Allahabad High Court
Anuj Saxena And Another vs State Of U.P. And 4 Others on 15 April, 2024
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:65609 Court No. - 34 Reserved A.F.R. Case :- WRIT - A No. - 12473 of 2023 Petitioner :- Anuj Saxena And Another Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Saurabh Srivastava,Irfan Ahmad Malik Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Devendra Kumar,Shekhar Gangal, Sr. Advocate With Case :- WRIT - A No. - 15184 of 2023 Petitioner :- Sunil Kumar And 7 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Saurabh Srivastava,Irfan Ahmad Malik Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Devendra Kumar,Shekhar Gangal With Case :- WRIT - A No. - 15191 of 2023 Petitioner :- Reeta Gautam Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Saurabh Srivastava,Irfan Ahmad Malik Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Devendra Kumar,Shekhar Gangal With Case :- WRIT - A No. - 15193 of 2023 Petitioner :- Ajay Kumar And 2 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Saurabh Srivastava,Irfan Ahmad Malik Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Devendra Kumar,Shekhar Gangal Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.
1. This judgment will dispose of the present writ petition and connected Writ - A No. - 15184 of 2023, Writ - A No. - 15191 of 2023 and Writ - A No. - 15193 of 2023. Since identical questions of facts and law are involved in Writ - A No. - 12473 of 2023, and Writ - A No. - 15184 of 2023, Writ - A No. - 15191 of 2023 and Writ - A No. - 15193 of 2023, the other matters were connected with Writ - A No. - 12473 of 2023, which was heard as the leading case. The parties exchanged affidavits in the leading case, and not in the other matters, though opportunity was granted to file a counter affidavit in those matters as well. Learned Counsel for the parties agreed that all the four writ petitions can be decided on the basis of affidavits filed in the leading case. This Court, accordingly, proceeds to notice facts from the leading case.
2. The Director (Local Bodies), Government of U.P., Lucknow by his letter dated 31.12.2014 issued to the Presidents and the Executive Officers of various Nagar Palika Parishad across the State, whose list is appended to the letter, informed that 345 technical posts of Class-IV are lying vacant and directed the Presidents and the Executive Officers to proceed with selections and appointments to these posts with information to the State Government. The letter of the Director shows that two posts, one of an Electrician and the other of a Junior Fitter, were lying vacant with the Nagar Palika Parishad, Khair, Aligarh. Acting on the aforesaid letter from the Director of Local Bodies, the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad, Khair, Aligarh (for short, 'the Nagar Palika') published an advertisement dated 05.02.2015. In response to the advertisement, the petitioners along with other eligible candidates applied for the post of Electrician and Junior Fitter. Interviews for the said posts were held on 15.04.2015 by a four-member Selection Committee, that included the President and the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika.
3. A list of selected candidates was issued on 15.04.2015, which showed the name of petitioner No.1, Anuj Saxena at Sr. No.1, whereas that of petitioner No.2, Kamal Singh, at Sr. No.3. The Executive Officer issued two separate appointment letters, both dated 20.04.2015, appointing petitioner No.1, Anuj Saxena, to the post of an Electrician and petitioner No.2, Kamal Singh, to the post of a Junior Fitter, on probation for a year. As the first petitioner's service-book would show that he was made permanent in the year 2016, the second petitioner's service-book shows that he was made permanent on 01.08.2016.
4. By a letter dated 14.07.2016, it appears that the Director, Local Bodies, asked the Presidents and the Executive Officers of the various Nagar Palika why they had not taken steps to fill up the technical posts, they were asked to do earlier and also explain themselves in this behalf. On 08.01.2018, the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika, issued an order, saying that he visited the office of the Nagar Palika and perused the attendance record of all regular employees. He said that he found that all the temporary employees were not present, and, therefore, directed that the services of all employees on probation, found absent, stand terminated forthwith.
5. The petitioners and 15 other similarly circumstanced employees of the Nagar Palika, aggrieved by the order dated 08.01.2018, instituted Writ-A No.7696 of 2018 before this Court, which was heard in the presence of the learned Counsel for the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika. This Court, by an order dated 13.03.2018, stayed the operation of the order dated 08.01.2018 and further said that the inquiry conducted by the District Magistrate, pursuant to orders of the Government, will not be affected due to pendency of this writ petition. It was also clarified that in case any disciplinary proceedings were proposed to be initiated against the petitioners for their unauthorized absence, it would be open to the respondents to do that. The petitioners were reinstated in compliance with the said interim orders of this Court dated 13.03.2018.
6. The petitioners' case is that the order dated 08.01.2018 was passed at the behest of the then newly elected President of the Nagar Palika, who harboured animosity against the outgoing President. Apart from causing the order dated 08.01.2018 to be passed, the then newly elected President made a complaint on the IGRS Portal relating to the petitioners' appointment. Acting on the said complaint, the District Magistrate, Aligarh constituted a committee, headed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khair along with two other members, one being the Tehsildar (Judicial) and the other, the Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam, to inquire into the matter. Acting on the orders of the District Magistrate dated 26.02.2018, inquiry by the committee headed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khair commenced. They issued a letter to the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika, asking for certain documents from his office.
7. The President of the Nagar Palika approached this Court by instituting Writ-C No.4825 of 2019 with a prayer that the inquiry commenced on the orders dated 26.02.2018 passed by the Additional District Magistrate into the validity of appointment made during the tenure of the earlier President, is not proceeding. This Court, therefore, remarked that an inquiry committee has already been constituted and no direction can be issued at the behest of the President to conclude the inquiry. It was nevertheless observed that if any proceedings have been initiated, it is expected that the same will be taken to its logical conclusion.
8. The former President, during whose tenure the petitioners had been appointed, also approached this Court instituting a writ petition, being Writ-C No.15328 of 2019, challenging the order dated 26.02.2018 passed by the District Magistrate/ Additional District Magistrate, ordering an inquiry into the appointments. This Court remarked that in the petitions instituted by some of the selected candidates, this Court, while issuing notice to the respondents, had permitted the inquiry to go on. It was, therefore, held that the Court does not consider it necessary to exercise their discretion in the matter, so as to hinder progress of the inquiry. The writ petition was, accordingly, dismissed vide order dated 02.05.2019 with a direction to the Additional District Magistrate to ensure that the inquiry is completed and a report in that regard submitted in accordance with law expeditiously, if possible, within the next three months.
9. In the counter affidavit filed in Writ-A No.7696 of 2018, preferred by the petitioners, the President and the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika said that the order dated 08.01.2018, impugned in the writ petition, was not available in the Palika records. The District Magistrate, Aligarh then issued another order dated 29.05.2018, constituting another inquiry committee, headed by the Additional District Magistrate (Administration) with two other members, one being the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khair, and the other, the Chief Treasury Officer, Aligarh. Also to go into the fraudulent appointments allegedly made in the Nagar Palika and financial irregularities committed there, the Committee were asked to submit their report within three days.
10. The Committee, now re-constituted, concluded the inquiry and submitted a report dated 19.06.2019 to the District Magistrate, where the ex-President and the then Executive Officer, besides Clerks and Officers, who were part of the Selection Committee, were found guilty. It was recommended that all the sixteen appointments be declared void. The aforesaid report, submitted by the Committee appointed by the District Magistrate, was forwarded by him to the Principal Secretary, Local Bodies, Government of U.P., Lucknow, who, by his order dated 05.08.2019, without considering the State Government's jurisdiction in the matter, or issuing notice to the adversely affected employees already appointed, held that the committee appointed by the District Magistrate showed that 16 employees appointed by the Nagar Palika have been appointed contrary to Government Orders illegally and in an irregular manner. The Selection Committee had been constituted without the District Magistrate's permission and selections made in an arbitrary manner. No permission from the State Government too had been taken.
11. The Principal Secretary ordered that all the 16 appointments, including those of the two writ petitioners here, being contrary to law, steps be taken to declare them void in accordance with rules. There were further directions issued as regards actions to be taken against the former President and other officials of the Nagar Palika, like lodging of FIR etc., but that is not the concern of the petitioners in the present writ petition. The Director, Local Bodies, in his turn, ordered the District Magistrate vide order dated 28.08.2019 to declare all the appointments against the 16 posts, including the petitioners' void. The District Magistrate, Aligarh, accordingly, passed a consequential order dated 11.09.2019, directing the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika to declare all the 16 appointments (including the petitioners') void by taking appropriate steps for the purpose. There were other directions issued relating to the lodging of the FIR etc., as directed by the Principal Secretary and the Director, Local Bodies, which again are not of much relevance here.
12. It appears that despite the orders dated 05.08.2019, 28.08.2019 and 11.09.2019 passed by the Principal Secretary, the Director, Local Bodies and the District Magistrate, respectively, no one disturbed the petitioners in their functioning as employees of the Nagar Palika, or at least they say so. But, the petitioners were not paid their salary since December, 2018, and, therefore, the petitioners, including the other similarly circumstanced employees, numbering a total of 16, instituted Writ-A No.4089 of 2023, praying that a mandamus be issued, directing the respondents to pay them regular salary along with arrears. This writ petition was taken up together with other writ petitions earlier filed by the petitioners and 14 other employees, being Writ-A No.7696 of 2018. This Court vide order dated 05.04.2023, noticing the respondents' stand in Writ-A No.7696 of 2018 that no order dated 08.01.2018, terminating the petitioners' services, was available in the Palika records, held that the order dated 08.01.2018 is not available in the Palika records, and, therefore, does not come in the petitioners' way. This Court, accordingly, disposed of Writ-A No.7696 of 2018 vide order dated 05.04.2023. By a separate order of the same day passed in Writ-A No.4089 of 2023, the Nagar Palika and the State were granted three weeks' time to file a counter affidavit. After this Court disposed of Writ-A No.7696 of 2018, the Executive Officer proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 07.07.2023, whereby the petitioners' appointment, as also those of 14 other employees, was declared void. The petitioners were declined assignment of duties.
13. The order dated 07.07.2023 to its face shows that it was passed in compliance with the orders of the Principal Secretary dated 05.08.2019, the order of the Director, Local Bodies, dated 28.08.2019 and the order of the District Magistrate dated 11.09.2019, besides the opinion of the District Government Counsel (Civil), Aligarh dated 10.05.2023.
14. Aggrieved by the orders dated 05.08.2019, 28.08.2019, 11.09.2019 and 07.07.2023 passed by the Principal Secretary, Local Bodies, Government of U.P., Lucknow, the Director, Local Bodies, U.P., Lucknow, the District Magistrate, Aligarh and the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika, respectively, this writ petition has been instituted.
15. On 07.08.2023, this Court passed the following order:
"Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel shall seek instructions within a week and clearly disclose the State's stand about what is meant by declaring the petitioners' appointment to be 'void'. It will also be indicated by the State whether the petitioners' appointments are non-existent with no record and products of forgery, or these are appointments that have been undertaken in violation of rules so as to render them void.
Learned Counsel appearing for the Nagar Palika Parishad, Khair may also seek instructions and disclose his stand answering the same issues.
Lay as fresh on 17.08.2023."
16. On 17.08.2023, further time was sought by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to obtain instructions and the matter was adjourned to 23.08.2023. On 23.08.2023, Mr. G.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Shekhar Gangal, learned Counsel appeared on behalf of the President and the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika and sought a week's time to file a counter affidavit, answering the issue indicated in the order dated 07.08.2023. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the President and the Executive Officer, respondent Nos.4 and 5 by Mr. Shekhar Gangal on 06.09.2023. This affidavit is dated 05.09.2023.
17. There are two supplementary affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners, one dated 06.07.2023 and the other dated 13.08.2023. A counter affidavit dated 04.09.2023 on behalf of respondent No.1 was filed, whereas another counter affidavit dated 05.09.2023 on behalf of the Director, Local Bodies, respondent No.2 was also filed. Another counter affidavit dated 05.09.2023 was filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Aligarh, respondent No.3.
18. A rejoinder affidavit, in answer to the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.4 and 5, dated 16.09.2023 was filed. Another rejoinder affidavit dated 19.09.2023, in answer to the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No.1, being an affidavit dated 19.09.2023 was filed. A rejoinder affidavit dated 19.09.2023, in answer to the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No.2, was also filed and the last was an affidavit dated 19.09.2023, in answer to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, respondent No.3.
19. On 16.10.2023, the parties having wholesomely exchanged pleadings, this petition was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. Judgment was reserved.
