Chattisgarh High Court
Rajesh Mahilange vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 20 September, 2024
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1 / 20
2024:CGHC:36965-DB
RAHUL
JHA NAFR
Digitally signed
by RAHUL JHA HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Date: 2024.09.27
11:56:39 +0530
CRA No. 1248 of 2021
1 - Rajesh Mahilange S/o Late Parsadi Mahilange Aged About 28 Years
R/o Village Biranpur, P. S. Dadhi, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Chauki, Khandsara, Station House
Bemetara District Bemetara Chhattisgarh
...Respondents
For Appellant : Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Dy. AG Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru 20/09/2024
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 29/09/2021 passed by Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act, 2012), Bemetara (C.G.) in Special Case No. 2 / 20 47/2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:
Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 of Rigorous Imprisonment for 01 year and the Indian Penal Code fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 03 months.
Under Section 366 of Rigorous Imprisonment for 03 years and the Indian Penal Code fine of Rs. 200/- in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 06 months.
Under Section 376 (2) Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 years and (I) (n) of the Indian fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment Penal Code of fine additional R.I. for 03 years Under Section 376 (3) Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 years and of the Indian Penal fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment Code of fine additional R.I. for 03 years Under Section 6 of Rigorous Imprisonment for 20 years and POCSO Act, 2012 fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 03 years
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that on 24/05/2018, father of the Prosecutrix made a report to the extent that someone after alluring the prosecutrix has taken her daughter away with him. On the basis of said report, a missing report complaint under Section 363 of the IPC was registered agaisnt unknown person under Crime No. 284/2018. During investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered from the possession of the appellant on 05/08/2019 and Baramdgi Panchnama (Ex.P/5) was prepared in front of the witnesses. On inquiry, the prosecutrix deposed that the appellant, on the pretext of marriage, made physical relationship with her. Subsequently, after obtaining the consent of the parents of the prosecutrix, she was 3 / 20 sent for medical examination. The underwear of the prosecutrix was seized vide Ex.P/6. The underwear of the appellant was also seized vide Ex.P/16. The seized clothes of appellant and the prosecutrix were sent for FSL examination at Raipur.
3. During investigation, in order to ascertain the date of birth of the prosecutrix, Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P/4c) was sezied. The prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Jyoti Sonwani (PW4). Subsequently, the appellant was arrested. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections 363, 366(A) & 376 (3) and Section 6 of the POCSO was filed before the concerned trial Court.
4. In order to bring home the above-stated offence, the prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses and exhibited 23 documents Exs.P-1 to P-23. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C was recorded, wherein he has pleaded his innocence and false implication in the matter and claimed to be tried.
5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. The prosecution has completely failed to prove the guilt of the appellant. She further submits that there are so many contradiction and omission 4 / 20 in the statement of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has completely failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix that on the date of the incident the prosecutrix was major. In fact, the prosecutrix herself left the house and resided with the appellant, therefore, the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable and the appellant should be acquitted of the charges framed against him.
7. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses are fully reliable. There are sufficient evidence available on record to hold that the appellant guilty for the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellant which does not require for any interference.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be whether the prosecutrix was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not.
10. In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix, we have examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has mainly relied upon Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex. P/4C), statements of 5 / 20 Prosecutrix (PW2), mother (PW3) and Head Master- Bhuneshwar Singh Verma (PW1). According to the Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex. P/4C), the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 08/09/2002.
11. The prosecutrix (PW2) in her statement has stated that her date of birth is about 08/09/2002. In cross-examination, she admitted that she did not know that whether her birth certificate has been prepared or not and whether her date of birth has been recorded in Kotwar register or not. She further admitted that she did not know the fact that at what age she was admitted in School.
12. Mother (PW3) of the prosecutrix has stated in her examination-in-
chief that the Prosecutrix is aged about 17 years. She admitted in cross-examination that her marriage took place at the age of 16 years and after one year of her marriage, the prosecutrix took birth. She is currently aged about 38 years.
13. Father (PW5) of the Prosecutrix has deposed in his examination-
in-chief that the date of birth of the Prosecutrix is 08/09/2002. He admitted in cross-examination that no birth certificate has been prepared of the Prosecutrix, but the date of birth has been registered in Kotwari Register. He also admitted that he did not remember whether he had registered the date of birth of the prosecutrix in the Kotwari Register.
14. Bhuneshwar Singh Verma (PW4), who is Head Master of the school has deposed that as per serial No. 907 of the Dakhil Kharij 6 / 20 Register, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 08/09/2002. He had admitted in cross-examination that there is no mention in the Dakhil Kharij Register that on what basis the entry was made. No author of Dakhil Kharij Register has been examined in the present case.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under:
"40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.
