Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Yudhvir Chopra S/O Bikramjit Chopra vs Secretary on 19 April, 2011
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH NEW DELHI Original Application No.3407 of 2009 This the 19th day of April, 2011 HONBLE SHRI JUSTICE V. K. BALI, CHAIRMAN HONBLE SHRI L. K. JOSHI, VICE-CHAIRMAN (A) Yudhvir Chopra S/o Bikramjit Chopra, R/o flat No.8, Sree Niwas Residency, B. T. Kavde Road, Pune-411013. Applicant ( By Ms. Mini Pushkarna, Advocate ) Versus 1. Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Government of India, Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi, Chairman, Board of Management, National Cooperative Development Corporation, New Delhi. 2. Managing Director, National Cooperative Development Corporation, 4, Siri Institutional Area, Hauz Khas, New Delhi. Respondents ( By Shri S. K. Arora, Programme Officer, Deptt. Representative ) O R D E R Justice V. K. Bali, Chairman:
Challenge in the present Original Application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is to memorandum dated 17.5.2004, vide which the respondents have proposed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for imposition of major penalty by conducting an oral inquiry in terms of provisions contained in NCDC Service Regulations, 1967, and to yet another memorandum dated 8.12.2009, vide which it has been ordered that the inquiry against the applicant would be held on 5.11.2009 at 11.00 a.m. in the chamber of the Director (F&TD/PD&LS/MIS), the inquiry officer.
2. The facts as set out in the Original Application for the reliefs as indicated above reveal that the applicant joined the respondent-Corporation in October, 1983 as Programme Officer. In due course, the applicant came to be promoted as Assistant Director. While holding the said post, he received a memorandum dated 7.8.2003 informing him that an entry had been made in his ACR for the period 1.4.2000 to 31.3.2001 to the effect, Integrity not beyond suspicion. Against the said memorandum the applicant made representations requesting expunction of the adverse remarks. The applicant was informed that the integrity column in the ACR for the period under question had been kept blank pending further investigation/inquiry into the matter. It is the case of the applicant that he came to know that the aforesaid remarks in his ACR had been recorded due to a complaint received from Secretary, Bazar Bungkawn Handloom Co-operative Society Ltd., that she had paid an amount of Rs.80,000/- to the applicant on 4/5.10.2000 for sanctioning financial assistance of Rs.8.124 lacs in favour of her society. The complaint is said to have been made on 26.2.2001, and the applicant pleads that he was never ever given any notice or intimation with regard to the same, and that no inquiry or any other proceeding was initiated against him after receipt of the said complaint. He came to know about the complaint only upon receipt of the memorandum dated 7.8.2003, which indicated adverse remarks in his ACR. The complaint was received by one Shri V. K. Suri, then Chief Director during the course of his official tour to Mizoram in February, 2001. Shri Suri was supposed to submit his tour report to his senior/Head Office. However, he did not mention anything about this complaint against the applicant in his tour report. Subsequently, the applicant received memorandum dated 5.12.2003 giving him opportunity to make representation against the allegation of accepting illegal gratification of Rs.80,000/- for favouring sanction of financial assistance to the Bazar Bungkawn Handloom Co-operative Society Ltd. The applicant submitted his reply dated 19.12.2003 requesting for copy of documents. He received a memorandum dated 9.1.2004 furnishing him copy of the complaint. Reply to this memorandum was given by the applicant vide his letter dated 21.1.2004 thereby requesting for documents in order to give his reply. Thereafter, the applicant was supplied copy of the complaint and reply was given by the applicant on 22.2.2004. On 17.5.2004, the applicant was charge-sheeted. The statement of article of charge against the applicant accompanying the memorandum aforesaid (Annexure-I) reads as follows:
Shri Yudhvir Chopra during his posting as Assistant Director, Regional Office, Guwahati solicited illegal gratification from the Secretary, Bazar Bungkawn Handloom Co-operative Society, Mizoram for favouring sanction of financial assistance to the said Society, and accepted illegal gratification of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees Eighty thousand) from the Secretary, Bazar Bungkawn Handloom Co-operative Society, Mizoram on 4th/5th October, 2000 at Hotel Chief, Aizawl. The above conduct of Shri Yudhvir Chopra is violative of the provisions of Regulation 17 (1)(i) of NCDC Service Regulations, 1967 which enjoins him to maintain absolute integrity and Regulation 17(1)(iii) ibid which enjoins him to do nothing which is unbecoming of an employee of the Corporation. Accompanying the memorandum aforesaid is also a statement of imputations of misconduct as also list of documents by which the article of charge is proposed to be substantiated, as also list of witnesses at Annexures II, III and IV respectively.
