Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
State Bank Of Bikaner And Jaipur And Anr. vs Vijay Singh Mehta on 20 December, 1985
Equivalent citations: 1986(1)WLN65
JUDGMENT Mahendra Bhushan Sharma, J.
1. This special appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated October 15, 1985, whereby he directed the appellant-Bank to determine the amount of provident fund and gratuity within a period of four months from the said date and pay the same to the petitioner. It was further ordered that the petitioner is entitled to the interest at rate of 13 per cent from August 7, 1980 i.e. after three months from the date of his discharge, and he is also entitled for compensation of Rs. 5000/- for being delayed the payment of provident fund and gratuity and he is further entitled to costs of Rs. 2000/-.
2. The petitioner was an Officer in the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (for short 'the Bank') till he was discharged from the service by order dated May 6, 1980 after disciplinary action. That order was challenged by the petitioner by a writ petition but the writ petition was dismissed on April 15, 1984 and the special appeal against the order of dismissal is pending in this Court. After the discharge from the service, the petitioner was not paid the amount of provident fund and gratuity, so he submitted an application dated 24-12-1980 (Ex. 1) to the Managing Director and vide Ex. 2 dated September 24, 1982 the officer-in-charge of the Bank in response to the petitioner's letter dated September 10, 1982 addressed to the Managing Director informed the petitioner to forward an application, addressed to the trustees State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Employees Provident Fund Bikaner to enable to refund the provident fund balance. The petitioner then served a notice dated May, 11, 1983 through his Advocate Shri Jaswant Raj Tatia addressed to the Branch Manager and the Managing Director and copy whereof was forwarded to the trustees Staff Provident Fund for necessary action. In response to that notice the officer-in-charge of the Provident Fund Section of the Bank wrote to the petitioner's Advocate vide Ex. 3 dated May 14, 1983, in which, the letter addressed to the Branch Manager Managing Director and the Trustees was to acknowledge and it was advised that the matter has been taken up with the Branch and also with the controller with regard to refund of the provident fund balance and it was further stated that he will be advised in the matter shortly and it was also informed that certain amount stands credited to the provident fund account of Shri Mehta in respect of contribution during the period of October, 1977, June 1978 and September 1978. When payment was not made to the petitioner, the petitioner filed the writ petition on July 16, 1984.
3. On behalf of the Bank reply to the writ petition was filed on November 6, 1984. One of the trustees of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees Provident Fund Shri Singhla filed a reply to the writ petition on May 13, 1985 and additional reply to the writ petition was further filed by the Bank on May 25, 1985. In these replies, various objections were raised.
4. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties allowed the writ petition and directed and ordered as above. Dis-satisfied with the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Bank and the Trustees of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees Provident Fund have preferred this appeal.
5. We have heard Mr. M.M. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondent.
6. Mr. M.M. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellants first of all submitted that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that all individual trustees of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees Provident Fund were not made parties to the writ petition and the Trustees of gratuity fund have also not been made parties. The Trustees of the Employees Provident Fund as well as of the gratuity fund are the necessary parties. Without giving them an opportunity of hearing no direction could be given by the learned Single Judge. Mr. Vyas submitted that it is only the Trustees of the two funds, who were under an obligation to make payment of the provident fund and gratuity amount and no mandamus can be issued to those who have not been heard and who have not been made parties to the writ petition. He referred to the provisions of the Regulations No. 48 and 49 in Chapter IX on Terminal Benefits of the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979 (here in after referred to as 'the Service Regulation') and to the provisions contained in the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees' provident Fund Regulations, 1969 (here in after referred to as 'the P.F. (Regulations) and the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (Payment of Gratuity to the employees') Regulations, 1970 (here in after referred to as the Gratuity Regulations'). Mr. Vyas submitted that under the P.F. and Gratuity Regulations, the provident fund and gratuity fund vest in the respective trustees of the two funds and the Bank is completely divested of the fund and ceases to have any control. The liability to make payment out of the funds is that of the trustee, so the trustees of the two funds are the necessary parties. Impleading the body of trustees in the name of the trustees relating to the Employees' Provident Fund is of no consequence. The trustees of the Employees' Provident Fund as such have not been served and the trustees of the gratuity fund have not at all been impleaded as parties. Mr. Vyas in support of his contention, placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. . In that case the the Shikshak Sangh and the private management had filed a writ petition to challenge the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Ordinance No. 22 of 1978 but did not nuke Reserve Poof teachers, who were to be deprived of their chance of appointment in vacancies in the posts of teachers in such institution, in case of success as respondents. It was held that the High Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of the writ petition without insisting upon the reserve pool teachers being made the respondents to the writ petition or at least some of them being made respondents there to in a representative capacity as the number of the reserve pool teachers was too large and had the petitioners refused to do so to dismiss the writ petition for non-joinder of necessary parties.