20. Heard Mr. Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Irfan Ahmad Malik, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Shekhar Gangal, learned Counsel for respondent Nos.4 and 5 and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the State respondents.
21. It is in the main urged by Mr. Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Irfan Ahmad Malik, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order dated 05.08.2019 passed by the Principal Secretary, directing the petitioners' appointment to be declared void on ground that the selections were contrary to Government Orders, done illegally and irregularly and without obtaining prior permission of the District Magistrate or the State Government, is manifestly illegal, inasmuch as under the scheme of Sections 74, 75 and 76 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916 (for short, 'the Act of 1916'), in some cases, the President would be the Appointing Authority, and, in others, the Executive Officer. There is absolutely no requirement of a permission by the District Magistrate to appoint permanent superior staff or permanent inferior staff of a Nagar Palika, the power to appoint being vested in the President and the Executive Officer, respectively. Mr. Pande has drawn the Court's attention to the provisions of Sections 74, 75 and 76 of the Act of 1916. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 05.08.2019 passed by the Principal Secretary is void, because he had no jurisdiction of the kind under Section 34(1-B) of the Act last mentioned. All the orders impugned are also assailed on ground that they are vague, non-speaking and bereft of reasons. The semblance of reasons assigned are contrary to the law. It is also argued by Mr. Pande that there is no source of authority with the State Government to have passed an order of the kind that the Principal Secretary did on 05.08.2019 under any provision of the Act of 1916, or on the foot of any other statute or statutory instrument, empowering the Government in this behalf.
22. On the other hand, Mr. G.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Shekhar Gangal, learned Counsel, representing the Nagar Palika and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, representing the State respondents, have said in one voice that the impugned orders are perfectly legal and made within jurisdiction. They submit that the State Government had all jurisdiction in the face of such profound illegalities, that are demonstrative of fraud, to direct the appointments to be declared void. It is also argued that the entire selection process is vitiated by manipulation and fraud, as found by the Inquiry Committee appointed by the District Magistrate. There is no necessity to offer any formal opportunity before the State Government passed their orders. In any case, the Inquiry Committee did hear, each of the affected persons and reached a positive conclusion that the entire selection process was fraudulent. Particulars of the fraud have been disclosed in the Inquiry Committee's report.
23. Rebutting the submissions of Mr. Pande, Mr. G.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate has emphatically argued, as has Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh done, that jurisdiction of the State Government to invalidate a resolution of the Nagar Palika or one of its Committees or officers, flows from the State Government's powers under Section 34 (1-B) of the Act of 1916. It includes the power to invalidate an appointment illegally made by the Nagar Palika or by one or more of its officers.
24. We have carefully considered the very detailed submissions advanced at the Bar by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
25. It would be apposite to take up the question of jurisdiction of the State Government to set aside the petitioners' appointments, or so to speak, the resolution of the Nagar Palika or its officers, like the President or the Executive Officer, appointing the petitioners, once the petitioners have already been appointed and the resolution or the decision of the competent Palika officers carried out. It would be profitable to refer to the provisions of Sections 71, 73, 74, 75 and 76 of the Act of 1916, which are quoted in extenso:
"71. Power of Municipality to determine permanent staff.- Except as provided by Sections 57, 66, 58 and 70, and subject to any general or special directions as the State Government may, from time to time, issue a Municipality may, by special, resolution, determine what servants are required for the discharge of the duties of the Municipality and their qualifications and conditions of service.
73. Appointment, etc., of servants on the educational establishment. - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the appointment of persons on the educational establishment of a Municipality shall be made by such authority as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government, and different authorities may be specified for different classes of posts on the establishment.
(2) The State Government may make rules regulating the recruitment, punishment, appeal and other conditions of service of persons appointed to the educational establishment of a Municipality;
Provided that the appointment of a teacher or Head of an institution shall be governed by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, or the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, as the case may be.
74. Appointment and dismissal of permanent superior staff. - Subject to the provisions of Sections 57 to 73, servants on posts in the non-centralised service, carrying scale of pay equal to or higher than the lowest scale of pay admissible to the clerical staff, shall be appointed and may be dismissed, removed or otherwise punished, or the services of a probationer may be terminated, by the President, subject to the right of appeal, except in the case of the termination of the service of a probationer, to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed :
Provided that appointments on the posts of Tax Superintendent, Assistant Tax Superintendents, Inspectors, Head Clerks, Sectional Head Clerks, Sectional Accountants, Doctors, Vaids, Hakims and Municipal Fire Station Officers, shall be subject to the approval of the Municipality.
75. Appointment of permanent inferior staff. - Except as otherwise provided, the Executive Officer shall appoint servants carrying scales of pay lower than the lowest scale of pay referred to in Section 74 :
Provided that in the case there is no Executive Officer, the said appointment shall be made by the President.
76. Punishment and dismissal of permanent inferior staff. - Except as otherwise provided, the Executive Officer, and where there is no Executive Officer, the President may dismiss, remove or otherwise punish servants of the Municipality, or terminate the services of probationers, referred to in Section 75, subject to their right of appeal, except in the case of the termination of the service of a probationer, to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed."
26. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions show that the power to determine the strength of the permanent staff of the Nagar Palika vests in the Palika, except with regard to matters provided for in Sections 57, 66, 68 and 70 and the said power is subject to any general or special directions of the State Government issued from time to time. Thus, apart from matters dealt with under Section 57, 66 etc., the power, that is subjected to general directions, is in the matter of determination of the strength and the kinds of servants required for discharge of duties of the Nagar Palika, including their qualifications and conditions of service. The State Government is, therefore, empowered to direct generally or specially the Nagar Palika in the State, upon the strength of their servants, the duties to be performed by them, qualifications and conditions of service. Subject, however, to such directions and the provisions of Sections 57, 66 etc. apart, these matters would have to be determined by the Nagar Palika by special resolution.
27. The power of appointment, as regard servants on the educational establishment of a Nagar Palika, has to be exercised by such authority as the State Government may specify. The State Government may make rules, regulating recruitment, punishment, appeal and other conditions of service of persons, appointed to the educational establishment of the Nagar Palika. So far as the appointment and dismissal of permanent superior staff of the Nagar Palika are concerned, again subject to the provisions of Sections 57 to 73, employees in the non-centralized services of the Palika, carrying pay scale equal or higher than the clerical staff, are required to be appointed and likewise dismissed or removed by the President of the Nagar Palika. Under Section 75, the power relating to appointment and dismissal etc. of the inferior staff is has vested in the Executive Officer.
28. In the scheme of appointment of the permanent superior staff and permanent inferior staff, to either of which one or the other petitioners may belong, the appointment is to be made by the President or the Executive Officer, as the case may be. So far as the issue of special directions of the State Government regarding the determination of the permanent staff for discharge of duties and their qualifications etc. are concerned, that is not the issue here. Rather, it was the Director of Local Bodies, who, vide his memo of 31st December, 2014, had directed the Nagar Palika across the State to fill up vacant posts, a list of which was appended to the said memo. The posts of an Electrician and a Junior Fitter involved in the leading writ petition and so also the other posts involved in the connected matters, were identified vacant by the Director of Local Bodies. The Nagar Palika moved to fill up these posts after issuing an advertisement for the purpose, pursuant to which the petitioners applied, were selected and appointed.
29. The petitioners in the leading petition were issued with appointment letters dated 20.04.2015 and they joined their respective posts the same day. The petitioners in the leading petition and the others were discharging their duties until 08.01.2018, when the Executive Officer inspected the office of the Nagar Palika and raised an issue about the attendance of employees on probation, who were found absent. There is said to be a sudden termination of the petitioners' services vide order dated 08.01.2018 passed by the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika, which was challenged by the petitioners before this Court through Writ-A No.7696 of 2018 and stayed vide order dated 13.03.2018. Later on at the hearing, the existence of this order was disowned by the Nagar Palika. That is not the relevant issue to be determined in this petition.
30. It is said that at the behest of the newly elected President of the Nagar Palika, a complaint regarding the validity of the petitioners' appointment as also that of the petitioners in the other writ petitions, was addressed to the District Magistrate, who appointed an Inquiry Committee, comprising two members, a Tehsildar (Judicial) and an Executive Engineer from the Jal Nigam. This Inquiry Committee did not go ahead much with the inquiry, but after some writ petitions were filed before this Court at the instance of the former President and the present President, the District Magistrate constituted another Committee, headed by the Additional District Magistrate (Administration) with two members, to inquire into the validity of the petitioners' selection and appointment and some other financial matters relating to the former President's tenure in office. This Committee was constituted by the District Magistrate on 29.05.2018. This Committee submitted a report dated 19.06.2019, holding the petitioners' appointments to be void. Some of the relevant findings of this Committee would be alluded to a little later in this judgment. The aforesaid inquiry report was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the State Government, where, acting on behalf of the Government, the Principal Secretary passed the impugned order dated 05.08.2019, declaring the petitioners' appointments void. This order has been echoed mechanically by the Director of Local Bodies by vide order dated 28.08.2019, directing the District Magistrate to take steps to ensure that the petitioners' appointments are declared void and the District Magistrate, in turn, passed an order dated 11.09.2019, directing the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika to take steps to declare the petitioners' appointments void in accordance with the orders passed by the State Government and the Director of Local Bodies. It was much later on 07.07.2023, in the circumstances already indicated that the petitioners' appointments were declared void by the Executive Officer through similar orders dated 07.07.2023 passed in relation to the petitioners here and in the other matters. All the orders dated 07.07.2023 formally declaring the petitioners' appointments void are ex facie not made by the Executive Officer in exercise of his own discretion. These have been issued on the dictate and command of the State Government carried in the order of the Principal Secretary dated 05.08.2019. All that has been added to it is the opinion of the District Government Counsel, which has entered consideration of the Executive Officer.
31. Two questions would, therefore, emerge for consideration in this case. The first is whether the State Government had the power and authority to declare void the petitioners' appointments in exercise of their powers under the Act of 1916; and, the other is even if the State Government did not have the power to avoid the petitioners' appointments made by the President or the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika, could the appointments still be declared void, if it were established that the appointments were based on fraud, dehors the question of authority with the State Government under the Act of 1916.
32. In order to answer the first question, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1916. For the sake of ready reference, the provisions of Section 34 aforesaid are being quoted in extenso:
"34. Power of the State Government or the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate to prohibit execution or further execution of resolution or order of Municipality. - (1) The Prescribed Authority may, by order in writing, prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a Municipality or a committee of a Municipality or a Joint Committee or any officer or servant of a Municipality or of a Joint Committee if in its opinion such resolution or order is of a nature to cause or tend to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury to the public or to any class or body of persons lawfully employed and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance for or under cover of such resolution or order.
(1A) The District Magistrate may, within the limits of his district, by order in writing, prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a Municipality or a committee of a Municipality or a Joint Committee or any officer or servant of a Municipality or of a Joint Committee if in his opinion such resolution or order is of a nature to cause or tend to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or a riot or affray, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act, in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order.
(1B) the State Government may, on its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a Municipality or a committee of a Municipality or a Joint Committee or any officer or servant of a Municipality or of a Joint Committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, [or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order.
(2) Where an order is made under sub-section (1) or (1-A)], a copy thereof with a statement of the reasons for making it, shall forthwith be forwarded by the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate through the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be, to the State Government which may thereupon, if it thinks fit, rescind or modify the order.
(3) [* * *] (4) Where the execution or further execution of a resolution or order is prohibited by an order made under sub-section (1), (1-A) or (1-B) and continuing in force, it shall be the duty of the Municipality, if so required by the authority making the order under the said sub-sections to take any action which it would have been entitled to take, if the resolution or order had never been made or passed, and which is necessary for preventing any person from doing or continuing to do anything under cover of the resolution or order of which the further execution is prohibited."
33. A perusal of Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916 would show that the State Government, either on its own motion or a report or complaint received, may prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order made under the Act of 1916 or any other statute by a Nagar Palika or a committee or officer or servant thereof, if in the opinion of the Government, the resolution or order was: (1) prejudicial to public interest; (2) passed or made in abuse of powers; or, (3) made in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. The State Government further have the power to prohibit the doing or continuance of any act by a person, acting on a resolution or order of the Nagar Palika, or under the cover of its resolution or order of an officer of the Nagar Palika, the execution or further execution whereof, the State Government had prohibited. There are two distinct facets of Section 34 (1B). One is the grounds, on the foot of which the State Government may exercise their powers, and, the other is the nature of powers that may be exercised. The two are not to be mixed up or confounded.
