Bangalore District Court
Mysore Paper Mills Limited vs M/S Amarjyothi Paper Co on 27 September, 2025
KABC170021742024
IN THE COURT OF LXXXIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE,
COMMERCIAL COURT, BENGALURU (CCH-84)
Present: Sri S. Sudindranath, LL.M., M.B.L.,
LXXXIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE
BENGALURU.
COM.O.S.No.1090/2024
Dated on this 27th day of September 2025
Plaintiff/s M/S. MYSORE PAPER MILLS LIMITED
Office at No.32, 5th Floor, D Devraj Urs
Road, (Race Course Road),
Bengaluru-560 001.
(By Sri Santhosh M, Advocate)
// versus //
Defendant/s M/S AMARJYOTHI PAPER CO.
No.125/9/1, Balaji Complex Sultanpet,
Bengaluru-560 053.
(By Sri C.Vijaya Kumar, Advocate)
Date of Institution of suit : 08-08-2024
Nature of the suit : Recovery of money
Date of commencement of : 15-03-2025
recording of the evidence
Date on which the : 27-09-2025
Judgment was pronounced.
: Year/s Month/s Day/s
Total duration
01 01 19
2
CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc
KABC170021742024
JUDGMENT
This is a suit filed by the plaintiff company against defendant company for recovery of total sum of Rs. 82,69,287 along with interest towards material supplied.
2. The plaint averments in brief are that, the plaintiff is in the business of manufacture and sale of paper and paper products and has been supplying material to the defendant and also to third parties on the basis of booking made by the defendant on credit basis under running ledger account. Towards material supplied directly to the defendant from 1- 4-2015 to 31-3-2016 and from 1-4-2016 to 15-7-2016 the balance pending amount payable by the defendant is Rs. 73,08,332. Apart from this, as a dealer, the defendant has booked products for supply to various third parties and in respect of such supply to third parties on booking made by the defendant for the period from 1-4-2009 to 31-3-2012 the outstanding balance payable is Rs. 9,60,955. In spite of reminders and issuance of legal notice, defendant has not paid the above sums. Hence, for recovery of the total sum of Rs. 82,69,287 along with interest, the present suit is filed. 3
CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024
3. On issuance of suit summons to the defendant, suit summons by RPAD was duly served and in response to the suit summons, defendant has entered appearance through Counsel. Thereafter, on the date fixed for filing of written statement, since there was no representation for defendant, written statement of defendant was taken as not filed. Thereafter, defendant filed IA No. 3 seeking leave to file written statement which was allowed subject to cost of Rs. 1,000. However, in spite of sufficient opportunity granted, defendant failed to pay the said cost and therefore written statement was discarded by orders dated 10-6-2025.
4. Thereafter, in the ex parte evidence, the representative of the plaintiff is examined as PW1 and got marked Ex. P1 to P18.
5. The defendant has not cross-examined PW1 and since written statement is discarded, there is also no rebuttal evidence adduced by the defendant.
6. After closure of evidence, I have heard the arguments of counsel for plaintiff and perused the records of the case. 4
CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024
7. In this case, since written statement of defendant was discarded, issues are not framed and therefore at this stage, the following point is framed for consideration;
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover sum of Rs. 82,69,287 which consists of sum of Rs. 73,08,332 for material directly supplied to the defendant and Rs. 9,60,955 towards materials supplied to third parties on the booking of the defendant, along with interest at 18% per annum from due date till date of realization?
8. My answer to the above point is in the negative for the following:-
REASONS.
9. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that, the plaintiff is in the business of manufacture and sale of paper and paper products and has been supplying material to the defendant and also to third parties on the basis of booking made by the defendant on credit basis under running ledger account. 5
CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 Towards material supplied directly to the defendant from 1- 4-2015 to 31-3-2016 and from 1-4-2016 to 15-7-2016 the balance pending amount payable by the defendant is Rs. 73,08,332. Apart from this, as a dealer, the defendant has booked products for supply to various third parties and in respect of such supply to third parties on booking made by the defendant for the period from 1-4-2009 to 31-3-2012 the outstanding balance payable is Rs. 9,60,955. In spite of reminders and issuance of legal notice, defendant has not paid the above sums. Hence, for recovery of the total sum of Rs. 82,69,287 along with interest, the present suit is filed.
