Bombay High Court
Shri Shyamsunder Radheshyam Agarwal vs State Of Maharashtra on 8 February, 2013
Author: Naresh H. Patil
Bench: Naresh H. Patil, A. R. Joshi
skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 4036 OF 2012
Shri Shyamsunder Radheshyam Agarwal ]
Adult, Occupation Business, ]
Residing at 3/18, Ram Mandir Road, ]
Bhayandar (W), Thane 401 101 ] ....Petitioner
versus
1. State of Maharashtra ]
And ]
2. Shri Bhupendra Ghisulal Borana
ig ]
Adult, Occupation Business, ]
Residing at 2, Janki Heritage, ]
Bhayandar (W), Thane 401 101 ] ..Respondents
Mr. A. A. Kumbhakoni i/b. Mr. Sandesh D. Patil for Petitioner.
Mrs. M. M. Deshmukh - APP for State / Respondent No. 1.
Mr. Vivek Kantawala with Mr. Vivek M. Sharma and Ms. Bhairavi
Waravdekar i/b. M/s. Vivek Kantawala & Co. for Respondent No. 2.
CORAM : NARESH H. PATIL &
A. R. JOSHI, JJ.
Date of Reserving the Judgment : 30.01.2013
Date of Pronouncing the Judgment : 08.02.2013
JUDGMENT :(Per : NARESH H. PATIL, J.)
1. Rule, returnable forthwith Heard finally by consent of the parties.
2. The petitioner challenges the judgment and order dated 1/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 16.10.2012 in Criminal Revision No. 142 of 2012 passed by the Ad-hoc District Judge - 3 and Addl. Sessions Judge, Thane.
3. It is the contention of the petitioner that he entered into an agreement with the respondent no. 2 Mr. Bhupendra Ghisulal Borana on 27.10.2009 in respect of plot of land bearing Old Survey No. 118, New Survey No. 113, Hissa No. 1, admeasuring about 2601 sq. yards of Village Bhayander, Taluka and District Thane. Under the agreement total consideration was fixed at Rupees Two Crores. According to the petitioner, the respondent no. 2 Mr. Bhupendra Ghisulal Borana paid certain amount to the petitioner from 26.10.2009 to 28.10.2009, details of which are mentioned in paragraph 2 of the petition. The petitioner placed on record a copy of agreement executed between the parties on 27.10.2009 at Exhibit 'A'.
4. The petitioner contends that in the year 2012 the respondent no.2 Mr. Bhupendra Borana filed an application Exhibit '269' in Special Civil Suit no. 436 of 2012 earlier bearing R.C.S. No. 69 of 2007 interalia contending that the petitioner had executed one agreement in his favour dated 30.12.2009. The said agreement is titled as agreement for development cum sale. The petitioner placed on record copy of the said agreement at Exhibit 'B'. According to the petitioner the said 2/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 agreement executed on 30.12.2009 clearly shows that it is per se forged agreement. According to the petitioner the signature of the petitioner is forged by respondent no.2 on the said agreement. The receipt clause of the said document is forged one. The said document appears to be executed before notary but the notarised register number which is mandatory is not mentioned in the said document. According to the petitioner the stamps of notary are also forged. The receipt clause does not bear signature of any witness and the signature of the petitioner on the receipt clause is undoubtedly forged.
5. The contention of the petitioner that as soon as the petitioner came to know, the petitioner filed complaint to Bhayander Police Station on 9.7.2012, on 7.9.2012, to the Sr. P.I. Bhayander Police Station, on 10.9.2012 to the Superintendent of Police, Thane. The petitioner had preferred a writ petition in the High Court bearing writ petition no. 3343 of 2012 praying for certain directions for registering a FIR against the accused therein. Prior to filing of the present writ petition, the petitioner had approached the Superintendent of Police Thane Rural. The Superintendent of Police, Thane had directed the Economic Offences Wing, Thane to investigate into the matter.
The Economic Offences Wing directed registration of FIR against the present respondent no. 2. The first information 3/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 report was registered against the accused under the provisions of sections 420, 465, 467, 471, 34 of Indian Penal Code.
