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[Cites 20, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Shushma Singh vs Smt. Shushma Mishra on 20 March, 2024

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        In     The     High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
                           At Jabalpur
                                      Before
              Hon'ble Shri Justice Duppala Venkata Ramana

                         On The 20th Of March, 2024

                        Misc. Appeal No. 1189 Of 2024

Between:-
1. Shushma Singh W/O Late Rajendra Singh,
   Aged About 37 Years, Occupation: House Wife

2. Ku Sheema Singh D/O Late Rajendra Singh,
   Aged About 20 Years, Occupation: Student

3. Ku Riya Singh D/O Late Rajendra Singh, Aged
   About 18 Years, Occupation: Student

4. Ansh Singh S/O Late Rajendra Singh, Aged
   About 16 Years, Occupation: Student

5. Sahil Singh S/O Late Rajendra Singh, Aged
   About 14 Years, Occupation: Student

  Appellant no.4 and 5 are minor through natural
  guardina mother Smt. Sshushma Singh W/o
  Late Shri Rajendra Singh,

  All R/o Village Kushha Tehsil Teonthar District
  Rewa (MP)

                                                            .....Petitioner
(By Shri Rajendra Singh - Advocate)

And
1. Smt. Shushma Mishra W/O Piyush Mishra,
   Aged About 43 Years, Occupation: Not Mention
   43 Lidil Road Jorge Town Allahabad District
   Prayagraj (U.P.) (Vehicle Owner)
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2. Bramhdev Tiwari S/O P.N. Tiwari Through
   Vehcole Owner Smt Shushma Mishra W/O
   Piyush Mishra Aged 53 R/O 43 Lidil Road Jorge
   Town Allahabad District Prayagraj (UP)

3. The New India Insurance Company Limited
   Alllabad Through Branch Manager Branch
   Office Mahendra Building Narendra Nagar
   Rewa District Rewa (MP)

4. Lalan Singh S/O Ram Prasad Singh, Aged About
   70 Years, Occupation: Agriculturist R/O Village
   Kushha Tehsil Teonthar District Sagar (MP)

                                                                .....Respondents
(None)

         This appeal coming on for admission this day, the court passed the

following:

                                    ORDER

The following issues arise for consideration:-

(i) Whether the appellants/claimants have shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 2919 days in filing this appeal before this Court ?
(ii) Depending on the outcome of the above issue this Court considered are ?
(iii) Whether the appellants/claimants has made out a case to consider the application for condonation of delay of 2919 days ? (2) The brief facts are that the present appeal filed by the appellants/claimants against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 18.11.2015. Challenging the order of learned Tribunal, filed this present appeal with delay of 2919 days and alongwith appeal filed IA No.3088/2024 for condonation of delay.
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(3) Counsel for the appellants/claimants has stated that first appellant is wife, appellant no.2 to 4 are the sons and daughters of the deceased and respondent no.4 is father of the deceased. The causes for delay stated in para-

2 of the petition that the first appellant is widow and she is dependent on respondent no.4, who is father-in-law of the appellant no.1. She authorized the respondent no.4 to file appeal against the award passed by the learned Tribunal. In para-4, it is stated that the appellant no.1 is not aware about the legal proceedings and she resides in remote village and the appellants are facing financial crises and fail to arrange the Court fees and legal expenses, due to which, she could not file the appeal within time and prays to condone the delay of 2919 days in filing the appeal as the delay occurred in filing the appeal is bonafide and not intentional the delay to be condoned in the interest of justice.

(4). In support of above averments in the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that this claim under the Motor Vehicle Act which is a beneficial legislation and lenient view should be taken while dealing with an application for condonation of delay. He placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Dr.Naresh Grover, ILR1 and the co-ordinate Bench of this Court condone the delay of six years and 121 days by taking a lenient view and the same is taken in consideration and the delay may be condoned and admit the appeal.

(5) This Court has considered the submissions made. Normally a very lenient view is being taken in the matters of this nature, particularly, where the appeals filed by the claimant against the award passed by the learned Tribunal which is a beneficial legislation giving benefit to the victims but the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that sufficient cause should be shown

1. ILR (2014) MP 1574 4 and that the word 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction, so as to advance substantial justice.

(6) In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, I am posing a question why the delay has to be condoned mechanically merely because the family lost their bread earner, some how arranging Court fees and meet the legal expenses and not aware about legal proceedings and residing in remote village for filing an appeal are not at all proper explanation. Hence, I am conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice but I am of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances, the appellants cannot take advantage of her own negligence.

(7) A decision reported in the case of Chief Post Master & Ors vs Living Media India Ltd.& Anr2, para-3, 27 and 29 are as follows :-

"After incorporating the above explanation, this Court refused to condone the delay by observing thus:
"3. .......Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest."

