Punjab-Haryana High Court
Baldev Singh vs State Of Haryana & Others on 16 July, 2009
Author: Ranjit Singh
Bench: Ranjit Singh
Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :1:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
DATE OF DECISION: MAY 16, 2009
Baldev Singh
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
State of Haryana & others
....Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
PRESENT: Mr.S.P.Singh, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr.Harish Rathee, Sr.DAG, Haryana,
for respondent Nos.1 to 3.
Mr.J.S.Yadav, Advocate,
for respondent No.4.
****
RANJIT SINGH, J.
Petitioner has questioned the appointment of respondent No.4 as a President of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Narnaul, District Mohindergarh. The ground of attack as advanced by the petitioner is that respondent No.4 was not eligible or qualified to be appointed as President of the District Consumer Forum.
The petitioner has challenged the appointment of Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :2: respondent No.4 on the ground that he does not possess the qualifications required for the post in the light of the provisions of Section 10 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "Consumer Act") and in terms of Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner would also take in aid the provisions of Rule 49 framed by Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "1975 Rules") by urging that respondent No.4 would not fall within the definition of an Advocate and hence could not have been held eligible or qualified for the appointment.
Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal, Commission issued a notification on 22.8.2007 for filling up four posts of Presidents in the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum at Ambala, Narnaul, Rewari and Sonepat. The petitioner was also the applicant and filed his application complete in all respects with all requisite documents. The petitioner was called for interview and he accordingly appeared before the Interview Board on 11.1.2008. The petitioner would submit that result was neither displayed on the board nor the marks obtained by each candidate in interview intimated through post etc. The petitioner waited for the result for three months, when he learnt that names of four persons stood recommended. He also learnt that one of the person recommended for the post was not even eligible to be so appointed. The petitioner accordingly made an application under Right to Information Act, in response to which he received a communication dated 21.7.2008 intimating that respondent No.4 was selected for the post of President at Narnaul. The particulars of respondent No.4, as disclosed in Annexure P-3, showed that he was enrolled as an Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :3: Advocate w.e.f.17.11.1973 and had practiced at Bulandsahar from this date till 16.11.1976. It is further mentioned that respondent No.4 had retired as Deputy Director, Panchayat (Legal) on superannuation from Haryana Government on 30.12.2006. The criteria adopted by the selection committee was also enclosed.
The petitioner would aver that respondent No.4 was having only 3 years experience at the Bar as an Advocate, but was recommended and appointed as President of the District Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum at Narnaul and the petitioner, who had a better claim and was fully eligible, was ignored. As per the petitioner, respondent No.4 is neither qualified nor eligible for the post of President of the District Forum and that his appointment is in violation of the provisions of Section 10 of the Consumer Act, which makes a provision for composition of the District Forum.
Section 10 of the Consumer Act provides that each District Forum shall consist of a person, who is or who has been or is qualified to be a District Judge, who shall be its President. This is so provided in Section 10(1)(a) of the Act. Section 10(1)(b) lays down the qualification of two other members, one of whom shall be a woman for being members of the District Forum. The method of appointment and the constitution of the selection committee is also given in the Section as such. Section 10(2) provides for the term of the office etc. Reference is then made to Article 233(2) of the Constitution to plead that appointment of respondent No.4 runs contrary thereto as petitioner was not qualified to be a District Judge. The submission is that the qualifications for the appointment of a District Judge are provided under Article 233(2) of the Constitution of Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :4: India and hence same are to be kept in view while appointing a person as President of the District Forum that being requirement under Section 10 of Consumer Act and such a person has to be one who is qualified to be a District Judge. By making reference to Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India, it is urged that for being eligible and to be appointed as a District Judge, one has to be an Advocate or a Pleader for a period not less 7 years and such a person has not to be in the service of Union or the State. Article 233(2) is as under:-
"(2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years as an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment."
