Madras High Court
M.Sekar vs P.Madeshwaran on 19 April, 2012
Author: S.Tamilvanan
Bench: S.Tamilvanan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:19.04.2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.TAMILVANAN Second Appeal No.1283 of 2011 & M.P.No.1 of 2011 M.Sekar ... Appellant vs. P.Madeshwaran ... Respondent This Second Appeal is preferred under Section 100 CPC against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.6 of 2010 dated 15.03.2011 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Namakkal, confirming the judgment and decree made in the suit in O.S.No.429 of 2000 dated 10.12.2009 on the file of the Sub Judge, Namakkal. For Appellant : M/s.T.Dhanyakumar For Respondent : Mr.P.Valliappan J U D G M E N T
The Second Appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment and decree passed in A.S.No.6 of 2010 dated 15.03.2011 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Namakkal, confirming the judgment and decree made in the suit in O.S.No.429 of 2000 dated 10.12.2009 on the file of the Sub Judge, Namakkal.
2.It is seen that the appellant/defendant has raised the following Substantial Questions of Law for consideration of this Second Appeal:
"a. Whether the plaintiff has established his readiness and willingness specifically to perform his part of the Agreement of sale b. Whether the Ex.A1 was executed for the loan transaction and the defendant had intention to sell the property."
3.The respondent/plaintiff has filed the suit seeking a decree for specific performance of contract based on an agreement of sale marked as Ex.A1. As per the averments of the plaint, the agreement dated 27.05.1997 was entered into between the appellant and the respondent and admittedly, it is a registered document.
4.Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant submits that Ex.A1 was executed only as a supporting document for a loan transaction between the appellant and the respondent, though the document reads as an agreement for sale. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant further submits that as per the document Ex.A1, sale consideration is stated at Rs.1,10,000/-, however, Rs.1,00,000/- was paid as advance and part of sale consideration, and therefore, there is no need for the respondent/plaintiff to wait till 03.05.2000 and to issue a legal notice dated 03.05.2000 seeking specific performance based on the agreement of sale dated 27.05.1997 to the appellant/defendant and according to him, during the above said period, the value of the property was raised to Rs.3,00,000/- per acre.
5.Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the sale agreement is a registered document and admittedly entered into between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant, hence the averments and the genuineness of the document cannot be disputed by the appellant/dependent. When the document reads as an agreement for sale, it is not open to the appellant to raise a self- contradictory defence against the Evidence Act, stating that it is not an agreement for sale, but only a document relating to loan transaction.
6.Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff drew the attention of this Court to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and argued that it is made clear that the oral evidence cannot impeach any documentary evidence. As contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant, the document Ex.A1 reads as an agreement of sale, hence, the appellant/defendant is estopped from raising a oral plea that Ex.A1 is a document relating to a loan transaction and not an agreement for sale against the averments of the document. Pursuant to the agreement, the appellant/defendant received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as part of sale consideration and the balance was only Rs.10,000/-. It is not in dispute that the respondent herein had issued pre-suit legal notice dated 03.05.2000 demanding the appellant/defendant to execute sale deed after receiving the balance of sale consideration. On the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant/defendant cannot raise a plea that the respondent/plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The first Substantial Question of Law raised by the appellant/defendant is whether the respondent/plaintiff has established his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement of sale. However, the appellant/defendant has raised a plea that the registered agreement for sale is only a document relating to a loan transaction. Therefore, he cannot say that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Hence, the first Substantial Question of Law cannot be construed as a real substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Second Substantial Question of law raised by the appellant/defendant is that, Ex.A1 is only a document relating to a loan transaction and there was no intention for the appellant to sell the property. On the side of the respondent/plaintiff argued that the aforesaid version cannot be accepted in view of the averments available on record, since the documentary evidence cannot be impeached by way of subsequent averments and oral evidence of the appellant.
7.Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant submitted that the respondent/plaintiff has not established his readiness and willingness to perform his part of agreement for sale and, according to him, Ex.A1 was executed only towards a 'loan transaction' as stated in the written statement and the appellant/defendant had no intention to sell the property. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant relied on the decision in VALLITHAI V. ARULRAJ, (2007) 5 MLJ 222, wherein, while dealing with Sections 16 and 20 of Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963) and Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) in a suit for specific performance of contract, this Court (V.Dhanapalan, J) has held that when the plaintiff has not established the validity of sale agreement on the basis of which the relief of specific performance is claimed and the defendant has let in contra evidence raising a plea that the document in question is only a mortgage deed and that the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree for specific performance, notwithstanding the fact that the alleged sale agreement, was registered.