10. In support of its case, the plaintiff has examined its representative as P.W. 1 and got marked Ex. P. 1 to P. 18.
11. Ex. P. 1 is the board resolution authorizing P.W. 1. Ex. P. 2 is the non-starter report of PIM. Ex. P. 3 is the ledger extract. Ex. P. 4 is the marketing customer ledger. Ex. P. 5 is email dated 5-3-2015 issued by the plaintiff to defendant for settlement of the outstanding dues. Ex. P. 6 is also ledger extract. Ex. P. 7 is letter issued by the plaintiff to the defendant dated 14-2-2017. Ex. P. 8 is letter issued by the defendant to the plaintiff stating that the defendant cannot 6 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 be held liable for material supplied to third parties. Ex. P. 9 is the reply to Ex. P. 8. Ex. P. 10 is letter issued by the plaintiff to all dealers dated 20-6-2013. Ex. P. 11 is the office copy of the legal notice caused by the plaintiff to the defendant dated 28-4-2018. Ex. P. 12 is printout of email dated 11-11-2016 issued by the plaintiff to the defendant calling for clearing the balance amounts. Ex. P. 13 are RPAD acknowledgments. Ex. P. 14 are tax invoices raised by the plaintiff against the defendant which are dated between 07-7-2015 to 14-7-2016. Ex. P. 15 are debit notes. Ex. P. 16 are letters issued by the plaintiff to the defendant being the reminder letters to clear the balance payment. Ex. P. 17 is a letter by the plaintiff to the defendant to clear the dues in respect of material supplied to third parties. Ex. P. 18 is another letter issued by the plaintiff to the defendant dated 26-9-2019 to clear the dues.
12. As already noted supra, although defendant has entered appearance through counsel, the written statement of defendant has been discarded for non-payment of cost of Rs. 1,000 which was imposed as a precondition for allowing written statement. And consequent upon discarding of 7 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 written statement, there is no rebuttal evidence. Although the defendant who has not filed written statement has restricted right of cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness only in so far as denying the plaintiff's case without putting forth the defense, as per law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Muniyappa v. Narayanappa - 2010 SCC Online Kar 4792, the defendant has not even availed that opportunity of restricted cross-examination and there is no cross- examination of PW1. Hence, the above oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff has remained undisputed.
13. Having considered the case of the plaintiff and the material on record, at the outset, being a suit for recovery of money, the court has to consider whether suit is filed within the period of limitation. This is because under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the court has to consider the question of limitation even if the same is not raised as a defense.
14. In this regard, even as per the plaint averments, the suit is filed for recovery of dues under two heads, that is, 8 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 recovery of Rs. 73,08,332 towards material directly supplied to the defendant and recovery of Rs. 9,60,955 towards material supplied to third parties on the booking of the defendant. The details in respect of material directly supplied to the defendant is at paragraph 4 of the Plaint wherein it is pleaded that the material was directly supplied to the defendant from 1-4-2015 to 15-7-2016. Even the invoices produced at Ex. P-14 are dated from 7-7-2015 to 14-7-2016. Therefore, it is clear that, the last date of transaction between the parties was 15-7-2016 even as per the plaint averments. Being a suit based on running account, the suit ought to have been filed within three years from the date of last transaction between the parties. In other words, the suit for recovery of amount towards material supplied directly to the defendant of Rs. 73,08,332 ought to have been filed within three years from the date of the last invoice, i.e. within 3 years from 15-07-2016 viz. on or before 15-07-2019.
15. Similarly, insofar as the amount claimed for supply of material to third parties on the booking made by the defendant is concerned, the specific plaint averments at 9 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 paragraph 6 are that such material was supplied to the third parties between 1-4-2009 to 31-3-2012. Therefore, even in respect of the said claim for Rs. 9,60,955, the suit ought to have been filed within three years from the date of last transaction, that is within three years from 31-3-2012. In other words, on or before 31-3-2015.