It is, thus, submitted that respondent No.4 being in the service of the Government could not have been eligible for being appointed as a District Judge and also on the ground that he was not an Advocate or a Pleader for seven years and hence his appointment as a President would be bad in law. This plea is raised on the ground that the petitioner is in service. In addition, it is also pointed out that selection of respondent No.4 would run contrary to the provisions of Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules. This Rule provides that an advocate shall not be a full time salaried employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or concern so long as he continues to practice. The plea, therefore, is that respondent No.4 was a full time salaried employee of a Government and hence could not be termed as an advocate in view of Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules and, thus, was not eligible for being appointed as a District Judge, which was Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :5: essential qualification for him to be appointed as a President of the District Forum. It is accordingly urged that ineligible and disqualified person has been appointed. Prayer is, thus, to set aside his appointment being illegal and arbitrary and having been made in violation of the statutory provisions.
State as well as respondent No.4 have filed written statement controverting the pleas raised in the writ petition. Respondent No.4 initially filed a written statement which he subsequently amended. The said amendment was allowed. The writ petition was ultimately admitted and has now been listed for hearing as per the directions of the Admitting Bench.
In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3, reference is made to the notice published in the Newspapers for inviting applications for filling up these four posts. The eligibility and disqualification as laid down in the advertisement are as under:-
"Applications are invited for filling up 4 vacant posts of Presidents in the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ambala, Narnaul, Rewari and Sonepat from amongst following who otherwise not ineligible or disqualified as per provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 2004:-
i) Advocates/Pleaders having not less than 10 years standing at Bar and not less than 35 years of age as on 31.8.2007.
ii) Serving District/Addl.District Judges; and
iii) Retired District/Addl.District Judges.
Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :6:
iv) District Attorney/Deputy District Attorney/ Assistant District Attorney having not less than 10 years standing including service and practice."
Reference is made to the provisions of Section 24 CPC to point out that a person to be eligible for being appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor is if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years. Even practice as a Pleader is to be deemed to be a period during which such person has been in practice as an advocate. In this background, reference is made to the record of respondent No.4 to say that he was enrolled as an Advocate on 17.11.1973 and thereafter was appointed as a Government Pleader by Governor of Haryana on 12.12.1979. Respondent No.4 retired as a Deputy Director, Panchayat (Legal ) on 31.12.2006. It is accordingly stated that he was called for interview being eligible. It is also pointed out that a Government counsel may be a Public Prosecutor or a Government Advocate or a Government Pleader. He too gets experience in handling various types of cases and such a person would fall in the description as an Advocate.
In the reply filed by respondent No.4, he in addition, has pointed out that the petitioner has no locus to file this petition as his name does not figure in the waiting list and even if appointment of respondent No.4 is to be set aside, the petitioner cannot get any relief. It is also alleged that the petitioner has concealed material facts. In this regard, it is pointed out that petitioner has attempted to convey an impression as if respondent No.4 was in service at the Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :7: time of appointment, whereas this is factually not correct. It is disclosed that respondent No.4 had applied for this appointment as a practicing advocate and in this regard has made reference to his application which is placed on record with the reply. It is claimed that respondent No.4 has thirty years experience as an Advocate as he was appointed as a Government Pleader which he remained from December, 1979 till the date of his retirement in 2006. Respondent No.4 would also make reference to the fact that he was held eligible and called for interview for selection to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service in the year 1992, which would indicate that he was considered eligible keeping in view the provisions of Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India. Contesting the plea raised by the petitioner on the basis of Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules, it is pointed out that the present Rule 49 was differently worded prior to 22.6.2001, which then had following part as well:-
"Nothing in this rule shall apply to a Law Officer of the Central Government of a State or of any Public Corporation or body constituted by Statute who is entitled to be enrolled under the rules of his State Bar Council made under section 28(2) (d) read with section 24(1)(e) of the Act despite his being a full time salaries employee.
Law Officer for the purpose of this rule means a person who is so designated by the terms appointment and who, by the said terms, is required to act and/or plead in courts on behalf of his employer."
