Chattisgarh High Court
Santosh Kumar Kashyap vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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2026:CGHC:10980-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 720 of 2024
Santosh Kumar Kashyap S/o Motilal Kashyap Aged About 58 Years R/o
Village And Post Kaitha, P.S. Hasaud, Tehsil Jaijaipur, District Janjgir
Champa Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of
Panchayat, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan New Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2. The Chief Executive Officer District Panchayat, District Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh.
3. Deputy Director District Panchayat, District Janjgir Champa,
Chhattisgarh.
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Dilip Kumar Swain, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate.
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE Date:
2026.03.03
14:34:31
+0530
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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
03.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. Dilip Kumar Swain, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State and Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2.
2. The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellant calling in question the legality and validity of the order dated 28.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 9086 of 2019 (Santosh Kumar Kashyap v. State of Chhattisgarh), whereby the writ petition instituted by the appellant herein came to be dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was appointed as Panchayat Karmi of Gram Panchayat Kaitha, Janpad Panchayat Jaijaipur, District Janjgir-Champa, and was subsequently designated to discharge the duties of Panchayat Secretary. During the course of service, he was implicated along with four co-accused persons in a criminal case, pursuant to which FIR bearing Crime No.117/2001 was registered at Police Station Jaijaipur for offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the IPC. The appellant was arrested on 08.08.2001 and remained in judicial custody till 3 05.10.2001. He further submits that owing to the aforesaid detention, the appellant could not discharge his duties. However, no written order of suspension, termination or removal was ever issued to him at that point of time. Upon enquiry by the Chief Executive Officer, District Panchayat, it was confirmed vide letter dated 09.04.2018 by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Jaijaipur, that the appellant had not been removed from the post of Panchayat Karmi. This position was reiterated in paragraph 4 of the order dated 26.04.2019 passed by the CEO, District Janjgir-Champa.
4. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant tha the criminal proceedings, registered as Criminal Case No.159/2007, culminated in acquittal of the appellant by judgment dated 30.12.2017. Despite acquittal, he was not permitted to resume duties. Consequently, he filed WPS No.5868/2018 before this Court. Vide order dated 07.09.2018, this Court directed the respondents to take a decision within 60 days and to determine the manner in which the intervening period was to be treated, observing that upon acquittal the status of the petitioner was required to be considered for restoration. Though the order required compliance within 60 days, the Chief Executive Officer passed order only on 26.04.2019, after a delay of 232 days. By the said order, the appellant was reinstated as Panchayat Secretary, but it was directed that he would not be entitled to any pay or allowances for the intervening period on the principle of "No Work No Pay". Aggrieved, by the said order, appellant preferred WPS No.9086/2019 seeking back wages, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide 4 order dated 28.08.2024 on the ground that the acquittal was not honourable but on benefit of doubt.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that under Rule 2 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, 'Rules of 1966'), a Government servant detained in custody for more than 48 hours is deemed to be under suspension. Since the appellant remained in custody beyond 48 hours, he ought to have been treated as deemed suspended and, at the least, entitled to subsistence allowance and continuity of service. He also argued that the observation of the learned Single Judge regarding dismissal w.e.f. 01.05.2002 is not borne out from the reinstatement order dated 26.04.2019. Reliance placed upon WA No.329/2019 (decided on 17.07.2019) is stated to be distinguishable on facts. It is urged that the appellant was prevented from working without a lawful order and therefore the principle of "No Work No Pay" ought not to have been applied.
6. Per contra, learned State counsel and learned counsel for respondent No. 2 supported the impugned order and submitted that no interference is called for in the intra-court appeal.
7. It is submitted on behalf of respondent No. 2 that the appellant was initially appointed as Panchayat Karmi by order dated 29.12.1995. Subsequently, in exercise of powers under Section 69(1) of the M.P./C.G. Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993, he was designated to discharge the duties of Panchayat Secretary. Upon 5 registration of FIR and his detention from 08.08.2001 to 05.10.2001, the Collector, by order dated 01.05.2002, terminated/de-notified him from the post. The appellant was acquitted on 30.12.2017 by extending benefit of doubt. In compliance with the direction dated 07.09.2018 passed in WPS No.5868/2018, respondent No. 2 passed order dated 26.04.2019 reinstating him in service but denying continuity of service and back wages for the intervening period by applying the principle of "No Work No Pay".