7. Mr. Vyas also referred to a decision of this Court in Bikaner Cold Storage Company v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioned 1979 Lab. LR 1017. It was held that in the absence of the Central Government, the question of its powers under Section 19A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions of the Act, 1952 cannot be decided.
8. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the Trustees of the Employees Provident Fund have been impleaded as parties and service on appellant No. 2 was effected on the officer-in-charge of the Trustees. Mr. C.L. Syngla received the notice as Officer-in-charge of the Trustees of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees, Provident Fund so, it should be taken that the Trustees of the Employees Pro-videent Fund are before the court and they were served and Shri C.L. Syngla as one of the Trustees had put appearance on behalf of the trustees, so this contention is of no avail to the appellant that the Trustees of the Employees, Provident Fund are not parties to the writ petition and that an opportunity of hearing was not given to them. As regards, the Trustees of the Gratuity Fund, Mr. Mridul submitted that the Trustees of the Gratuity Fund as such have no independent existence. The Board of Directors of the appellant-Bank constitute the Trust and when the Bank is impleaded as a party then the Board of Directors are very much before the Court. He also urged that the liability for payment of Provident Fund and Gratuity is of the Bank. How and in what manner the Provident Fund and gratuity fund are administered or managed is the internal management of the Bank and it may be that these funds have come into existence under the Regulations but these funds have no existence as such and so, the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on the aforesaid ground. Reliance was placed by Mr. M. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondent on the decision of the Supreme Court in Murari Mohan Deb v. The Secretary to the Govt. of India and Ors. 1985(2) SLR 170. The court observed:
If there was technical error in the draftsmanship of the petitioner by a lawyer a Forester a class IV low grade servant should not have been made to suffer. An oral request to correct the description of the First respondent would have satisfied- the procedural requirement. By raising and accepting such a contention, after a lapse of six years, !he law is brought into ridicule. The Court could have conveniently read the cause title as Government of India which means Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Home affairs instead of the description set out in the writ petition and this very petition would be competent by any standard. The contention is all the more objectionable for the additional reason that the appointing authority of the appellant, the Chief Commissioner of the Government of Tripura as well the Chief Forest Officer who passed the impugned order were impleaded and they represented the administration of Tripura Government as well as the concerned officers. Therefore, not only the petition as drawn up was competent but no bone of contention could be taken about its incompetence.
9. We have considered the respective contentions of both the' sides. Regulation 48 of the Service Regulations provides that every officer shall become a member of the Provident Fund and shall subscribe and agree to be bound by the rules of the Fund and Regulation 48(2) enjoins upon the Bank to contribute to the Provident Fund in accordance with the rules governing the Provident Fund from time to time. Regulation 49 makes the provision for Gratuity. Regulation 49(2) provides for extent of gratuity payable to the officer. Regulation 49 6) lays down the procedure to be adopted by all the Branches with a view to stream-line and expedite settlement of claims of retiral benefits to the members of the staff. The employee is required to submit separate applications to the Branch Manager for payment of the Provident Fund and Gratuity. The Branch Manager is required to forward these applications along with the particulars of amounts due to the Bank or no dues certificates as the case may be along with the particulars mentioned in Clause (a). Under Clause (b) the controlling authorities at Head Office are required to ensure that the particulars are received not only from their branches but will have them scrutinised within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt at their Secretariat. After scrutiny of the applications, the controlling authorities are required to counter sign and forward the same to the officer-in-charge, Provident Fund section in Case of application of Provident Fund and in case of applications for payment of gratuity, the Controlling Authorities shall forward these applications to the Manager, Finance and Accounts after calculating the gratuity payable to the employees to enable to make payment soon-after retirement. It is further provided in sub-clause (iii) of Clause (b) that as the Managing Director is the Executive Trustee empowered to carry on day to day administration of the gratuity fund all the cases of payment of gratuity either under the Gratuity Regulations or under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 should be sent to the Manager, Finance and Accounts being Secretary of the Gratuity Fund, who will in turn submit such cases to the Executive Trustee for necessary action.
