regulated by the society and not by the State and therefore, the present petition be dismissed on this count alone.
[37] It was further submitted that the respondent No.5/institute is not a 100% grant-in-aid college, rather it is extended only limited grant in the form of block grant and such grant is extended on the budgetary estimate of expenses sent by the respondent No.5/institute to manage its expenses with regard to maintenance, infrastructure, courses, salary expenses etc. [38] It was further submitted that the respondent No.5 didn't received NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 19 WP-20900-2024 grant on the basis of the posts and as it is an autonomous private body, the State has no control over the service conditions of its employees, thus, the present petition being not maintainable against the State deserves to be dismissed.
[39] With regard to Electronic and Telecommunication Course, it was submitted that it was a self-financed program run by the respondent No.5/institute and was not funded by the State and in the matters where courses are not funded by the State, any action taken by the Institute of any kind is not the concern of the State and for the relief in that regard, the writ against the State would not be maintainable. It was, thus, prayed that the present petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed.
[40] Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION [41] The first and foremost question, which is posed before this Court to answer is that whether the respondent No.5/Institute/College being an aided Institute, is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not ?
[42] If the Authority/Body can be treated as a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, then in such circumstances, it goes without saying that a writ petition under Article 226 would be maintainable against such an Authority/Body for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental and other legal rights. Therefore, the definition contained in Article 12 is for the purpose of application of the provisions contained in Part III. Article 226 of the Constitution, which deals with NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 20 WP-20900-2024 powers of the High Courts to issue certain writs, inter alia, stipulates that every High Court has the power to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including, in appropriate cases, any Government, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other legal purpose.
[43] So far as Article 12 of the Constitution is concerned, the "State" includes "all local and other Authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India". The debate on the question as to which body would qualify as "other authority" & the test/principles applicable for ascertaining as to whether a particular body can be treated as "other authority" has been never ending. If such an authority violates the fundamental right or other legal rights of any person or citizen (as the case may be), a writ petition can be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and seeking appropriate direction, order or writ. However, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of the High Court is not limited to the Government or authority which qualifies to be "State" under Article 12. Power is extended to issue directions, orders or writs "to any person or authority". Again, this power of issuing directions, orders or writs is not limited to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but also "for any other purpose". Thus, power of the High Court takes within its sweep more "authorities" than stipulated in Article 12 and the subject-matter which can be dealt with under this Article is also wider in scope.
[44] In the matters of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 21 WP-20900-2024 Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. v. V. R. Rudani & Ors. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 691 and the other two judgments, in the matters of K. Krishnamacharyulu & Ors. v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering & Another reported in 1997 (3) SCC 571 and Satimbla Sharma v. St. Paul's Senior Secondary School reported in (2011) 13 SCC 760, similar issue has been dealt with.
[45] In the matter of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra) , dispute arose between the Trust which was managing and running science college and teachers of the said college. It pertained to payment of certain employment related benefits like basic pay, etc. The matter was referred to the Chancellor of Gujarat University for his decision. The Chancellor passed an award, which was accepted by the University as well as the State Government and a direction was issued to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the said award. However, the aforesaid Trust running the science college did not implement the award. Teachers filed the writ petition seeking mandamus and direction to the Trust to pay them their dues of salary, allowances, provident fund and gratuity in accordance therewith. It is in this context an issue arose as to whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable against the said Trust which was admittedly not a statutory body or authority under Article 12 of the Constitution as it was a private Trust running an educational institution. The High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable and the said view was upheld by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. In paras 14, 16 and 19, it was held as under:-
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 22 WP-20900-2024
"14. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellant Trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as government aid. Public money paid as government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating university. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. [ See The Evolving Indian Administrative Law by M.P. Jain (1983) p. 266.] So are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 23 WP-20900-2024 management. When there is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party.
15. xxx xxx xxx
16. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The 'public authority' for them means everybody which is created by statute--and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all 'public authorities'. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of mandamus'. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to 'any person or authority'. It can be issued 'for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose'.
17. xxx xxx xxx
18. xxx xxx xxx
19. The term 'authority' used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning like the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 24 WP-20900-2024 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non- fundamental rights. The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied."