8.It is seen that the suit relating to the Second Appeal was filed by the respondent herein as plaintiff based on the registered sale agreement dated 27.05.1997. The respondent/plaintiff has stated that the sale agreement was executed by the appellant/defendant getting an advance amount of Rs.1,00,000/- as part of sale consideration and after getting the balance amount of Rs.10,000/-, he has to execute the sale deed as per the agreement. However, the appellant/defendant failed to perform his part of contract to execute the sale deed after receiving the balance of sale consideration, hence, the suit was filed. On the other hand, the appellant/defendant has stated that there is no agreement for sale between the appellant and the respondent and according to him, the appellant was in need of money a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-, for which the respondent/plaintiff asked him to execute a registered sale agreement for advancing the loan amount. Hence, on a compelling circumstances, the appellant/defendant had executed Ex.A1-registered agreement and therefore, the respondent/plaintiff is not entitled to seek specific performance of the contract.
9.Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant, in support of his contention relied on a decision in SHANTHI KAWARBAI V. SUSHILA, 2009 (4) CTC 842, whereunder, a Division Bench of this Court (M.Chockalingam and R.Subbiah, JJ) has held as follows:
"It is well settled proposition of law that readiness and willingness must be from the very commencement of the agreement till the completion of the contract. While the readiness must actually indicate the financial position of the purchaser to make payment of consideration, the willingness must speak of his frame of mind. In the instant case, a careful scrutiny of the materials would indicate that they are contrary to the contentions put forth by the respondent/plaintiff's side that she was ready and willing to perform the contract."
10. In N.P.THIRUGNANAM V. DR.R.JAGAN MOHAN RAO, 1995 (5) SCC 115, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that Specific Performance is an equitable remedy and it is the discretion of the Court, however, such discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The relevant portion of the decision reads as follows:
"5... ... ... Under Section 20, the Court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was a valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of Specific Performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the Court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the Suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract."
11. In AZHAR SULTANA V. B.RAJAMANI AND OTHERS, 2009 (3) SCALE 159, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus:
"17. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 postulates continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff. It is a condition precedent for obtaining a relief of grant of Specific Performance of contract. The Court, keeping in view the fact that it exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, would be entitled to take into consideration as to whether the Suit had been filed within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast law can be laid down therefor."
12.the written statement, the appellant/defendant has admitted that he had executed a registered document dated 27.05.1997, marked as Ex.A1. However, he raised a plea that he had signed in the document considering it as a document relating to the loan obtained by him. In the proof affidavit filed by the appellant/defendant as D.W.1, he had stated that he was in need of an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- and the said amount was advanced by the respondent/plaintiff, for which, he had agreed to pay interest at the rate of Rs.2/- for Rs.100/- per month. For the same, the sale agreement for a consideration of Rs.1,10,000/- was executed by him and that he paid interest for about one year. However, he has admitted that he had not obtained any receipt for the alleged payment of the interest.
13. It is well settled that documentary evidence cannot be impeached by oral evidence except in any abnormal circumstances where there is legally acceptable evidence available against the document. In the instant case, admittedly, Ex.A1-Sale agreement was executed and registered, hence, as per sub section (e) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, it has to be presumed that being an official act has been regularly performed, until the contrary is proved. Ex.A1 is a registered sale agreement as per the averments and the registration of the document. Admittedly, it was signed by the appellant/defendant, however, contrary to avements made therein, the appellant/defendant has stated that the same was executed by him towards a loan transaction, for which, he paid interest at 24% p.a. for about one year. Even according to him, for the payment of alleged interest, there is no supporting document. It is seen that the appellant/defendant has simply made his averments in the written statement against the registered document and also deposed the evidence against the registered agreement for sale and as per his oral evidence, the said document was executed towards loan transaction. The brother of the appellant/defendant, who was examined as D.W.2 has also admitted that the aforesaid Ex.A1 was executed on 27.05.1997 wherein he signed as one of the witnesses, for which, the appellant/defendant received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. However, he has deposed his oral evidence that it was a document executed towards a loan transaction and his brother, the appellant herein had no intention to sell the suit property as per the document, Ex.A1. The appellant/defendant who executed Ex.A1, registered sale agreement and D.W.2, his brother, one of the attestors to the document are estopped from adducing oral evidence against the document.
