Karnataka High Court
H. Sanjeevaiah vs Smt. Huchamma on 24 September, 2025
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RSA No. 1204 of 2017
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.1204 OF 2017 (SP)
BETWEEN:
H. SANJEEVAIAH
S/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS
R/AT KANNALI VILLAGE
YESWANTHPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK -560022.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. RAJARAM SOORYAMBAIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. HUCHAMMA
W/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
SINCE DECEASED REP. BY LRS.
Digitally signed by
1(a). SMT. MUNIYAMMA
SHARMA ANAND
CHAYA
W/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
Location: HIGH COURT AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS.
OF KARNATAKA
1(b). SMT. PUTTAMMA
W/O KEMPANNA
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
1(a) AND 1(b) ARE R/AT
KANNALLI, KODIGEHALLI POST
YASHWANTHPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK -560112.
1(c). SMT. NAGAMMA
W/O GANGANNA
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AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
R/AT BEHIND GRAM PANCHAYATH
KUMBALGODU POST
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK - 560112.
1(d). SMT. JAGADAMBE @ JYOTHI
W/O PUSHPARAJ
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
R/AT DASAREHALLI POST
AGRAHARA
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK -560073.
LATE GANGAMMA
SINCE DECEASED REP. BY LRS.
1(e). SRI. MANU
S/O ANJANAPPA @ APPI
AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS
R/AT KODIGEHALLI POST
YASHWANTHPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560112.
1(f). SRI. NAGARAJ @ CHANDAN
S/O ANJANAPPA @ APPI
AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS
R/AT KODIGEHALLI POST
YASHWANTHPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560112.
1(g). SMT. VASANTHA KUMARI
W/O SURESH
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT KANNALLI,
KODIGEHALLI POST
YASHWANTHPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560112.
2. SRI. H. BYRAPPA
S/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
NO.225, MALLASANDRA
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RSA No. 1204 of 2017
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T. DASARAHALLI POST
BENGALURU - 560057.
3. SRI. SIDDAPPA
S/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS.
4. SRI. C. MAHADEVAIAH
S/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO.3 AND 4
ARE R/AT KANNELI VILLAGE
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK -560022.
5. SRI. H. NAGARAJU
S/O LATE HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
NO.186, MAGADI MAIN ROAD
MAHADESHWARANAGAR
9TH CROSS
BENGALURU - 560079.
....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. C.M.NAGABUSHANA, ADVOCATE)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 100 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 10.03.2017 PASSED IN
R.A.NO.100/2015 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ADDL., DISTRICT
JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU. PARTLY
ALLOWING THE APPEAL FILED AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE DATED 29.04.2015 PASSED IN OS.NO.2087/2006 ON
THE FILE OF THE II ADDL., SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU
RURAL DISTRICT, BENGLAURU.
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THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, E.S. INDIRESH J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH
CAV JUDGMENT
1. This Regular Second Appeal is preferred by the plaintiff assailing the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2017 in R.A.No.100 of 2015 on the file of IX Additional District Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural, Bengaluru, partly allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 29.04.2015 in O.S.No.2087 of 2006 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bengaluru Rural, Bengaluru, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff.
2. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred as per their ranking before the Trial Court. -5-
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3. It is the case of the plaintiff that, land bearing Sy.No.67 situated at Kanelli village, Bengaluru North Taluk, to an extent of 09 acres 18 guntas is a service Inam land. The said land was re-granted in favour of one Hanumanthappa, S/o. Anjinappa to an extent of 02 acres, 24 guntas. It is also stated that, a portion of the land was also re-granted in favour of one Hanumanthappa, S/o. Hanuma to an extent of 02 acres, 24 guntas, which was situated adjacent to each other. The said grantee - Hanumanthappa, S/o. Hanuma died leaving behind the defendants to succeed to his estate. It is further stated that, the defendants have agreed to sell the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly, the parties have entered into an Sale Agreement on 21.05.2001. The total sale consideration of the suit schedule property to be conveyed was Rs.2,75,000/- and as such, on the date of the Sale Agreement, the -6- NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR plaintiff has paid Rs.1,50,000/- as part of total consideration amount to the defendants. It is also stated that, the parties have agreed to complete the entire sale transaction within 11 months from the date of execution of the Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001.
