Allahabad High Court
Sanjay Kumar Tiwari vs State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Deptt. ... on 13 July, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 2594
Author: Vivek Chaudhary
Bench: Vivek Chaudhary
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR In Chamber Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 3922 of 2020 Petitioner :- Sanjay Kumar Tiwari Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Deptt. Transport & Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Gaurav Mehrotra, Shubham Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary,J.
1. The case is taken up through Video Conferencing.
2. Heard Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel.
3. This writ petition has come along with Writ Petition (S/S) No.6303 of 2020 (Pushpanjali Mitra Gautam Vs. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Transport Lko. and Another) challenging the suspension order dated 31.01.2020 whereby two Assistant Transport Officers were suspended, one being Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tiwari Petitioner in the present petition and other Smt. Pushpanjali Mitra Gautam in the connected case. The suspension is on charges of non deposit of certain amounts collected from time to time in the Government treasury from January, 2018 to June, 2018.
4. The facts would be clear from the two orders of this court, first the interim relief order dated 11.02.2020 in the present petition which reads:
" Heard Shri Gaurav Mehrotra and Shri Shubham Tripathi, learned counsels for petitioner and learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties.
Petitioner has challenged order dated 31st January 2020 suspending petitioner from service on charges of momentary embezzlement.
Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that although the period of momentary embezzlement has been indicated in the impugned order as 23rd January 2018 till 07th June 2018 but petitioner was posted in the said District only on 22nd May 2018 as would be evident from the charge certificate which is annexed to petition. It has also been submitted that petitioner in fact was the one who had brought the aforesaid facts to the knowledge of authority by means of his letter dated 17th January 2019 and it was at his instance that the aforesaid momentary embezzlement was taken cognizance of by authority concerned. Learned counsel has also drawn attention to the letter dated 07th February 2019 written by petitioner with regard to aforesaid fact, which has been acknowledged in the order dated 13th June 2019 suspending Shri Tara Chand clerk concerned. Learned counsel has submitted that after completion of inquiry proceedings against the said Shri Tara Chand, he was visited with minor penalty on account of fact that there was no loss to State Exchequer petitioner.
Learned counsel for petitioner as such has submitted that once the main perpetrator has been punished with minor penalty, at best, though not admitting, petitioner would be liable only for negligence in case found guilty for which major penalty cannot be imposed and therefore in such circumstances, suspension cannot be resorted to in terms of Rule 4 of U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999.
Prima facie, submission advanced by learned counsel for petitioner has force for which opposite parties are granted four weeks' time to file detailed counter affidavit. List this case in the week commencing 16th March 2020. In the meantime, operation of impugned order darted 31st January 2020 shall remain stayed."
5. In the petition of Pushpanjali Mitra Gautam upon hearing this Court on 03.03.2020 passed the following order:
"Heard learned counsel for the parties.
By means of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the Office Memo dated 31.01.2020, by means of which the petitioner has been placed under suspension.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the allegations so levelled against the petitioner is that the amount so collected during the period from 23.01.2018 to 07.06.2018 to the tune of Rs. 9,48,049/- has not been deposited in the Government Treasury while the petitioner was discharging on the post of ARTO (Administration) at that point of time.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards para 13 of the writ petition which is being reproduced herein below:
"That Shri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari was posted in Raebareli on the post of ARTO (Enforcement) from dated 01.07.2017 to 21.05.2018 hence it is clear that the dated i.e. 23.01.2018, 24.01.2018, 25.01.2018, 27.01.2018, 29.01.2018, 02.04.2018, 16.05.2018 on which amount from the challan compounding fees was realised in the enforcement section, Sri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari in his capacity of supervising enforcement section was primarily responsible to oversee/supervise physically whether amount collected by enforcement clerk Sri Tara Chand who himself was cashier also, has been forwarded from enforcement section Almirah to the administration section cash chest or not. He failed to supervise the movement of the compounding fees realised from enforcement challans to the cash chest."