34. The grounds, on which the Nagar Palika may exercise its powers, have been spelt out hereinabove, and need not be repeated. Also, that is not very material to the issue involved in the present case. What is of relevance here is, what kind of powers the Nagar Palika may exercise on any of the grounds available to them under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916. The power, that is invested in the Nagar Palika, is fundamentally the power to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order of the Nagar Palika, or one of their committees, officers or servants. There is nothing more or nothing less to this power. The power to restrain a person from doing or continuing to do any act in pursuance of or under the cover of a resolution of the Nagar Palika, is really consequential to the State Government's power to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution of the Nagar Palika or an order of one of their committees, officers or servants. One cannot imagine the State Government restraining someone to do or continue to do something, which that person is doing in pursuance of a resolution or order of the Nagar Palika or one of its officers, unless the State Government have prohibited, by the essence of their power under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916, the execution or further execution of the resolution or the order, which the person restrained is acting in compliance of.
35. The moot question, therefore, is that given the fact that the only power that the Nagar Palika have under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916, being one to prohibit or further prohibit the execution of a resolution or order of the Palika, would that power extend to annulling or setting aside an appointment made by the Nagar Palika, or by one of its officers competent under the law, in the exercise of their statutory powers, the appointment having already taken effect and the resolution or the order exhausted itself. This question fell for consideration very early in the day in Shujaat Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 1966 All LJ 499. In Shujaat Ullah Khan (supra), the Court had before it to judge the validity of an order passed by the State Government under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916, prohibiting the execution of a resolution passed by the Municipal Board, exonerating the petitioner of charges laid against him. In the context of the exercise of power to prohibit or further prohibit the execution of the resolution by the Municipal Board, exonerating the petitioner of the charges in Shujaat Ullah Khan, it was held by Broome, J.:
"4. It is clear that the only order that can be passed by the State Government under this sub-section is a prohibitory order to prevent something being done in the future. It is not open to the Government, acting under this sub-section, to give any positive direction such as has been given in the present case, where the Government has ordered the Board to reconsider its report and to make a further inquiry and take a fresh decision. The resolution passed by the Board on 28-11-59, exonerating the Executive Officer and dropping the charges against him, exhausted itself as soon as it was passed, for the charges were straight away dropped and the Executive Officer stood exonerated. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for "execution or further execution" that could be prohibited by the State Government under Sec. 34(1-B)."
36. The scope of powers under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1972) 3 SCC 345, where, approving this Court in Shujaat Ullah Khan, it was held by their Lordships:
"5. The only point of substance urged by the Board before this Court was that the provisions of Section 34(1-B) of the Act were incapable of application to an order of dismissal. The contention was that, when an order of dismissal is passed, the order operates by its own force and no further steps are necessary to implement such an order. It was submitted that the sub-section applied only to those cases where the resolution of the Board or order required some steps to be taken to effectuate the resolution or the order and not when the resolution or order was effective by its own force. In other words, where on the passing of the resolution or order it exhausted itself, the State Government could hardly "prohibit the execution or further execution" of that resolution or order; and, therefore, where the State Government interfered by prohibiting the execution or further execution of the resolution or order, it really intended to cancel or set aside the resolution or order which, in the submission of the petitioner, was beyond the powers of the State Government. It appears to us that there is considerable force, in this submission.
6. Section 34 is in that part of Chapter II of the Act which deals with the subject "Control of Board". The marginal note to the section is "Power of the State Government or the Prescribed Authority or the District Magistrate to prohibit execution of or further execution of resolution or order of the Board". Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) deal with the powers of the Prescribed Authority and the District Magistrate in this respect. Sub-section (1-B) deals with the powers of the State Government and is as follows:
"(1-B) The State Government may, of its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a board or a committee of a board or a joint committee or any officer or servant of a board or of a joint committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order."
7. It should be noted that the words italicised above were inserted by an amendment which came into force on November 30, 1964, that is to say, much after the order of dismissal by the Executive Officer had been passed, though before the order of the State Government, dated May 12, 1965. Before the amendment, the State Government could pass the order of prohibition of execution only when, in its opinion, the resolution or order was prejudicial to the public interest but, after the amendment, such an order could also be made by the State Government if, in its opinion, the resolution or order was made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. It was contended on behalf of the Board that it was not competent for the State Government in this case to make the order on the ground that the order of dismissal was in flagrant breach of a provision of the law for the time being in force. But that point is only of academic interest, because the order itself shows that it had been passed also on the ground that the order of dismissal was prejudicial to the public interest. We assume, therefore, that the State Government was satisfied that the order of dismissal passed by the Executive Officer was prejudicial to the public interest. The question, however, is whether, after the order of dismissal had been passed on April 9, 1964, the State Government had the power virtually to set aside or cancel the order under the cover of purporting "to prohibit the execution or further execution of that order". In our opinion, that sub-section does not clothe the State Government with such a power. The resolution of the Board or the order of a duly authorised officer of the Board is not liable to be cancelled or set aside under this section. All that could be done under it is to prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order, or the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. Where the resolution or order does not require any acts to be performed or steps to be taken for the execution or further execution of the resolution or order of the Board or of its Officer, as in the present case, there is really nothing to prohibit. It was contended on behalf of the State that, when the State Government was empowered to order prohibition of the execution of the resolution or order, it was virtually empowered to set aside or cancel the order and, in support of this view, a reference was made to sub-section (4) of that section which provides that it shall be the duty of the Board, if so required by the authority making the order under sub-section (1-B) to take any action which it would have been entitled to take, if the resolution or order had never been made or passed, and which is necessary for preventing any person from doing or continuing to do anything in pursuance of the resolution or order. If the object of the provision was to clothe the State Government with the power to cancel or set aside the resolution of the Board or order, it would have simply said so without resorting to the circumlocution "prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order". We do not, therefore, think that sub-section (1-B) read with sub-section (4) applies to any resolution or order which exhausts itself after it is passed or made. That is the view taken by a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Shujaat Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. [1966 ALJ 499] .
8. In that case, a resolution was passed by the Board exonerating Shujaat Ullah Khan, who was the Executive Officer of the Board, from certain charges their had been framed against him. The State Government, thereupon, purporting to act under Section 34(1-B) of the Act, quashed the Board's resolution on the ground that it was illegal, not having been passed by 2/3rds of the members constituting the Board and was otherwise prejudicial to the public interest. This order of the State Government was challenged by Shujaat Ullah Khan on several grounds, one of them being that no order under Section 34(1-B) could be passed, because the resolution of the Board had been fully implemented and nothing remained to be executed in respect thereof. This contention was accepted by the learned Judge who observed as follows:
"It is clear that the only order that can be passed by the State Government under this sub-section is a prohibitory order to prevent something being done in the future. It is not open to the Government, acting under this sub-section, to give any positive direction such as has been given in the present case, where the Government has ordered the Board to reconsider its report and to make a further inquiry and take a fresh decision. The resolution passed by the Board, exonerating the Executive Officer and dropping the charges against him, exhausted itself as soon as it was passed, for the charges were straightaway dropped and the Executive Officer stood exonerated. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for execution or further execution that could be prohibited by the State Government under Section 34(1-B)."
In our opinion, that reasoning equally applies to the present case. The order of dismissal was self-operative and nothing remained for execution or further execution which could be prohibited by the State Government under that section. On that ground alone, the order passed by the State Government will have to be set aside."
(emphasis by Court)
37. In Shujaat Ullah Khan, the order passed by the Nagar Palika or the Municipal Board, as it was called at the time, was exonerating an employee of the charges against him, whereas in Municipal Board, Kannauj (supra) before the Supreme Court, was an order of dismissal by the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika passed against an employee of theirs. Looking to the nature of the order passed by the Nagar Palika in both cases, it was held by the Supreme Court as well as this Court that there was nothing surviving to execute or further excute, upon which the power of the State Government to prohibit the execution or further execution could operate.
38. Here, the orders passed by the President or the Executive Officer, as the case may be, are orders of appointment in favour of the petitioner, the effect of which, according to the respondents, survives the appointment. The respondents would say that everyday that an employee invalidly appointed, like the petitioners, discharges duties in the Nagar Palika's establishment, it is an act of execution of the order of appointment passed by an officer of the Nagar Palika. Therefore, if the orders appointing the petitioners are declared void, it is in effect an exercise of the power to prohibit the execution or further execution of the order of an officer of the Nagar Palika, whether the President or the Executive Officer, whoever appointed the one or the other petitioners. In support of this reasoning, reliance is placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Ram Kishore and others v. District Magistrate, Fatehpur and others, 2007 (2) AWC 1137. Ram Kishore (supra) is a case that concerned the exercise of powers under Section 34 (1A) by the District Magistrate to cancel the order of appointment of a Safai Karmachari appointed in Nagar Palika Parishad, Fatehpur. It is quite another matter if the District Magistrate could ever exercise that power under Section 34 (1A) of the Act of 1916. The Court did go into the question if a resolution of the Nagar Palika or an order by an officer thereof, that had nothing further remaining about it to operate, could be prohibited by the State Government, exercising powers under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916. In Ram Kishore (supra), it was held:
"16. In Municipal Board, Kannauj v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1971 SC 2147, the Supreme Court held that once a resolution of the Board became operative, nothing remained further to be done under the said resolution which could be prohibited by an authority exercising its power under Section 34(1) of the Act. It was held that the authority was created for a limited purpose and where a power was given under a Statute to do a certain thing in a certain manner and if the same was not done in that manner, the authority had that power to prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order, but it had no power to cancel or set aside the resolution or order of the Board.
17. The Supreme Court, in Municipal Board Kannauj [supra] interpreted the provisions of Section 34 (1-B) as it stood before its amendment by U.P. Act No. 26 of 1964. The words "or has been provision of any law for the time being in force" was added by the amendment. The view expressed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was followed in Har Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 1977 All 302, in which the Division Bench was concerned with a compromise entered into by the Board with a third party and in pursuance of a resolution passed by the Board. The Division Bench held that Section 34(1-B) after the amendment empowered the State Government to cancel a resolution.
18. In the present case, illegal appointments were made by the Executive Officer in abuse of its powers and such abuse of the powers can be restricted by the State Government. In my opinion, the State Government can restrain such authority not only to act further but can cancel the appointment while exercising its powers under sub-section (1-B). Such an exercise of power by the State government falls within the purview of the words "may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order.""
39. A Bench decision of this Court in Har Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Ministry of Local Self Government) Lucknow and another, AIR 1977 All 302 besides the Supreme Court's holding in Municipal Board, Kannauj, were noticed by the learned Judge in Ram Kishore to arrive at the conclusions that he did. The facts in Har Pal Singh (supra) can best be recapitulated in the words of their Lordships, which read:
"1. The Municipal Board, Mussoorie has a ropeways connecting the Mall Road to Gunhill. On 24-3-1972, tenders were invited by the Board for running the ropeways. The petitioner's tender was the highest. The tender was accepted and thereafter on 14-6-1972, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the Board for running the ropeways for three years with effect from 15-6-72 to 14-6-1975. Amongst the various conditions of the agreement, one of the conditions stipulated was that the ropeways were to be given to the petitioner in a running condition and thereafter the contractor would be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the ropeways. The ropeways was handed over to the petitioner on 19-6-1972. It thereafter transpires, that the petitioner informed the Board that the ropeways was not in a fit condition and as such the royalty fixed under the agreement should be reduced. This the petitioner did by his letter dated 13-11-1972. On 4-12-1973, the President of the Municipal Board wrote a letter to the petitioner saying that the State had directed that ropeways be completely stopped from operation. On 27-12-1973, the petitioner informed the Board that an amount of Rs. 60,000/- will be required for repairs of the ropeways and in case the Board was not prepared to spend the same, the lease in favour of the petitioner may further be extended by five years and in that event the petitioner would get it repaired at his own costs. On 28-12-1973, a meeting of the Board took place and it was resolved that as the Board did not have sufficient funds, it was not in a position to repair the ropeways. It further resolved that the petitioner may carry out the repairs of the ropeways and the lease be extended for a period of five years from 1-1-1974. This resolution was later on confirmed by the Board on 8-1-1974. Subsequently a registered agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the Board on 1-1-1974. On 27-8-1975, the State Government purporting to act in excercise of powers conferred on it under Sec. 34(I-B) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (Hereinafter referred to as the Act) the cancelled the resolutions of the Board dated 8-12-1973 and 8-1-1974 by which it had decided to extend the lease of the petitioner for a period of five years. The petitioner has challenged this order of the State Government."