3. An inquiry officer came to be appointed on 26.8.2005. The inquiry proceedings were held on 22.9.2005 and 26.9.2005. The applicant would, however, not attend the said proceedings as he had reservations against appearing before the inquiry officer appointed earlier, and also for the reason that his representation was still pending before the Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. In consideration of the allegation of the applicant as regards bias of the inquiry officer, another inquiry officer was appointed on 14.6.2007. It is the case of the applicant that the respondents thereafter did not commence departmental proceedings for long time. The applicant received a memorandum only on 16.9.2009 intimating him the date of inquiry as 6.10.2009. The applicant did not attend the said inquiry and requested for an adjournment on the ground that he had to collect documents since the inquiry was re-commenced after a long time. It is his case that this was all the more imperative in view of the fact that he had been transferred intermittently after 2005, the year in which the departmental proceedings were last held. The department thereafter issued another memorandum dated 8.10.2009, which too was replied by the applicant.
4. On the facts as mentioned above, it is the case of the applicant that there has been inordinate delay in conduct of departmental proceedings and continuation of such departmental proceedings would seriously prejudice his case, and would result into miscarriage of justice. The prolonged and delayed proceedings against the applicant are stated to be contrary to the circular dated 27.12.2004 and office memorandum dated 16.2.2004 issued by the respondent corporation in that regard. The applicant makes reference to some other circulars to the same or similar effect. The applicant states that he had a negligible role in the whole procedure as regards sanctioning of financial assistance to the cooperative society. It is his case that firstly, the examination of the proposal for sanctioning of financial assistance to any cooperative society is done by the dealing official; secondly, the said proposal is put before the Regional director for consideration; thirdly, on getting the clearance from the Regional Director, agenda note is prepared by the dealing official, which is again approved by the Regional Director for placing it before the Regional Screening Committee; fourthly, thereafter, the agenda is placed before the Screening Committee to consider whether to recommend or not the sanction of the project; and fifthly, the financial assistance is sanctioned by the competent authority, i.e., the Regional Director, who issues the sanction letter. The applicant was one of the four members of the Regional Screening Committee, which was headed by the Regional Director as its chairman. The final decision with respect to sanction of financial assistance is taken by the Regional Director. The role of the applicant, it is pleaded, is thus very miniscule in the whole process of the sanctioning of the financial assistance.
5. From the pleadings as made above, what has primarily been contended is that there is inordinate delay both in initiation and conduct of the departmental proceedings, which has greatly prejudiced the case of the applicant, and, therefore, the impugned memorandum and the subsequent proceedings need to be set at naught. Learned counsel representing the applicant would also argue on merits of the controversy, but when confronted with the position that there may be practically no scope to go into the merits of the controversy in appreciating the case set up by the applicant and the defence that may be projected by him, and that the scope of judicial review for quashing of the charge at its very threshold may be on very limited and specified grounds, nothing much was urged in that regard. However, as mentioned above, the contention of the learned counsel representing the applicant as regards delay in initiating and conducting the departmental proceedings is seriously pressed into service.
6. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal the respondents have entered appearance and by filing their reply, hotly contested the cause of the applicant. It is the case of the respondents that delay is rather on the part of the applicant. It is pleaded that the applicant is delaying the proceedings on one ground or the other and is not cooperating with the inquiry officer, and not attending the proceedings. While giving the sequence of events culminating into charge-sheeting the applicant, it is pleaded that a complaint was received by the then Regional Director (Shri V. K. Suri, Chief Director, Regional Office, Guwahati) vide letter dated 26.2.2001 from one Ms. Hmingthansangi, Secretary, Bazar Bungkawn Handloom Co-operative Society, Mizoram, Aizawl, wherein she had alleged that the applicant, assistant Director in Regional Office, Guwahati, had come to Aizawl and instructed that the loan applied by the said Society would be sanctioned if 10% of the loan amount, i.e., Rs.80,000/- was arranged. Accordingly, she had alleged to have paid the said amount to the applicant at Hotel Chief in October, 2000. Her letter was forwarded by the Chief Director, Guwahati to the Head Office for follow-up action on the complaint. Inquiries were made with Regional Dsirector, Guwahati to ascertain whether the applicant was in Aizawl on the days mentioned by the complainant in her complaint. Letter dated 27.9.2000 of the Regional director, Guwahati addressed to the Registrar of Cooperative societies, Mizoram regarding the tour programme of the applicant, it is pleaded, would show that he was to visit Aizawl from 3rd to 5th October, 2000 in connection with the discussions on pending proposals of some of the cooperatives in the State. Para 3 of the letter aforesaid would further show that the applicants tour programme included the visit to the above-named society. Copy of letter dated 28.9.2000 has been placed on records. The contents of the letter aforesaid written by the applicant himself would also show that he was to visit Aizawl from 3rd to 5th October, 2000. It is pleaded that in order to confirm whether there was any substance in the allegations made by the Secretary of the Society aforesaid, whereabouts of the applicant on 4th and 5th October, 2000 were ascertained; the TA bill submitted by the applicant for the said period would show that he had stayed at Hotel Chief, Aizawl from 4.50 pm of 5th October, 2000 to 11.00 am of 7th October, 2000. From the records of the Regional Office, Guwahati, it was found that vide letter dated 30.10.2000 issued by the Regional Director, Guwahati to the Secretary to Government of Mizoram, Cooperation Department, that the said Society was indeed sanctioned Rs.8.124 lacs for its project. The respondent issued memoranda dated 5.12.2003, 9.1.2004 and 9.2.2004 informing about the allegation of soliciting and accepting illegal gratification of Rs.80,000/- from the Secretary of the said Society for favouring sanction of financial assistance to it, and sought representation of the applicant, if any, in the matter. The applicant furnished his representation dated 22.2.2004 stating therein that the said complaint was false and was an act of mischief making. His representation was considered by the respondent and since it was not found satisfactory, the Managing Director ordered a disciplinary inquiry under Regulation 41 of the Regulations of 1967, and accordingly issued the memorandum dated 17.5.2004, on the charge that the applicant during his posting as Assistant Director, Regional Office, Guwahati solicited illegal gratification from Secretary, Bazar Bungkawn Handloom Co-operative Society, Mizoram for favouring sanction of financial assistance to the said Society, and accepted illegal gratification of Rs.80,000/- on 4th/5th October, 2000 at Hotel Chief, Aizawl. The applicant was informed of the complaint/allegations of the Secretary of the Society vide memorandum dated 5.12.2003. Before taking further action on the complaint, the applicant was given an opportunity under Regulation 40 of the Regulations of 1967 to make representation, if any, within thirty days. In response to this, the applicant vide his letter dated 19.12.2003 requested for a copy of the complaint and also a copy of the preliminary inquiry report. Accordingly, copy of the complaint dated 26.2.2001 was given to the applicant vide memorandum dated 9.1.2004. However, the preliminary inquiry report being confidential in nature, was not furnished to the applicant. The applicant vide letter dated 21.1.2004 informed that the complaint was not legible, and, therefore, the respondent Corporation again provided fresh typed certified copy vide memorandum dated 9.2.2004. However, vide his reply dated 22.2.2004 the applicant submitted that the complaint was false and was an act of mischief making. It is pleaded that the reply of the applicant was considered and was found not satisfactory, and as such, vide memorandum dated 17.5.2004 he was informed of the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him under Regulation 41 of the Regulations of 1967. The applicant was asked to furnish his written statement of defence either admitting or denying the charge within ten days of receipt of the memorandum dated 17.5.2004, and also to inform whether he desired to be heard in person. The applicant vide letter dated 15.6.2004 asked for copies of various documents, the relevance of which was not justified by him, and hence, vide memorandum dated 30.6.2004, he was informed that in terms of extant instructions in the matter, inspection or furnishing of copies of documents for the purpose of admitting or denying the charge was not necessary. The applicant was, therefore, again advised vide memo aforesaid to admit or deny the charge and furnish his statement of defence by 9.7.2004. The applicant, however, requested that he be allowed time till 31.7.2004 to reply to the memorandum dated 30.6.2004. It is the case of the respondents that the applicant neither furnished his statement of defence nor admitted or denied the charge except stating that the complaint was false, and, therefore, the disciplinary authority appointed the inquiry officer vide order dated 26.8.2005. The applicant instead of attending the inquiry proceedings held on 20.9.2005, 26.9.2005 and 27.9.2005 as fixed by the inquiry officer, leveled the charge of bias against the inquiry officer. Therefore, the disciplinary authority appointed a new inquiry officer vide order dated 14.6.2007. Since the presenting officer in the case had been transferred to Regional Office, Lucknow, new presenting officer was appointed vide order dated 3/16.9.2009, and on the same date, the inquiry officer issued a memorandum informing the applicant that the inquiry had been fixed for 6.10.2009 in NCDC Head Office at New Delhi, in which he was advised to present himself. The applicant instead of attending the inquiry proceedings preferred to send a letter dated 24.10.2009 by Speed Post which was received on 3.11.2009, wherein the applicant inter alia requested for postponing the inquiry by sixty days on the plea that he had to trace and collect papers to prepare his defence. The inquiry officer accordingly granted one months time to the applicant vide memo dated 11.11.2009 and fixed the next date of hearing as 26.11.2009, but the applicant neither sent any statement of defence nor admitted or denied the charge, and instead approached this Tribunal before 6.11.2009 without even disclosing the entire facts correctly and obtained an ex parte order of stay of proceedings before the inquiry officer.
