Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Premraj Kannaujiya And Another on 17 May, 2017
Author: Vijay Lakshmi
Bench: Vijay Lakshmi
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 52 Case :- GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 2468 of 2017 Appellant :- State Of U.P. Respondent :- Premraj Kannaujiya And Another Counsel for Appellant :- G.A. Hon'ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi,J.
The State has filed this appeal under Section 378 (3) Cr.P.C. along with an application seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 30.1.2017, passed by Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bareilly in S.S.T. No.303/13, State Vs. Premraj Kannaujiya and another arising out of Case Crime No.787A/12, Police Station-Cantt, District-Bareilly, whereby the learned trial court has acquitted the accused-respondents from the charges under Sections 406,504 and 506 I.P.C.
Heard learned counsel for the appellant. Perused the records.
Some relevant facts in brief are that the first informant Shanker Lal who was a fourth class employee at District Hospital, Bareilly and a member of scheduled caste, retired from his post on 31.7.2010. At the time of retirement, he received a large amount of money as provident fund and gratuity etc. On 28.11.2010, the accused respondents came to his house and asked him to lend them Rs.6 lakhs for buying a tractor with promise that they will return the money within four-five months. The first informant, believing on their words, gave them Rs.6 lakhs in two installments each of Rs.3,00,000/- drawing the aforesaid amount from his bank account of S.B.I. However, after expiry of five months, when he asked for his money, the accused Premraj returned only 90,000/- on 15.1.2011 and Rs.10,000/- on 17.1.2011 and promised to return back the remaining amount after two or three months. But, on 15.4.2012, when the first informant reached his house and claimed his money, accused-respondents denied the same and used abusive language indicating his caste. They also threatened him with dire consequences.
On the basis of the F.I.R., the investigation and thereafter the trial proceeded and ultimately it culminated in the impugned judgment, acquitting the accused respondents.
Learned A.G.A. has contended that the first informant in his statement and also in the F.I.R. has clearly stated that he had lent the amount to the accused-respondents after withdrawing it from his bank account of S.B.I., but the Investigating Officer did not even bothered to file the copies of his bank statements in proof of the prosecution case. It is further contended that even the court below failed to summon the bank statements of informant under Section 311 Cr.P.C., which it was empowered to do even suo motu.
A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the court below has recorded a clear finding that the amount withdrawn by the first informant from the bank was not given to the accused persons, but it was invested in Viza Rave Company, in proof of which Paper Nos.43 kha/2 and 43 kha/3 were filed by the defence. The defence had also produced two witnesses who were found reliable by the learned trial court.
To the contrary, the prosecution could not produce any cogent and reliable evidence regarding lending of money to the accused-respondents.
On the aforesaid grounds, the learned trial court acquitted the accused-respondents.
A careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment shows that the trial court has properly appreciated the evidence. The judgment is well discussed and is based on sound reasons. There does not appear any illegality or perversity in the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial court. I do not find any factual or legal error in the assessment of evidence by the court below in so far as the acquittal of accused-respondents is concerned. The view taken by the court below is a reasonably possible view. The court below has given cogent, convincing and satisfactory reasons while acquitting the respondents and the impugned judgment and order passed by the court below does not suffer from any infirmity, requiring any interference by this appellate court.
It is always to be kept in mind that the golden thread which runs through the administration of criminal justice while hearing the appeal against the acquittal is that even if two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing towards the acquittal of the accused and other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be accepted and the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed by the appellate court.
In Mahadeo Laxman Sarane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 705, it has been held as under:
"It is true, that the settled legal position is that in an appeal against acquittal the High Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal if on the basis of the same evidence two views are reasonably possible-one in favour of the accused and the other against him. In such a case if the trial court takes a view in favour of the accused, the High Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal."
In C. Antony Vs. K.G.Raghavan Nair, (2003) 1 SCC 1, the Apex Court has observed as following:-
"Unless the findings of trial court are perverse or contrary to the material on record, High Court cannot, in appeal, substitute its finding merely because another contrary opinion was possible on the basis of the material on record."
In Sirajuddin Vs. State of Karnataka, (1980) 4 SCC 375, the Apex Court has reiterated the same principle in the following words:-
"Where trial Court's order of acquittal is based on a reasonably possible view, High court should not, as a rule of prudence, disturb the acquittal."
Considering the facts and circumstances in wake of the above cited legal position, I do not consider it to be a fit case for grant of leave to appeal to the applicant. The application seeking leave to appeal is, accordingly, rejected and, consequently the appeal is also dismissed.
Order Date :-17.5.2017-SB