40. Interpreting the powers of the State Government to prohibit execution or further execution of a resolution of the Board or a Nagar Palika, it was held in Har Pal Singh:
"3. This section came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Board, Kannauj v. State of U.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 345 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2147.] . In that case, the Municipal Board Kannauj had dismissed 74 sweepers. Subsequently, the State Government in the purported exercise of its powers under Sec. 34(I-B) of the Act cancelled the resolution dispensing with the services of the sweepers. It was held by the Supreme Court that Sec. 34(I-B) of the Act did not confer power on the State Government to cancel a resolution which did not require any further execution. They approved of the decision of this court in the case of Shujaat Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. [1966 A.L.J. 499.] . That case related to a resolution passed by the Board exonerating the Executive Officer of the Board, from certain charges and it was held that Sec. 34(I-B) of the Act did not authorise the State Government to cancel or rescind such a resolution, as the resolution became effective as soon as it was passed and exhausted. It is clear from these authorities that the State Government can only pass an order in respect of a resolution or an order passed by the Board which requires execution or further execution and not where the resolution or order passed by the Board does not require any further act to be done in its pursuance. It is also clear that it cannot apply to a case where the resolution or order passed by the Board has already been carried into effect. In our view the section does not authorise the State Government to undo an act which has already been completed in pursuance of a resolution. In the present case, after the resolution of the Board was passed, in consonance with the provisions of Secs. 96, 97 and 98 of the Act, a registered agreement was entered into between the parties. This was so because contracts have to be sanctioned by a resolution and thereafter the Board and the contracting parties have to enter into an agreement which is then registered. After the resolution sanctioning lease of the petitioner for a further period of five years was passed the only act that had to be done in execution of that resolution was to enter into an agreement with the petitioner in accordance with Secs. 97 and 98 of the Act. That agreement was entered into much before the State Government passed the impugned order. Thus when the order came to be passed no further act was required to be done in pursuance to the resolution. The rights of the parties after agreements had been reached, came to be governed by the agreement and not by the resolution as has been contended for by the Standing Counsel.
4. A perusal of Sec. 96 of the Act shows that the legislature has drawn a distinction between a resolution and a contract, for it postulates that before a contract is entered into by the Board it must be preceded by a resolution. Sec. 34(I-B) empowers the State Government to cancel a resolution and we cannot read into it a power to cancel a contract entered into by the Board and a third party, in accordance with the provisions of Secs. 96, 97 and 98 of the Act."
41. If one turns to the holding of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj, the principle about the exercise of the power to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order of the Board or the Nagar Palika, or the order of an officer of the Nagar Palika is interpreted in unmistakable terms to mean that the power under sub-section (1B) and sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act of 1916 did not extend to setting aside or cancelling an order of the Nagar Palika or an officer thereof. The crux of this reasoning is that if it had been the legislative intent to clothe the State Government with the power under sub-section (1B) or sub-section (4) of Section 34 to set aside or cancel an order of the Board or an officer of the Board, the statute would have simply said so to adopt the words of their Lordships, "without resorting to the circumlocution "prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order"". We do not, therefore, think that sub-section (1B) read with sub-section (4) applies to any resolution or order, which exhaust itself after it is passed or made.
42. The ratio of the decision in Municipal Board, Kannauj lies here. What is meant by prohibiting the execution or further execution of a resolution or order of the Nagar Palika is not dependent upon the nature of the resolution or the order. It really depends upon the fact if what the resolution or the order directs, has been accomplished. A resolution that exonerates an employee from charges laid against him or dismisses him from service, both passed or made by a Nagar Palika or an officer thereof, would, in no way, be different from a resolution or order of appointment, pursuant whereto an employee is appointed to the office. The performance of duties by the employee are not acts done in pursuance of or under the cover of the resolution or order appointing him. The employee does act on behalf of the Nagar Palika, once appointed, by virtue of the status, that is conferred upon him, by the resolution of the Nagar Palika or the order of a competent officer of the Nagar Palika appointing him. Once appointed, the employee acquires a status in the same manner that a resolution or order of the Nagar Palika or one of its officers awards a contract. Once the contract comes to be executed, it leaves nothing to be done by the contractee in pursuance of or under the cover of the Nagar Palika's resolution or the order of one of its officers. All that the contractee does, after the contract is executed, is in discharge of his obligations under the contract. In both cases that we have indicated, the resolution of the Nagar Palika or an order of one of its officers exhausts itself, once it is executed and results in an appointment or a contract, or for that matter, the bringing into existence of any other obligations. The principle in Municipal Board, Kannauj does, by no means, lend itself to the construction where an employee appointed under an order of the Nagar Palika may be regarded everyday to be doing acts in pursuance of or under the cover of the resolution or order appointing him. He does it by virtue of the status that comes into being upon the resolution of the Nagar Palika or the order of a competent officer, directing his appointment being executed, and, therefore, exhausted. This is the unmistakable principle discernible from the holding of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj and the Bench decision in Har Pal Singh, in the face of which, the remarks of this Court in Ram Kishore must be regarded as confined to the facts of that case.
43. The other decision on the same lines as Ram Kishore relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents is Smt. Suman Verma and others v. Special Secretary, Nagar Vikash Anubhag-6, Government of U.P., Lucknow and others, 2004 (2) AWC 1247. This decision has been referred to in Ram Kishore. In the appeal carried from the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Smt. Suman Verma (supra), being Special Appeal No.35 of 2004, the Division Bench, on wider ground, set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and remitted the matter for a decision afresh, vide judgment and order dated 04.04.2016. The writ petition was thereafter never decided on merits and declared to have become infructuous with efflux of time. The same view of the law was endorsed by a Division Bench of this Court in Rishi Kumar Gupta and others v. Nanoomal Yadav and others, AIR 1976 All 365. In Rishi Kumar Gupta (supra), it was observed:
"8. Another important feature of the question is that power conferred by Section 34 can be utilised in a case where "the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed by a Board is required to be prohibited. "But where, as here, the resolution does not require any act to be done for enforcing it, there is really nothing to prohibit. In the present case respondent No. 1 was elected as Vice-President on April 29, 1975, by a special resolution. Section 54 or any other provision of this Act does not provide for any other formality to be undergone or performed before a person elected as Vice-President assumes the office. Sub-section (2) of Section 54 of the Act gives to the Vice President a fixed term of one year. This term starts running immediately with effect from the date on which the special resolution electing him as such is passed. Accordingly, the resolution is self-operative and gets exhausted the moment it is passed. Hence there remains nothing the execution or further execution of which could be prohibited under Section 34 of the Act. Interpreting the same phrase used in S. 34 (1-B) of the U. P. Municipalities Act in Kannauj Municipality v. State of U. P., AIR 1971 SC 2147, the Supreme Court held that the order passed by the Kannauj Municipal Board dismissing the services of some of the sweepers employed in it, became operative by its own force and as no further steps were necessary to implement such an order hence Section 34 (1-B) of the Act was inapplicable to an order of dismissal. Applying the law enunciated by the Supreme Court we also find that as the resolution electing respondent No. 1, as Vice President became operative with effect from April 29, 1975 there remained nothing to be done under the resolution which could be prohibited by the Commissioner by exercising his powers u/s. 34 (1). Section 34 (1) did not empower the Commissioner to cancel the resolution. The order of the Commissioner is therefore, not supportable under Section 34. The learned single Judge, therefore, was right in quashing the said order.
9. It is settled that an authority created by a statute for a limited purpose has to act within four corners of that Act otherwise no act of such an authority can be of any operation, if he purporting to exercise such power, transcends the limits of the authority conferred by it. Similarly it is also a settled rule of interpretation of statute that when power is given under statute to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way: See Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch D 426. Applying these principles to the present case it appears to us that the Prescribed Authority did not have power to set aside the special resolution of the Municipal Board passed on 29-4-1975, as in doing so it exercised power which did not belong to it."
44. This Court may add that the power under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916 has been largely understood the way that this Court does, by the Supreme Court and by two Bench decisions and a Single Judge, as indicated hereinabove. There does not seem to be any reason to depart from the settled view and recognize in the State Government some power to set aside, executed resolutions or orders, which it does not have under sub-section (1B) of Section 34.
45. In view of our conclusion on the first question, the impugned order dated 05.08.2019 passed by the State Government has to be held without jurisdiction and so also the orders passed in compliance therewith by the Director (Local Bodies), the District Magistrate and the Executive Officer. On this ground alone, these orders cannot be sustained and have to be quashed.
46. This brings this Court to the other question, if it was open to the State Government, in view of the findings recorded by the Committee appointed by the District Magistrate, suggesting the petitioners' appointment to be tainted with fraud, to hold these void.