On the basis of the aforesaid, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as per the procedure the amount is collected by the ARTO (Enforcement) and as soon as, the said amount is provided to the Office of the ARTO (Administration), the same is deposited in the Government Treasury. Since the amount in question has been recovered from the Almirah of the ARTO (Enforcement), therefore, as per the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said amount could not have been deposited by the office of the petitioner. He has further submitted that the custodian of the said amount at that point of time was Shri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari who has also been placed under suspension on 31.01.2020 and this Court has passed the interim order on 11.02.2020 staying the suspension order to Shri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari.
As per learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari while filing Service Single No. 3922 of 2020 has not disclosed in the writ petition that at that point of time he was discharging the functions of ARTO (Enforcement) and his office was custodian of amount in question.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that this Court granted the interim order to Shri Sanjay Kumar Tiwari on 11.02.2020 on the point that Shri Tiwari was not serving on the post of ARTO (Administration) at that point of time. Further, this Court has observed that the main culprit was one Tara Chand(Clerk), who has deposited the entire amount in the Government Treasury on 04.02.2019 and there is no loss to the State Exchequer. Besides the said Tara Chand has been awarded minor penalty.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the main culprit Shri Tara Chand(Clerk) has been awarded a minor punishment and the amount in question has already been deposited in public exchequer, therefore, there is no purpose to place the petitioner under suspension. The enquiry may go on and he shall cooperate with the departmental proceedings.
The matter requires consideration.
Let short counter affidavit be filed within a period of ten days indicating the fact as to whether the amount in question has been received in the office of ARTO (Enforcement), when the petitioner was serving on the post of ARTO (Administration) and if yes, what would be the consequences.
Para 13 of the writ petition shall be replied categorically.
List this case on 17.03.2020 as fresh in the additional cause list along with Service Single No. 3922 of 2020.
If the short counter affidavit as directed above is not filed within stipulated time, the interim relief application of the petitioner may be considered on the next date."
6. Today when the case was taken up, it was specifically put to learned counsel for petitioner in the present writ petition, as to why the fact that Mr. Sanjay Tiwari was working as Assistant Regional Transport Officer (Enforcement) (hereinafter referred to as "ARTO (E)") at Raebareli since 1.7.2017 till 21.5.2018 was not mentioned in the writ petition and why it was falsely stated that he joined at Raebareli only on 22.05.2018. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner had joined as ARTO (A) on 22.05.2018 and the said fact is stated in the writ petition. He further submits that by supplementary affidavit filed thereafter on 17.03.2020, the factual position was clarified.
7. The court is not satisfied with the reply of petitioner. The supplementary affidavit is filed only after another court had pointed out the misstatements of the petitioner. Petitioner in his writ petition no where states that he was already working as ARTO (E) at Raebareli since 1.7.2017 and worked till 21.5.2018 and on 22.5.2018 he took charge of the post of ARTO(A), which was relevant for the purposes of the present writ petition. Rather Petitioner's writ petition states otherwise. In paragraph 2 of the writ petition, petitioner states:
"The impugned suspension order dated 31.01.2020 has been passed on the incorrect premise that the petitioner while working as ARTO (A), Rae Bareli from 23.01.2018 till 07.06.2018, neither deposited in the State Treasury nor entered in the Cash Book/Main Cash Book an amount of Rs.9,48,049/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs Forty Eight Thousand Forty Nine). The aforementioned impugned order has been passed without verifying the veracity of the facts stated as the petitioner had joined his duty as ARTO (A) at Rae Bareli on 22.05.2018 itself and had only served for 16 days during the alleged period mentioned in the impugned order."
8. In paragraph 6 and 7 of the writ petition further stated: "That vide order dated 18.05.2018 issued by the respondent No.2 bearing No.95/2018/1768/30-3-18-07GI/2018 the petitioner was posted as Assistant Regional Transport Officer (Administration) at Rae Bareli, complying with the aforementioned order the petitioner joined as Assistant Regional Transport Officer (Administration) at Rae Bareli on 22.05.2018. Copy of the charge certificate of the petitioner bearing No.203/SaPraSha/ARTO/2018 dated 22.05.2018 is being annexed herewith as Annexure No.2 to this writ petition.
