Bombay High Court
Maria Madeirae Fernandes vs Vishnu Mahadeo Kanekar on 5 February, 1987
Equivalent citations: AIR1987BOM240, 1987(2)BOMCR224, (1987)89BOMLR347, AIR 1987 BOMBAY 240, (1987) 2 BOM RC 224, (1987) 89 BOM LR 347, 1987 BOM LR 89 347
JUDGMENT Kamat, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal by the landlady is against the order of the single Judge dt. 12th April, 1984 rendered in Writ Petn. No. 64 of 1983 challenging the validity of the order of he order of the Administrative Tribunal dt, 10th Mar. 1983 in eviction Appeal No. 24 of 1980 and the order of the Additionakl Rent Controller. South Goa, Margoa, dt. 30th Sept. 1980 in Case No. Building 53 of 1980. By the impugned order dt. 12th April 1984 in Writ Petition No. 64 of 1983 the two orders one dt. 10th Mar. 1983 made by Tribunal and the other of the Additional Rent Controller dt. 30th Sept. 1980. whereby the tenant had been ordered to vacate the residential premises under his occupation and directed him to put the landlandy in possession within 30 days were set aside.
2. The question posed in this Letters Patent Appeal turns on the interpretation of S. 32 and S. 22 of the Goa. Daman and Diu Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act. 1968. hereinafter for brevity sake called 'the Rent Act'. For the purposes of appreciating the contention raised by Shri Dias. learned counsel for the appellantlandlady. a few facts be stated.
3. The appellant filed proceedings for eviction of the tenant on 11th April, 1980 under Sec. 22(2)(a) of the Rent Act fro non payment of the rents along with other grounds like damage to the premises and nuisance. The respondent-tenant was served with the summons of these proceedings on 2nd May 1980 which required him to attend the Court of the Additional Rent Controller on 5th June 1980. However, on 5th June 1980 nothing happened as the Rent Controller was not available and the matter stood posted for 10th July 1980. On 10th July 1980 the tenant presented his written statement which was taken on record and at the same time filed an application for deposit of the arrears of rent from Nov. 1979 till the date of the filing of the application with a further prayer to allow him to continue to deposit the further rents till the culmination of the proceedings.
4. On 14th July 1980 the appellantlandlady moved an application praying therein to stop further proceedings averring therein that the tenant has no right to contest the proceedings as hhe has failed to pay the arrears or depost the same before the Controller within 30 days from the date of service of the summons on him. Obviously this application was under S. 32 of the Rent Act. On a notice of this application being given to the tenant. the tenant showed cause by his reply dt. 1st Sept. 1980 bringing to the notice of the Rent Controller that he has already moved an application for deposit and so far no orders have been passed thereon with the result he was not able to deposit the arrears of rent. The Additional Rent Controller, however, on the same day, that is, 1st Sept, 1980 passed an order on tenant's application dt. 10th July 1980 permitting the tenant to deposit the arrears and recurring rents without prejudice to the right of the landlady and undisputably all the arrears of rent were deposited up to date on 6th Sept. 1980.
5. The appellant-landlady's application under S. 32 for stopping proceedings was thereafter taken upn and an order was passed by the Controller on 30th Sept. 1980 directing the tenant to vacate and hand over the possession of the premises to the applellant within one month thereof as the tenant had failed and neglected to deposit arrears within 30 days from the date of service of the summons of the proceedings on him. The Controller held that inasmuch as the tenant had been served with a notice of the proceedings of eviction he ought to have moved an application for depositing the rents and ought to have deposited the rents within the prescribed time and in any case no sufficient cause was shown by the tenant for filing the application beyond the time prescribed. Being aggrieved by this order of the Controller the tenant knocked the gates of the Administrative Tibunal in an appeal but, however, that appeal was dismissed by the Order of 10th Mar. 1983.
6. The tenant instituted the Writ Petn. No. 64 of 1983 challenging these two orders. The petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge who by the Order dt. 12th April 1984 upset the two Orders ofd the Additional Controller and the Tribunal solely on one ground. namely, that once the Controller had allowed the respondent-tenant to file his written statement on 10th July 1980 thereby permitting the tenant to contest proceedings, the stage for stoppint the proceedings under sub-sec. (4) of S. 32 of the Rent Act is not available to the landlady. As a consequence of this Order the main proceedings against the tenant had to be decided bythe Controller on its merits.