10. It would appear from the provisions contained in Regulation 49(6) that on presentation of the applications, first of all they have to be processed by the Branch Manager and then by the Controlling Authorities, so that expeditious payment can be made to the staff of the Bank. In case of the Provident Fund the Officer-in-charge, Provident Fund Section is required to arrange payment and in case of gratuity, the Managing Director being the Executive Trustee is required to deal with the applications for making payments.
11. We may now consider the provisions of the Provident Fund Regulations and the Gratuity Regulations. These Regulations had been framed in exercise of the power confirmed by Section 63 of the State Bank of India(Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (No. 38 of 1959). So these Regulations are, undoubtedly, statutory in character. Under Regulation 3 of the Provident Fund Regulations, the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees' Provident Fund shall be vested in the Trustees who shall be the Directors of the Bank together with not more than six members of the Fund to be nominated by the Board of Directors of the Bank to represent, as far as possible, all categories of staff provided, however, that at least one-fourth of the total number of Trustees shall be members of the Fund each of whom is also a 'workman'. Regulation 5 of the Provident Fund Regulation empowers the Trustees to appoint a Committee to carry on the business of the fund including sanctioning of payments to the members. Regulation 11, provides for investment of all moneys of the Funds to be deposited in the Bank in an account styled, "Trustees of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Employees' Fund" or invested by the Trustees in any securities for the time being as provided in theses Regulations. Then, there are provisions relating to the Temporary Advances house building and insurance policy, etc. Regulation 16 provides for cessation of interest of three months after the termination of service or death of member. Regulation !7 provides for payment of amount standing to the credit of member. It lays down that the sum standing to the credit of a member shall become payable when he ceases to be a member after adjusting any withdrawals made under various Regulations or after adjusting any sums due from him.
12. There are similar provisions in the Gratuity Regulations as well. The Gratuity Regulations also provide in Regulation 3 that the gratuity fund shall vest in the trustees, who shall be the Directors and the General Manager for the time being of the Bank. The General Manager shall be the Executive Trustee and shall have the power to carry on day to day administration of the gratuity fund. From I-7-1974, the post of General Manager has been re-designated as Managing Director. Regulation 10 of the Gratuity Regulations provides for payment of gratuity to be made out of the fund. It lays down that any gratuity granted by the Bank to the employee, shall be paid to the employees or such other person or persons in India by the Trustees out of the gratuity funds. Regulation 12 makes a provision as to when the gratuity is admissible Regulation 12(6) provides that the gratuity will be granted in case of an employee if his service in the Bank is terminated by the Bank.
13. On the basis of the provisions, in these Regulations the respective funds are vested in the Trustees and that the Bank is as such divested of the funds and payments out of these funds are to be made by the Trustees, so it is vehemently contended that in the absence of the Trustees being heard, no mandamus can be issued by this Court. The Trustees are the necessary parties. In case of Employee's Provident Fund, individual Trustees have not been made parties nor they have been made parties in a representative capacity nor the Chairman has been served whose service has been wrongly stated by the learned Single Judge and in case of Gratuity Fund, the Trustees have not been made parties, so the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground.