6. The petitioner contends that the respondent no.2 had filed one complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Thane, bearing No. OMA 546/2012. In the said complaint it was contended by the respondent no. 2 that he had purchased the property in question from the present petitioner vide an agreement dated 30.12.2009. It was further ig contended that inspite of the order of status quo granted by the Civil Court on 5.10.2009 the present petitioner had induced the respondent no.2 into parting with Rupees Fifty lakhs and entered into the agreement dated 30.12.2009.
7. The petitioner intervened in the proceedings of the complaint and pointed out several documents to the Judicial Magistrate First Class and prayed that no order be passed as prayed for in the said complaint. The Judicial Magistrate First Class on 8.8.2012 passed an order thereby rejecting the prayer for direction under section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code ("Code"), however the Judicial Magistrate First Class had directed the complaint to be put up for verification under section 200 of Code. The petitioner has annexed copy of the complaint along with copy of the order at Exhibits 'E' and 'F'.
4/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 :::skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12
8. The respondent no.2 challenged the said order in a criminal revision application bearing No.142 of 2012 in the Court of Sessions Judge, Thane. The petitioner was not joined as a party respondent to the said criminal revision application.
9. By an order dated 16.10.2012 the Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, allowed the revision application and held that the trial court erred in refusing to issue directions under section 156(3) of the Code. The order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class on 8.8.2012 below Exhibit '1' in OMA No. 546/2010 was set aside and the concerned police station was directed to investigate in the matter under section 156(3) of the Code.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Kumbhakoni submitted that the present petitioner was a necessary party to the proceedings of the revision application. The moment the order was passed on 8.8.2012 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class refusing to issue orders under section 156(3) of the Code the petitioner accrued a right to be heard in the criminal revision application filed by the respondent no. 2. The petitioner had suffered prejudice as in absence of petitioner's participation the learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the criminal revision application filed by the respondent no. 2 and 5/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 directed investigation by taking recourse to the provisions under section 156(3) of the Code. In the submissions of the learned counsel even though only prayer made in the complaint filed by the respondent no.2 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class was for grant of relief in respect of directions under section 156(3) of the Code, the Judicial Magistrate First Class had power and discretion to decline to pass an order under section 156 and to resort to proceedings envisaged under section 200 of the Code. The powers of the Magistrate cannot be curtailed by the nature of prayers made in the complaint.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of (I) Mona Panwar vs. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad through its Registrar and Ors. [(2011) 3 Supreme Court Cases 496, (II) Raghu Raj Singh Rousha vs. Shivam Sundaram Promoters Private Limited & Anr. [(2009)2 Supreme Court Cases 363] and (III) Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia & Anr. vs. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel & Ors. [2012(9) Scale 671]
12. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 Shri Vivek Kantawala submitted that the Magistrate's discretion and jurisdiction shall relate to the prayers made in the complaint.
6/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 :::skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 The Judicial Magistrate First Class could not have over stepped the jurisdiction and post the complaint for verification of complainant under section 200 of the Code on the next date.
The respondent no. 2 - original complainant before the Judicial Magistrate First Class had prayed for the only relief in respect of directions to Bhayander police station or any other concerned police station under section 156(3) of the Code to investigate the above crime. The Magistrate had not taken any cognizance of the complaint and therefore there is no question of the present petitioner being made party respondent to the revision application before the Sessions Court. In the submissions of the counsel, the petitioner was not at all a necessary party to the proceedings of the revision application.
It was further submitted that it is for the complainant to decide as to whether he should pray for relief under section 156(3) of the Code or his application is to be treated as a regular complaint. Section 200 of the Code does not provide a particular format of the application of the petitioner to be filed before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. It is a settled principle that the court could normally grant relief to the party as per his prayer. The learned counsel referred to Judgment of the Full Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Panchabhai Popatbhai Butani & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2010(1) Bom. C.R. (Cri.)1)] 7/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12
13. We have perused the copy of complaint, the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class on 8.8.2012, the impugned order dated 16.10.2012 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Thane and other relevant documents. We have perused the judgments cited supra.
14. The handwritten order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class is reflected on the first page of the complaint. The Magistrate under the order observed that the complainant's documents filed on record were perused. The advocate for complainant was heard. The Magistrate did not find it necessary to invoke powers under section 156(3) of the Code, hence the Magistrate directed putting up the matter for verification of the complainant under section 200 of the Code on the next date.