7. What is challenged now by the landlady is her right to get the tenant evicted under sub-sec. (4) of S. 32 of the Rent Act irrespective of the fact that the tenant had filed his written statement and the same was admittedand taken on record on 10th July 1980. The submission of Shri Dias. counsel for the appellant. is that S. 32 is allpervasive and applies at all the stage of the proceedings for eviction when pending until its culmination. He urges that S. 32 can be invoked in every case of eviction on any of the grounds available under Ss. 22, 23 and 30 of the Rent Act and is an independent and distinct provision and comes into play only when a tenant wants to contest the proceedings filed against him and that being so it enjoins upon the tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit not only arrears of rent but also the recurring rents falling due and payabkle until the termination of the fproceedings. He further urges that the word 'contest' used in S. 32 includes all thestages of the proceedings until finally adjudicated and viewed thus'contest' will mean not merely filing of the written statement but also the cross-examination of the landlady and her witnesses. leading defences and final arguments on merits. Secondly. according to him, sub-sec. (3) of S. 22 operates on a different plane and covedrs a different field where the tenant wants to terminate the proceedings at its very inception and all that he has to do is to pay the arrears and cosxt irrespective of default or no default on his part, however, this provision is available only when eviction is sough on grounds of nonpayment of rents and falling in arrears of rent under S. 22(2)(a).
8. The learned single Judge held that once the written statement is taken on record, the stage for not allowing the tenant to contest the proceedings goes off the board, In that he observed that when there is a failure on the part of the tenant to pay the arrears or deposit the same he is not permitted to contest the proceedings of eviction against him but, however, once the wirtten statement is filed he is permitted to contest the proceedings and in this view of the matter he held that the appellant's application to stop proceedings and in this view of the matter he held that the appellant's application to stop proceedings under S. 32(4) does not survive. What prevailed upon the learned Single Judge is that once the stage of S. 22, sub-sec. (3) is crossed. the stage of filing written stagement arises and when written statement arises and when written statement is filed, the contest is over and the question of applicability of S. 32(4) surpasses.
9. There is considerable merit in the submission of Shri Dias. In our view the learned single Judge has clearly fallen in error in narrowly construing the word 'contest' appearing in sub-sec. (1) of S. 32. To better appreciate the contentions, it may be advantageous to extract S. 32 of the Rent Act which reads as under: -
"32. Payment or deposit of rent during pendency of proceedings for eviction.-
(1) No tenant against whom a proceeding for eviction has been instituted by a landlord lunder this Act shall be entitled to contest the proceeding before thre Controller or any appeallate or revisional authority or to prefer any appeal or revision under this Act, unless he has paid to the landlord or deposits with the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority. as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposti any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority.
(2) The deposit of rent under sub-sec. (1) shall be made within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) ...............................
(4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceeding and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.
(5)........................................
Taking S. 32 as it is, it is clear to us that any proceedings for eviction of a tenant irrespective of whether it is under S. 22 or under S. 23 or under S. 30 inasmuch as the proceedings are for eviction of the tenant the section must apply. Where the tenant desires to contest the proceedings filed against him for his eviction and in case he is in arrears of rent, a duty is cast on him to deposti no only the arrears of rent up to the date of the filing of the proceedings but further continue to deposit the rents till the proceedings are culminated and/or pay and continue to pay the same to the landlord. S. 22 of the Rent Act provides for the otherwise abridged grounds for the eviction of the tenant by the landlord. S. 23 speaks of the right of the landlord to obtain possession from the tenant when the landlord himself requires the building for his own occupation or that of his family members. In addition S. 30 also gives a ground in favour of the landlord to evict his tenant on the ground that the building is reasonably and bona fide required for carrying out the repairs, alterations and additions and when the building is bona fide required for the immediate purpose of demolishing and erecting a new building in its place, the right of the tenant to re-occupy notwithstanding. Therefore, when an eviction of the tenant is sought either on any of the grounds specified under S. 22 or under Ss. 23 and/or 30, in the event the tenant is in arrears of rent, no sooner such proceedings are filed against him, he is statutorily required to pay to the landlord or deposti before the Controller all the arrears of rent and continue to pay or deposit the recurring rents till the culmination of the proceedings under S. 32 and that too in the case of arrears within 30 days from the date of the summons served on him and in cases of rent falling due darling the pendency of the proceedings to pay the same in accordance with R. 7 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Rules. 1969. that is to say within 15 days from the date on which the rent becomes due and payable by him. On a true and proper reading of this Section and the scheme of the Act it is explicit that it embraces all cases of eviction filed against a tenant. A similar view had been already taken by the learned Judicial Commissioner in the decision of Leelali Javerbhai v. Smt. Maria Bemvinda da Costa. reported in AIR 1973 Goa 46 while answering a specific question raised that S. 32 has no application when a proceeding is initiated by a landlord under S. 30(2) of the Rent Act. it was rightly negatived by the learned Judicial Commissioner.
