Bombay High Court
Arjandas Naraindas Adnani vs Narsingdas Naraindas Adnani And Others on 4 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997BOM20, (1996)98BOMLR494, AIR 1997 BOMBAY 20, (1996) 4 ALLMR 1 (BOM), 1996 (4) ALL MR 1, (1996) 2 MAH LJ 993, (1997) 1 MAHLR 764, (1997) 1 CIVLJ 335, (1997) 2 CURCC 367, (1997) 1 BOM CR 509
ORDER Dr. B.P. Saraf, J.
1. The sole controversy in these appeals is whether Court can award interest under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act from the "date of the award" or it can be awarded only from the "date of the decree". According to the appellant, in view of the clear language of S. 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, interest can be awarded by the Court only from the date of the decree and not from the date of the award. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Associates, . This contention of the appellant is vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents who submits that the power of the Court under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act is wide enough to enable it to grant interest even from the date of the award. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P). Ltd., and Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, . So far as the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Associates (supra) is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the same is contrary to and inconsistent with the above decisions of the Supreme Court and, therefore, a decision per incuriam and hence the ratio thereof should not be followed by this Court.
2. Before dealing with the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties in regard to the scope and ambit of the powers of the Court in the matter of grant of interest under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act, it maybe expedient to set out briefly the material facts of the case and some of the relevant dates. The dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration on 17th September, 1973 and the award was made on 15th March, 1979. The award was thereafter filed in the Court. Petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for setting aside certain portions of the award was dismissed by the learned single Judge by his order dated 20th/21st April, 1983. Appeal against the same was also dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 10th November, 1987. The matter was thereafter taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court modified the award. In the meantime respondent No.1 took out a notice of motion before the learned single Judge claiming decree in terms of the award. The learned single Judge, by his judgment and order dated 9th March, 1995, made the notice of motion absolute and passed decree in terms of the award, as modified by this Court as well as the Supreme Court, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the award till realisation. It is the latter part of the above order by which interest has been awarded by the Court from the "date of the award" which has been challenged by the appellants in these appeals on the ground that under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act interest can be awarded by the Court only from the date of the award.
3. We have given our careful consideration to the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. The sole question that arises for determination is whether interest can be awarded by the Court on the principal sum adjudged by an award from "the date of the award" or it can be granted only from the "date of the decree". The answer to this question would depend on the true and correct interpretation of S. 29 of the Arbitration Act which provides for award of interest S. 29 reads as Follows:
"29. Interest on awards.-- Where and in so far as an award is for the payment of money the court may in the decree order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree".
A plain reading of this section clearly goes to show that in a decree, the Court has been empowered to award interest only "from the date of the decree". The language of this section is clear and unambiguous and by no stretch of imagination or interpretation, the expression "the date of the decree" can be construed to mean "the date of the award". Any attempt to do so will amount to rewriting the section to provide for award of interest from "the date of the award" contrary to not only the clear language of the statue but also the clear intention of the Legislature which can be discerned from the fact that the words "from the date of the award" which appeared in S. 29 in the Bill on the lines of S.11 of the English Arbitration Act of 1934, were substituted by the words "from the date of the decree" following the recommendation of the Select Committee to which the said Bill was referred by the Parliament. The Select Committee's recommendation on this aspect of the matter, which was accepted by the Parliament, reads as follows:
"Instead of fixing by the Act the rate of interest which an award shall bear and enacting that interest shall run from the date of the award, we have provided in accordance with the analogous provision in the Code of Civil Procedure that the Court may fix the rate of interest, but we have made the date from which the interest shall run from the date of the decree."
It is this suggestion of the Select Committee that was accepted by the Parliament and the words "from the date of the award" in S. 29, which appeared in the Bill, were substituted by the words "from the date of the decree".
This gives us an insight into the background in which the legislature provided in S. 29 for grant of interest from "the date of the decree" and not from "the date of the award". Though the statement of objects and reasons or the Select Committee report cannot be the ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, it can definitely be used as an aid to find out what really persuaded the Legislature to enact a particular provision or to use a particular expression therein. There is no bar on referring to and relying upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons and Notes on clauses or the Select Committee Report for that limited purpose. In fact, such material may be of great help to the Court in cases where clear words or expressions in a statute are sought to be construed to mean something different than what emerges from a plain reading thereof. In such cases, as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, , the Courts should follow the more legally realistic and socially responsible canon of listening to the Legislative authors when their artifact is being interpreted than the 'sound proof theory' of ignoring voices from parliamentary debates, once sanctified by British tradition.
4. In the instant case, however, no aid or assistance is required from the Statement of Objects and Reasons or the Select Committee Report in view of the fact the meaning of the words "from the date of the decree" in S. 29 is quite clear and no ambiguity, whether patent or latent, lurks within them. In such a case, the only safe and correct way of construing statutes, as stated by Lawaton LJ in Mc Cormick v. Horsepower Ltd., (1981) 2 All ER 746 (at p.751), is to apply the plain meaning of the words. If we apply this rule in the present case, there can be no dispute that the plain meaning of the words in S. 29 of the Arbitration Act is that interest can be awarded by the Court from the date of the decree. By no rule or canon of interpretation, it can be construed to mean "from the date of the award".
5. The very same controversy whether a Court has the power to grant interest from the date of the award till payment came to be considered by a single Judge Bench of this Court in Srikanta & Co. v. Union of India, . After elaborate discussion on the construction of S. 29 of the Arbitration Act, Tulzapurkar, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as follows (at p.354):
"Section 29 of the Act is exhaustive of the whole law upon the subject of "interest on awards" and since the said section enables the Court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged by an award from the date of the decree onwards, it must be held that it carries with it the negative import that it shall not be permissible to the Court to award interest on the principal sum adjudged by an award for any period prior to the date of the passing of the decree".