4. It is also stated that, the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and as such, approached the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed. It is also stated in the plaint that the defendants have made claim for further payment and as such, plaintiff has paid Rs.50,000/- on 16.03.2002 and Rs.50,000/- on 10.02.2004 to the defendants. It is also stated that having received the major portion of the sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- from the plaintiff, the defendants refused to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, -7- NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR the plaintiff has filed the suit in O.S.No.2087 of 2006, seeking relief of specific performance of the contract.
5. On service of notice, the defendants entered appearance and filed detailed written statement, denying the averments made in the plaint. It is the specific case of defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 that, the defendants have not executed the Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001 as stated in the plaint and accordingly, denied the entire case of the plaintiff. It is also stated that, the plaintiff has not shown the readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and therefore, the defendants have sought for dismissal of the suit. It is also stated in the written statement that, the land in question was notified for acquisition by the Bangalore Development Authority. Hence, it is the case of the defendants that, the claim made by the plaintiff requires to be dismissed. -8-
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6. Based on the pleadings on record, the Trial Court has framed the issues for its consideration.
7. In order to establish their case, the plaintiff has examined 04 witnesses as PW1 to PW4 and produced 15 documents, which were marked as Exs.P1 to P15. The defendants have examined 03 witnesses as DW1 to DW3 and produced 03 documents, which were marked as Exs.D1 to D3.
8. The Trial Court, after considering the material on record by its judgment and decree dated 29.04.2015, decreed the suit of the plaintiff and as such, directed the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff by receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.25,000/- within 6 months from the date of the judgment. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the defendants have preferred R.A.No.100 of 2015 -9- NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR before the First Appellate Court and the same was resisted by the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court after considering the material on record by its judgment and decree dated 10.03.2017, allowed the appeal in part and as such, set aside the judgment and decree in O.S.No.2087 of 2006 for specific performance of the contract by the defendants. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff has preferred this Regular Second Appeal.
9. This Court vide order dated 24.03.2021 formulated the following substantial questions of law:
"1) Whether the time prescribed for performance under the Agreement of Sale (Ex.P1) stood enlarged in view of the defendants receiving consideration beyond time fixed in the agreement ?
2) Whether the First Appellate Court was right in holding that, the plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act ?
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3) Whether the exercise of discretion by the First Appellate Court to refuse specific performance was just and proper ?
4) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court reversing the judgment of the Trial Court is valid and based on evidence ?"
10. I have heard Sri. Rajaram Sooryambail, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri. C.M. Nagabhushana, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
11. Sri. Rajaram Sooryambail, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that, the sale agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants on 21.05.2001 and total consideration amount was Rs.2,75,000/-. He further argued that, as on the date of the agreement, the plaintiff has paid Rs.1,50,000/- and remaining amount of Rs.50,000/- was paid on 16.03.2002 and Rs.50,000/- on
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR 10.02.2004 and as such, the plaintiff has shown readiness and willingness to execute registered Sale Deed, however, the defendants have refused to execute the registered Sale Deed and accordingly, it is contended that the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court requires to be set aside in this appeal.
12. It is further argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant by referring to Ex.P6 that the legal notice dated 31.05.2006 was issued by the plaintiff to the defendants, calling for execution of the registered Sale Deed, however, an evasive reply has been made as per Ex.P7. It is also argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that as on the date of Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001, the defendants have handed over the possession in respect of subject land in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and therefore, as per Section 53A of
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a part performance has been made by the defendants and the said aspect has been ignored by the First Appellate Court. In order to buttress his arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mst. Sugani vs. Rameshwar Das and Another reported in AIR 2006 SC 2172 and argued that, the Court has to consider the totality of the circumstances and further as the plaintiff has periodically paid the sale consideration amount to the defendants and same was acknowledged and admitted by DW1 and accordingly, sought for interference of this Court.