15. The order clearly mentions that the Magistrate had declined to grant relief to the respondent no. 2- complainant directing investigation under section 156(3) of the Code. At the same time, Judicial Magistrate First Class had posted the matter on the next date for verification of the complainant. Considering the scheme of provisions of section 156 and 200 of the Code and the facts of the case, we are of the view that the powers on 8/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 the Magistrate while passing orders on a complaint cannot be restricted to the prayer made in the complaint. The Magistrate is entitled to exercise judicial discretion in consonance with the contentions raised in the complaint and scheme of the Code and the relevant provisions of law. Submissions that the Magistrate in the present set of facts was not entitled to pass an order for verification of the complainant under section 200 of the Code are not sustainable.
16. The core issue raised by the petitioner is in respect of non joinder of the necessary party to the proceedings of criminal revision application. It is settled principle that the cognizance takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of offence. "Taking cognizance of " means "cognizance of an offence and not of the offender." At the time when the complaint was presented before the Magistrate, two options were available (i) to pass order under section 156(3) of the Code and (ii) to take recourse to procedure enunciated under the provisions of Section 200 of the Code i.e. examination of the complainant on oath and the witnesses present and proceed further in accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 200 of the Code. In the present case the Magistrate after perusal of the record placed and applying mind reached conclusion not to order for investigation under section 156(3) of 9/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 the Code but to resort to procedure prescribed under section 200 of the Code. The Magistrate therefore has taken cognizance while resorting to the procedure under section 200 of the Code. In the facts of the present case the present petitioner - original respondent to the complaint was entitled to be heard before the Sessions Court.
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mona Panwar (cited supra). The Supreme court has observed in paragraphs 18, 22 and 23 as under :
"18. When the complaint was presented before the appellant, the appellant had mainly two options available to her. One was to pass an order as contemplated by Section 156(3) of the Code and the second one was to direct examination of the complainant upon oath and the witnesses present, if any, as mentioned in Section 200 and proceed further with the matter as provided by Section 202 of the Code. An order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with the final report either under Section 169 or submission of charge- sheet under Section 173 of the Code. A Magistrate 10/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 can under Section 190 of the Code before taking cognizance ask for investigation by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The Magistrate can also issue warrant for production, before taking cognizance. If after cognizance has been taken and the Magistrate wants any investigation, it will be under Section 202 of the Code.
22. The judicial discretion exercised by the appellant was in consonance with the scheme postulated by the Code. There is no material on the record to indicate ig that the judicial discretion exercised by the appellant was either arbitrary or perverse. There was no occasion for the learned Single Judge of the High Court to substitute the judicial direction exercised by the appellant merely because another view is possible. The appellant was the responsible judicial officer on the spot and after assessing the material placed before her she had exercised the judicial discretion. In such circumstances this Court is of the opinion that the High Court had no occasion to interfere with discretion exercised judiciously in terms of the provisions of the Code.
23. Normally, an order under Section 200 of the Code for examination of the complainant and his witnesses would not be passed because it consumes the valuable time of the Magistrate being vested in inquiring into the matter which primarily is the duty of the police to investigate. However, the practice 11/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 which has developed over the years is that examination of the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would be directed by the Magistrate only when a case is found to be a serious one and not as a matter of routine course. If on a reading of a complaint the Magistrate finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code will not be conducive to justice, he will be justified in adopting the course suggested in Section 200 of the Code."
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raghu Raj Singh Rousha (cited supra). The Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs 9 and 11 as under :
"9. A person intending to set the criminal law in motion inter alia may file an application under Section 156(3) of the Code. When a first information report is lodged, a police officer has the requisite jurisdiction to investigate into the cognizable offence in terms of Section 156(1) of the Code. Where, however a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code, he may also direct that such investigation be carried out in terms thereof.
11. One of the questions which arises for consideration is as to whether the learned 12/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. Indisputably, if he had taken cognizance of the offence and merely issuance of summons upon the accused persons had been postponed, in a criminal revision filed on behalf of the complainant, the accused was entitled to be heard before the High Court."