14. It is true that the Trustees as such of the Gratuity Fund have not been impleaded as parties in the writ petition. It is also true that individual Trustees of the Provident Fund have also not been made parties. The first question that arises for consideration is as to whether they are the necessary parties in the present case. The Fund under the two Regulations have been created in exercise of the statutory powers and funds have been vested in the Trustees and payments to the members have to be made put of the funds. It is significant that" there is no provision in the two Regulations. That the liability of the employer shall cease with regard to the payment of balance of the Provident Fund and Gratuity amount, when these amounts stand transferred and vested in the Trustees. The whole object appears to be that the Trustees should have control over the Funds in connection with the investment and disbursement. The liability for the payment by the Bank does not cease Under Section 4 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, the new bank, which is constituted under Section 3 shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued in its name. Under the two Regulations, no trust by any name has been created. What is provided is that the funds shall vest in and shall be managed by the Trustees. In the absence of creation of any trust as such, it cannot be said that the funds have been clothed with any legal personality. The Trustees have to act with regard to the liability of the Bank regarding the payment to the members on behalf of the Bank. The liability for payment is of the Bank being the employer and this liability of the Bank has to be discharged by the Trusteess for and on behalf of the Bank. In our opinion, such is the jural relationship between the Bank and the Trustees as is evident from the scheme of the two Regulations, if read together with the provisions contained in Regulation 49(6) of the Service Regulations. We are unable to find that the liability of the employer ceases after the transfer of the funds of the members to the Provident Fund or to the Gratuity Fund as the case may be vesting the same in the Trustees. In this view of the matter, particularly taking into account, the jural relationship between the Bank and the Trustees of the two Funds, we are unable to hold that the Trustees of the two funds are the necessary parties. In our considered opinion, they could only be said to be proper parties but not necessary parties.
15. The matter, otherwise, can also be viewed. We may first take up the question of the Trustees of the Employees' Provident Fund. The Trustees of the Employees' Provident Fund have been made non-petitioner No. 2 in the writ petition and it is the Trustees of the Employees' Provident Fund as such who preferred this appeal as appellant No. 2. So, it can be said that the Trustees of the Employees' Provident Fund have been made parties, though, they have not been made parties individally. Service of the notices on non-petitioner No. 2 has been effected- on the Officer-in-charge. That being so, it can be said that the Trustees as a body have been served and they should have put in appearance if they so desired. It appears that only one of the trustees has put in appearance, if the other Trustees have not put in appearance, it can not be said that an opportunity of hearing was not given to them, when as a body, they have been served through the Officer-in-charge. If it is not so, then the appeal by the Trustees as such, is equally incompetent. Viewed in this light as well, there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the Trustees should have been individually made parties and should have been given an opportunity of hearing
16. As regards the Trustees of the Gratuity Fund, it may be stated that the Bank was made a party. The Trustees of the Gratuity Fund are only the Director and Managing Director. When the Bank is before the Court, then the Directors and the Managing Director can be said very much before the Court holding both the positions as Director and Managing Director as well as Trustees and Executive Trustee. As already stated that Regulation 49(6) of the Service Regulations lays down the functions of the Managing Director in his capacity as an Executive Trustee to deal with the applications for payment of the Gratuity amount as the Manager Finance and Accounts being the Secretary of the Gratuity fund is required to submit the cases of the Gratuity to him for necessary action. In the light of this consideration, we find that the Trustees of the Gratuity Fund are not required to be made parties independently, they are parties to the writ petition through the Bank, which is liable to make payment of the gratuity amount.
17. In our opinion, these technical objections should not have been raised by the Bank employer. As admittedly, the moneys of the Provident Fund and of the Gratuity are lying in the Funds by way of trust and the Bank is bound to discharge its solemn obligation to see that the payments of the Provident Fund and the Gratuity are made to its employees.
18. Mr. M.M. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellants next contended that the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution should not have been exercised by this Court when the writ petition was filed after considerable delay. He submitted that the normal period of limitation for filing the suit would be 3 years, which had expired on 6-5-1983 and the writ petition Was filed on I6-7-1984, after 4 years, so the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.