It is only after 22.6.2001 that the above noted provisions have been deleted. From this, it is pleaded that experience of Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :8: respondent No.4 as a Government Pleader till 22.6.2001 cannot be nullified, which would, thus, mean that respondent No.4 had 24 years experience as an advocate being a Government Pleader etc. Both the sides have cited large number of precedents before me in support of their respective contentions. All of these may not be much relevant considering the controversy involved in the present case. Counsel for the petitioner was rather committed in his submission and relied upon some of the judgments to urge that an advocate, who is in the Government service even if he be a Government Pleader or a Public Prosecutor or even a State counsel working in the office of Advocate General, would not be advocate as per Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules and hence would not be eligible for being considered for the appointment of President of Consumer Protection Act. That being the line of emphasis of the counsel, the majority of judgments cited by him were those which had interpreted the word "Advocate" in the light of Rule 49 of 1975 Rules. On the other hand, counsel for the State as well as respondent No.4 were equally emphatic in submitting that a Pleader or a person working as a District Attorney or as a Government advocate cannot be held ineligible for being considered for appointment on the ground that he is not an advocate when seen in the context of Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules. To answer the plea of locus with which the counsel for the petitioner was confronted, he would say that any body can challenge the appointment in case disqualified or ineligible person was appointed. In response to specific query, the counsel conceded that present one was not a writ of quo-warranto, but prayer was only to issue writ in the nature of mandamus/certiorari for quashing the Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :9: appointment/selection of respondent No.4. Another fact of significance, which the counsel for the petitioner conceded, was that he had not raised a challenge to the advertisement as such on any of the grounds including that the eligibility conditions or the disqualification as laid down in the advertisement were contrary either to the provisions of the Act or in violation of the Constitution. In short, there was no challenge made by the petitioner that the advertisement suffers from any such infirmity. In this background, the challenge is required to be seen in the context of conditions of eligibility and disqualification as provided in the advertisement. It is, thus, to be seen if respondent No.4 was eligible or qualified for being appointed to the post in terms of advertisement, Annexure P-1. This in a way narrowed down the controversy. This fact was also not seriously disputed by the counsel for the petitioner. In this context, number of judgments which were cited at the bar may not be relevant, though to be fair to the counsel, these would need a notice.
The conditions of eligibility and disqualification as given in the advertisement have already been reproduced above. As per Annexure P-1, a person who is not eligible or disqualified as per the provisions of Consumer Act and the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules could apply for appointment, if he was covered by any of the four clauses given in the advertisement. Thus, an Advocate/Pleader having not less than 10 years standing at the bar, if he fulfilled the age criteria could apply. Similarly, serving District/Addl.District Judge as well as retired District/Addl.District Judges could so apply. District Attorney/Deputy District Attorney/Assistant District Attorney could also apply if they had not less than 10 years standing. This standing Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :10: significantly was to be inclusive of service and practice. Thus, Advocates/ Pleaders having not less than 10 years standing at Bar, District Attorney, Deputy District Attorney, Assistant District Attorney having not less than 10 years standing as a practice and service apart from serving and retired District and Addl.District Judges were eligible and qualified to apply. In this background, the law cited would need appreciation.