13. Per contra, Sri. C. M. Nagabushana, learned counsel appearing for the respondents sought to justify the impugned judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court.
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14. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that, the suit is barred by the limitation, that the plaintiff has not shown readiness and willingness to complete the transaction from the date of the Sale Agreement and the said aspect has been considered by the First Appellate Court in the right prospective and therefore, judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court has to be confirmed. It is also argued by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of V.P. Venkatesh vs. G. Padmavathi reported in ILR 2015 KAR 2695 that, the plaintiff has slept over the matter by issuing legal notice on 31.05.2006 from the date of the Sale Agreement and therefore, delay on the part of the plaintiff has to be considered and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the appeal.
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15. It is also argued by the learned counsel by referring to paragraph Nos.44 to 46 of the judgment of First Appellate Court and submitted that, the plaintiff has utterly failed to prove his readiness and willingness to prove his obligation under the Sale Agreement and therefore, sought to justify the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. In this regard, he places reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Usha Devi and Others vs. Ram Kumar Singh and Others reported in (2024) 8 SCR 501 and the judgment of this Court in the case of D. Jayaramaiah and Others vs. Durgadevi and Others reported in 2025 (1) AKR 641 and argued that, the plaintiff has failed to prove his readiness and willingness and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the appeal.
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16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have carefully examined the finding recorded by both the courts below and perused the original records. It is forthcoming from the finding recorded by both the courts below that, the suit schedule property belonged to Hanumanthappa (husband of the defendant No.1 and father of the defendant Nos. 2 to 5). There is no dispute with regard to the title of the defendants. The plaintiff and defendants have entered into a Sale Agreement on 21.05.2001 (Ex. P1) for total sale consideration of Rs.2,75,000/-. It is forthcoming from the Sale Agreement that, the plaintiff has paid, Rs.1,50,000/- as advance amount and undertakes to pay the balance amount at the time of the registration of the Sale Deed. It is also forthcoming from the shara in Ex.P1 wherein, the defendants have made a claim for additional advance amount to repay the PLD Bank
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR dues and as such, the plaintiff has paid Rs.50,000/- on 16.03.2002. It is stated that the entire transaction has to be completed within 11 months from the date of execution of the Sale Agreement. It is forthcoming from the shara in Ex.P1 wherein, the plaintiff has paid Rs.50,000/- to the defendants and the same was acknowledged by the defendant No.1. This aspect would makes it clear that, out of total sale consideration of Rs.2,75,000/-, the plaintiff has paid Rs.2,50,000/-. In order to prove the Sale Agreement dated 25.01.2001, plaintiff has examined PW2 to PW4-attestors to the Sale Agreement. At this stage, it is relevant to extract the cross-examination of DW1 dated 17.06.2014, which reads as under:
"ªÁ¢ ¸ÀAfêÀAiÀÄå ನನ ಾವನ ಮಗ ಇರು ಾ ೆ. ನನ ಾವನ ೆಸರು ಹನುಮಂತಪ .