[46] In para 14, the Apex Court spelt out two exceptions to the writ of mandamus viz. (i) if the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus can be issued; and (ii) if the management of the college is purely a private body "with no public duty", mandamus will not lie. It was clarified that since the Trust in the said case was an aided institution, because of this reason, it discharged public function, like government institution, by way of imparting education to students, more particularly when rules and regulations of the affiliating university were applicable to such an institution, being an aided institution. In such a situation, it was held that the service conditions of academic staff were not purely of a private character as the staff had super-added protection by university's decision creating a legal right and duty relationship between the staff and the management. Further, NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 25 WP-20900-2024 the Apex Court explained in para 19 that the term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, would receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12, inasmuch as Article 12 was relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32, whereas Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights, but also non-fundamental rights. What is relevant is the dicta of the Court that the term "authority" appearing in Article 226 of the Constitution would cover any other person or body performing public duty. The guiding factor, therefore, is the nature of duty imposed on such a body, namely, public duty to make it exigible to Article 226.
[47] In the matter of K. Krishnamacharyulu (supra) , it was again emphasised that where there is an interest created by the Government in an institution to impart education, which is a fundamental right of the citizens, the teachers who impart the education get an element of public interest in performance of their duties and in such a situation, remedy provided under Article 226 would be available to the teachers.
[48] Both the decisions pertain to educational institutions and in the said cases, the function of imparting education was treated as the performance of the public duty, that too by those bodies where, the aided institutions were discharging the said functions like Government institutions and the interest was created by the Government in such institutions to impart education.
[49] In the matter of Satimbla Sharma (supra), the school involved therein received grant-in-aid from the Government of Himachal Pradesh for NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 26 WP-20900-2024 the period between 1967 and 1976. From the year 1977-1978, the Government of Himachal Pradesh stopped the grant-in-aid and in such circumstances, the teachers of the school were paid less than the teachers of the Government schools and the Government-aided schools in the State of Himachal Pradesh, which led to filing of a writ petition before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh seeking a direction to pay the salary and allowances at par with the teachers of Government schools and the Government-aided schools. The learned Single Judge directed the respondents therein to pay to the writ petitioners therein salary and allowances at par with their counterparts working in the Government schools from the dates, they were entitled to and at the rates admissible from time to time, which was challenged in letters patent appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The said appeal came to be allowed and the writ petition filed by the teachers was dismissed.
[50] The said order was challenged before the Apex Court and while disposing of the appeal, it was held in paras 25, 26, 27 and 29 as under:
"25. Where a statutory provision casts a duty on a private unaided school to pay the same salary and allowances to its teachers as are being paid to teachers of governmentaided schools, then a writ of mandamus to the school could be issued to enforce such statutory duty. But in the present case, there was no statutory provision requiring a private unaided school to pay to its teachers the same salary and allowances as were payable to teachers of government NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827
27 WP-20900-2024 schools and therefore a mandamus could not be issued to pay to the teachers of private recognised unaided schools the same salary and allowances as were payable to teachers of government institutions.
26. In K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg., (1997) 3 SCC 571 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 841, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, executive instructions were issued by the Government that the scales of pay of Laboratory Assistants as nonteaching staff of private colleges shall be on a par with the government employees and this Court held that even though there were no statutory rules, the Laboratory Assistants as non-teaching staff of private college were entitled to the parity of the pay scales as per the executive instructions of the Government and the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide enough to issue a writ for payment of pay on a par with government employees. In the present case, there are no executive instructions issued by the Government requiring private schools to pay the same salary and allowances to their teachers as are being paid to teachers of government schools or government-aided schools.
27. We cannot also issue a mandamus to Respondents 1 and 2 on the ground that the conditions of provisional NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 28 WP-20900-2024 affiliation of schools prescribed by the Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations stipulate in Clause (5)(b) that the salary and allowances and other benefits of the staff of the affiliated school must be comparable to that prescribed by the State Department of Education because such conditions for provisional affiliation are not statutory provisions or executive instructions, which are enforceable in law. Similarly, we cannot issue a mandamus to give effect to the recommendations of the Report of Education Commission 1964-1966 that the scales of pay of school teachers belonging to the same category but working under different managements such as Government, local bodies or private managements should be the same, unless the recommendations are incorporated in an executive instruction or a statutory provision. We, therefore, affirm the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.
28. We, however, find that the 2009 Act has provisions in Section 23 regarding the qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service of teachers and subsection (3) of Section 23 of the 2009 Act provides that the salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of, teachers shall be such as may be prescribed. Section 38 of the 2009 Act empowers the NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 29 WP-20900-2024 appropriate Government to make rules and Section 38(2)(l) of the 2009 Act provides that the appropriate Government, in particular, may make rules prescribing the salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of teachers, under sub-section (3) of Section 23. Section 2(a) defines "appropriate Government" as the State Government within whose territory the school is established.
29. The State of Himachal Pradesh, Respondent 3 in this appeal, is thus empowered to make rules under subsection (3) of Section 23 read with Section 38(2)(l) of the 2009 Act prescribing the salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of, teachers. Article 39(d) of the Constitution provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women.