Reference is made to Bar Council of Gujarat Vs. Vinod Harjivandas Dixit, AIR 2001 Gujarat 132. Interpreting Gujarat Bar Council (Constitution and Conduct of Business) Rules, a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in this case has held that an advocate voluntarily depositing/suspending Sanad for holding office of profit ceased to be a member of Bar Council for a period of suspension. This case apparently would not apply to the facts of the present case. Here an advocate, who was a member of the Bar Council voluntarily intimated the suspension of practice as an advocate and he was said to be not an advocate being no more on the electoral roll and in this context it was held that he will be deemed to have vacated his office when he ceased to be an advocate. Such is not the situation in the present case. It is no body's case that respondent No.4 had ever sought suspension of his licence. Reference is made to Akhilesh Kumar Misra and others Vs. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others, AIR 1995 Allahabad 148 where an advocate, who was serving as an Assistant Public Prosecutor, was not permitted to appear in U.P.Higher Judicial Service examination by counting that period towards his practice during which he was Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :11: Assistant Public Prosecutor. This observation was made by the court while interpreting Section 25 Cr.P.C. It is no body's case that respondent No.4 was a Public Prosecutor for which it can be said that he is not entitled to count such period as standing an advocate. Similarly, reference made by the counsel to K.R.Biju Babu Vs. High Court of Kerala & Anr., 2008 LAB.I.C. 1784 would also not be attracted to the facts of the present case as it was also a case where a person was a Public Prosecutor appointed to conduct CBI cases and was so found to be holding a civil post under the Union of India and as such could not be treated as a practicing advocate. Mallaraddi H.Itagi and others Vs. The High Court of Karnataka and another, 2002 LAB.I.C.2074 was also a case where Public Prosecutor was held to be a Government servant and not to be a practicing advocate. Similar is the situation in the case S.Biju Vs. High Court of Kerala, 2001(4) SCT 742 where again the period of service as an Assistant Public Prosecutor was held not to be countable as a period of practicing advocate for the purpose of selection as Munsiff Magistrate. The ratio of law laid down by this court in Dr.Mrs.S.K.Bhatia Vs. State of Punjab, 1998(1) S.C.T. 514 apparently is in different context and it was held that Deputy Advocate General and Assistant Advocate General, who are selected on regular basis and are in a regular pay scale are to be treated as Government servants. This was in context to see whether such appointments were contractual or regular appointment. It is not held that they are not to be termed as an advocate. Rather, observations made by Division Bench of this court in Paramjit Singh Goraya Vs. Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :12: The Bar Council of India & Others, 2008(2) S.C.T. 196 may be of some relevance. Interpreting Rule 49 as amended w.e.f.22.6.2001, it was held that advocate who is in whole time employment of a Corporation, Bank and other such like institutions are ineligible to contest Bar Council elections, but an advocate who engages himself in the office of Advocate General would not be deemed to be a whole time employee of Government. It is held that such a person is not under administration control of the Government as he continues to be the officer of the court. He pleads the case of a Government in the same way as advocate pleads cases of their clients etc. It is, thus, categorically held that law officer engaged for services of the office of Advocate General cannot be excluded from the purview of definition of advocate and cannot be included in the category of Government Advocates employed on full time salary so as to fall within the purview of Rule 2(f) to incur disqualification for contesting the elections to the office of Bar Council. The case of Oma Shanker Sharma and another Vs. Delhi Administration and another, 1989 (7) Service Law Reporter 458 again was a case of Public Prosecutor, who was held ineligible for appointment as a District Judge. Shankar Sharma's case did not find the approval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as would be noticed in later part of the judgment.
The counsel for the petitioner still was dissatisfied and came back to cite some more judgments without realising that the present case is required to be decided in terms of the eligibility or disqualification as laid down in the advertisement. With a renewed vigor, he cited before me a decision in case of Munni Lal Garg Vs. Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :13: State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1970 Rajasthan 164. No doubt, in this case a full Bench of Rajasthan High Court has taken a view that a person who is an advocate and who has practiced for more than seven years but partly as an advocate and partly as a pleader is not eligible for appointment to Higher Judicial Service, but it would require a notice that in the advertisement before me a pleader is eligible to apply which was not the position in the relevant Rules regulating the appointment of Advocates to the Higher Judicial Service under Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules. Rather this was a case where the petitioner was not called for interview being ineligible in terms of Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services Rules, which he challenged on the ground of being ultra vires of Article 14 and 233 of the Constitution of India on the ground that Article 233(2) provides that a person who has to credit seven years practice either as an advocate or a pleader is eligible for appointment to the post of District Judge and Rule made in this regard was ex facie, ultra vires of the provisions of this Article of the Constitution of India. Thus, by interpreting this Rule, the court held that practice as a pleader was not eligible for appointment. In the present case, the position is exactly contrary. Here a person is eligible to apply even if he had worked only as a pleader and this also cannot be said to be in any manner contrary to or in violation of the provisions of Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India. As per Article 233(2), a pleader is eligible for appointment as a District Judge, the disqualification being that a person be not in the service of Union or State.