42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-
"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the 7 / 20 documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."
43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:-
"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."
44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can 8 / 20 not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-
"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."
16. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:
"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of 9 / 20 judgments is as follows:
33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of 10 / 20 the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.
33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in 11 / 20 consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."
17. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :
"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test"
conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution 12 / 20 but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:
"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i),
(ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while 13 / 20 determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:
"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."
14 / 20
18. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the Prosecutrix (PW2) has stated in her deposition that her date of birth is 08/09/2002, but in cross-examination, she admitted that she did not remember whether her date of birth certificate has been prepared or not. Her mother (PW1) has deposed that the prosecutrix is aged about 17 years, but she admitted in cross-examination that she was married at the age of 16 years and after 1 year of marriage, the prosecutrix got birth and presently she is aged about 38 years. Father (PW5) has deposed that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 08/09/2002, but he admitted in cross-examination that no birth certificate of the prosecutrix was prepared. Headmaster Bhuneshwar Singh Verma (PW1) though has admitted that in the Dakhil Kharij Register, the age of the prosecutrix has been mentioned as 08/09/2002, but in cross-examination, he has admitted that there is no mention in the Dakhil Kharij Register that on what basis the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in the said register.
19. Except for these evidences, no other evidence like Kotwari register or ossification test report have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years of age. The oral evidence of the witnesses PW-1, PW -2, PW-3 and PW-4 and also Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P/4C) are not sufficient to hold that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of incident because of the reason that no documents has been shown that on what basis the entry with 15 / 20 regard to age of the prosecutrix has been mentioned in the Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P/4C). There is no evidence that on what basis the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in the said register. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is recorded in the Dakhil Kharij Register on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the prosecutrix are not of that sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the prosecutrix. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor.
20. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellant has committed rape upon her or not.
21. In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person and has held in Para 9 and Para 10 of its judgment that:-
"9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have 16 / 20 been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian.
10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking".
22. PW-2, Prosecutrix has deposed in her statement that she first time met with the appellant in December, 2018 as he had come to their village for watching Nacha Program. In that program, she got acquainted with the appellant. The appellant had given his mobile number to her and subsequently, they started to talk on 17 / 20 mobile phones, which continued for about 5-6 months. She deposed that the appellant always used to say to marry her on phone. She deposed that on the date of incident, at about 2 O'clock in the night, the appellant came to her house and called her on phone, then she went there and subsequently, he took her to Durg and thereafter from Durg to Pune. They stayed for about 2 days and thereafter, the appellant took her to Hyderabad by train, where the appellant kept her for one week. She deposed that during that period, the appellant performed marriage in a temple and subsequently, he made physical relationship with her many times. In cross-examination, she admitted that on the date of incident, when the appellant called her on phone in the night, she did not tell to her family and silently she, after opening the door of the house, went to him. She further admitted that while she was going with the appellant from Durg to Pune, she did not made any complaint to anyone in the way against the applicant.
23. PW-3, Mother of the prosecutrix has deposed that on the date of incident, when they woke up in the morning, the prosecutrix was not there. They searched her nearby vicinity, but she was not traceable. Subsequently, the report was lodge.
24. PW-5, Father of the prosecutrix has deposed that on the date of incident, when he wokeup, he did not find the prosecutrix in the house. He searched her, but she was not found. Subsequently, a missing report was lodged by him vide Ex.P/12. 18 / 20
25. Dr. Jyoti Sonwani (PW4) has medically examined the prosecutrix.
She deposed that during the course of medical examination, no injury was found on the body of the prosecutrix. Her hymen was old ruptured. She had prepared two vaginal slides of the prosecutrix. She opined that there was no sign of recent intercourse with the prosecutrix.
26. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as also the evidence on record, it would not be safe for this Court to hold that the appellant has committed rape upon her, rather it reflects from the evidence that the prosecutrix herself eloped with the appellant and had made consented sexual intercourse with her as she was in love with the appellant and the same is evident from her admission made in last paragraph of her cross-examination.
27. From the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, it is clear that the prosecutrix herself eloped and stayed with the appellant, she has not made any complaint to anyone and has not raised any alarm for a long considerable period. Had she been forcefully raped her against her will or consent, she would definitely raised alarm or to make complaint to the anyone. Since, it is held that the prosecutrix is not below the 18 years of age, she is capable to give her consent and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant procured a minor girl with the intention to illicit intercourse or committed rape upon her.
28. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be 19 / 20 maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the prosecutrix must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the prosecutrix is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case.
29. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt.
30. In the result, the appeal is Allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 29/09/2021 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against him. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
31. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC, the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of 20 / 20 leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
32. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Shoaib/Rahul