7. The applicant has filed rejoinder, where the relevant dates from issuing the charge memorandum dated 5.12.2003 up to 16.9.2009 have been mentioned, which read as follows:
a) Date of charge memo 5.12.03
b) Issue of chargesheet 17.5.2004
c) Appointment of E.O. 26.8.2005
d) Date of inquiry proceedings 20.9.2005 & 26.9.2005
e) Request of the applicant for change of E.O. 22.9.2005
f) Silence of one year 26.9.2005 to nine months 14.6.2005
g) Appointment of another E.O. 14.6.2007
h) Silence of two years & 15.6.2007 to 3 months 16.9.2009 The applicant has filed an additional affidavit to which as well reply has been filed by the respondents, but there would be no need to refer to the contents thereof as nothing based thereon has been urged during the course of arguments.
8. The case file consists of more than 500 pages, but we have referred to only such pleadings and documents upon which the contentions have been raised by the learned counsel representing the parties, in particular with regard to delay in initiating the proceedings and the conduct thereof.
9. We have heard the learned counsel representing the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case. In the context of the facts as fully detailed above, we do not find any delay, much less inordinate delay without any explanation, as regards commencement or initiation of the proceedings against the applicant. The complaint against the applicant with regard to his accepting illegal gratification was received by then Regional Director, Guwahati on 26.2.2001. The letter of the complainant was forwarded by the Chief Director, Guwahati to the Head Office for follow up action. Inquiries were made with Regional Director, Guwahati to ascertain whether the applicant was in Aizawl on the days mentioned by the complainant. It would clearly emerge from the facts as given above that the respondents would not straightway initiate action against the applicant on receipt of complaint against him, and would rather make preliminary inquiries to satisfy themselves that there was prima facie truth in the allegations. In our considered view, it was necessary to do so, as surely and definitely, immediate action on receipt of the complaint would not have been advisable. Complaints against officers dealing with public have become a common feature. A vast majority of people not satisfied when required relief is not given to them, would make allegations against the officers concerned. If on receipt of a complaint, immediate action is taken in the matter, substantial number of officers dealing with public may be facing departmental inquiries, and that would not augur well for the administration of justice. If while taking this aspect into consideration the respondents made inquiries, and we may reiterate that inquiries were made in the present case and a preliminary inquiry report is also available with the respondents on that behalf, no fault can be found with the respondents in delaying initiation of the departmental proceedings against the applicant. The respondents issued memoranda dated 5.12.2003, 9.1.2004 and 9.2.2004 when they were satisfied prima facie with regard to allegations made in the complaint informing about the allegations of soliciting and receiving illegal gratification from the Secretary of the cooperative society, and also sought explanation of the applicant. The applicant vide letter dated 19.12.2003 requested for supply of copies of the complaint and the preliminary inquiry report. The respondents supplied him copy of the complaint, but would not give to him the preliminary inquiry report being confidential in nature. The applicant thereafter demanded a fair copy of the complaint, as the one supplied to him was not legible. A fresh typed certified copy of the complaint was given to the applicant vide memorandum dated 9.1.2004. The applicant submitted his reply on 22.2.2004 which was not found to be satisfactory, and the memorandum came to be issued to him on 17.5.2004. The applicant was asked to give his written statement of defence either admitting or denying the charges within ten days of receipt of the said memorandum, as also to inform whether he desired a personal hearing. The applicant instead of giving reply to the memorandum, vide letter dated 15.6.2004 asked for copies of various documents. It is the case of the respondents that the applicant could not justify the relevance of the documents demanded by him, and he was accordingly informed. He was again informed vide another memorandum to furnish his reply by 9.7.2004. The applicant would press for time to file reply to the memorandum, but would not furnish his statement of defence nor would admit or deny the charge, except stating that the complaint was false. The inquiry officer was appointed on 26.8.2005, who started the proceedings, the first date fixed in that regard being 20.9.2005. The proceedings in the matter were thereafter to be held on 26.9.2005 and 27.9.2005, but the applicant would not appear before the inquiry officer. He would rather ask for change of the inquiry officer, as the inquiry officer appointed by the respondents, it was the case of the applicant, was biased against him. A new inquiry officer came to be appointed on 14.6.2007. Meanwhile, the presenting officer in the case had been transferred to Lucknow, and a new presenting officer was appointed vide order dated 16.9.2009, and on the same date a memorandum was issued informing the applicant that the inquiry had been fixed for 6.10.2009. The applicant requested for postponement of the inquiry for a period of sixty days, and thereafter filed the present Original Application and obtained interim directions from this Tribunal.