16. Whereas, the present suit is filed on 8-8-2024, which is hopelessly barred by limitation.
17. To save the suit from the bar of limitation, learned counsel for plaintiff in his written submissions, which was filed in response to clarifications sought for by this court on the question of limitation on 26-9-2025, has essentially raised two points. Firstly, it is contended that the plaintiff is a government undertaking and therefore, Article 112 of the Limitation Act is applicable, which provides for a limitation of 30 years for any suit filed by or on behalf of the central government or state government. In this regard, at paragraph 11 of the written submissions of the counsel for plaintiff dated 26-9-2025, it is specifically contended that plaintiff is a government company. For ready reference, Article 112 of the Limitation Act is extracted below; 10
CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 Any suit (except a Thirty years. When the period of suit before the limitation would Supreme Court in begin to run under this Act the exercise of against a its original like suit by a private person jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
18. Article 112 has been interpreted by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of BSNL v. Pawan Kumar Gupta, (2016) 1 SCC 363 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 327 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 876 at page 369, as follows;
11. It could be seen from the undisputed facts, which are adverted to in the impugned judgment that undisputedly the suit claims against the debtors/subscribers are beyond the period of three years of limitation which is available. Therefore, contention of the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant Company that the benefit accrued in favour of the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the fact situation, has a far-reaching consequences for the reason that, though the Company is a 11 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central Government. The expression "Central Government" under the General Clauses Act is clearly defined, which relevant provision is extracted in the aforestated portion of this judgment. By a reading of the aforestated definition, by no stretch of imagination it can be construed that the appellant Company which is registered under the Companies Act, though the share capital of the Company owned in the name of the President is 100%, it cannot be construed as the Central Government for the reason that the appellant Company by registration under the Companies Act, no doubt it is under the control of the Central Government as it is financed and its administration is under the absolute control of the Central Government, nonetheless, it shall not be construed as the Central Government for the reason that the appellant Company is a separate legal entity. It also cannot claim that it is entitled to the benefit under Article 112 of the Limitation Act on the ground that a debt recoverable from the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section 3 of the TP Act, even if the same has been transferred under Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, thereby vesting in it the rights and the remedies vis-à-vis the same. No doubt, by execution of the said instrument it has got the actionable claim transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from the debtors and subscribers. As could be seen from the 12 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 claim, the undisputed facts of these appeals are that on the date of the transfer, some of the claims were time-barred, therefore, the Company cannot construe that the time-barred debts are also actionable claims by way of transfer in its favour, which entitles it to avail the benefit of Article 112 of the Limitation Act i.e. the period of thirty years to institute suits for recovery of the same. Such an interpretation is contrary to Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
12. A careful reading of Article 112 of the Limitation Act clearly reveals that in any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the period of limitation would be thirty years. The period of limitation time from which the period begins to run is mentioned under Column 3 of the above Article of the Limitation in the Schedule, which reads as follows:
"When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person."
By a careful reading of the aforesaid Article, it makes abundantly clear, that a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of the Central Government. It is not the case of the appellant herein that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government. This is for the reason that the appellant Company has instituted the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office Memorandum wherein DoT 13 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 has transferred its assets and actionable claims. It cannot be said that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government because the appellant-
plaintiff is a company, a distinctly independent and separate entity.
Therefore, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid Article 112 of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim due to DoT is wholly misconceived in law.
13. The other argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant Company that it is an agency or instrumentality under the Central Government which falls within the inclusive definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act is wholly misconceived for the reason that Article 112 of the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or the State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities are not incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Such an argument is contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. [(2002) 3 SCC 533] In para 14 of the said judgment it is categorically stated that the legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process and the Court cannot do the legislative functions. Para 14 of the said judgment reads thus : (SCC p. 542) "14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If 14 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. [(2000) 5 SCC 515] ) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case [N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, (1996) 3 SCC 88] . In Nanjudaiah case [State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah, (1996) 10 SCC 619] the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the connected matter i.e. Civil Appeal No. 2409 of 2009, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in A.K. Bindal v. Union of India [(2003) 5 SCC 163 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 620] , paras 5, 14 and 17 and Food Corporation of India v. Municipal Committee, Jalalabad [(1999) 6 SCC 74] in support of the contention that the expressions "Central Government" or "State Government" in terms of Section 3(8) and Section 3(60) of the General 15 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 Clauses Act do not include in their purview or definition their agencies or instrumentalities.
15. In view of the aforesaid judgments of this Court, the legal contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the appellant being the agency or instrumentality of the Central Government is entitled to maintain the suit claims within thirty years as provided under Article 112 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act or alternatively, whatever the limitation period which was available for the Central Government, within three years from the date of execution of the agreement are wholly unsustainable in law.
(Emphasis Supplied)
19. From the above law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, it is crystal clear that the benefit of Article 112 is inapplicable to a government company and it only applies where the suit is filed by the central government or state government itself. Admittedly, the present suit is filed by a company by name Mysore Paper Mills Limited. Even conceding that said company is a government company, wholly controlled by the state government, as per the above law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, the benefit of Article 16 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 112 will not apply. Therefore, this contention of the plaintiff deserves to be rejected.