14.However, PW1 has deposed that Ex.A1 was executed by the appellant/defendant for which, he received an advance amount and part of sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- out of total sale consideration fixed at Rs.1,10,000/- as stated in the document. In Ex.A1 registered sale agreement, the appellant and the respondent have signed as parties to the document. P.W.2 and D.W.2 have also signed as attestors to the said document. P.W.2 has deposed evidence as per the averments of the document, supporting the case of the respondent/plaintiff whereas D.W.2, who is brother of the appellant/defendant though admitted that he was one of the attestors to the registered document and also not disputing the passing of sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- has given evidence against the averments of the document, whereby, he has stated that his brother, the appellant/defendant had no intention to sell the suit property. Having admitted his signature as an attestor to a registered document, if a person turned round and adduce oral evidence against the document, in view of Section 114 (e) of Indian Evidence Act, even the conduct of such a person as improper and not trustworthy. It is not the case of the appellant/defendant that Ex.A1, registered document was obtained under threat and coercion. Even if it is so, he could have lodged a complaint immediately after the execution of the document. It is not in dispute that the document was executed by the appellant/defendant and registered before the concerned Sub Registrar Office in the presence of his brother, who was examined as D.W.2. As per Ex.A1, the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- was received by the appellant/defendant and therefore, the unreasonable averments of the appellant/defendant that it was a document pertaining to a loan transaction and interest was paid to the respondent/plaintiff regularly for about one year, by the appellant/defendant, without getting any receipt from the respondent/plaintiff could not be accepted by any prudent man. The evidence available on record would clearly establish that the appellant/defendant has raised only an unreasonable and unsustainable defence against the suit claim.
15.Having considered the oral and documentary evidence and also concurrent finding of the Court below, this Court is of the view that the suit has been properly decreed by the trial Court and the same was confirmed by the first Appellate Court. The respondent/plaintiff had issued legal notice dated 03.05.2000, a copy of which was marked as Ex.A2, to the appellant/defendant, since the appellant/defendant was not ready to receive the balance of consideration Rs.10,000/- and perform his part of contract by way of executing sale deed. The legal notice was received by the appellant/defendant under Ex.A3-Postal Acknowledgment. However, no reply was sent by the appellant/defendant for the reasons best known to him. Had the amount been received by the appellant/defendant from the respondent/plaintiff towards a loan transaction as alleged by the appellant/defendant, he could have executed only a promissory note or a mortgage deed and there could be no need to execute the registered agreement for sale and to entrust his original sale deed relating to the property to the respondent/plaintiff. After executing the agreement of sale, the appellant/defendant cannot raise a plea that the alleged document is only a loan transaction and not an agreement of sale though the document reads only a sale deed. As per the evidence, it is crystal clear that the appellant/defendant was not ready to perform his part of contract whereas the respondent/plaintiff was ready and also issued legal notice seeking specific performance of contract.
16.On the side of the respondent/plaintiff, even the original sale deed, dated 27.05.1997, entrusted to the respondent/plaintiff by the appellant/defendant was also produced and marked. Had there been no sale agreement, there could be no need for the appellant/defendant to hand over his original sale deed, dated 23.09.1989 to the respondent/plaintiff to be marked as Ex.A4.
17.The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case would clearly establish that the respondent/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement of sale whereas the appellant/defendant was not ready and willing even after receiving the legal notice. Having accepted the execution of the registered document, Ex.A1, the appellant/defendant is not entitled to dispute the averments of the document by his inconsistent and self-contradictory version and the oral evidence of the appellant/defendant would not impeach the documentary evidence. The legally unsupported self-contradictory version of the appellant/defendant would not prove any rebuttal presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act. Hence, this Court is of the view that there is no error or infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the Court below. Accordingly, the Substantial Questions of Law (a) and (b) are answered against the appellant/defendant and in favour of the respondent/plaintiff.
18.In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No order as to costs.
19.04.2012 Index : Yes/No Internet: Yes/No To
1.The Principal District Judge, Namakkal.
2.The Sub Judge, Namakkal.
S.TAMILVANAN, J kal S. A. No.1283 of 2011 & M.P.No.1 of 2011 19.04.2012