19. We find no merit in this contention. The moneys of the petitioner were being held in trust and there is no denial of liability, on the contrary, in Annx. 2 an application was asked to be submitted to the Trustees for payment of the Provident Fund balance and in Annx. 3, it was stated that the matter has been taken up by the Branch and that the counsel for the petitioner shall be advised shortly. We may also state that the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are plenary and this Court is competent to entertain any matter, even when it is brought to it after lapse of considerable time. In our opinion, the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. The cause of action for refund of the amount of the Provident Fund and the Gratuity will arise when there is refusal or denial of liability for payments else the money shall remain lying as trust. Mr. M.M. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that there is mis-joinder of cause of action and patties in the writ petition, so the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on Dhabai Sualal Yadav v. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi 1979 RLW 358. This is yet another technical objection. In the view, which we have taken of the matter as considered above, the trustees are not necessary parties or in the alternative, the Trustees of the two funds are before the Court and considering their jural relation with the Bank, we find no substance in the contentions advanced by Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellant. The employer is the Bank and the Bank is liable to make payment through the Trustees, so, the question of mis-joinder of cause of action and of the parties does not arise. In the circumstances of the present case, this contention, in our opinion, is devoid of any force. Mr. Vyas further contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the fact that the petitioner has not ceased from the service of the Bank as per the case of the petitioner. He has disputed his termination, which is the subject matter of the appeal pending before this Court. The liability for payment of the Provident Fund & Gratuity arises only when the employee ceases to be a member or when the employee's services are terminated. Such is not the case of the petitioner, so there is no liability for payment.
20. To our mind, it is a strange argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. We have to see the case of the appellant and not the case of the petitioner. As a result of any disciplinary action, any liability for payment of the Provident Fund and Gratuity has arisen then it is not open to the employee to come forward and say that, liability has not arisen as the employee is challenging the disciplinary action. It is open to the employee to challenge the action taken against him and simultaneously proceed to take action for obtaining all benefits to which, he is entitled after the disciplinary action. He cannot be denied the terminal or retiral benefits. The status of the employee has to be considered in the view of the employer and admittedly in the view of the employer, the petitioner's services were terminated and as such, he is entitled to the terminal benefits The pendency of the appeal does not in any way disentitle the petitioner to claim the Provident Fund and Gratuity amounts.
21. Mr. M.M. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the learned Single Judge seriously erred in awarding the amount of compensation and heavy costs of Rs. 2000/-. The petitioner himself as at default in not making an application in the prescribed forms which are Ex.R/1 and Ex.R/2. In the absence of the applications in the prescribed form, the petitioner's matter could not have processed. During the pendency of the writ petitioner, on 28-5-1985 as applications have been submitted to the concerned authorities in the prescribed form, so there has been no delay in consideration of the petitioner's claim on the part of the Bank. Suffice it to say that there are no forms prescribed under the law. Under Regulation 49(6) of the Service Regulations for payment of the Provident Fund and the gratuity amount, the applications no doubt are required to be submitted to the Branch Manager. Thereafter, the Branch Manager is required to forward the application along with the particulars mentioned in Clause (a) of Regulation 49(6). in the present case, the petitioner directly moved the Managing Director vide Annx. 1 dated 24-12-1980 and 10-9-1982 and the other communications made in the writ petition and it appears that the applications were not submitted to the Branch Manager when the Highest authority in the administration had been moved then it is not open to the bank that payment could not be made or the matter could not be processed without an application to the Branch Manager. The petitioner was only apprised of about the submission of the application by Annexure 2, Regulation 49(6) cannot be read in the manner that without any application to the Branch Manager the matter shall not, in any way be, processed by the Bank, when a claim has otherwise been made. Thus this contention has no merit that the petitioner has not moved to the concerned authority in the prescribed form.