6. The above decision was followed by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramsingh v. Ramsingh, . In the above case, the High Court also considered the question whether S. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be applied in the case of an award brought before the Court and held that the said section has no application in such a case. The legal position was summed up by S. K. Mal Lodha, J. in the following words (at p.150 of AIR):
"S. 29 of the Act empowers the Court where the award is for payment of money to award the reasonable rate of interest from the date of the decree. Section 34, C.P.C. provides for award of pendente lite and further interest. It is thus clear that under S. 29 of the Act, the Court can only award interest from the date of the decree of the Court till the realisation of the amount."
It was observed (at p.150 of AIR):
"Under S. 34 of the Act (C.P.C.?) interest from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and from the date of the decree until realisation can be awarded. Section 29 of the Act, however, does not grant that power to the court inasmuch as the court can grant interest only from the date of the decree at such rate as the court deems reasonable and that too, on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree".
7. Both these decisions recently came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Associates, . The Supreme Court, while dealing with an identical controversy whether interest pendente lite can be granted by the Court under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, on consideration of S. 29 of the Act, categorically held that under S. 29 of the Court cannot grant interest pendente lite. The Supreme Court referred to the decision of this Court in Srikanta & Co. (supra) and the Rajasthan High Court in Ram Singh (supra) and summed up the legal position as follows (at pp.2510-11 of AIR SCW):
"The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Court could award interest pendente lite. Section 29 of the Act says that insofar as award is, for the payment of money, the Court may in the decree, order interest from the date of the decree at such rate as it deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. In Srikantha & Co. v. Union of India it was held that S. 29 carries with it the negative import that it shall not be permissible to the court to award interest on the principle sum adjudged in the award for a period prior to the date of the passing of the decree. The same principle was reiterated in Ram Singh v. Ram Singh of the Act empowers the Court, that where the award is for payment of money, to grant reasonable rate of interest on the principal amount adjudged and confirmed in the decree, only from the date of the decree. Section 34, CPC empowers the Court, where there is a decree for payment of money to grant interest pendente lite and future, till the date of realisation. Since S. 29 of the Act enables Court to grant interest on the principal amount adjudged in the award and confirmed in the decree only from the date of the decree, it carries a negative import with it that the Court has no power to grant interest pendente lite. The High Court, therefore, was not right in granting interest pendente lite, which the arbitrator himself had not granted."
The Supreme Court has thus categorically held that under S. 29 of the Act the Court can grant interest only from the date of the decree and not from the date of the award. That is the clear ratio of the above decision and there can be no controversy in that regard.
8. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, submits that the ratio of the above decision should not be followed because it is a decision per incuriam as it is contrary to and inconsistent with the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Electors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., , which has been relied upon by the learned single Judge, and Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, . We have carefully perused the above decisions. We, however, do not find any conflict between the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Associates and the two decisions relied upon by the counsel for the respondents. The issue before the Supreme Court in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Electors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (supra) was "the power of the arbitrator to award interest for the period from the date of the award till the date of the decree" and not the power of the Court. Similarly, in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra) also, the subject matter of challenge was award of interest by the arbitrator at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of reference to the date of payment or decree, whichever, was earlier. The point at issue before the Supreme Court thus was the power of the arbitrator to award interest from the date of the award till the date of the decree or the date of realisation and it was in that context that the Supreme Court observed (at p.2194 of AIR):
"The question of interest can be easily disposed of as it is covered by recent decisions of this Court. It is sufficient to refer to the latest decision of a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department of Orissa v. G. C. Roy, . Though the said decision deals with the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite, the principle of the decision makes it clear that the arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period commencing with the date of award to the date of decree or date of realisation, whichever is earlier. This is also quite logical for, while award of interest for the period prior to an arbitrator entering upon the reference is a matter of substantive law, the grant of interest for the post-award period is a matter of procedure. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides both for awarding of interest pendente lite as well as for the post decree period and the principle of S. 34 has been held applicable to proceedings before the arbitrator, though the section as such may not apply. In this connection, the decision in Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd., may be seen as also the decision in Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors, , which upholds the said power though on a somewhat different reasoning. We, therefore, think that the award on item No.8 should have been upheld".
On the other hand, the controversy before the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Associates, (supra), specifically pertained to the scope and ambit of the power of the Court to award interest under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act and it was in that context that the Supreme Court held that S. 29 enables the Court to grant interest from the date of the decree and not from the date of the award.
9. It is well settled that a judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. As observed by Dr. A. S. Anand, J. in CIT v. Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd., :
" It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court to support their reasoning".
In this connection, the following note of caution given by the Supreme Court in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, , which was also quoted with approval in the above decision, is also apposite:
"It is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment".
10. From the above discussion, it is clear that the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Jain Associates, (1994 AIR SCW 2507) (supra) is a binding authority on the powers of the Court to award interest under S. 29 of the Act and following the same, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Court can award interest under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 only from the date of the decree and not from the date of the award.
11. In the instant case, no interest was awarded by the arbitrator. It was for the first time that while passing the decree in terms of the award, the learned single Judge awarded interest under S. 29 of the Arbitration Act from the date of the award till realisation which he could not have done having regard to the legal position set out above. We, therefore, modify the judgment and order of the learned single Judge under appeal in so far as it relates to award of interest and direct that the decree in terms of the award shall be with interest at the rate of 12 per cent pr annum from the date of the decree till realisation.
12. In the result, these appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
13. Appeals partly allowed.