ನಮ ಯಜ ಾನರ ೋದರ ಾವ ಹನುಮಂತಪ . ನನ ಗಂಡನ ೆಸರು ಸಹ ಹನುಮಂತಪ , ನನ ಗಂಡ ೕ ೋ ಸು ಾರು 28 ವಷ"#ಾ ರುತ$ೆ. ಾನು, ನನ ಗಂಡ%&ೆ 4 ಜನ ಗಂಡು ಮಕ(ಳ*, 6 ಜನ ೆಣು- ಮಕ(ಳ* ಇರು ಾ.ೆ. 4 ಜನ ೆಣು- ಮಕ(/&ೆ 0#ಾಹ#ಾ ರುತ$ೆ. ನನ 5 ೇ ಮಗ/&ೆ 2001ರ12 ಾನು 0#ಾಹ ಾ3ರು ೇ ೆ. ಆಗ
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR ನನ&ೆ ಮದು#ೆ&ೆ ಹಣದ ಅವಶ7ಕ ೆ ಇದು8ದ8 ಂದ ಾನು ಹಣ ಪ9ೆದು:ೊಂಡು ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾರು ಬ.ೆದು:ೊ=>$ೆ8ೕ ೆ ಎಂದ.ೆ ಸ . ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾರು ಆದ :ಾಲ:ೆ( ನನ 4 ಜನ ಗಂಡು ಮಕ(ಳ* ಸA ಾ3$ಾ8.ೆ ಎಂದ.ೆ ಸ ಯಲ2. ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾ &ೆ ಾನು ನನ ೆಬB=>ನ ಗುತು"
ಾC$ೆ8ೕ ೆ. ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾ &ೆ ನನ Dೊ ೆ ನನ - $ೊಡEಮಗ Fದಪ , ಮಹ$ೇವಯ7 ಸA ಾ3$ಾ8.ೆ. ನನ 4 ೇ ಮಗ ಾಗ.ಾಜು ಮತು Gೈರಪ ಸಹ ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾ &ೆ ಸA ಾ3$ಾ8.ೆ ಎಂದ.ೆ ಸ ಯಲ2. ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾ ನ12 Iಾರು Iಾರು ೆಬB=>ನ ಗುತು"
ಾC$ಾ8.ೆ. Iಾರು ಸA ಾ3$ಾ8.ೆ ಎಂದು ೇಳಲು ಬರುವJKಲ2. ನನ&ೆ ನನ ಮಕ(ಳ ಸA ಗು "ಸಲು ಬರುವJKಲ2. ನನ ಎLಾ2 ಮಕ(ಳM ಕ;ಯದ ಕ.ಾ &ೆ ಸA ಾCದ8ರೂ ಸಹ ಅದ ಂದ ತN F:ೊಳOಲು ಸುಳ*O ಾP ೇಳ* $ೆ8ೕ ೆ ಎಂದ.ೆ ಸ ಯಲ2."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff and defendants are close relatives and their land are situated adjacent to each other. It is the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that, the plaintiff has failed to prove the readiness and willingness as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. In this regard, perusal of the Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001- Ex.P1, and shara mentioned in the said Sale Agreement, on 16.03.2002, and 10.02.2004 reveals that, the plaintiff
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR has paid more than 90% of the agreed sale consideration amount to the defendants. DW1 admits the execution of the Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001 and share made thereon. Therefore, it has to be concluded that, the plaintiff has not only pleaded readiness and willingness to complete the entire transaction in the pleadings but also proved through the evidence, wherein, DW1 and DW2 admit about the execution of Sale Agreement and further payments made thereunder. It is also forthcoming from the records that the plaintiff has addressed a legal notice- Ex.P6 dated 31.05.2006, wherein, the plaintiff has expressed his willingness to execute a registered Sale Deed, however, the said notice was replied by the defendants as per the reply notice at Ex.P7, seeking copy of the Sale Agreement. It is pertinent to mention here that, knowing fully well about the execution of the Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001, the perusal of
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR the reply by the defendants shows their conduct to defeat the legal right of the defendants. The said reply at Ex.P7, is an evasive reply and do not conform to the admission made in the cross-examination by DW1 and DW2. In this regard, though the learned counsel appearing for the respondents urged that the suit is barred by limitation, however, perusal of the records would indicate that, plaintiff has paid the sale consideration amount on subsequent dates namely, on 16.03.2002, as per shara for sum of Rs.50,000/- which is within 11 months from the date of execution of the Sale Agreement dated 25.01.2001 and thereafter, another sum of Rs.50,000/- was paid on 10.02.2004 as per the shara mentioned in the Sale Agreement and that apart the plaintiff has caused legal notice dated 31.05.2006 (Ex.P6) calling upon the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed. This fact would establish the conduct of the plaintiff to
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR complete the sale transactions. The plaintiff has filed the suit on 30.08.2006 and therefore, the suit is filed within three years from the date of refusal of performance by the defendants as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents cannot be accepted.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst.Sugani (supra), at paragraph 16 has held that, while considering the readiness and willingness on the part of the parties, the court has to consider the facts in entirety and circumstances relevant to ascertain the intention and conduct of the party concerned. Therefore, the intention of the plaintiff to execute a registered Sale Deed at the earliest is forthcoming from the shara dated 16.03.2002 and 10.02.2004 in the Sale Agreement dated 25.01.2001 and same was
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR fortified by issuing legal notice dated 31.05.2006 (Ex.P6). Perusal of the reply, sent by the defendants at Ex.D7, substantiate that the defendants were not aware about the execution of the Sale Agreement despite being admitted in the evidence by DW1 and DW2, cannot be accepted. Hence, as the suit is filed within three years from the date of refusal of the performance contract by the defendants as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Usha Devi (supra), is squarely supports the contention of the plaintiff. At this stage, it is relevant to cite the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sabbir (dead) Through Lrs vs. Anjuman (Since deceased) Through Lrs reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1292 paragraph 12 reads as under:
"12. From perusal of the plaint on the record it, transpires that there is a statement in Paragraph No. 6 that till the month of October, 1980, the original respondent (since
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR deceased) and her husband (now, as Legal Representative) had asked the appellants to execute the Sale Deed and then an eviction notice was served on the original respondent (since deceased) and her husband (now, as Legal Representative) and his brother. It has further been stated that this was after the respondents asked the appellants to execute the Sale Deed within 15 days after taking permission. Thus, nowhere it has been even indicated, in clear terms, that the respondents were ready and willing to pay the balance amount and get the Sale Deed executed in their favour. In view thereof, from their own pleadings in the plaint, even after five and a half years, there being no averment that the respondents were ready and willing to perform their obligations under the ATS and pay the balance/remaining amount is enough for the suit of the respondents to be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone. The ATS is dated 31.07.1975 and the suit was filed on 01.01.1981. The limitation for filing a suit for specific performance, as per Article 54 of the Schedule to The Limitation Act, 1963 is 3 years 'from the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused.' In Ghewarchand v. Mahendra Singh, (2018) 10 SCC 588, it was observed that when deciding upon the question of limitation, it is mainly required to see the plaint allegations and how the plaintiff has pleaded the accrual of cause of action for filing of the suit. Apropos limitation, this Court observed, in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 as under:
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR '12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.
28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.-- The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907].)'"
(emphasis supplied)
19. Following the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the view that, the suit is filed within three years from the date of refusal of the performance of Sale Agreement as per the legal notice issued by the plaintiff and the reply, made by the defendants and therefore, I am of the opinion that, the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents on the limitation cannot be accepted.
20. Insofar as the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is concerned, I am of the opinion
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR that, the judgment of this court in V.P. Venkatesh, (supra) referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, cannot be made applicable to the facts this case on the sole ground as the plaintiff in the present case paid more than 90% of the sale consideration amount. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.S Venkatesh vs. A.S.C. Murthy (D) by LRs and Others, reported in 2020 3 SCC 280, paragraph 15 to 20 reads as under:
"15. The next question for consideration is in relation to compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act by the plaintiff. Though a question was raised before the trial court that there are no pleadings as regards the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform the contract, the trial court has rightly held that there is sufficient compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act to the extent of pleadings. Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
16. The words "ready and willing" imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract.
17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115] , it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available.
18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582] , this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus: (SCC p. 584, para 5) "5. ... So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved."
19. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390] and Pukhraj
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna [Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251] .
20. The judgment of this Court in Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan [Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan, (2005) 6 SCC 243] is almost similar to the case at hand where the plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to re-convey property. The plea of the plaintiff was that the transaction was one of mortgage and the sale stood redeemed and the plaintiff was discharged from the debt and he was ready to pay the defendant the amount for the property only in the alternative that the plea of mortgage was not accepted by the Court, would show that his readiness was conditional. The plaintiff did not have any income and could not raise the amount required for repurchase of the property. In the totality of the circumstances, it was held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the contract. The conditions laid for the specific performance of the contract are in para 30, which is as under: (SCC p. 256) "30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the respondent-plaintiffs were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in-chief would not suffice. The conduct of the respondent-plaintiffs must be judged having
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on record."