Respondent 3 should therefore consider making rules under Section 23 read with Section 38(2)(l) of the 2009 Act prescribing the salary and allowances of teachers keeping in mind Article 39(d) of the Constitution as early as possible."
[51] In one of the recent pronouncements of the Apex Court in the case of St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors. reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498 , the entire law on the subject has been discussed threadbare. In the said case, the Apex Court has held that while a private unaided minority institution might be touching the spheres of public NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 30 WP-20900-2024 function by performing a public duty, its employees have no right of invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of matters relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provision.
[52] Considering all the recent case laws, the Apex Court in the matter o f Army Welfare Education Society New Delhi vs Sunil Kumar Sharma passed in Civil Appeal Nos.7256-7259 of 2024 [arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 3138-3141 of 2021)], dated 9th of July, 2024 while dealing with similar matter involving private unaided institution held that the High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondents therein holding that the appellant society is a "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution, as imparting education though involves public duty and therefore, public law element could be said to be involved therein, however, the relationship between the respondents therein and the appellant society was that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract and if there was a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents therein, but herein case, the society managing the affiliated respondent No.5/college was paid public money by the Government in the form of maintenance grant/block grant and in a way, public money paid as Government aid played a vital role in control maintenance and working of the Respondent No.5/Institution. Respondent No.5/Institution like Govt. Institutions thus could be said to have been discharging public function by NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 31 WP-20900-2024 way of imparting education to the students and it is subjected to rules and regulations of the affiliating university. The activities of the institutions are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such a case, therefore, cannot be said to be devoid of any public character, so are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff thus cannot be said to be purely of a private character, rather it has a super-added protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management and when there is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party. However, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty and the 'public authority' for them means everybody which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined under statute, so government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all 'public authorities', but there is no such limitation for High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of mandamus' and Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. Thus, according to this Court the present writ seeking relief of quashment of the order of discontinuance of service and reinstatement the petitioner back in service on the post of Head of the Department (HOD), Electronic and Telecommunication or in the Department of Electrical Engineering by granting him all consequential and monetary benefits, would be maintainable.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 32 WP-20900-2024 [53] So far as availability of alternate remedy is concerned, this Court has in preceeding paras held that Respondent No. 5/Institution, though not a statutory body within the meaning of Article 12, is engaged in public functions, receives substantial Government aid, and is subject to close supervision of the affiliating University. Its actions infringing the personal, legal rights of the petitioner, therefore, would attract the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the objection raised by the respondents regarding availability of an alternative remedy under Clause 42 of the College Code would not be absolute bar, thus, the objection stands rejected. The judgments in Alok Kumar Choubey v. State of M.P., 2021 (1) MPLJ 348 (DB), and Sandeep Jain v. State of M.P. (W.P. No. 13260/2020, decided on 01.03.2021), make it clear that where allegations pertain to jurisdictional error, violation of statutory provisions, or breach of natural justice, the existence of an alternate remedy cannot bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
[54] Further, the Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Jahan Khan, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 88 has held as under :
12. Before parting with the case, we may also deal with the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that a remedy by way of an appeal being available to the respondent, the High Court ought not to have entertained his petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
There is no gainsaying that in a given case, the High Court NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 33 WP-20900-2024 may not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot be said to be of universal application. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ court may still exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, in at least three contingencies, namely, (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or
(iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In these circumstances, an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and Sanjana M. Wig v.
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.).
[55] In light of the foregoing discussion and the settled position of law, this Court holds that the respondent institution, though not a statutory body, is engaged in the discharge of public functions and receives substantial financial assistance from the Government. The extent of State control, coupled with the public character of its duties, is sufficient to attract the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 34 WP-20900-2024 Accordingly, the writ petition is maintainable, and the existence of an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar to the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in the present case.
[56] Before adverting to the merits, it is apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of Statute-30 governing the service conditions of the petitioner.
[57] Clause 20 which forms part of Part V of Statute-30 deals with the Teachers of the College reads as under:-
"20. (1) No appointment to any teaching post in the college, including the post of the Principal but excluding part-time appointments, temporary appointments which are not to continue for more than six months and appointments to posts which are to be filled by promotion, shall be made except.
(a) after duly and widely advertising the post together with the minimum qualifications as prescribed by the All India Council for Technical Education, therefore and the emoluments of the post and allowing the reasonable time within which the applicants may in response to the advertisements, submit their applications;
(b) on the recommendation of the Selection committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 17 below for the "Non-grantee colleges" and the Rules framed under Madhya Pradesh Ashasakiya Shikshan Sanstha NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827
35 WP-20900-2024 (Adhyapakon tatha Karmachariyon ke vetano ka sandya) Adhiniyam 1978 for "Grantee Colleges".
(2) No appointment to the post of Principal shall be made except with the prior approval of the Executive Council.