That it is pertinent to mention here that even before the petitioner was transferred to Rae Bareli, Cashier/Junior Clerk at the Regional Transport Office, Rae Bareli had on multiple occasions committed grave irregularity of not depositing the official cash in the State Treasury. Apparently, first such irregularity was committed on 23.01.2018, when one Smt. Pushpanjali Mitra Gautam, the predecessor of petitioner was posted as ARTO (A), Rae Bareli, after which the Cashier/Junior Clerk namely Sri Tara Chand failed to deposit the cash in the State Treasury on seven other instances before the joining of the petitioner and on two instances after the joining of the petitioner."
9. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition he further stated "It is noteworthy that the petitioner had only joined his duties at Rae Bareli on 22.05.2018."
10. Similarly ground B taken in the writ petition reads:
"B. Because, the allegation of misappropriation as per the impugned order is from 23.01.2018 till 11.06.2018. The petitioner had joined service in Rae Bareli on 22.05.2018. It is apparent from above that once the petitioner joined his duty he put a curb on any such illegal activities immediately, acting in his supervisory capacity. As already mentioned above, the petitioner also conducted an inspection and caught the aforesaid misappropriation and directed necessary action as per the rules."
11. Thus in the entire writ petition, misstatement is made and court is made to believe that petitioner came to Raebareli and joined for the first time on 22.05.2018, concealing the fact that he was already posted and working at Raebareli as ARTO (E) since 1.7.2017. Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for petitioner now fairly concedes before this court that prior to his posting as ARTO(A) petitioner was working as ARTO (E) at Raebareli only since 1.7.2017 and this fact is nowhere stated in the writ petition. He also could not dispute that the same is a relevant fact for the purposes of this case as is noted in the interim order of the connected writ petition.
12. Even otherwise on merits, I find that on 11.06.2018 an amount of Rs.41,200/- along-with an amount of Rs.36,500/- and on 07.07.2018 an amount of Rs. 1,30,400/- was collected and not deposited in the Government Treasury. The said amounts were collected and not deposited after the petitioner had taken charge on the post of ARTO (A) on 22.05.2018. Therefore, complicity of the petitioner in the misappropriation cannot be ruled out and can be decided only in a proper inquiry. There is no explanation in the entire writ petition with regard to the said aspect, though the same is specifically noted in the order dated 13.06.2019 (Annexure-12) to the writ petition and other documents annexed with the writ petition.
13. Be that as it may, from the above this court finds that the petitioner has purposely concealed relevant facts/made false statements before this Court. Supreme Court has deprecated such conducted repeatedly. Suffice would be to refer to the case of K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and others (2008) 12 SCC 481. The said judgment takes into consideration the earlier long settled law on this issue at length. The relevant paragraphs 34 to 51 of the said judgment reads :
"34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs1 in the following words:
"... it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts- it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it- the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement".
(emphasis supplied)
36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done". The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax Commissioner, Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96) "... Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit".
(emphasis supplied)
38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek" or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the Court knows law but not facts".
39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commissioners is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and "clean breast" cannot hold a writ of the Court with "soiled hands". Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.
40. Let us consider some important decisions on the point:
41. In State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd.2 almost an agreed order was passed by the Court that on expiry of the licence for manufacturing of liquor on September 6, 1976, the distillery would cease to manufacture liquor under the licence issued in its favour. Then, the Company filed a petition in the High Court for renewal of licence for manufacture of liquor for 1976-77, and the Court granted stay of dispossession. In appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the order granting stay of dispossession on the ground that the petitioner-Company in filing the petition in the High Court had misled it and started the proceedings for oblique and ulterior motive.