10. S. 22 of the Rent Act reads:-
"22. Grounds of eviction. - (1) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf.
(2) If the Controller.after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied -
(a) that the tenant is in arrears in payment of rent due by him in respect of the builing for a total period of three months and has failed to pay or tender such arrears of rent as are legally recoverable from him within thrity days of the receipt of or of the refusal of a registered notice served on him by the landlord for such arrears: or:
(b) that the tenant has without the written consent of the landlord -
(I) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building for a purpose other than than for which it was reased .... of damage as are likely to impair materially the value or tltility of the building: or
(d) that the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conducts which are a nuisance to the occupiers of other portions of the same building or of buildings in the neighbourhood:
(e) that the tenant of a dwelling house has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built acquired vacant possession of. or been allotted a residence or
(f) that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, or
(g) that the tenant has denied the tile of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building: and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application.
(3) No order for the eviction of a tenant shall be made on the ground specified in cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2). if the tenant. within thirty days of the service of the summons of proceedings on him, pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits with the Controller the arrears of rent due by him up to the date of such payment, tender or deposit together with the cost of application:
Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this sub-section. if. having obtained such benefit once in respect of any building he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that bnuilding for a toatal period of three months.
(4) In any proceeding falling under Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) if the Controller on an application made to it is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay, tender or deposit rent was not without reasonable cause, he may nothwithstanding anything contained in subsec. (3) or in S. 32 after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. give the tenant a reasonable time. to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord up to the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender the application shall be rejected."
We will have seen that this Section speaks of everal grounds mentioned for the eviction case of arrears within 30 days from the date of the summons served on him and in cases of rent falling due during the penciency of the proceedings to pay the same in accordance with R. 7 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lkease. Rent and Eviction) Control Rules. 1969. that is to say within 15 days from the date on which the rent becomes due and payable by him. On a trtue and proper reading of this Section and thre scheme of the Act it is explicit tht it embraces all cases of eviction filed aginst a tenant. A similar view had been already taken by the learned Judicial Commissioner in the decision of Leelali Javerbhai v. Smt. Maria Bemvinda da Costa reported in AIR 1973 Goa 41. In that case in was clearly held that it is the tenant's duty to deposti rent as envisaged under S. 32 independent to the nature of the proceedings instituted by the landlord. In another decision of S. S. Kakodkar v. Dr. Inacio Cruz dos Martires Paes reported in AIR 1973 Goa 46 while answering a specific questin raised that S. 32 has no application when a proceeding is initiated by a landlord under S. 30(2) of the Rent Act, it was rightly negatived by the learned Judicial Commissioner.
10. S. 22 of the Rent Act reads: -
"22. Grounds of eviction. - (1) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf.
(2) If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showin cause against the application is satisfied -
(a) that the tenant is in arrears in payment of rent due byhim in respect of the building for a total period of three months and has failed to pay or tender such arrears of rent as are legally recoverable from his within thirty days of the receipt of or of the resudal of aregistered notice served on him by th landlord for such arrrears:or:
(b) that the tenant has without the written consent of th landlord-
(I) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or any portion therof or
(ii) used the building for apurpose other than that which it was leased of damges as re likely to impair mateially the value or utility o th building :or
(d) that the tenant ha been guilty o fsuch acts and condusts which are anuisance to the occupies of other portions of the same building or or building in the neighbourhood:
(e) that the tenant of a dwelling house has whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built acquired vacnt posseion of or been alloted a residence or
(f) that the tenant has ceased to aoccupy the building for a continuous period of ofur months without reasonable cause or
(g) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenacy and tha suchdenial or claim was not bona fide, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possesion of the building:and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application (3) No order fo th eviction of atenant shall be made on th ground specified in cl (a) of Sub-sec (2) if the tenant within thirtuy days of the service o th esummons of proceeding on him pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits with the contoller the arrears of rent due byhim up to the date of such payment tender or deposti together with th cost of application:
Provided that no tenant shall be entiutled to the benefit under this sub-section if having obtined such benefit once in respect iof nay building he agin make sa defult in the payment of rent of that building for a total perido of three months.