(3) No person shall be appointed to any teaching post including that of the Principal unless he possess the minimum qualifications prescribed for the post by the All India Council of Technical Education and approved by the State Government from time to time.
(4) Every change in teaching staff of the college shall be immediately reported to the University by the Principal."
[58] Sub-Clause 2 and 3(i) of Clause 24 of the Statute-30 reads as under:
(2) The work of the probationer is found to be unsatisfactory and he is not informed for the same by the Governing Body at least one month before the expiry of the probation period, the probationer shall be deemed to have been confirmed in his appointment on the expiry of the period of probation.
(3) (i) Every teacher other than the teacher appointed on part-time or temporary basis shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed in the Appendix. A copy of the contract shall be given to the teacher and a copy NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827
36 WP-20900-2024 shall be lodged with the University:
(ii) ........ ............ ................ ........... ............ .......... .
[59] Clauses 33 and 42 of the Statute-30 read as under:
33.(1) The service of a teacher other than person appointed on temporary or part-time basis or on probation shall not be terminated after confirmation except on the following grounds and without the approval of the Executive Council.
(i) Misconduct including willful neglect of duty.
(ii) A Breach of the terms of the contract.
(iii) Physical or mental unfitness.
(iv) Incompetence provided that the plea of incompetence shall not be used against a teacher after two years of his confirmation.
(v) Abolition of the post with the prior approval of the Executive Council.
Provided that termination of service on any ground falling under (i) or (iv) above shall not be ordered without holding an inquiry in which the teacher is given a statement of charges against him and is afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
Provided also that action to terminate the service of a teacher on the ground of physical or mental unfitness shall NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 37 WP-20900-2024 not be taken except on the basis of a report of Medical Board of the State Government.
(2) Except where the services of a teacher are terminated on the ground of misconduct including neglect of duty or breach of the terms of the contract neither the Governing Body nor the teacher shall terminate the agreement except by giving to the other party three calendar month's notice or by paying to the other party a sum equal to thrice the monthly salary which the teacher concerned is than earning. The period of notice shall not include the summer vacation or any part thereof.
Clause 42. Any dispute arising out of the contract of service between the Governing Body of the College and any of its teachers shall at the request of the teacher or the Governing Body be referred by the Kulpati to a tribunal consisting of one nominee of the Kulpati other than a member of the Executive Council who shall be the Chairman and one nominee each of the teacher and the Governing Body and the decision of the tribunal shall be final.
[60] As per Clause 20, appointments to teaching posts shall be made only after due advertisement, adherence to AICTE qualifications, and recommendations of a duly constituted Selection Committee.
[ 6 1 ] In pursuance of the aforesaid provisions, the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Lecturer in the Electrical Engineering NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 38 WP-20900-2024 Department of respondent No.5-College pursuant to an advertisement dated 14.09.1995. Although his initial engagement was on an ad hoc basis vide order dated 03.01.1989, he was subsequently appointed on a regular basis. Thereafter, vide order dated 15.02.2001, the petitioner was appointed as In- charge Head of the Electronics and Telecommunication Department and his services were temporarily transferred from the Electrical Engineering Department. Subsequently, pursuant to a fresh advertisement dated 09.02.2007 and a duly conducted selection process for the post of Head of Department (Electronics and Telecommunication), the petitioner was selected and appointed to the said post vide order dated 03.10.2007 on probation for a period of one year.
[62] In view of Clause 24(2) of Statute-30, where a probationer is not informed about the unsatisfactory nature of his work at least one month prior to the expiry of the probation period, he shall be deemed to have been confirmed upon completion of probation. Admittedly, no such intimation was issued to the petitioner and, accordingly, his services stood confirmed, which was formally recorded vide order dated 23.02.2010.
[63] The order of confirmation specifically provided that the services of the petitioner could be terminated by either side by giving three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof. This condition is in consonance with Clause 33(2) of Statute-30, which stipulates that, except in cases of termination on the ground of misconduct, neglect of duty, or breach of contract, neither the Governing Body nor the teacher shall terminate the contract except by giving three calendar months' notice or by payment of salary equivalent thereto. NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 39 WP-20900-2024 [64] It is not the petitioner's case that his service conditions are not governed by Statute-30, which were framed vide Notification dated 10.04.2007 in exercise of powers conferred under Section 38(1) read with Section 37 of the Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1998. The said Statute governs Autonomous Colleges as well as Private Colleges running on self-financing schemes. Clause 3 thereof provides that the College Code shall apply to all colleges admitted to the privileges of the University, except those maintained or managed by the State Government, a Municipal Corporation, or the University itself.