42. In Vijay Kumar Kuthuria v. State of Haryana3 it was the case of the petitioners that the provisional admissions granted to them were not cancelled and they were continuing their studies as post-graduate students in Medical College on the relevant date. On the basis of that statement, they obtained an order of status quo. The Supreme Court ordered inquiry and the District Judge was asked to submit his report whether the provisional admissions granted to the petitioners were continued till October 1, 1982 or were cancelled. The report revealed that to the knowledge of the petitioners their provisional admissions were cancelled long before October 1, 1982 and thus, the petitioners had made false representation to the Court and obtained a favourable order.
Dismissing the petition, this Court observed: (SSC p. 334, para 1):-
"1. ...But for the misrepresentation this Court would never have passed the said order. By reason of such conduct they have disentitled themselves from getting any relief or assistance from this Court and the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be dismissed".
43. Deprecating the reprehensible conduct of the petitioners as well as of their counsel, the Court stated: (Vijay Kumar Kathuria case, SCC pp.334-35, para 3) "3. Before parting with the case, however, we cannot help observing that the conduct or behaviour of the two petitioners as well as their counsel (Dr. A.K. Kapoor who happens to be a medico-legal consultant practising in Courts) is most reprehensible and deserves to be deprecated. The District Judge's report in that behalf is eloquent and most revealing as it points out how the two petitioners and their counsel, (who also gave evidence in support of the petitioner's case before the District Judge) have indulged in telling lies and making reckless allegation of fabrication and manipulation of records against the College Authorities and how in fact the boot is on their leg. It is a sad commentary on the scruples of these three young gentlemen who are on the threshold of their carriers. In fact, at one stage we were inclined to refer the District Judge's report both to the Medical Council as well as the Bar Council for appropriate action but we refrained from doing so as the petitioners' counsel both on behalf of his clients as well as on his own behalf tendered unqualified apology and sought mercy from the Court. We, however, part with the case with a heavy heart expressing our strong disapproval of their conduct and behaviour...."
(emphasis supplied)
44. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P.4 certain hoteliers filed a petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the maximum price of foodstuffs fixed by the Government contending that it was uneconomical and obtained ex parte stay order. The price, however, was fixed as per the agreement between the petitioners and the Government but the said fact was suppressed. Describing the fact as material, the Court said: (SCC pp. 580-81, para 7) "7. ...Petitioners who have behaved in this manner are not entitled to any consideration at the hands of the Court".
45. In Agricultural & Processed Food Products v. Oswal Agro Furane5 the petitioner filed a petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which was pending. Suppressing that fact, it filed another petition in the High Court of Delhi and obtained an order in its favour. Observing that the petitioner was guilty of suppression of "very important fact", this Court set aside the order of the High Court.
46. In State of Punjab v. Sarav Preet6 A obtained relief from the High Court on her assertion that a test in a particular subject was not conducted by the State. In an appeal by the State, it was stated that not only the requisite test was conducted but the petitioner appeared in the said test and failed. Observing that the petitioner was under an obligation to disclose the said fact before the High Court, this Court dismissed the petition.
47. In Union of India v. Muneesh Suneja7 the detenu challenged an order of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) by filing a petition in the High Court of Delhi which was withdrawn. Then he filed a similar petition in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana wherein he did not disclose the fact as to filing of the earlier petition and withdrawal thereof and obtained relief. In an appeal by the Union of India against the order of the High Court, this Court observed that non-disclosure of the fact of filing a similar petition and withdrawal thereof was indeed fatal to the subsequent petition.
48. A special reference may be made to a decision of this Court in All India State Bank Officers Federation v. Union of India8 In that case, promotion policy of the Bank was challenged by the Federation by filing a petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. It was supported by an affidavit and the contents were affirmed by the President of the Federation to be true to his "personal knowledge". It was stated: (SSC p.337, para2) "2. ...The petitioners have not filed any other similar writ petition in this Honourable Court or any other High Court".