(4) In any proceeding falling under cl.9a) of sub-sec (2) I fthe Controller on an application made to it I satisfied that the tenant's default to pay tender or deposit rent was no withou treasonable cause he may not withstanding anything contianed in subSec 93) or in S,32 after giving the parties an opportunity o fbieng heard give the tenant a reasobale time to payor tender the rent such payment o rtender and on such payment or tender the application shall be rejected.' We willhave seenthat this Section speaks of several ground mentioned for the evicgtion of a tenant but however this section has been subjected to several constraints by itself. For instnce no proceeding for eiviction against a enant would lie on ground of non payment of rent, unless the tenant is in rrrears of payment of rent due byhim in repect of a building for a total period of three months and has failed to apyor tender sucharrears of rent as are legllyrcoverable from him within 30 days of th ereceipt of or refusal of a registered notic served on him bythe landlord for recovery of such arrears. The first constraint is that the notice of demand must be given bythe lanlord calling upon the tenant to paythe arrears of rent giving him 30 days time and it is only on failure of the tenant to comply with the demand that the proceedings can bve initaiated. The Second constraint is that the tenat must be in arrears for a total peiod of three months. Sub -sec (3) of S.22 gives a new lease of life to the tenant that if within 30days of the service of s summons on him he pays or tenders to the landlords or deposits with th Contoller th arrears of rent due by him up to date of such payment, tender or deposit together with the cost of th application then in that case no order for eviction of the tenant can arise and the proceeding s come to an end eith that. However it is avialable only once. Where as under cl. (a) of sub-sec 92) of s.22 a tenant is required topay the arears of rent which are legally recoverable within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice served onhim by th landlord, insofar as sub-sec (3) of S.22 is concerned a duty is cast on the tenant to depostit all arrears of rent and not merlyleglly recovable rent within 30days from the service of the summons once the proceedings are isntituted aginst him. Thi saspect of the matter is already dedided in aspect of the amtter is alreadydecided in a Letters patent Appeal by this very bench vide Letters patent Appeal by this very Bench vide Letters patent appeal no.58 of 1983. This Letters Patent Appeal also decided that the words legally recoverable appaering ijn S.22(2)(a) cannot be telescoped in S.32 and the in order to contest theproceeding the tenant has to deposti all the arrears of rent.
11. Coming to sub-sec (4) o S.22 it must be held that this sub-section I sentirely a distinct and separate provision is entirely a distinct and separate provision in favour oft the tenant to come before the Controller at any time by an application saying that his default to apy and tender or depostit the rent was not without reasonable cause and that he is prepared to pay and tender the rendts due on/or before such date as the Controller mauy fix and if such application is accepted by the Contoller the proceddings for his eviction come to an end. Wheras in sub-sec (3) of s.22 a limit of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the summons has been prescibed for a tenant to pay or deposit the arrears of rents together with the cost of the application, there is no such limit prescribed in sub-sec.(4) of S.22. The common feature of sub-sec.(3) and sub-sec (4) of S.22 is the acceptance off the position of being in arrears of rnt but bythier nature these two provisions are entiurely different and operate on two different planes. Irrespecetive of whether thje tenant is indefault or not under sub-sec (3) he merly indicates his willingness to depostit the rent and agrees to pay the cost and gets out of the eviction an dthe proceedings are terminated there and then only. Butunder sub-sec (4) the tenant shows cause as to whyhis default should be condoned an dit is for the Controller in hi sjudicial discreiton to accept the cause shown cause a sto why his default shoul dbe condoned and it is for the Controller in hi sjudicial discreiton to accept the cause shown by such tenant and reject the application of the landlord and the tenant is not even required to plead that he is paying the cost of th application. there is no time limit nor limit on number o fapplication to be made. Sub-sec (4) We accord with the view taken by a bench of this Court in the decision of Shaikh Ibrahim ShaikhMohamed v. Joao Andrade e souza in letters Patent Appeal no.52 of 1983 decided on 5th dec.1984. inthis case the tenant had made an application for deposit of arrears of rent and recurring rents. later on applied for termination of th proceedings but. however that application failed to emtnion tah he was agreeble to apy th cost and secondly that application was filed beyond 30 days from the date of service of the summons of the proceeings on him. The auhtorities did not grnat relief to the tenant holding that it could not be held to be an application under sub-sec (3) of S.22. The petitioner was ordered to be evicted on merits. The orders to be evicted on merits. The orders of the authoirties were challenged in a Writ Petition which wa dismissed in limine by asingle Judge. Though his letters patent appel was dismised on facts of the case, the Letters patent bench held on interpretation of S.22 tha firstlythe purpose of deposit of arrears of rent uner S.32 and under S,22 (3) are quite distinct.Secondly it was held that sub-sec (4) of S.22 and sub-sex (3) of that Section operate on different planes. It was so held because sub-sec. (4) of S.22 applieds at any stage ofth eviction proceedings not withstanding sub-sec.(3) of S.22 or for that matter S.32 nor its sets out anytime limit for making an application nor it prohibits filing of any number of applications. The argument that sub-sec(4) of S.22 would apply even to a defaulter in applying under sub-sec (30 was rejected and it wa clearlyheld that theyare two independent Sections. It is not possible to depart from this position.