22. Mr. Vyas further contended that the learned Single Judge could not and should not have awarded the cost of Rs. 2,000/-. Lawyer's fee can be taxed in accordance with the High Court Rules. Under Rule 278 (as amended), the maximum fee that can be awarded is Rs. 500/- & fee can only be taxed when certificate of fee has been submitted before the delivery of the judgment under Rule 292. Mr. Mridul, on the other hand, submitted these rules will have no application as they only relate to taxing of the Advocate-fee. Costs are in the discretion of the Court. The manner in which replies have been filed and looking to the conduct of the Bank in not making payment despite the regular application by the petitioner and despite the suggestion of the Court, the learned Single Judge thought it proper to award the cost amounting to Rs. 2,000/-. As regards costs, Mr. Mridul further referred to Black's Law Dictionary in which meaning of the expression "Costs" has been given as under:
Costs--A pecuniary allowance, made to the successful party (and recoverable from the losing party) for his expenses in prosecuting or defending an action or a distinct proceeding within an action. Fed. R. Civil P. 54(d); Fed. R. App. P. 39. Generally, "Costs" do not include Attorney fee unless such fees are by a statute denominated costs or are by statute allowed to be recovered as costs in the case. Fees and charges required by law to be paid to the courts or some of their officers, the amount of which is fixed by statute or Court, rule, e.g. filing and service fee.
23. He also referred to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, in which the meaning of "Costs" has been given as under:
Costs--The expenses incurred by the party in the prosecution or defence of a suit;
They are distinguished from fee in being an allowance to a party for expenses incurred in conducting his suit; whereas fees are a compensation to an officer for services rendered in the progress of the cause. Musser v. Good 11 S & R (Pa) 248.
24. Reliance was also placed by Mr. M. Mridul on the decision in Devki Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors. , in which, on account of harassment by the State, the petitioner was awarded exemplary costs in view of the deliberate and motivated harassment meted out to him. We find force in the submission of Mridul. The rules referred to by Mr. Vyas relate to taxation of fee and the rule has nothing to do with the award of costs. Looking to the conduct of the Bank, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was justified in awarding the cost of Rs. 2,000/-. The contention is, therefore, over-ruled.
25. Mr. Vyas also pointed out that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the provision of the Gratuity Act, 1972 applies in the case. He submitted that as per the definition the word "employee", the petitioner's case is not covered under the said Act. At the relevant time this Act was applicable to the person employed on wages not exceeding Rs. 1000/-, With effect from 1-7-1984, this amount has been enhanced to Rs. 1600/-. We agree with the submission of Mr. Vyas that provision of the Gratuity Act is not applicable to the petitioner.
26. It is further urged by Mr. M.M. Vyas, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge was wrong in awarding the compensation simultaneously with interest Rs. 12% per annum. When any money is not paid to any person which is due to him then that person is only entitled to interest by way of damages, the interest is awarded only because the person entitled to money is deprived of the use of that money and it can be said that he has suffered a loss thereon. Independent of interest, compensation should not have been awarded by the learned Single Judge. Mr. Mridul referred to the meaning of word 'compensation' from Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1984 Edition), in which it is stated that the compensation is something to be done for or paid to a person of equal value with something of which he has been deprived by the acts or negligence of the party so doing or paying. It is true that the petitioner has been deprived of the use of money. But when interest is being awarded then in our opinion, for any such deprivation compensation cannot be awarded over and above the amount of interest. For deprivation of money, moneys will have to be paid along with interest by way of compensation. Mr. Mridul referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Sohan Singh v. Union of India and Anr. . In that case, the appellant was compensated by payment of a lump sum amount in lieu of benefit which he would have been entitled if he had continued in service for the extended period. In that case the compensation was awarded in lieu of the principal amount. This case is of no help to the petitioner. We are of the opinion, that the petitioner is not entitled to any compensation over and above the amount of interest. With regard to the interest at rate of 12% per annum, in may be stated that it has not been seriously challenged before us. Only reasonable interest has been awarded. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and Ors. v. M. Padmanabhan Nair and V.P. Gautama v. Union of India and Ors. 1984 (1) S.L.J. 120.
27. No other point survives for consideration.
28. In the result this appeal is partly allowed. The direction given by the learned single Judge with regard to the payment of amount of compensation is quashed and set aside. Rest of the order of the learned Single Judge is maintained. Parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.