2. AIR 2012 SC 1506 5

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

(8) Another decision in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & contractors Private Ltd.3, para 65 and 66 are as under:-

"65. Apart from this, there is a long delay of 131 days beyond the 60-day period provided for filing an appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act. There is no explanation worth the name contained in the condonation of delay application, beyond the usual file-
3. (2021) 6 SCC 460 6 pushing and administrative exigency. This appeal is therefore dismissed.
66. In the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 15278 of 2020, the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 27-1-2020 [M.P. Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. v. Swastik Wires, 2020 SCC OnLine MP 3003] relies upon Consolidated Engg. [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] and thereby states that the judgment of this Court in N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] would not apply. The judgment of the High Court is wholly incorrect inasmuch as Consolidated Engg. [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] was a judgment which applied the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and had nothing to do with the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] was a direct judgment which applied the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and then held that no condonation of delay could take place beyond 120 days. The High Court was bound to follow N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] , as on the date of the judgment of the High Court, N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] was a judgment of the two learned Judges of the Supreme Court binding upon the High Court by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution. On this score, the impugned judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside."

(9). Another decision in the case of State of Odisha and Anotehr Vs. Krupasindhu Nayak and Another 4 ,paras 6 and 7 is as under:-

6. Similarly this Court in the case of State of Odisha in Para-5 has held as follows:--
"5. The Supreme Court has recently in a series of matters reiterated that the explanation usually offered by the State and its entities for the delay on account of administrative exigencies should not be accepted unless they are shown to be justified. A sampling of such orders is as under:
4. 2023 SCC Online Ori 1941 7
(i) Order dated 13th January 2021 in SLP No. 17559 of 2020 (State of Gujarat v. Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas)
(ii) Order dated 22nd January 2021 in SLP No. 11989 of 2020 (The Commissioner of Public Instruction v. Shamshuddin)
(iii) Order dated 22nd January 2021 in SLP No. 25743 of 2020 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sabha Narain)
(iv) Order dated 4th February 2021 in SLP No. 19846 of 2020 (Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Admin)
(v) Order dated 11th January 2021 in SLP No. 22605 of 2020 (The State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda)"

7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and placing reliance on the decisions as cited (supra), this Court does not find any sufficient cause pleaded by the Appellants for condoning the delay in question. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to condone the delay in filing the appeal and dismiss the I.A. accordingly.

(10). Another decision in the case of Nivruti G. Ahire Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others 5 ,para -32 and 33 are as under:-

32. The order passed by the Apex Court in the case in hand specifically states about absence of reasons to interfere in the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition, and on that count the S.L.P. was dismissed. The said order cannot be said to be an order disclosing no reason. On the contrary, the order specifically states that "We see no reasons to interfere." Obviously the interference spoken of was in relation to the order dated 23-8-2006 passed in Writ Petition No. 644 of 2000, which is sought to be reviewed. Once the Apex Court has opined that it finds no reason to interfere in the said order of this Court, to entertain an application for review of such an order would virtually amount to entertain an
5. 2007 SCC Online Bom 492 8 application for expressing an opinion different from the one expressed by the Apex Court in such order. Such an act would virtually amount to judicial indiscipline, though it may not be an affront to the order of the Apex Court.
33. For the reasons stated above, neither the applicant has been able to disclose sufficient cause for the condonation of delay of 108 days in filing the review petition nor do we find the review application itself being maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Hence the application for condonation of delay is dismissed with costs. Consequently, the review petition also stands dismissed.

(11). Another decision in the case Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through legal representatives and Others Vs. Union of India and Another 6 ,para 30, 31 and 32 are as under:-

30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
31.Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows
6. (2023) 10 SCC 531 9 the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse".

Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.

(12) The above judgments read together, sufficient cause not explained for not filing the appeal. There is huge delay of 2919 days in filing the appeal and the facts of this case also show that there was no sufficient cause whatsoever to condone such a long delay. This Court does not find any sufficient cause pleaded by the appellant for condoning the delay in question.

(13) In such circumstances, this Court has no difficulty in concluding that the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of the delay of 2919 days, lacked bonafide and the petition had been negligent all through and above all the explanation offered by the appellant was concocted and false.

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(14) In such circumstances, obviously the discretion could not have been exercised in favour of the petitioners/appellants, who had not approached the Court with a clean hand and therefore, this Court declined to allow the IA No.3088/2024 for condonation of delay.

(15) In view of the aforesaid discussions and the for the reasons stated above, I find no merit in this petition, consequently the appeal is dismissed.

DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA,J rk Digitally signed by RAVIKANT KEWAT Date: 2024.03.20 18:22:38 +05'30'