12. What therefore emerges is that S.32 I sindependent of S.22. The same is to be invoked by th tenant incase he wnts to contest the proceedings o feviction filed aginst him be taht on any of th grounds under S.22 or under Ss.23 or 30. The beneficient facility provided to the tenant under sub-sec (3) of S.22 is only available a aginst the ground spoken to under S.22 (a) when invlke dby th provision under S.22(4) but in two different circumstnces. However in the former case the question of admitiing afault or showing cause for default does not arise and inteh latter case suffiecient cause for default is required to be shown and ther I sno time limit prescribed. In any case, threfore, S.32 has no application at all. It, therefore, s.32 has no application at all. It.therefore, further transpires that S.22 is by itseld a self contained Copde and affords added facility of protection aginst eviction sought on the ground of non-payment of rents and that too dehors S.32.S.22 therfore operates in the field created byitself and we therefore, fully agree with the views expressed by the Division bench in Letters patent Appeal No.52 of 1983.
13. We adverted to the above discussion with a view to better appreciate the contorversy in thsi appeal. We aslo made reference to various decisions upra referred to in order to show how different aspects of these two section sfell before the Court for consideration from time to time. now coming to the main controversy that once the tenant is allowed to filehis written statement and when permitted to deposit the rent, there is no longer default on the part of the tenant and the stage for stopping procedings under S.32 (40 does not arise cannot be accepted for verystrong reaons. In thsi connection it must be seen that the right to file wirtten statements or fikling defencesi snot provided for under S.32 of the Rent Act. The right of the tenant to file his written statement or defend the proceding si sprovided for byverysub-sec (@) of S.22 for that sub-section reads:-
"If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause aginst the application is stisfied.....".
It is for the tenant to satisfyby showing cause aginst the application filed aginst himand showimg cause can only mean filling the written statement or appropriate defence. All that S.32 mentions is that no tenant aginst whom proceddings for eviction ha been instituted by a landlord under this Asct sahll be entitled to contest the proceedings before the Controller or anby appellate or revisional authority or to prefer any appeal or revision unless he has paid..... The word 'contest' here cannot be construed narrowly to hold merly filling awritten statement or defences the word contest will hav to be construed in abroad sense to mean everystage of the proceedings till its culmination. For instnces the word 'contes' will have to be construed in abrodad sense to mean every stage of the proceeings till its culmination. For instnces the word'contest' would embrace in it filling of the written statement, cross-examination of the landlord and his witness leading defence evidence and arguments on merits before the final order is made by the Contoller. In our view if a restricted menaing if given to the word 'contst' tomean only filing o th ewritten statement, it can bring about unforessen difficulities in the wayof the alandlord and also undesirable results.
14. Thi sSection is envisaged bythe legislature to protect the intersts of th elandlord to secure the rents from cntankerous tenants so that the landlord I snot driven tofile another proceeding for recovery of rents in another fortum.