19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manharibai Muljibhai Kakadia (cited supra). The Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs 56, 57 and 58 as under :
"56 In Raghu Raj Singh Rousha, a two-Judge Bench of this Court was faced with a question whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code was justified in passing an order in the absence of the accused persons. That was a case where a complaint was filed under Section 200 of the Code in respect of offences punishable under Sections 323, 382, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120-B, 506 and 34 of IPC. Along with the complaint, an application under Section 156(3) was also made. The Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order refusing to direct investigation under Section 156(3) and the complainant was asked to lead pre- summoning evidence. The complainant aggrieved by the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate filed a revision petition before the High Court. The High Court with the consent of the APP appearing for the 13/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 State set aside the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate with a direction to him to examine the matter afresh after calling for a report from the police authorities. It is from this order that the matter reached this Court at the instance of the suspect / accused. The Court observed that if the Metropolitan Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence and issuance of summons upon the accused persons had been merely postponed, in a criminal revision filed on behalf of complainant, the accused was entitled to be heard before the High Court. Sections 397, 399 and 401 were noticed by this Court and so also few earlier decisions including Chandra Deo Singh, Vadilal Panchal, P. Sundarrajan and then in paragraphs 22 and 23 (Pg. 369) of the Report, the Court held as under:
22. Here, however, the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance. He had applied his mind. He refused to exercise his jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code. He arrived at a conclusion that the dispute is a private dispute in relation to an immovable property and, thus, police investigation is not necessary. It was only with that intent in view, he directed examination of the complainant and his witnesses so as to initiate and complete the procedure laid down under Chapter XV of the Code.
23. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be 14/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 sustained and is set aside accordingly. The High Court shall implead the appellant as a party in the criminal revision application, hear the matter afresh and pass an appropriate order.
57. In a comparatively recent order in A. N. Santhanam, a two-Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with a question, whether the High Court committed an error in disposing of the criminal revision petition filed by the complainant without any notice to the accused. On behalf of the accused / suspect, it was argued that the High Court committed the error in disposing of the criminal revision without any notice to him. On the other hand, on behalf of the complainant it was argued that no notice as such was required to be issued to the accused as it was at the stage of taking cognizance.
The Court considered Section 401, particularly, sub section (2) thereof and held as under:
"A plain reading of Clause (2) of the said provision makes it abundantly clear that the High Court in exercise of its revisional power cannot pass any order which may cause prejudice to the accused or other persons unless he has an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.
In the instant case it cannot be said that the rights of the appellant have not been affected by the order of revision. The complaint filed by the 15/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 respondent which was rejected for whatsoever reasons has been resurrected with a direction to the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint. Undoubtedly, whether the appellant herein was an accused or not but his right has been affected and the impugned order has resulted in causing prejudice to him.
In the circumstances, we are of the view that the decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondent has no application whatsoever to the facts situation. In fact the decision of this Court was in a case where the complaint was taken cognizance and not a case where the complaint was rejected. In the circumstances, we hold that the High Court committed an error in allowing the revision filed by the respondent herein without any notice to the appellant.
For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside and the Criminal Revision Case No. 1045 of 2003 shall stand restored to its file for hearing and disposal on merits after notice to the appellant herein.
58. We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by this Court in P. Sundarrajan, Raghu Raj Singh Rousha and A. N. Santhanam. We hold, as it must be, that in a revision petition preferred by complainant before the High Court or the Sessions Judge challenging an order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under Section 203 of the Code at the stage under Section 200 or after 16/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 following the process contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused or a person who is suspected to have committed crime is entitled to hearing by the revisional court. In other words, where complaint has been dismissed by the Magistrate under Section 203 of the Code, upon challenge to the legality of the said order being laid by the complainant in a revision petition before the High Court or the Sessions Judge, the persons who are arraigned as accused in the complaint have a right to be heard in such revision petition. This is a plain requirement of Section 401(2) of the Code. If the revisional court overturns the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint and the complaint is restored to the file of the Magistrate and it is sent back for fresh consideration, the persons who are alleged in the complaint to have committed crime have, however, no right to participate in the proceedings nor they are entitled to any hearing of any sort, whatsoever by the Magistrate until the consideration of the matter by the Magistrate for issuance of process. We answer the question accordingly. The judgments of the High Courts to the contrary are overruled."
20. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 referred to the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Panchabhai Popatbhai Butani (cited supra). The Court has 17/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 observed in paragraphs 35, 53, and 54 as under:
"35. From this discussion, it is clear the the order under section 156(3) is passed at a pre-cognizance stage of a proceeding before the Court and is limited to the extent of directing an investigation in accordance with law. Earlier, the settled principle of law in Indian Courts was that the Magistrate while exercising powers under section 156(3) could only direct investigation of a case and not registration of an F.I.R. However, with the development and expansion of principles of criminal jurisprudence, this has undergone a definite change. Now, for quite some time the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that the Magistrate exercising his power under section 156(3) can direct registration of an F.I.R and his jurisdiction is not only limited to a direction to investigate the offence.
53. We have already noticed that the reference to the provisions of section 190 in the provisions of section 156(3) is merely to determine jurisdiction of Magistrate to whom an application has to be made by the aggrieved person or a complainant. It no way controls the power of the Court to direct registration and/or investigation as contemplated in section 156(3). The proceedings under section 156(3) are pre- cognizance. Once cognizance is taken by the Magistrate under section 190 of the Code, he could proceed in his discretion treating under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not the legislative intent that in the complaint or application / 18/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 petition under section 156(3) detailed factual allegations containing in detail the happening of events from beginning to end should be made. It is sufficient for the person to make averment of facts disclosing cognizable offence further stating that the police has failed to take action despite intimation under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Unnecessary emphasis on the prayer cannot be laid. However, it is a settled principle that the Court would normally grant relief to a party as per its prayer.
54. However, keeping ig in view the principles of criminal jurisprudence again no stringent format can be provided or is necessary in relation to a prayer clause. It is for the complainant or the aggrieved person to decide whether he wishes to refer the matter to investigation under section 156(3) of the Code or whether his application is to be treated as a regular complaint under section 200 of the Code. We have no hesitation in holding that no particular format of the application or petition to Magistrate under section 156(3) is provided or is required to be made. Suffice it for the complainant or aggrieved person to bring it to the notice of the Court under section 156(3) that despite intimation to the police it has failed to act and investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with law or that in the fact situation of the case it was necessary to directly approach the Court. Once such a petition is presented, the learned Magistrate is free to exercise appropriate jurisdiction in accordance with law and at the request of 19/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 ::: skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12 complainant but a petition cannot be rejected by the Court merely on the ground that it does not contain a proper prayer clause insofar as it discloses commission of a cognizance offence."
21. Considering the principles laid down aforesaid by the Apex Court, we are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have heard the petitioner - original respondent to the complaint before passing the impugned order. The petitioner ought to have been made a party to the proceedings of the criminal revision application. Non joinder of the petitioner in the revision application has resulted in causing prejudice to the interest of the petitioner. It has deprived the petitioner from right to be heard in a case where adverse order was passed against the petitioner by the learned Sessions Judge.
22. We hold that the Judicial Magistrate First Class had discretion in the facts of the case either to resort to the procedure enunciated under section 156(3) or to the procedure prescribed under section 200 of the Code. The powers of the Magistrate are not curtailed by the prayers made in the complaint while exercising judicial discretion. We do not find any fault or error in the Magistrate resorting to the procedure prescribed under Section 200 of the Code.
20/21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 :::skc JUDGMENT CRI WP 4036-12
23. The impugned judgment and order passed in Criminal Revision No. 142 of 2012 on 16.10.2012 by the Ad-hoc District Judge -
3 and Addl. Sessions Judge, Thane, is quashed and set aside.
The case is remanded back to the Court of Sessions Judge, Thane. The petitioner shall be added as party respondent to the criminal revision no. 142 of 2012. We direct the Additional Sessions Judge, Thane to decide criminal revision application no. 142 of 2012 on its own merits after hearing the parties including the present petitioner Shyamsunder Radheshyam Agarwal. It is clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the complaint.
24. Rule made absolute.
(A. R. JOSHI, J.) (NARESH H. PATIL, J.)
Chandka
21/21
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 19:38:41 :::