47. Regarding the appointment of the first petitioner, Anuj Saxena in the leading writ petition, the Committee have recorded the following findings:
"3. श्री अनुज कुमार सक्सैना पुत्र श्री ओमप्रकाश सक्सैना की नियुक्ति विद्युत मिस्त्री के पद किया जाना-
श्री कुलदीप सिंह प्रधान लिपिक द्वारा दिनांक 21-01-2015 को अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष नगर पालिका परिषद खैर के समक्ष आख्या / नोटशीट प्रस्तुत की गयी जिसमें लिपिक द्वारा अंकित किया गया कि "उ०प्र० शासन के शासनादेश संख्या -906/9-6-2014-113मिस / 13टी०सी० दिनांक - 21 अक्टूबर 2014 के अनुक्रम में निदेषक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० के पत्रसं०- सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्रसं० 169 / 2013 - 14 दिनांक 07-11-2014 एवं उ०प्र० शासन के शासनादेश स० 2331 / 9-6-2014-113 मिस / 13टी०सी० दिनांक 16 दिसम्बर 2014 के अनुक्रम में निदेशक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० के पत्र सं०- सा०सेल / 319 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्र सं०-169/2013-14 लखनऊ दिनांक 31 दिसम्बर के अनुपालन में करसंग्रह इंस्पेक्टर 02 पद, विद्युत मिस्त्री 01 पद व जूनियर फिटर 01 पद जिसमें आरक्षण की स्थिति अनारक्षित दर्शाते हुए नगर पालिका अधिनियम 02 सन् 1916 की धारा 74 के अर्न्तगत समूह ग व समूह ग के पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अध्यक्ष व समूह घ के पदों पर अधिशासी अधिकारी में अधिकार समाहित हैं" अतः उक्त पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अग्रेतर कार्यवाही किये जाने की अनुमति चाही गयी है" ।
जिसपर अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष द्वारा हस्ताक्षर किये गये है । इसीप्रकार दिनांक 29-01-2015 मे आख्या / नोट शीट प्रस्तुत की गई जिसमें लिपिक द्वारा अंकित किया गया कि " कि कृपया टीप पृष्ठ सं० 1 पर अनुमोदन दिनांक 21-01-2015 का सदर्भ ग्रहण करें प्रदत्त अनुमोदन के अनुपालन में समूह 'ग' एवं समूह 'घ' के रिक्त पदों पर अर्ह अभ्यर्थियों से आवेदन पत्र प्राप्त किये जाने हेतु दैनिक समाचार पत्र कल्पतरू एवं दैनिक आज नें विज्ञप्ति प्रकाशित किये जाने हेतु पृष्ठाकिंत आलेख्य पत्रावली पर रक्षित है कृपया आलेख्य पर हस्ताक्षर करते हुये अनुमोदन प्रदान कर विज्ञप्ति प्रकाशित किये जाने की अनुमति प्रदान करना चाहें ।" उक्त नोट शीट पर तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष द्वारा दिनांक रहित हस्ताक्षर कर अनुमति प्रदान की गयी। इसके उपरान्त तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी नगर पालिका परिषद खैर के पत्र सं० मीमो दिनांक 01-02-2015 को कल्पतरू व दैनिक आज समाचार पत्रों में दिनांक 05-02-2015 के राष्ट्रीय संस्करण में प्रकाशन हेतु प्रकाशन हेतु पत्र प्रेषित किया गया है। (सलंग्न) उक्त पत्र में अंकित किया गया है कि समूह ग व समूह घ के निम्न पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अर्ह अभ्यर्थियों से आवेदन दिनांक 12 फरवरी 2015 की सांय 5:00 बजे तक अधिशासी अधिकारी नगर पालिका परिषद खैर जनपद अलीगढ उ०प्र० का नाम पंजीकृत डाक के माध्यम से अर्ह अभ्यर्थियों के आमंत्रित किये जाते हैं पंजीकृत डांक के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी माध्यम से अभ्यर्थी का आवेदन स्वीकार नहीं किया जायेगा । जिसका प्रकाशन दिनांक 14-02-2015 को किया गया जबकि आवेदन 12-02-2015 की सांय तक ही लिए जाने थे। (छायाप्रति संलग्न ) इसके उपरान्त पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध संशोधित विज्ञप्ति पत्रांक मीमो दिनांक 13-02-2015 का अवलोकन किया गया जिसमें अंकित किया गया है कि 02 कर संग्रह इंस्पेक्टर एवं 1 जूनियर फिटर व 1 इलैक्ट्रीशियन के पद के आवेदन हेतु दिनांक 12-02-2015 से बढाकर 21-02-2015 कर दी गयी है तथा संवाददाता प्रावदा दैनिक को सूचना प्रकाशन हेतु प्रतिलिपि प्रेषित की गयी है । यहाँ यह बिन्दु उल्लेखनीय है कि संशोधित विज्ञप्ति हेतु पालिका द्वारा पत्र जोकि दिनांक 13-02-2015 को जारी किया गया जिसमें अधिशासी अधिकारी नगर पालिका द्वारा समाचार पत्र में प्रकाशन हेतु कोई निश्चित दिनांक का विवरण नहीं दिया गया है। संशोधित विज्ञप्ति का प्रकाशन भी दिनांक 13-02-2015 में ही किया गया है जो अगले दिन के समाचार पत्र में प्रकाशित की जानी चाहिए थी । (संलग्न) उसी दिन विज्ञप्ति का प्रकाशन किये जाने तथा विज्ञप्ति पत्र दिनांक 01-02-2015 को 05-02-2015 में प्रकाशित किये जाने के बजाय दिनांक 14-02-2015 में छापा गया जबकि आवेदन की तिथि 12-02-2015 की सांय 5:00 बजे तक सुनिश्चित की गयी थी जिससे स्पष्ट होता है कि तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी, अध्यक्ष व पालिका कर्मचारियों द्वारा विज्ञप्ति प्रकाशन की प्रक्रिया में अनियमितता एवं नियमों को दरकिनार कर भ्रष्ट आचरण कर जानबूझकर अपने चहेतों को लाभ पहुँचाने के लिए नियम कानून को ताक पर रखकर किया गया है। कमल सिंह की पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध नोट शीट / आख्या पर श्री राकेश शर्मा लिपिक, श्री अखिलेश सेंगर, लिपिक व श्री कुलदीप सिंह, प्रधान लिपिक द्वारा अपने हस्ताक्षर कर अंकित किया गया है कि उ०प्र० शासन के शासनादेश संख्या-906/9-6-2014-113 मिस / 13टी०सी० दिनांक- 21 अक्टूबर 2014 के अनुक्रम में निदेषक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० के पत्रसं०- सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्रसं० 169/2013-14 दिनांक 07-11-2014 एवं उ०प्र० शासन के शासनादेश स० 2331/9-6-2014-113मिस / 13टी०सी० दिनांक 16 दिसम्बर 2014 के अनुक्रम में करसंग्रह इंस्पेक्टर 02 पद, विद्युत मिस्त्री 01 पद व जूनियर फिटर 01 पदों को भरे जाने की स्वीकृति प्राप्त हुई है इन पदों पर आवेदन प्राप्ति की सूचना कल्पतरू, दैनिक आज व प्रावदा दैनिक में प्रकाशित हयी जिसमें उक्त पदो हेतु आवेदन प्राप्त हुए किन्तु कर संग्रह इंस्पैक्टर के पद पर संबंधित यूनियन के द्वारा पदोन्नति की मांग को दृष्टिगत रखते हुए उक्त पद के साक्षात्कार को स्थगित किया जाना उचित होगा। अब केवल दो पद इलैक्ट्रीशियन 1 पद व जूनियर फिटर 1 पद का साक्षात्कार होना है जिनके लिए केवल 5-5 आवेदन प्राप्त हुए है साक्षात्कार हेतु समिति नियत की जानी है जिसके लिए निम्न नाम, पदनाम अंकित है तथा साक्षात्कार हेतु 15-04-2015 नियत की जाने की स्वीकृति एवं साक्षात्कार की तिथि 15-04-2015 नियत करने की कृपा करें।" तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष द्वारा अपने दिनांक रहित हस्ताक्षर के द्वारा साक्षात्कार हेतु स्वीकृति दी गयी है। चयन समिति हेतु श्री शिवप्रसाद वर्मा खण्ड विकास अधिकारी, टप्पल, श्री सी०बी० सिंह, पशु चिकित्साधिकारी खैर व श्री मौहम्मद आलम फरसौरी, अवर अभियंता, सिचाई विभाग एवं तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी को सम्मलित किया गया है।
पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध पत्र सं० मीमो दिनांक 10-04-2015 (संलग्न), का अवलोकन किया गया जोकि श्री शिवप्रसाद वर्मा खण्ड विकास अधिकारी, टप्पल, श्री सी०बी० सिंह, पशु चिकित्साधिकारी खैर व श्री मौहम्मद आलम फरसौरी, अवर अभियंता, सिचाई विभाग को संबोधित है जिसके अर्न्तगत तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी द्वारा उपरोक्त को अवगत कराया गया है कि दिनांक 15-04-2015 को अपरान्ह 12:00 बजे पालिका कार्यालय में निम्न आवेदनों के सापेक्ष आवेदकों का साक्षात्कार लिया जाना है। अध्यक्ष नगर पालिका खैर द्वारा साक्षात्कार हेतु अनुमोदित समिति में सदस्य नामित किये गये है तथा श्री शिवप्रसाद वर्मा खण्ड विकास अधिकारी, टप्पल, श्री सी०बी० सिंह, पशु चिकित्साधिकारी खैर व श्री मौहम्मद आलम फरसौरी, अवर अभियंता, सिचाई विभाग को नियत समय, दिनांक, स्थान पर उपस्थित होकर साक्षात्कार लेने का अनुरोध किया गया है जिलाधिकारी अलीगढ को नियुक्ति प्रकिया के बारे में सूचना दिये जाने का कोई साक्ष्य पत्रावली पर नही है।
नियुक्ति पत्रावली के अवलोकन से विदित है कि दिनांक 15-04-2015 को 05 अभ्यर्थियों द्वारा साक्षात्कार में प्रतिभाग किया गया जिसमें अनुज कुमार सक्सैना पुत्र स्व० ओमप्रकाश सक्सैना, मोहित कुमार शर्मा पुत्र श्री मुकेश कुमार शर्मा, श्री जनक सिंह पुत्र हरवीर सिंह, धीरेन्द्र प्रताप सिंह पुत्र श्री देशराज सिंह व अशोक कुमार पुत्र राधाचरन का विवरण पत्रावली पर अंकित है तथा कमल सिंह पुत्र केवल सिंह व राजेश कुमार पुत्र औकार सिंह के ही आवेदन पत्र व अभिलेखों की छायाप्रतियां पत्रावली पर संलग्न की गयी है। चयन समिति द्वारा पाँचों अभ्यर्थियों में से श्री अनुज सक्सैना पुत्र ओमप्रकाश सक्सैना को सर्वाधिक कुल 73 अंक दिये गये तथा चयन समिति द्वारा अंक पत्र पर दिनांक 15-04-2015 को हस्ताक्षर कर दिये गये जिसको अध्यक्ष द्वारा अनुमोदित कर दिया गया जिसके क्रम में दिनांक 20-04-2015 को श्री अनुज सक्सैना को 5200-20200 ग्रेड पे 1800 वेतनमान पर विद्युत मिस्त्री के पद पर नियुक्ति हेतु अधिशासी अधिकारी द्वारा दिनांक रहित हस्ताक्षर कर नियुक्ति पत्र जारी किया गया है। जिसपर कोई डिस्पेच नम्बर नहीं है और न ही उसकी प्रति प्रेषित कर शासन व जिलाधिकारी महोदय को अवगत कराया गया है। पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध श्री अनुज सक्सेना द्वारा प्रस्तुत योगदान आख्या दिनांक 01-05-2015 को स्वीकृत नहीं किया गया है।
उक्त के संबंध में तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी ने अपने स्पष्टीकरण / जवाब दिनांक 12-11- 2018 में अवगत कराया है कि उक्त पद के चयन हेतु नियमों की जानकारी न होने के कारण साक्षात्कार को अग्रिम आदेशों तक स्थगित कर दिया गया तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष द्वारा विस्तृत जानकारी करने के उपरान्त साक्षात्कार की कार्यवाही प्रारम्भ की गयी किन्तु इसी बीच कर्मचारी संगठन के अध्यक्ष के द्वारा तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष के समक्ष प्रस्ताव रखा गया कि कर निरीक्षकों के पदों पर वरिष्ठतम कर्मचारी को पदोन्नति का लाभ देते हुए काफी समय से कम्प्यूटर आपरेटर के पद पर नियत वेतन पर कार्य कर रहे कर्मचारी को नगर पालिका अधिनियम सं० 02 सन 1916 की धारा 75 के परिपालन में तैनात किया जाये । तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष नगर पालिका खैर ने कर्मचारी संगठन से वार्ता के उपरान्त कर निरीक्षक के पद का साक्षात्कार स्थगित करते हुए कार्यालय की आख्या प्राप्त कर पालिका में कार्यरत वरिष्ठतम कर वसूलकर्ता श्री राजेश कुमार जो पदोन्नति के समय कर निरीक्षक का ही वेतन प्राप्त कर रहे थे, को कर निरीक्षक के पद पर पदोन्नत कर दिया तथा नबम्बर 2007 से नियत पारिश्रमिक पर कार्यरत कम्प्यूटर आपेरटर कु० रीता गौतम को उनकी योग्यता, अनुभव, कार्य के प्रति लगनशीलता को दृष्टिगत रखते हुए कर निरीक्षक के पद पर नियमित कर दिया । उपरोक्त के अतिरिक्त विद्युत मिस्त्री व 01 जूनियर फिटर की नियुक्ति हेतु साक्षात्कार लिया गया साक्षात्कार के उपरान्त परिणाम पत्र का अध्यक्ष, नगर पालिका परिषद खैर द्वारा अवलोकन कर अनुमोदन किया गया तदोपरान्त नगर पालिका अधि० सं० 02 सन् 1916 की धारा 74 के अर्न्तगत श्री अनुज कुमार सक्सैना को विद्युत मिस्त्री के पद हेतु नियुक्ति पत्र निर्गत किये गये ।