20. Another contention raised in the written submissions is that repeatedly, reminder letters were being issued by the plaintiff to the defendant and the latest of such reminder letters is dated 17-10-2023. The law is very well settled that mere issuance of legal notice or reminder letters will not extend the period of limitation. In this regard, reference may be made to the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Har Dayal, (2010) 1 SCC 394 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1837 at page 397 ;
10. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have totally ignored the enormous delay of more than 30 years on the part of the respondent in approaching the court. This Court has repeatedly held that merely giving representation will neither extend the limitation nor wipe out the delay and laches. (See S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P. [(1989) 4 SCC 582 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 50 :
(1989) 11 ATC 913 : AIR 1990 SC 10] ) Further, the respondent and his brothers were categorically informed in September 1989 that due to non-availability of agricultural land, they were entitled only to cash equivalent of compensation as per the Rules and therefore, Rs 383.50 each being their share of compensation was to their credit and they could draw the same. The respondent could have challenged that order on the ground that 17 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 he was entitled to land and not cash. But he did not do so.
(Emphasis Supplied)
21. If such a contention were to be accepted that, by merely issuing reminder letters, the limitation will be extended, then no suit would ever be barred by limitation because the plaintiff can issue a reminder letter and then contend that suit is filed within three years from the date of the reminder letter. Anyhow, when the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the law, extracted supra, that issuance of representation will not extend the period of limitation, it follows that the same principle is applicable even to legal notice / reminder letters. Therefore, by merely issuing the reminder letters or legal notice, the limitation is not extended.
22. In conclusion, it is to be noted that, admittedly, the last transaction between the parties, insofar as direct supply of material to the defendant, even as per the Plaint averments took place on 15-07-2016, and the last transaction between the parties, insofar as supply to third parties on booking of the defendant, took place on 31-03- 18 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 2012, and the suit is filed beyond the period of three years from the respective last dates of transaction and hence barred by limitation.
23. Once this conclusion is reached, it follows that the suit has to be dismissed on the sole ground that it is barred by limitation and it is not permissible for this court to go into the merits of the matter. Accordingly, I hold that the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation. And accordingly, answering the point for consideration in the negative, I proceed to pass the following :-
ORDER.
The suit is dismissed, with cost.
Office to draw decree accordingly.
Office to issue soft copy of this
Judgment to both sides by email, if
furnished.
[Dictated using MacWhisper Pro 10.8.1, transcript revised, corrected, signed and then pronounced by me in open court on this the 27th day of September, 2025] (S. Sudindranath) 19 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 LXXXIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, COMMERCIAL COURT, BENGALURU ANNEXURE
1. List of witnesses examined on behalf of Plaintiff/s:
PW1 : Sri. Mohan D. Kulkarni
2. List of witnesses examined on behalf of
Defendant/s:
Nil
3. List of documents marked on behalf of
Plaintiff/s:
Ex.P1 : Attested copy resolution of board of directors of
plaintiff authorizing PW-1.
Ex.P2 : Non starter report of PIM.
Ex.P3 : Attested copy of ledger extract.
Ex.P4 : Attested copy of marketing customer ledger.
Ex.P5 : Print out of e-mail.
Ex.P6 : Attested copy of ledger account
Ex.P7 : Office copy of letter dated. 14.02.2017 along
with RPAD acknowledgement.
Ex.P8 : Letter issued by the defendant dated 29.03.2017
Ex.P9 : Letter issued by plaintiff to defendant dated
12.04.2017 along with RPAD acknowledgement Ex.P10 : Communication issued by plaintiff dated 20.06.2013.
Ex.P11 : Office copy of legal notice dated. 28.04.2018 along with RPAD receipt and Annexure-I 20 CT 1390_Com.O.S.No.1090-2024_Judgment.doc KABC170021742024 Ex.P12 : Printout of e-mails (2 sheets) produced along with I.A.No.4 Ex.P13 : Postal acknowledgments (9 in Nos.) produced along with I.A.No.4 Ex.P14 : Tax invoices along with delivery challans and some tax invoices are also accompanied by stock room reel list.
Ex.P15 : Debit note (3 Nos.) Ex.P16 : Office copies of letters.
Ex.P17 : Office copy of letter dated 18.03.2017 along with postal acknowledgement.
Ex.P18 : Office copies of letters.
4. List of documents marked on behalf of Defendant/s:
Nil (S. Sudindranath) LXXXIII ACC & SJ, (COMMERCIAL COURT), BENGALURU