Mathew Daniel Vs. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1996 Kerala 222 cited before me again would not be of much Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :14: assistance to the counsel for the petitioner as respondent No.4 was not seeking appointment on the ground that he had retired from the service as a District Judge. In this case, it was held that a person not retiring from service as a District Judge and who could not have been promoted as District Judge at the time of his retirement not competent to be appointed as a President of the District Forum. Respondent No.4 is not seeking his appointment on any of the ground that he was a District Judge or could have been promoted as a District Judge. There are more than one conditions provided for eligibility and serving and retired District and Addl. District Judges being one of these qualifications. Even the Advocates/Pleaders/ District Attorneys etc. are held eligible and not disqualified for appointment and District Attorney etc. could count their service towards ten years standing provided.
Rather, I find that the ratio of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Suri etc. etc. Vs. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi and another, 1998(4) RSJ 346 would apparently apply to the facts of the present case. Petitioner Sushma Suri applied for recruitment to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service claiming that she had put in experience for not less than seven years as an advocate but was not called for interview. Sushma Suri was appointed Assistant Government Advocate in 1986 and then promoted as Addl.Government Advocate. When she was not called for interview, she filed a writ petition in the High Court at Delhi. The High Court relying upon the case of Oma Shankar (supra), held that she was not entitled to be considered for the appointment. She accordingly filed appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court when the Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :15: Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved the ratio of law laid down in Oma Shankar's case and held as under:-
"8. In Oma Shankar Sharma's case, the Delhi High Court approached the matter in too pedantic a manner losing sight of the object of recruitment under Article 233(2) of the Constitution. Whenever any recruitment is conducted to fill up any post, the area of recruitment must be as broad based as Rules permit. To restrict it to advocates who are not engaged in the manner stated by us earlier in this order is too narrow a view, for, the object of recruitment is to get persons of necessary qualification, experience and knowledge of life. A Government counsel may be a public prosecutor or Government Advocate or a Government Pleader. He too gets experience in handling various types of cases apart from dealing with the officers of the Government. Experience gained by such persons who fall in this description, cannot be stated to be irrelevant nor detrimental to selection to the posts of Higher Judicial Service. The expression `members of the Bar' in the relevant rule would only mean that a particular class a persons who are actually practising in courts of law as pleaders or Advocates. In a very general sense an Advocate is a person who acts or pleads for another in a court and if a public prosecutor or a Government counsel is on the rolls of the Bar Council and is entitled to practice under the Act, he answers the description of an Advocate."Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :16:
The Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that Law Officer (Public Prosecutor or Government Counsel) would continue to be an advocate. It is further observed that the intention of the relevant Rules is that a candidate eligible for appointment to Higher Judicial Service should be a person who regularly practices before the Court or Tribunal appearing for a client. Interpreting the provisions of Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules, on which the counsel for the petitioner banked heavily, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that an Advocate employed by the Government or a Body Corporate as its Law Officer even on terms of payment of salary would not cease to be an Advocate in terms of Rule 49 if the condition is that such Advocate is required to act or plead in courts on behalf of the employer. The test, as per the Supreme Court, was not whether such person is engaged on terms of salary or by payment of remuneration but whether he is engaged to act or plead on its behalf in a court of law as an Advocate. Aptly it is observed that the terms of the engagement will not matter at all. What is of essence, as observed by the Supreme Court, is as to what such Law Officer engaged by the Government does. The test, as noticed by the Supreme Court, is to see if he acts or pleads in the court on behalf of his employer or otherwise. If he is not acting or pleading on behalf of his employer, then he ceases to be an Advocate. It is also observed that if the