10. Whereas, there has been some delay in appointing the second inquiry officer as also in commencing the proceedings by the said inquiry officer, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the same would not vitiate the charge memo and further inquiry proceedings conducted against the applicant. It is too well settled a proposition of law by now that there is no straitjacket formula that if there be a delay in conducting the departmental proceedings against an employee, the charge memo has necessarily to be set aside. There are no pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there may be delay in conducting disciplinary proceedings. As to whether the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Another settled principle in such matters is that the delay should have caused some prejudice to the delinquent. The nature of allegations is also another determining factor. There are indeed some cases where the allegations are such that it may be well nigh impossible for an employee to defend himself after a lapse of so many years. To illustrate, if the allegations against an employee be that ten years ago he neglected his duties in supervising construction of a dam which resulted into some deviations in the procedure or loss to the government, it may not be possible for the employee to defend himself, as surely, after so many years the witnesses sought to be examined by him to prove that he was discharging his duties efficiently, may not be available, or, in any case, may not even remember what had happened a decade ago. There would be no need to multiply the illustrations, as that would unnecessarily burden this judgment. All that we may, however, like to observe is that whether the defence of a delinquent is likely to be prejudiced or would be definitely prejudiced would depend primarily upon the nature of the allegations leveled against him.
11. Learned counsel representing the applicant would, however, in her endeavour to persuade us to quash the charge memo and the subsequent proceedings against the applicant would rely upon three judicial precedents of the Honble Supreme Court. The first in line is the judgment in P. V. Mahadevan v M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board [JT 2005 (7) SC 417]. Relevant facts of the case aforesaid reveal that a charge memo was issued against the employee in 2000 as regards irregularity in issuing a sale deed in 1990. The records were very much available with the respondents and yet, no action was taken against the employee for such a long time. There was no explanation whatsoever offered by the housing board for the inordinate delay. While placing reliance upon its earlier two decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v Bani Singh & another [JT 1990 (2) SC 54] and State of A.P. v N. Radhakrishnan [JT 1998 (3) SC 123], the Apex Court observed, Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. There is no statement of law made in the judgment. The case has been decided and chargesheet quashed under the circumstances of the case. We may only mention that it may not have been possible for the delinquent employee in the case aforesaid to prove his innocence by showing that he had adopted a regular procedure in issuing the sale deed, after a decade.
12. The next judicial precedent, reliance upon which has been placed by the learned counsel is State of A. P. v N. Radhakrishnan [JT 1998 (3) SC 123], referred to by the Honble Supreme Court in P. V. Mahadevan (supra). The view taken in this case is the same as was taken in P. V. Mahadevan. We may refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in para 19 of its judgment in N. Radhakrishnans case, which read as follows:
19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay N. Radhakrishnan, the respondent before the Apex Court, it would appear from the facts of the case, was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. He was posted as City Planner, Municipal Corporation in 1981. A report dated November 7, 1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh to the Secretary to Government of India, Housing, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department, about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorized construction in multi-storied complexes in twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with municipal authorities. While commenting upon the charges framed against the respondent, it was observed that the same had been framed against him merely on the basis of the report dated November 7, 1987 from Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, which was of general in nature raising accusing fingers on various officers of the corporation, but without any reference to the relevant files and pin-pointing if the respondent or any other official charged was at all concerned with the alleged deviations and unauthorized construction in multi-storied complexes. The fact situation was also taken into consideration while upholding the judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge against the respondent.