21. The aforesaid judgment was followed by this court in the case of D. Jayaramaiah (supra) and facts in the above case is contrary to the facts of the present case as both the DW1 and DW2 admits the execution of the Sale Agreement at Ex.P1 and subsequent shara made therein. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj & Ors reported in 2025 SCC online SC 723 had an occasion to consider the entire gamet of law on Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and the relevant paragraph 16 to 18 reads as under:
"16. It is settled law that under the Act, 1963, prior to the 2018 Amendment, specific performance was a discretionary and equitable relief. In Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, (2019) 3 SCC 704, which has been followed in P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, (2022) 14 SCC 793, this Court framed material questions which require consideration
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR prior to grant of relief of specific performance. The relevant portion of the judgment in Kamal Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow:
"7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are:
7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property.
7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.
7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract;
7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; 7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and, if so, on what grounds.
8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22,
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts."
17. It is trite law that 'readiness' and 'willingness' are not one but two separate elements. 'Readiness' means the capacity of the Respondent No. 1-buyer to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the sale consideration. 'Willingness' refers to the intention of the Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including attending circumstances.
18. Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are reproduced hereinbelow:--
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 SCR 227, it has been held as under:-- "6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43:
"In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit."
The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit...."
(emphasis supplied) B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913, it has been held as under:--
"6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff...."
(emphasis supplied) C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429, it has been held as under:-- "27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties."
(emphasis supplied) D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243, it has been held as under:--
"30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on records."
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR (emphasis supplied) E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held as under:--
"16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has performed his part of the contract or has always been ready and willing to do so..."
(emphasis supplied) F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:--
"16. The words "ready and willing" imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract.
17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115], it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available.
18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5)
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR "5. ... So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved."
(emphasis supplied)
22. Following the declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above and considering the cross-examination of the DW1, dated 17.06.2014 and 10.07.2014, wherein the DW1 admits that as on the date of execution of Sale Agreement dated 21.05.2001 (Ex.P1) the defendants have handed over the possession of suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff having received total
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR Rs.2,50,000/- as advance amount as against the total sale consideration of Rs.2,75,000/- and further deposed that, the plaintiff has to pay only Rs.25,000/- to the defendants, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court, after duly considering the material on record, rightly decreed the suit by directing the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff. The Trial Court's appreciation of the records is in accordance with the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above. However, re- appreciation of evidence by the First Appellate Court suffers from infirmity and the evidence of DW1 and DW2 has been misconstrued. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that, it is the duty of the First Appellate Court to re-appreciate the entire material on record in the light of the provisions contained under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC (See. Santhosh Hazari case reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179). In this connection it is
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR appropriate to extract the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamila Begum (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Shami Mohd. (D) Therefore. Lrs and Anr., reported in AIR 2019 SC 72, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 36 held as follows:
"36. The first appellate court being the final court of fact has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. Considering the nature and scope of the first appellate court in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar [Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 521] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 395, para 15) "15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy [B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 :
(2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 808] , this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-
31, paras 3-4) '3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state:
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179] , SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram [Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756] SCC p. 758, para 5.)'"
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR
23. Following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as mentioned above, since the re-appreciation of the evidence by the First Appellate Court is contrary to law and therefore, I find perversity in the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court.
Hence, I am of the view that, the substantial question of law referred to above favours plaintiff/appellants. In the result I pass the following:
ORDER i. Regular Second Appeal is allowed.
ii. Judgment and decree dated 10.03.2017 passed in R.A.No.100 of 2015 on the file of IX Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru, is hereby set aside.
iii. The judgment and decree dated 29.04.2015 in O.S.No.2087 of 2006 on the file of II
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NC: 2025:KHC:38562 RSA No. 1204 of 2017 HC-KAR Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru is hereby confirmed.
iv. The suit in O.S.No.2087 of 2006 is hereby decreed by directing the defendants to execute the registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff as per the terms mentioned therein.
Sd/-
(E.S.INDIRESH) JUDGE SB List No.: 1 Sl No.: 45