[65] Since respondent No.5-Institute is admittedly affiliated to the Rajiv Gandhi Proudyogiki Vishwavidyalaya, it stands admitted to the privileges of the University. Consequently, the provisions of Statute-30 are fully applicable to respondent No.5.
[66] The grievance of the petitioner, therefore, left is that the order of discontinuation of his services is in violation of the mandatory provisions of Statute-30 and is without jurisdiction, as none of the grounds enumerated under Clause 33(1) existed. It is contended that there was neither any allegation of misconduct, willful neglect of duty, breach of contract, physical or mental unfitness, incompetence, nor abolition of the post with prior approval of the Executive Council. The petitioner asserts that mere discontinuation on account of closure of the course is not contemplated under Clause 33 and, since the institute was allegedly 100% grant-in-aid, closure of the course could not have resulted in discontinuance of staff.
[67] In this regard, the reply filed by the State assumes significance. NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 40 WP-20900-2024 The State has categorically clarified that respondent No.5-Institute was extended only a limited grant in the form of a block grant, based on budgetary estimates submitted by the Institute for meeting expenses relating to maintenance, infrastructure, and certain courses. It has further been clarified that no post-wise or salary-specific grant was sanctioned. In light of the aforesaid, if the post held by the petitioner is seen, it pertained to a self- financed course, the closure of the said department and consequent discontinuation of services thus cannot be said to be illegal. The contention that the petitioner ought to have been absorbed back into the Electrical Engineering Department, in view of the fact that he was substantively appointed as HOD, Electronics and Telecommunication Department with a stipulation that he could be removed after giving 03 months notice or salary therefore, is devoid of any merits.
[68] From the record, it is an admitted position that the Electronics and Telecommunication course was a self-financed course and was not included within the scope of the block grant, which extended only to certain departments such as Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Computer Science, and Electrical Engineering and as per the respondents, even the block grant sanctioned did not cover the entire expenditure of the aided departments and constituted only a marginal portion of the total expenses. This factual assertion has not been controverted by the petitioner.
[69] The petitioner's reliance on the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Shikshan Sanstha Adhiniyam, 1978, as amended by the Amendment Act No.26 of 2000, to contend that the State was obliged to NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 41 WP-20900-2024 release 100% maintenance grant for payment of salary, is wholly misconceived, as the block grant was sanctioned only for specified courses and did not include the Electronics and Telecommunication Department, which was admittedly self-financed.
[70] The petitioner's contention that his appointment was against a government-sanctioned post, that he was extended benefits under the Career Advancement Scheme, and his name appeared in a list of employees allegedly forming part of the government setup, whose salaries were disbursed through a nationalised bank and the Institute had sought grant-in- aid from the State for payment of his salary, is concerned, the aforeasaid argumets do not withstand the judicial scrutiny, as though the petitioner was initially appointed as a Lecturer but later on in the year, 2007 upon fresh a advertisement for appointment on the post of Head of the Electronics and Telecommunication Department, the petitioner was substantively appointed after successfully completion of the probation period and he was availing all the benefits of HOD thereafter. The benefits of Career Advancement Scheme were extended to the petitioner not because the post of the petitioner was government sanctioned post, but were extended by virtue of the decision of the Board of Governors of the institution to adopt the career advancement scheme for the staff in their institution. The list, which has been relied upon by the petitioner allegedly obtained under RTI to show that the name of the petitioner appeared in the list of employees of the government setup, the institute had specifically denied about ever issuance of such list under the RTI. It has also been stated that the said documents doesn't contain NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26827 42 WP-20900-2024 signatures of any officer under the RTI and had alleged that the list so appended alongwith rejoinder were self-serving documents prepared by the petitioner himself when he was serving as a Principle. This allegation has gone uncontroverted, thus, it could be unsafe to rely on those documents.
[71] In the totality of the circumstances, the petitioner has failed to establish any violation of statutory or constitutional provisions. The decision to discontinue his services was founded on financial and academic considerations and does not suffer from illegality, arbitrariness, or perversity.
[72] For the reasons stated hereinabove, the writ petition fails on merits and is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) JUDGE Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR, 2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34d631287f1b1cdd90b4a4 pwn* 9f265f02d9d593f, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID - 7064434, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh, serialNumber=61b9d129971d2ea4fd4455ed49ea436ea65e26164bee ed89153191c56e98ce21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR Date: 2025.12.17 15:59:10 +05'30'