Bombay High Court
The State Of Maharashtra vs M/S. Dhruwa Woollen Mills Pvt. Ltd. And ... on 5 August, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991(3)BOMCR666, 1991CRILJ3142
JUDGMENT
1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the State of Maharashtra on behalf of the Provident Fund Inspector and is directed against M/s Dhruwa Woollen Mills Pvt. Ltd. and its four directors and the manager. It appears that on the accused tendering a plea of guilt before the learned Magistrate that the same was accepted and original accused Nos. 1 and 3 to 7, who are respondents to this criminal appeal, were fined Rs. 200/- collectively, in default simple imprisonment for 60 days for the offences punishable under section 14A of the Employees' Provident Funds Act.
2. Appearing on behalf of the State, Mr. Patil contended that the fine imposed on the accused was abnormally low and that it is very much in the public interest that a punishment which was commensurate with the nature of offence ought to have been awarded. He, therefore, maintained that regardless of the explanation of the accused concerning their financial difficulties, the closure of the unit etc. that the sentence awarded by the trial Court be enhanced.
3. As against this, Mr. Madhavi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, has pointed out that original accused No. 5, who is present respondent No. 4, has died on 26-5-1991. The appeal as against him would, therefore, abate and so would the companion application filed by him, abate as far as he is concerned.
4. Mr. Madbhavi has pointed out to me that a perusal of the Rozanama will indicate that original accused Nos. 3 and 4 recorded a plea of guilt before the trial Court and they appear to have pleaded guilty on behalf of all the accused. The question raised by Mr. Madbhavi and one of some importance as far as the proceedings of this type are concerned is as to whether it is at all permissible for a particular accused to register a plea of guilt on behalf of another accused. There can be no dispute about the fact that if the accused is not present before the Court and does not tender a plea of guilt on his own behalf that he cannot be bound by a plea of guilt that has been made to the Court by some other accused on his behalf. The procedure adopted by he learned Magistrate is clearly wrong and to this extent the Criminal Application No. 2364 of 1988, which now survives only as far as original accused No. 6 is concerned, requires to be allowed. Rule will accordingly be made absolute in that application and the conviction and sentence against original accused No. 6 will have to be set aside.
5. The second point and one of equal importance canvassed by Mr. Madbhavi is on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka, . Mr. Madbhavi submits, briefly, that an accused who tenders a plea of guilt before a trial Court, particularly in summary trial or in cases where the punishment is essentially one of fine, invariably does so on the basis of a plea bargaining. It is, therefore, his submission that where an accused has opted to plead guilty possibly for practical reasons and possibly where a Court itself, for certain considerations, has accepted his plea and taken a lenient view that de hors all these factors the State cannot thereafter file an appeal for enhancement. It is precisely this issue that fall for determination before the Supreme Court and Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) observed that it would almost be a breach of faith for the State to take advantage of the plea of guilt because the accused would be totally handicapped before the appeal Court and would not be in a position to make any submission having regard to the unconditional plea of guilt recorded before the trial Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that in such cases if the State desires to go behind the order of conviction and ask for enhancement that the only course open to the appeal Court would be to remand the matter to the trial Court so that the accused can decide as to whether or not he would prefer to plead guilty and to place on record all requisite and relevant submissions for the purpose of exercise of the trial Court's discretion in the matter of sentence.
6. I agree with the submissions jointly canvassed by the learned A.P.P. and Mr. Madbhavi that in a petty matter of the present type it would be unfortunate if the learned trial Magistrate is required to re-open a small case after a lapse of so many years. However, that course is inevitable because the procedure adopted having been a wrong one, both the parties would be prejudiced if the present orders are allowed to stand. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences of original accused Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are set aside. The case is remanded to the trial Court with a direction that the same be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. 7. For the reasons stated earlier, the rule is accordingly made absolute in Criminal Application No. 2364 of 1988 and Criminal Appeal No. 206 of 1984 to stand dismissed.
7. Order accordingly.