उक्त के संबंध में तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष श्री पंकज पवार ने अपने स्पष्टीकरण / जवाब दिनांक 12-11- 2018 में अवगत कराया है कि शासन के पत्र सं 906/9-6-2014-113 मिस / 2013 टी०सी०-1 दिनांक 21-10-2014 के अनुसार निदेशक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० 8वॉ तल इन्दिरा भवन लखनऊ ने अपने पत्रांक सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्र सं० 169 / 2013 - 14 लखनऊ दिनांक 07 नवम्बर 2014 के द्वारा 02 कर निरीक्षकों के पदों को तथा शासन के पत्र सं० 2331 / 976-2014 - 113 मिस / 2013 दिनांक 18-12-2014 पर निदेशक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० 8वाँ तल इन्दिरा भवन लखनऊ ने अपने पत्रांक सांख्यिकी सेल / 319 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्र सं0 169 / 2013 - 14 लखनऊ, दिनांक 31 दिसम्बर 2014 के द्वारा 01 विद्युत मिस्त्री व 01 जूनियर पाइप लाइन फिटर के पदों को भरे जाने की स्वीकृति प्रदान की गयी। उपरोक्त शासनादेशों को बोर्ड के समक्ष जिस पर बोर्ड के द्वारा अपनी सहर्ष स्वीकृति प्रदान की गयी तदोपरान्त पदों को भरे जाने हेतु मण्डल से प्रकाशित होने वाले समाचार पत्रों में दैनिक कल्पतरू, एवं दैनिक आज व दैनिक राजपथ मे विज्ञप्तियाँ प्रकाशित करायी गयी जो कि मास्टर पत्रावली पर साक्ष्य के रूप में उपलब्ध है तथा नगर पालिका अधिनियम सं० 2 सन् 1916 की धारा 74 व 75 के तहत इन पदों पर सीधी भर्ती के अधिकार अध्यक्ष व अधिशासी अधिकारी में निहित हैं, को आधार मानकर की गयी हैं। विद्युत मिस्त्री एवं पाइपलाइन फिटर तथा समूह घ के चपरासी पदो के साक्षात्कार हेतु समितियो का गठन किया गया तथा साक्षात्कार के उपरान्त ही नियुक्तियाँ की गयी ।
उपरोक्त समस्त अभिलेखों, साक्ष्यों, नियुक्ति पत्रावली, साक्षात्कार पत्रावली तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष के स्पष्टीकरण / जबाव एवं वर्तमान अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री संदीप सक्सैना व अध्यक्ष श्री संजीव अग्रवाल द्वारा प्राप्त आख्याओं इत्यादि का गहनता से परिशीलन करने के पश्चात् यह स्पष्ट होता है कि नगर पालिका परिषद- खैर के उपरोक्त दोनों कर्मचारियों श्री अखिलेश कुमार लिपिक एवं श्री कुलदीप सिंह, प्रधान लिपिक एवं तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष श्री पंकज पवार एवं अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी की मिली भगत से नियम एवं कानून को ताक पर रखकर भ्रष्ट आचरण करते हुए उपरोक्त अनियमित नियुक्तियाँ की गयी है जो किसी भी तरह से बने रहने योग्य नहीं है। उक्त पद हेतु विज्ञप्ति दो लोकल समाचार पत्र प्रावदा एवं कल्पतरू एक्सप्रेस में निकाली गयी है जबकि नियमानुसार दो प्रतिष्ठित समाचार पत्रों में विज्ञप्ति निकाली जानी चाहिए थी तथा नियुक्तियों के प्रकाशन में भी अनियमितताओं का समावेश किया गया है। जिस दिन विज्ञप्ति हेतु पत्र जारी किया गया उसी दिन विज्ञप्ति का प्रकाशन किया जाना अनियमित व अव्यवहारिक तरीकों को अपनाकर नियुक्ति किया जाना नितान्त गलत व भ्रष्टाचार की श्रेणी में आता है। जोकि शून्य घोषित किये जाने योग्य है। उक्त पदों हेतु चयन समिति मनमाने तरीके से बनायी गयी जिसकी अनुमति जिलाधिकारी महोदय द्वारा नहीं ली गयी ।
नियुक्ति पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध शासन के पत्र सं सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्रसं० 169/2013-14 दिनांक 07-11-2014 के अर्न्तगत नगर पालिका परिषदो में रिक्त समूह ग के कुल 120 पदो को निम्न शर्तों के अनुसार भरे जाने की स्वीकृति प्रदान की गयी है कि-
"नगर पालिका परिषदो में रिक्त समूह-ग के कुल 120 पदो को निम्न शर्तों के अनुसार भरे जाने से पूर्व पद सृजन संबंधी शासनादेशों से पदों का मिलान / सत्यापन संबंधित नगर निकाय से सुनिश्चित कराया जाये। कुल 120 पदों को भरे जाने हेतु सुसंगत शासनादेशों / नियमावली के अर्न्तगत कार्यवाही सुनिश्चित करायी जाये तथा उपरोक्तानुसार कार्यवाही करते हुए संलग्न सूची में दर्शाये गये अपनी निकाय से संबंधित पदों पर नियुक्ति / चयन की नियमानुसार कार्यवाही पूर्ण कर सूचना निदेशालय / शासन को उपलब्ध करायें।"
प्रमुख सचिव, कार्मिक अनुभाग - 4 उ०प्र० शासन, लखनऊ के शासनादेश सं० 20/4/2002/का-2-2002 दिनांक 29 जून 2002 ( समूह 'ग व समूह घ के पदों पर सीधी भर्ती की प्रक्रिया नियमावली, 2002 ) में निर्दिष्ट प्रावधानों का अनुपालन नहीं किया गया है तथा शासनादेश के अनुरूप न तो उचित चयन समिति का गठन किया गया और न ही चयन प्रक्रिया का पालन किया गया। (संलग्न) उक्त नियुक्ति प्रक्रिया में आरक्षण नियमावली / सुसंगत शासनादेशों को दरकिनार करते हुए मनमाने तरीके से कर ली गयी है। नगर पालिका खैर में कर्मचारी / अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष की मिलीभगत से मनमाने तरीके से भ्रष्ट आचरण करते हुए अनियमित तरीके से श्री अनुज सक्सैना की नियुक्ति विद्युत मिस्त्री के पद पर की गयी है जोकि नितान्त गलत, नियम विरूद्ध है तथा अनियमितता की श्रेणी में आता है। उक्त अनियमित नियुक्तियों के लिए नगर पालिका परिषद खैर के तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष व अधिशासी अधिकारी / कर्मचारी पूर्ण रूप से दोषी है जिनके विरूद्ध विभागीय/ वैधानिक कार्यवाही किये जाने की संस्तुति की जाती है।"
48. Likewise, in relation to the second petitioner, Kamal Singh in the leading petition, the Committee recorded the following findings:
"2. श्री कमल सिंह पुत्र श्री केवल सिंह की नियुक्ति जूनियर फिटर पद पर किया जाना:-
"श्री कुलदीप सिंह प्रधान लिपिक द्वारा दिनांक 21-01-2015 को अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष नगर पालिका परिषद् खैर के समक्ष आख्या /नोटशीट- प्रस्तुत की गयी जिसमें लिपिक द्वारा अंकित किया गया कि उ०प्र० शासन के शासनादेश संख्या-906 /9-6-2014-113मिस / 13टी0सी0 दिनांक - 21 अक्टूबर 2014 के अनुक्रम में निदेषक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० के पत्रसं०- सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्रसं0 169 /2013-14 दिनांक 07-11-2014 एवं उoप्रo शासन के शासनादेश स० 2331 / 9-6-2014-113 मिस / 13टी०सी० दिनांक 16 दिसम्बर 2014 के अनुक्रम में निदेशक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० के पत्र सं०- सा०सेल / 319 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्र सं०-169 / 2013-14 लखनऊ दिनांक 31 दिसम्बर के अनुपालन में करसंग्रह इंस्पेक्टर 02 पद, विद्युत मिस्त्री 01 पद व जूनियर फिटर 01 पद जिसमें आरक्षण की स्थिति अनारक्षित दर्शाते हुए नगर पालिका अधिनियम 02 सन् 1916 की धारा 74 के अर्न्तगत समूह ग व समूह ग के पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अध्यक्ष व समूह घ के पदों पर अधिशासी अधिकारी में अधिकार समाहित हैं" अतः उक्त पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अग्रेतर कार्यवाही किये जाने की अनुमति चाही गयी है"।
" जिसपर तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष द्वारा हस्ताक्षर किये गये है। इसीप्रकार दिनांक 29-01-2015 मे आख्या / नोट शीट प्रस्तुत की गई जिसमें लिपिक द्वारा अंकित किया गया कि " कि कृपया टीप पृष्ठ सं० 1 पर अनुमोदन दिनांक 21-01-2015 का सदर्भ ग्रहण करें प्रदत्त अनुमोदन के अनुपालन में समूह 'ग' एवं समूह 'घ' के रिक्त पदों पर अर्ह अभ्यर्थियों से आवेदन पत्र प्राप्त किये जाने हेतु दैनिक समाचार पत्र कल्पतरू एवं दैनिक आज में विज्ञप्ति प्रकाशित किये जाने हेतु पृष्ठाकिंत आलेख्य पत्रावली पर रक्षित है कृपया आलेख्य पर हस्ताक्षर करते हुये अनुमोदन प्रदान कर विज्ञप्ति प्रकाशित किये जाने की अनुमति प्रदान करना चाहें ।" उक्त नोट शीट पर तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष द्वारा दिनांक रहित हस्ताक्षर कर अनुमति प्रदान की गयी। इसके उपरान्त तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी नगर पालिका परिषद खैर के पत्र सं० मीमो दिनाक 01-02-2015 को कल्पतरू व दैनिक आज समाचार पत्रों में दिनांक 05-02-2015 के राष्ट्रीय संस्करण में प्रकाशन हेतु प्रकाशन हेतु पत्र प्रेषित किया गया है । ( सलंग्न ) उक्त पत्र में अकित किया गया कि समूह ग व समूह घ के निम्न पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अर्ह अभ्यर्थियों से आवेदन दिनांक 12 फरवरी की सांय 5:00 बजे तक अधिशासी अधिकारी नगर पालिका परिषद खैर जनपद अलीगढ उ०प्र० के नाम पंजीकृत डाक के माध्यम से अर्ह अभ्यर्थियों के आमंत्रित किये जाते हैं पंजीकृत डांक के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी माध्यम से अभ्यर्थी का आवेदन स्वीकार नहीं किया जायेगा । जिसका प्रकाशन दिनांक 14-02-2015 को किया गया जबकि आवेदन 12-02-2015 की सांय तक ही लिए जाने थे। (छायाप्रति संलग्न) इसके उपरान्त पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध संशोधित विज्ञप्ति पत्रांक मीमो दिनांक 13-02-2015 का अवलोकन किया गया जिसमें अंकित किया गया है कि 02 करसंग्रह इंस्पेक्टर एवं 1 जूनियर फिटर व 1 इलैक्ट्रीशियन के पद के आवेदन हेतु दिनांक 12-02-2015 से बढाकर 21-02-2015 कर दीं गयी है तथा संवाददाता प्रावदा दैनिक को सूचना प्रकाशन हेतु प्रतिलिपि प्रेषित की गयी है। यहाँ यह बिन्दु उल्लेखनीय है कि संशोधित विज्ञप्ति हेतु पालिका द्वारा पत्र जोकि दिनांक 13-02-2015 को जारी किया गया जिसमें अधिशासी अधिकारी नगर पालिका द्वारा समाचार पत्र में प्रकाशन हेतु कोई निश्चित दिनांक का विवरण नहीं दिया गया है। संशोधित विज्ञप्ति का प्रकाशन भी दिनांक 13-02-2015 में ही किया गया है जो व्यवहारिक रूप से संभव नहीं है। (संलग्न) उसी दिन विज्ञप्ति का प्रकाशन किये जाने तथा विज्ञप्ति पत्र दिनांक 01-02-2015 को 05-02-2015 में प्रकाशित किये जाने के बजाय दिनांक 14-02-2015 में छापा गया जबकि आवेदन की तिथि 12-02-2015 की सांय 5:00 बजे तक सुनिश्चित की गयी थी जिससे स्पष्ट होता है कि तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी, तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष, श्री पंकज पवार व पालिका में तैनात रिपोर्ट प्रस्तुतकर्ता कर्मचारियों श्री राकेश शर्मा लिपिक, श्री अखिलेश सेंगर लिपिक, व श्री कुलदीप सिंह प्रधान लिपिक द्वारा विज्ञप्ति प्रकाशन की प्रक्रिया में अनियमितता एवं नियमों को दरकिनार कर भ्रष्ट आचरण कर जानबूझकर अपने चहेतों को लाभ पहुँचाने के लिए नियम कानून को ताक पर रखकर किया गया है। कमल सिंह की पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध नोट शीट / आख्या पर श्री राकेश शर्मा लिपिक, श्री अखिलेश सेंगर, लिपिक व श्री कुलदीप सिंह, प्रधान लिपिक द्वारा अपने हस्ताक्षर कर अंकित किया गया है कि उ०प्र० शासन के शासनादेश संख्या 906/9-6-2014-113मिस / 13 टी०सी० दिनांक-21 अक्टूबर 2014 के अनुक्रम में निदेषक स्थानीय निकाय उoप्रo के पत्रसं०- सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्रसं० 169 /2013-14 दिनांक 07-11-2014 एवं उoप्रo शासन के शासनादेश सं० 2331 / 9-6-2014-113 मिस / 13टी0सी0 दिनांक 16 दिसम्बर 2014 के अनुक्रम में करसंग्रह इंस्पेक्टर 02 पद, विद्युत मिस्त्री 01 पद व जूनियर फिटर 01 पदों को भरे जाने की स्वीकृति प्राप्त हुई है इन पदों पर आवेदन प्राप्ति की सूचना कल्पतरू, दैनिक आज व प्रावदा दैनिक में प्रकाशित हयी जिसमें उक्त पदो हेतु आवेदन प्राप्त हुए किन्तु कर संग्रह इंस्पैक्टर के पद पर संबंधित यूनियन के द्वारा पदोन्नति की मांग को दृष्टिगत रखते हुए उक्त पद के साक्षात्कार को स्थगित किया जाना उचित होगा। अब केवल दो पद इलैक्ट्रीशियन 1 पद व जूनियर फिटर 1 पद का साक्षात्कार होना है जिनके लिए केवल 5-5 आवेदन प्राप्त हुए है साक्षात्कार हेतु समिति नियत की जानी है जिसके लिए निम्न नाम, पदनाम अंकित है तथा साक्षात्कार हेतु 15-04-2015 नियत की जाने की स्वीकृति एवं साक्षात्कार की तिथि 15-04-2015 नियत करने की कृपा करें।" तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष द्वारा अपने दिनांक रहित हस्ताक्षर के द्वारा साक्षात्कार हेतु स्वीकृति दी गयी है। चयन समिति हेतु श्री शिवप्रसाद वर्मा खण्ड विकास अधिकारी, टप्पल, श्री सी०बी० सिंह, पशु चिकित्साधिकारी खैर व श्री मौहम्मद आलम फरसौरी, अवर अभियंता, सिचाई विभाग एवं तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी को सम्मलित किया गया है।
पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध पत्र सं० मीमो दिनांक 10-04-2015 (संलग्न), का अवलोकन किया गया जोकि श्री शिवप्रसाद वर्मा खण्ड विकास अधिकारी, टप्पल, श्री सी०बी० सिंह, पशु चिकित्साधिकारी खैर व श्री मौहम्मद आलम फरसौरी, अवर अभियंता, सिचाई विभाग को संबोधित है जिसके अर्न्तगत तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी द्वारा उपरोक्त को अवगत कराया गया है कि दिनांक 15-04-2015 को अपरान्ह 12:00 बजे पालिका कार्यालय में निम्न आवेदनों के सापेक्ष आवेदकों का साक्षात्कार लिया जाना है । अध्यक्ष नगर पालिका खैर द्वारा साक्षात्कार हेतु अनुमोदित समिति में सदस्य नामित किये गये है तथा श्री शिवप्रसाद वर्मा खण्ड विकास अधिकारी, टप्पल, श्री सी०बी० सिंह, पशु चिकित्साधिकारी खैर व श्री मौहम्मद आलम फरसौरी, अवर अभियंता, सिचाई विभाग को नियत समय, दिनांक, स्थान पर उपस्थित होकर साक्षात्कार लेने का अनुरोध किया गया है जिलाधिकारी अलीगढ को नियुक्ति प्रक्रिया के बारे में सूचना दिये जाने का कोई साक्ष्य पत्रावली पर नही है।
नियुक्ति पत्रावली के अवलोकन से विदित है कि दिनांक 15-04-2015 को 05 अभ्यर्थियों द्वारा साक्षात्कार में प्रतिभाग किया गया जिसमें राजेश कुमार पुत्र ओंकार सिंह, राजेश शर्मा पुत्र उमाशंकर शर्मा, कमल सिंह पुत्र केवल सिंह, हरिराम सिंह पुत्र महेन्द्र सिंह ठाकुर व रासबिहारी पुत्र भारत सिंह का विवरण पत्रावली पर अंकित है तथा कमल सिंह पुत्र केवल सिंह व राजेश कुमार पुत्र औकार सिंह के ही आवेदन पत्र व अभिलेखों की छायाप्रतियां पत्रावली पर संलग्न की गयी है। चयन समिति द्वारा पाँचों अभ्यर्थियों में से श्री कमल सिंह पुत्र केवल सिंह को अधिकतम 100 अंको में से सर्वाधिक कुल 75 अंक दिये गये तथा चयन समिति द्वारा अंक पत्र पर दिनांक 15-04-2015 को हस्ताक्षर कर दिये गये जिसको अध्यक्ष द्वारा अनुमोदित कर दिया गया जिसके क्रम में दिनांक 20-04-2015 को कमल सिंह को 5200-20200 ग्रेड पे 1800 वेतनमान पर जूनियर फिटर के पद पर नियुक्ति हेतु अधिशासी अधिकारी द्वारा दिनांक रहित हस्ताक्षर कर नियुक्ति पत्र जारी किया गया है। जिसपर कोई डिस्पेच नम्बर नहीं है और न ही उसकी प्रति प्रेषित कर शासन व जिलाधिकारी महोदय को अवगत कराया गया है। पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध श्री कमल सिंह द्वारा अपनी योगदान आख्या दिनांक 01-05-2015 को स्वीकृत नहीं किया गया है।
उक्त के संबंध में तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी ने अपने स्पष्टीकरण / जवाब दिनांक 12-11-2018 में अवगत कराया है कि उक्त पद के चयन हेतु नियमों की जानकारी न होने के कारण साक्षात्कार को अग्रिम आदेशों तक स्थगित कर दिया गया तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष द्वारा विस्तृत जानकारी करने के उपरान्त साक्षात्कार की कार्यवाही प्रारम्भ की गयी किन्तु इसी बीच कर्मचारी संगठन के अध्यक्ष के द्वारा तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष के समक्ष प्रस्ताव रखा गया कि कर निरीक्षकों के पदों पर वरिष्ठतम कर्मचारी को पदोन्नति का लाभ देते हुए काफी समय से कम्प्यूटर आपरेटर के पद पर नियत वेतन पर कार्य कर रहे कर्मचारी को नगर पालिका अधिनियम सं० 02 सन 1916 की धारा 75 के परिपालन में तैनात किया जाये। तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष नगर पालिका खैर ने कर्मचारी संगठन से वार्ता के उपरान्त कर निरीक्षक के पद का साक्षात्कार स्थगित करते हुए कार्यालय की आख्या प्राप्त कर पालिका में कार्यरत वरिष्ठतम कर वसूलकर्ता श्री राजेश कुमार जो पदोन्नति के समय कर निरीक्षक का ही वेतन प्राप्त कर रहे थे, को कर निरीक्षक के पद पर पदोन्नत कर दिया तथा नवम्बर 2007 से नियत पारिश्रमिक पर कार्यरत कम्प्यूटर आपेरटर कु० रीता गौतम को उनकी योग्यता, अनुभव, कार्य के प्रति लगनशीलता को दृष्टिगत रखते हुए कर निरीक्षक के पद पर नियमित कर दिया। उपरोक्त के अतिरिक्त विद्युत मिस्त्री व 01 जूनियर फिटर की नियुक्ति हेतु साक्षात्कार लिया गया साक्षात्कार के उपरान्त परिणाम पत्र का अध्यक्ष, नगर पालिका परिषद खैर द्वारा अवलोकन कर अनुमोदन किया गया तदोपरान्त नगर पालिका अधि० सं० 02 सन् 1916 की धारा 74 के अर्न्तगत श्री कमल सिंह को जूनियर पाइप लाइन फिटर के पद हेतु नियुक्ति पत्र निर्गत किये गये ।
उक्त के संबंध में तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष श्री पंकज पवार ने अपने स्पष्टीकरण / जवाब दिनांक 12-11- 2018 में अवगत कराया है कि शासन के पत्र सं 906/9-6-2014-113 मिस / 2013 टी०सी०-1 दिनांक 21-10-2014 के अनुसार निदेशक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० 8वॉ तल इन्दिरा भवन लखनऊ ने अपने पत्रांक सांख्यिकी सेल / 261 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्र सं० 169 / 2013 - 14 लखनऊ दिनांक 07 नवम्बर 2014 के द्वारा 02 कर निरीक्षकों के पदों को तथा शासन के पत्र सं० 2331 / 976-2014-113मिस / 2013 दिनांक 18-12-2014 पर निदेशक स्थानीय निकाय उ०प्र० 8वॉ तल इन्दिरा भवन लखनऊ ने अपने पत्रांक सांख्यिकी सेल / 319 / शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्र सं० 169 / 2013 - 14 लखनऊ दिनांक 31 दिसम्बर 2014 के द्वारा 01 विद्युत निस्त्री व 01 जूनियर पाइप लाइन फिटर के पदों को भरे जाने की स्वीकृति प्रदान की गयी। उपरोक्त शासनादेशों को बोर्ड के समक्ष जिस पर बोर्ड के द्वारा अपनी सहर्ष स्वीकृति प्रदान की गयी तदोपरान्तं पदों को भरे जाने हेतु मण्डल से प्रकाशित होने वाले समाचार पत्रों में दैनिक कल्पतरू, एवं दैनिक आज व दैनिक राजपथ मे विज्ञप्तियाँ प्रकाशित करायी गयी जो कि मास्टर पत्रावली पर साक्ष्य के रूप में उपलब्ध है तथा नगर पालिका अधिनियम सं० 2 सन् 1916 की धारा 74 व 75 के तहत इन पदों पर सीधी भर्ती के अधिकार अध्यक्ष व अधिशासी अधिकारी में निहित हैं, को आधार मानकर की गयी हैं। विद्युत मिस्त्री एवं पाइपलाइन फिटर तथा समूह घ के चपरासी पदो के साक्षात्कार हेतु समितियो का गठन किया गया तथा साक्षात्कार के उपरान्त ही नियुक्तियाँ की गयी।
उपरोक्त समस्त अभिलेखों, साक्ष्यों, नियुक्ति पत्रावली, साक्षात्कार पत्रावली तत्कालीन अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष के स्पष्टीकरण / जबाव एवं वर्तमान अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री संदीप सक्सैना व अध्यक्ष श्री संजीव अग्रवाल द्वारा प्राप्त आख्याओं इत्यादि का गहनता से परिशीलन करने के पश्चात् यह स्पष्ट होता है कि नगर पालिका परिषद खैर के उपरोक्त दोनों कर्मचारियों श्री अखिलेश कुमार लिपिक एवं श्री कुलदीप सिंह, प्रधान लिपिक एवं तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष श्री पंकज पवार एवं अधिशासी अधिकारी श्री गुलशन सूरी की मिली भगत से नियम एवं कानून को ताक पर रखकर भ्रष्ट आचरण करते हुए उपरोक्त अनियमित नियुक्तियाँ की गयी है जो किसी भी तरह से बने रहने योग्य नहीं है। उक्त पद हेतु विज्ञप्ति दो लोकल समाचार पत्र प्रावदा एवं कल्पतरू एक्सप्रेस में निकाली गयी है जबकि नियमानुसार दो प्रतिष्ठित समाचार पत्रों में विज्ञप्ति निकाली जानी चाहिए थी तथा नियुक्तियों के प्रकाशन में भी अनियमितताओं का समावेश किया गया है। जिस दिन विज्ञप्ति हेतु पत्र जारी किया गया उसी दिन विज्ञप्ति का प्रकाशन किया जाना अनियमित व अव्यवहारिक तरीकों को अपनाकर नियुक्ति किया जाना नितान्त गलत व भ्रष्टाचार की श्रेणी में आता है। जोकि शून्य घोषित किये जाने योग्य है। उक्त पदों हेतु चयन समिति मनमाने तरीके से बनायी गयी जिसकी अनुमति जिलाधिकारी महोदय द्वारा नहीं ली गयी । नियुक्ति पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध शासन के पत्र सं० सांख्यिकी सेल /261/ शासन का एजेण्डा / सूत्रसं० 169/2013-14 दिनांक 07-11-2014 के अर्न्तगत नगर पालिका परिषदो में रिक्त समूह-ग के कुल 120 पदो को निम्न शर्तो के अनुसार भरे जाने की स्वीकृति प्रदान की गयी है कि:-
"नगर पालिका परिषदो में रिक्त समूह ग के कुल 120 पदो को निम्न शर्तो के अनुसार भरे जाने से पूर्व पद सृजन संबंधी शासनादेशों से पदों का मिलान / सत्यापन संबंधित नगर निकाय से सुनिश्चित कराया जाये। कुल 120 पदों को भरे जाने हेतु सुसंगत शासनादेशों / नियमावली के अर्न्तगत कार्यवाही सुनिश्चित करायी जाये तथा उपरोक्तानुसार कार्यवाही करते हुए संलग्न सूची में दर्शाये गये अपनी निकाय से संबंधित पदों पर नियुक्ति / चयन की नियमानुसार कार्यवाही पूर्ण कर सूचना निदेशालय / शासन को उपलब्ध करायें।"
प्रमुख सचिव, कार्मिक अनुभाग - 4 उ०प्र० शासन, लखनऊ के शासनादेश सं० 20/4/2002/का-2-2002 दिनांक 29 जून 2002 ( समूह ग व समूह घ के पदों पर सीधी भर्ती की प्रक्रिया नियमावली, 2002 ) में निर्दिष्ट प्रावधानों का उक्त पदों पर नियुक्ति हेतु अनुपालन नहीं किया गया है तथा शासनादेश के अनुरूप न तो उचित चयन समिति का गठन किया गया और न ही चयन प्रक्रिया का पालन किया गया। (संलग्न) उक्त नियुक्तियाँ प्रक्रिया में आरक्षण नियमावली / सुसंगत शासनादेशों को दरकिनार करते हुए मनमाने तरीके से कर ली गयी है। नगर पालिका खैर में कर्मचारी / अधिशासी अधिकारी व अध्यक्ष की मिलीभगत से मनमाने तरीके से भ्रष्ट आचरण करते हुए अनियमित तरीके से श्री कमल सिंह की नियुक्ति जूनियर फिटर के पद पर की गयी है जोकि नितान्त गलत, नियम विरूद्ध है तथा अनियमितता की श्रेणी में आता है। उक्त अनियमित नियुक्तियों के लिए नगर पालिका परिषद खैर के तत्कालीन अध्यक्ष व अधिशासी अधिकारी / कर्मचारी पूर्ण रूप से दोषी है जिनके विरूद्ध विभागीय / वैधानिक कार्यवाही किये जाने की संस्तुति की जाती है।"
49. Not to comment on the merits of the matter, but still to ensure that irrelevant considerations do not creep in the decision of the State Government to find if indeed the appointments are vitiated by fraud, it must be observed that the repeat mention in the inquiry report dated 19.06.2019 submitted by the Committee appointed by the District Magistrate that at decisive steps of the selection process, permission of the District Magistrate was not taken or that he was not intimated, is not at all relevant. The Appointing Authority under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act of 1916 is the President or the Executive Officer and it is not necessary for them to seek permission or report to the District Magistrate about the steps taken during the selection. This is not to say that other findings, whatever these are, which may truly be suggestive of fraud, would not be relevant, subject, of course, to verification and opportunity to the petitioners, whose appointments are under question. Any forgery in the record, which has a decisive impact on the selection, may be relevant. Likewise, the due publication of vacancies in newspapers, as prescribed by rules, with adequate notice to the prospective candidates, may also be relevant. This Court does not wish to record any findings on the issue of fraud, as that has to be done by the State Government on relevant evidence and a correct understanding of what would constitute fraud, as the law understands it; not by personal notions or a layman's understanding of it.