13. The third and last judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel is in M. V. Bijlani v Union of India & others [(2006) 5 SCC 88]. The facts of the said case reveal that the concerned employee was to be departmentally proceeded on the following charges:
(i) that he had failed to maintain ACE-8 Register showing acquisition and utilization of 4000 kg of telegraph copper wire received from SDOT, Raipur, through Sub-Inspectors Kashiram and Bdul Quadir on 22.10.1969, 30.10.1969 and 2.12.1969 for utilization on Geedam-Bairagarh truck line against Estimate No.2162 duly approved;
(ii) that he had failed to supervise the working of the line and utilization of copper wire while the rules require the personal supervision and accountability of the said wire; and
(iii) that he also showed misleading entries on the bills of transportation for transportation of the material. The concerned employee failed before the Tribunal and the High Court. The case was dealt on merits by the Supreme Court and a firm finding was recorded in favour of the employee. The matter as regards delay was also taken into consideration and in that regard reliance was placed on State of M. P. v Bani Singh (supra). We are of the firm opinion that a balancing act has to be done by the Tribunal and courts while considering the plea of an employee for quashing the chargesheet at its threshold on the ground of delay only. The delay has to be inordinate and without any sufficient cause. Further, the nature of allegations and the prejudice likely to be caused to the employee has also to be necessarily taken into consideration. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the proceedings, the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. In the language used by the Honble Supreme Court in para 19 of its judgment in N. Radhakrishnan (supra), the essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay, particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay.
14. The allegations in the case in hand against the applicant are of accepting illegal gratification. Surely and admittedly, the allegations are serious in nature. We do not want to comment upon the merits of the controversy at this stage, as surely, the same would prejudice the case of either party. Suffice it may, however, to say that nothing at all could be urged during the course of arguments as to how the applicant is likely to be prejudiced in his defence, but for to urge that the applicant has since already been prejudiced, inasmuch as, he has been ignored for promotion and has been superseded by number of his juniors, and has also been ignored for upgradation in pay, which comes in the way of an employee after he has served for particular number of years, only because of pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. These are not the kind of prejudices that are looked into in quashing a charge-sheet. The prejudice is primarily as regards the delinquent being unable to defend himself after lapse of number of years in view of the nature of the allegations leveled against him. Present, as mentioned above, is a case of allegations where the applicant is stated to have accepted illegal gratification. The charge would be proved or may fail primarily on the nature and quality of evidence led by the department, and it could not be urged during the course of arguments as to how and in what manner the applicant would be prejudiced in defending himself before the departmental authorities.
15. The only other contention of the learned counsel representing the applicant is that the inquiry is pending against the applicant since 2004, and a period of seven years has gone by, and, therefore, alternatively, this Tribunal may direct the respondents to complete the inquiry in a time-bound manner, and also that the applicant should be supplied the documents as asked for by him.
16. The charge subject matter of inquiry against the applicant has already been reproduced hereinbefore. Accompanying the charge memo, as mentioned above, is a list of documents and witnesses on the basis of which, the department would endeavour to prove the charges against the applicant. There are only six documents and three witnesses as mentioned in Annexures III and IV respectively accompanying the charge memo. It is not the case of the applicant that the listed documents have not been supplied to him. However, if any of the listed documents may not have been supplied to the applicant, the same shall be given to him forthwith. Further, any document that the applicant may have asked for and which may be relevant as regards the allegations made against him, which may touch upon the defence projected by the applicant, shall also be supplied to him immediately. If such documents as demanded by the applicant are not to be given to him, the reasons for not supplying the same shall be recorded. Even though, we find from the facts of the present case that some delay in the matter has been caused because of non-cooperation of the applicant, we would still order that the inquiry officer would complete the proceedings as expeditiously as possible and definitely within a period of six months from receipt of certified copy of this order. Naturally, the direction aforesaid would be subject to the cooperation to be shown by the applicant, and if, therefore, on any occasion, the respondents may feel that the applicant is not cooperating, they would be well within their right to seek extension of time by making out a case of non-cooperation by the applicant.
17. In view of the discussion made above, whereas we reject the main prayer of the applicant so as to quash the charge memo and subsequent proceedings conducted in the matter, we accept the alternative prayer of the applicant as mentioned above. With the directions aforesaid thus, present Original Application is disposed of, leaving, however, the parties to bear their own costs.
( L. K. Joshi ) ( V. K. Bali ) Vice-Chairman (A) Chairman /as/