In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank, however, it was asserted that the statement was "false". The Federation had filed a writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was admitted but interim stay was refused. Another petition was also filed in the High Court of Karnataka. It was further pointed out that Promotion Policy was implemented and 58 officers were promoted who were not made parties to the petition. In affidavit-in-rejoinder, once again, the stand taken by the petitioner was sought to be justified. It was stated: "The deponent had no knowledge of the writ petition filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, hence as soon as it came to his knowledge the same has been withdrawn. Secondly, the petitioners even today do not know the names of all such 58 candidates who have been promoted/favoured". It was contended on behalf of the Bank that even that statement was false. Not only the petitioner- Federation was aware of the names of all the 58 officers who had been promoted to the higher post, but they had been joined as party- respondents in the writ petition filed in the Karnataka High Court, seeking stay of promotion of those respondents. It was, therefore, submitted that the petitioner had not come with clean hands and the petition should be dismissed on that ground alone.
49. "Strongly disapproving" the explanation put forth by the petitioner and describing the tactics adopted by the Federation as "abuse of process of court", this Court observed: (All India Stae Bank Officers Federation Case, SCC pp.340-41, paras 9 & 11) "9. ... There is no doubt left in our minds that the petitioner has not only suppressed material facts in the petition but has also tried to abuse judicial process. ...
11. Apart from misstatements in the affidavits filed before this Court, the petitioner Federation has clearly resorted to tactics which can only be described as abuse of the process of court. The simultaneous filing of writ petitions in various High Courts on the same issue though purportedly on behalf of different associations of the Officers of the Bank, is a practice which has to be discouraged. Sri Sachhar and Sri Ramamurthy wished to pinpoint the necessity and importance of petitions being filed by different associations in order to discharge satisfactorily their responsibilities towards their respective members. We are not quite able to appreciate such necessity where there is no diversity but only a commonness of interest. All that they had to do was to join forces and demonstrate their unity by filing a petition in a Single Court. It seems the object here in filing different petitions in different Courts was a totally different and not very laudable one". (emphasis supplied)
50. "Deeply grieved'" by the situation and adversely commenting on the conduct and behaviour of the responsible officers of a Premier Bank of the country, the Court observed; (All India State Bank Officers Federation Case, SCC p.342, para 12) "12. We have set out the facts in this case at some length and passed a detailed order because we are deeply grieved to come across such conduct on the part of an association, which claims to represent high placed officers of a premier bank of this country. One expects such officers to fight their battles fairly and squarely and not to stoop low to gain, what can only be, temporary victories by keeping away material facts from the court. It is common knowledge that, of late, statements are being made in petitions and affidavits recklessly and without proper verification not to speak of dishonest and deliberate misstatements. We, therefore, take this opportunity to record our strong and emphatic disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in this ease and hope that this will be a lesson to the present petitioner as well as to other litigants and that at least in future people will act more truthfully and with a greater sense of responsibility.
(emphasis supplied)
51. Yet in another case in Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab9 this Court stated: (SCC p. 420, para 24) "In order to sustain and maintain sanctity and solemnity of the proceedings in law courts it is necessary that parties should not make false or knowingly, inaccurate statements or misrepresentation and/or should not conceal material facts with a design to gain some advantage or benefit at the hands of the court, when a court is considered as a place where truth and justice are the solemn pursuits. If any party attempts to pollute such a place by adopting recourse to make misrepresentation and is concealing material facts it does so at its risk and cost. Such party must be ready to take consequences that follow on account of its own making. At times lenient or liberal or generous treatment by courts in dealing with such matters are either mistaken or lightly taken instead of learning proper lesson. Hence there is a compelling need to take serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice".
14. In view of the aforesaid well settled law, looking to the conduct of the petitioner who is expected to be a responsible government employee, even having powers to look after finances on behalf of State, and has been suspended on charges of financial irregularity and thereafter approached this Court by attempting to manoeuvre facts/making false statement of facts, I find it a fit case to dismiss the petition with costs.
15. The writ petition is dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs.10,000/-. The cost is to be deposited by the petitioner within a period of one month from today before the Senior Registrar, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow.
16. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Order Date :- 13.7.2020 Shubhankar (Vivek Chaudhary, J.)