50. Fraud may best be understood in the context of three specific kinds of it, that is understood by the law. These are actual or positive fraud, legal fraud or fraud in law and constructive fraud. The three are enunciated and explained in The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyer thus:
"The CLASSIFICATION OF FRAUD most frequently used by Courts and text writers is (1) Actual or positive fraud; (2) legal fraud or fraud in law; (3) constructive fraud.
ACTUAL OR POSITIVE FRAUD. Actual or positive fraud has been said to consist in circumventing, cheating, or deceiving a person to his injury, by any cunning, deception, or artifice.
LEGAL FRAUD OR FRAUD IN LAW. The terms "legal fraud" and "fraud in law" were formerly used by the Courts to describe a species of actionable fraud in which a corrupt motive, such as a desire to obtain a benefit or to cause an injury, was lacking, but the other elements were present. The term "legal fraud" has also been used to characterise false representations more or less innocent which will be sufficient ground for the rescission of a contract.
"I do not understand legal fraud. To my mind it has no more meaning than legal heat or legal cold, legal light or legal shade. There never can be a well-founded complaint of legal fraud, or of anything else, except where some duty is shown and correlative right, and some violation of that duty and right." (Lord Bramwell, Weir v. Bell (1878) 3 Ex. D. 243).
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD. A constructive fraud has been said to be "an act which the law declares to be fraudulent, without inquiring into its motive; not because arbitrary rules on this subject have been laid down but because certain acts carry in themselves an irresistible evidence of fraud."
51. It is a well-settled principle that fraud vitiates every solemn transaction. The equally well settled proposition is that fraud, wherever found, must be undone. It is on the second principle that this Court thinks that the State Government must examine the validity of the petitioners' appointment on the touchstone of fraud. The earlier decision that the State Government made was a decision in usurpation of jurisdiction, which they did not possess under the law, thinking that they had it. We have concluded that neither the State Government nor the Director of Local Bodies or the District Magistrate, acting on the command of the State Government, have authority under the law to annul the petitioners' appointments, already made, in the exercise of the State Government's power under Section 34 (1B) of the Act of 1916. But, it is quite a different matter for the State Government to avoid the appointments, if they think that on tangible evidence appointments to public posts by the Nagar Palika, are vitiated by fraud. If indeed the appointments are fraudulent in the sense understood by law, these must be undone and for the purpose, the State Government have to examine relevant evidence, one of which may be the inquiry report submitted by the Committee appointed by the District Magistrate. Other evidence would also have to be called before the finding can be reached. The State Government must call that evidence; and, it should be relevant evidence. It is also regarded as a principle that if a transaction is beset by fraud, it can be undone without opportunity to the beneficiary. This principle, however, has to be understood in the context of rights already accrued, where the fraud is not so patent that there cannot be any two opinions about it. If there could be two opinions, the person whose interest may be adversely affected with the finding of fraud and consequent annulment of the benefit accruing to him/ her, the person likely to be adversely affected must be heard. The first kind, where the fraud is so patent that no opportunity need be given, may be classically illustrated by acts done by an impostor in public office, who is caught red-handed, impostering for a public officer. To undo the benefits of the impostor's acts or holding him an impostor, the beneficiaries of his acts or the impostor himself, may not be required to be given opportunity. However, where actions are not so glaringly deceitful but mired in the cluster of some truths and other falsehood, it would be too perilous to deprive the beneficiary of a transaction, purporting to have been done in accordance with law, but impeached as fraudulent, to do so without opportunity to the beneficiary. The petitioners' case would lie in the second category, entitling them to opportunity. In this connection, reference may be made to State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma and others, (2016) 4 SCC 791. It was a case arising out of a complaint that the writ petitioners had secured their selection to the BTC Training Course under the physically handicapped quota on the basis of certificates, fraudulently procured. The writ petitioners did not suffer from disability under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Rules, 1996. It was in the context of these facts that it was held by the Supreme Court, reversing this Court, in Ravindra Kumar Sharma (supra):
"6. In the facts of the instant case there was a serious complaint lodged by Viklang Sangh of illegal usurpation of the quota reserved for specially abled by a large number of persons who were not in fact specially abled and have procured certificates fraudulently from their districts under the Rules of 1996. On the basis of the said complaint the Government has issued an order for the purpose of verification of such certificates issued by the Medical Board and certificates of 21% of selected candidates of handicapped category were found to be fraudulent. It is settled proposition of law that fraud vitiates and in such a case when a large number of candidates have illegally usurped the reserved seats of the persons suffering from disability, the action of the State Government did not call for interference.
7. In Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra [Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 7 SCC 605] , it was observed: (SCC p. 614, para 16) "16. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 (CA)] , Lord Denning observed at QB pp. 712 and 713: (All ER p. 345 C) '... No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.' In the same judgment Lord Parker, L.J. observed that fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity. (p. 722) These aspects were recently highlighted in State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao [State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149] ."
8. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319] it was held thus: (SCC pp. 327-30, paras 15-18, 23, 25-26 & 29) "15. ... Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together.
16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter.
17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.
18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.
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23. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
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25. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata.
26. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros. [Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros., (1992) 1 SCC 534] it has been held that: (SCC p. 553, para 20) '20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.' ***
29. In Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore Project Ltd. [Chittaranjan Das v. Durgapore Project Ltd., 1994 SCC OnLine Cal 291 : (1995) 99 CWN 897 : (1995) 2 Cal LJ 388] it has been held: (SCC OnLine Cal paras 56-57: Cal LJ p. 402, paras 57-58) '56. Suppression of a material document which affects the condition of service of the petitioner, would amount to fraud in such matters. Even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in such a situation.
57. It is now well known that a fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Thus, even if the date of birth of the petitioner had been recorded in the service returns on the basis of the certificate produced by the petitioner, the same is not sacrosanct nor the respondent Company would be bound thereby.'"
9. This Court in Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133] at para 119 has held thus: (SCC p. 219) "119. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end design. There is a distinction between exercise of power in good faith and misuse in bad faith. The former arises when an authority misuses its power in breach of law, say, by taking into account bona fide, and with best of intentions, some extraneous matters or by ignoring relevant matters. That would render the impugned act or order ultra vires. It would be a case of fraud on powers. The misuse in bad faith arises when the power is exercised for an improper motive, say, to satisfy a private or personal grudge or for wreaking vengeance of a Minister as in S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab [S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72] . A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. Use of a power for an 'alien' purpose other than the one for which the power is conferred is mala fide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order. The ulterior or alien purpose clearly speaks of the misuse of the power and it was observed as early as in 1904 by Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Lord Overtoun [General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Lord Overtoun, 1904 AC 515 : (1904-07) All ER Rep Ext. 1448 (HL)] : (AC p. 695) '... that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the powers shall be used bona fide for the purposes for which they are conferred.' It was said by Warrington, C.J. in Short v. Poole Corpn. [Short v. Poole Corpn., 1926 Ch 66 : 1925 All ER Rep 74 (CA)] , that: (Ch pp. 90-91) '... no public body can be regarded as having statutory authority to act in bad faith or from corrupt motives, and any action purporting to be that of the body, but proved to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt motives, would certainly be held to be inoperative.'"
11. In our considered opinion in the peculiar facts of this case of such a fraud and genuine suspicion raised in the representation lodged by the Viklang Sangh and when 21% of such certificates have been found to be fraudulently obtained, there was no scope for the Division Bench to interfere and issue order to perpetuate fraud, writ is to be declined in such a scenario and no equity can be claimed by the respondents.
12. In the circumstances we set aside the impugned judgment and order [Ravindra Kumar Sharma v. State of U.P., 2010 SCC OnLine All 1726 : (2010) 83 ALR 342] passed by the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition. However before taking any action against the individuals they shall be issued show-cause in the matter and thereafter decision will be rendered in accordance with law. Let this exercise be completed within a period of four months. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent."
52. In the result, these writ petitions succeed and are allowed in part. The impugned orders dated 05.08.2019, 28.08.2019, 11.09.2019 and 07.07.2023 passed by the Principal Secretary (Local Bodies), Government of U.P., Lucknow, the Director (Local Bodies), Government of U.P., Lucknow, the District Magistrate, Aligarh and the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Khair, Aligarh, respectively, are hereby quashed. The quashing of these orders will not entitle the petitioners to be reinstated in service immediately. There being allegations of fraud in recruitment to the various posts to which the petitioners in the leading case and the other writ petitions have been appointed, the State Government will proceed to pass fresh orders in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to each of the petitioners, whose interest is at stake. For the purpose, separate notices will be issued to the petitioners in all the four writ petitions by the State Government/ Principal Secretary, Local Bodies, Government of U.P., Lucknow, indicating the grounds and facts and on the basis whereof the Principal Secretary thinks the appointments are vitiated by fraud. The petitioners will be entitled to submit their reply together with evidence, showing cause. In case, all the petitioners or some of them, after holding the inquiry aforesaid, are found to have been validly appointed, they shall be entitled to their salary and continuity in service. However, if all the petitioners, or any one, or more of them, are found to have been appointed without following the procedure prescribed to the extent of being fraudulent, or their appointments are otherwise vitiated by fraud, they will not be entitled to salary and their rights to hold the post would determine. It goes without saying that any orders, that are passed by the Principal Secretary, Local Bodies, acting for the State Government, shall be given effect to by the President and the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika. It is also made clear that any orders, that are passed by the State Government, shall entitle any person, who may be aggrieved by that order, to challenge it before the competent forum, as advised.
53. There shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 15.04.2024 Anoop (J.J. Munir, J.)