8. It is further contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the Appellant substantively remained an employee of Gram Panchayat Kaitha, which is an autonomous local body under the Panchayat Raj Act. In absence of Gram Panchayat being impleaded as a party, the writ petition itself suffered from non-joinder of necessary party. It is also urged that under Rule 18(1)(f) of the M.P. Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, an efficacious alternative remedy was available to the appellant to challenge the determination regarding pay and allowances for the intervening period. Without exhausting the statutory remedy, he directly invoked writ jurisdiction. Additionally, it is submitted that the Appellant did not plead or establish that he was not gainfully employed during the relevant period. In absence of foundational pleadings and proof, back wages cannot be claimed as a matter of right.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
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10. It is not in dispute that the Appellant was dismissed/de-notified from service by order dated 01.05.2002 following his arrest and detention in connection with offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420/34 IPC. He remained in judicial custody from 08.08.2001 to 05.10.2001 and was acquitted by judgment dated 30.12.2017 by granting benefit of doubt. Pursuant to order dated 07.09.2018 passed in WPS No.5868/2018, he was reinstated vide order dated 26.04.2019 but denied pay and allowances for the period 01.05.2002 to 26.04.2019 on the principle of "No Work No Pay".
11. The issue requires consideration in light of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules. Sub-rule (1) mandates that upon reinstatement, the competent authority shall pass a specific order regarding pay and allowances for the period of absence and whether such period shall be treated as duty. Sub-rule (2) provides that where the Government servant has been "fully exonerated", he shall be paid full pay and allowances, subject to sub-rule (6). Sub-rule (7) further provides that even where pay is reduced under the proviso, it shall not be less than subsistence allowance admissible under Rule 53.
12. The expression "fully exonerated" assumes significance. The distinction between honourable acquittal and acquittal on benefit of doubt has been recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 541, wherein it was held that reinstatement with full benefits would arise only where the employee is acquitted of all 7 blame and honourably exonerated.
13. In the present case, perusal of the judgment dated 30.12.2017 passed in Criminal Case No.159/2007 shows that the learned trial Court acquitted the appellant by extending benefit of doubt, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It is thus not a case of honourable acquittal or a finding that the prosecution was false or malicious.
14. The principle of "No Work No Pay" is founded upon the concept that wages are paid in consideration of services rendered. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh v. Brijmohan Kaur, reported in (2005) 9 SCC 43, reiterated that a Government servant who has not worked is ordinarily not entitled to salary for the period of absence.
15. A Division Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh (WA No. 329 of 2019, decided on 17.07.2019), has held that where acquittal is based on benefit of doubt and not honourable exoneration, and where there is no case of malicious prosecution, the employee cannot claim entire service benefits for the intervening period at the cost of public exchequer.
16. In the present case, the appellant was out of service on account of his involvement in a criminal case and consequent detention. It is not his case that the prosecution was malicious or fabricated. The acquittal being on benefit of doubt, he cannot be said to have been "fully exonerated" within the meaning of Rule 54(2) of the Fundamental 8 Rules.
17. The competent authority, while reinstating the Appellant on 26.04.2019, specifically exercised its jurisdiction under Rule 54(1) and determined that the intervening period from 01.05.2002 to 26.04.2019 would be treated under the principle of "No Work No Pay". Such determination cannot be said to be arbitrary or contrary to the statutory framework.
18. The learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the distinction between honourable acquittal and acquittal on benefit of doubt, and has correctly applied the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court. No perversity or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated warranting interference in intra-court appeal.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has passed a well-reasoned and legally sustainable order. The appellant is not entitled to back wages or continuity of service for the period from 01.05.2002 to 26.04.2019.
20. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Brijmohan