15. For instance in an eviction proceeings a tenant witha view to contest make san application within 30 days....................................... service of summons on him and deposits the arrears and at some stage file his wittten statement and once having done tha the therefater refuses to payor deposit the recurring rents due. Can he be permitted to saythat S.32(4) is not applicable as he ahs already filed the written statment and therebypermitted tocontest the proceeings are finallyb concluded. What , therefore applied tothe proceedings before the Controller would also apply before the Contoller would also apply before the appellate an dalso before the revisional authority and no tenant can be amde to ge awaywithout depositing the arrears or recurring rents. In this view of th amatter it is not possibl eto accept that once the tenant has file hi swritten statement and deposited the rents due the stage of sub-sec (4) of S.32 surpasses,On the contrary it must be held taht it sia stauttoruy requiremnts on th part of atenant t deposit if he is in arrears within 30days and continue to deposit the recurring rents due and payable until the procedings are culmianted. Equally a right is created in favour of th landlord to move the contoller or the appellate and or the revvisional authority as the case may be by an application to stop further proceedings at any stage and obtain a direction to the tenant to put him in possession. This is however subject to tenant showing sufficeitn cause for not stopping futher proceedings and in which case the authorities ar given discretion either to stop or not stop the proceedings.
16. The stage of option of the tenant to move the Contoller unde S.22(3) within 30 days of the dat of service of summons is for avoiding eviction and put an end to the procedings at its very inception. The tenant can equally apply at any time of the proceeding s under S.22(4) by admitting his default and showing reaonable cause for such default . But in both the cases ther is no theme of contesting th eproceedings unlike Sections I sno doubt to secure the arrears of rents of ................................................................. added facilitied to the tenant in different circumstnces. Therefore the stages spoken to in S.22 are entirely distinct from what is mentioned in S.32.
17. Now in the present case appellant landladythough she succeds on tha main ground, it must be seen that the tenant on the first effective date of hearing on 10th July 1980 moved an application for deposit of arrears of rents and in that he even mentioned that he is not in arrears of payment of rent for th noths of Nov. and Dec.1979. He further mentions taht he ahd sent money order for the month of Jan 1980 but it was refused and for that matter even for the subsequent months. He was able to obtain an order fordeposit only on Ist Sept. 1980. But it can be againsaid in his favour that in that application he offered to deposit all th arrears of rent deposited them bychallan issued to him by the contoller on 6th Sept 1980.
18. We have already held taht S.22 applied at any stage of th proceddings therefore it is opento the proceedings therefore it is open to the respondent tenant to move such application before the Contollr showing reasonable cause with regard to the default in apyment of the rents S.22(4) enjoins upon the tenant to show reaosnable cause and if Controller is satisfied. the Controller can require the tenant to apy to the landlord or deposit in his Court all the amount due up to date and reject the needless to mention that welfare statutes must of necessity receive broad interpretation when legialation is designed to give relief it is not taking a stricter view of the matter. Judges ought to be more concerned with the context colour and content of th statutes. The object thereby afford protection to the tenants s.22 was amended in 1976 to remove hardship amendment as contined in Ss. 22(3) and 22(4) to the tenant t stop his eviction . Viewed thus the expression "Resonable cause" regard to the object of the Act. whil exercising discretion theController has tothe first time or is tia perisitent feature whether it sibona fide or contumacious: whther it si done to harass the landlord or otherwise: in shor what has to be found is whether on the facts and circumstnces of the case there is reasonable cause for non payment.
19. It is true taht the application dt.10th july 1980 lacks specific prayer as required under s.22(4) but from the allegation smade there in it si required to be found out whether there was reasonable cause on hi spart. In cur view therefore taking all the fact sand circumstance sof the case that application o fthe repondent tenants could be treated as an application under S.22(4) we therefore direct the rent Contoller to decide this application and consider the facts disclosed and if necessary record evidence and decide whether thre was reasonable cuse on th part of the tenant not to paythe rents to th appellant landlady. If the controller accepts the application of th respondent tenant then obviously the appellant -landlady cannot succeed on the ground under s.22 920(a) in which case the Contoller mayproceed to decide the appellant -landlady's application for eviction on the grounds of damage to the premises and nuisance.
20. For the reasons recorded above the impugned order of th learned single Judge dt 12th April 1984 in Writ Petn. No.64 of 1983 is set aside. But, nowever we are not able to restore the orders of the Additional rent Controller South goa margao, dt.30th Sept. 1980 in Cse no. Building 53 of 1980 and the Administrative Traibunal de 10th mar. 1983 in Eviction Appeal No.24 of 1980 in view of the direction that we ahve made for trating the tenant's application dt.10th July 1980 as an application under S.22(40. Subject to the aforesaid observations this appeal is accordingly party allowed but, however, the parties are to bear their own costs.
21. Appeal partly allowed.