terms of engagement are such that he does not have to act or plead but is to do other kinds of work then he becomes a mere employee of the Government or the Body Corporate. It is further observed that Bar Council of India had understood the expression "Advocate" as the one who is actually practising before the courts which expression Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :17: would include even those who are Law Officers appointed as such by the Government or the body corporate. Thus, Rule 49 of the 1975 Rules has been interpreted in a manner by saying that what is required to be seen is not the terms of engagement but the kind of duties performed by a person. If a person is an employee of the Government or a Corporation to perform any function other than that of pleading or as an advocate then he would not be eligible to be called as an advocate but the one who is engaged to plead the cases in the court or to work as an advocate though on full time remuneration, would continue to be an advocate and the provisions of Rule 49 have been understood and interpreted in this manner. The submission by the counsel for the petitioner that the position after 22.6.2001 would change is again misconceived. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Suri (supra) has not interpreted that portion of the Rule which has been deleted w.e.f.22.6.2001 but has elaborated the term "Advocate" as contained in Rule 49 in the light of the person being salaried employee of the government, firm or corporation or of concern. The submission made by the counsel for the petitioner would not, thus, warrant acceptance.
There is not much need to go into the plea of locus of the petitioner as raised on behalf of respondent No.4 and so also his plea that the petitioner has made an attempt to mislead or misstate the facts. Counsel for respondent No.4 would, however, be justified in referring to Punjab Superior Services Rules, 1963 which makes a provision for appointment of direct recruits to the post of Superior Judicial Service. Rule 9 inter-alia provides that no person shall be eligible for direct recruitment unless he has been for not less than 10 Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :18: years an Advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for such appointment. He would accordingly contend that pleader is eligible for being appointed to the Superior Judicial Service in terms of the Rules so framed, unlike those cases where Rule did not make pleader to be eligible. He accordingly submits that some of the decisions would have no applicability to the facts of the present case on that ground. This plea seems to be well founded.
The distinction drawn by the counsel for the petitioner in the definition of a `Government Pleader' and a `Pleader' may need a notice. The counsel for the petitioner submits that Government pleader is defined under Section 2(7) CPC, whereas pleader has been defined under Section 2(15). The submission in this context is that the pleader and Government Pleader are different and Pleader as defined in Section 2(15) would be eligible for appointment and not the Government Pleader. Even this plea does not appear sound. Government Pleader has been defined under Section 2(7) which is an inclusive definition and it says that a Government Pleader includes any officer appointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions expressly imposed by this Code on the Government Pleader and also any pleader acting under the direction of the Government Pleader. Clearly this being an inclusive definition would carry in its purview a `Pleader'. One has to be a pleader for being a Government Pleader as the wording of Section 2(7) would suggest. It would be important to notice that any pleader acting under the direction of the Government Pleader could also be a Government Pleader. It is, thus, clear that Section 2(7) does not assign any different meaning to a Government Pleader and the Government Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :19: Pleader would include in its definition a pleader who has been defined to be a person entitled to appear and plead for another in court and which includes an Advocate, a Vakil and an Attorney of a High Court.
The net result of above discussion is that the ineligibility and disqualification in this case are to be seen in terms of the advertisement, Annexure P-1. No provision of the Consumer Act has been brought to my notice, which lays down any ineligibility condition for a person for being appointed as a President of the Forum. Section 10 of the Consumer Act only lays down a qualification for a person for such appointment and the advertisement does not run contrary to any provision of the Constitution or other law. The qualification for being a District Judge or who can be a District Judge apparently have been taken care of while issuing advertisement, which, in any case is not under challenge before me in the present writ petition. It also could not be disputed before me that the pleader was an eligible qualification for counting the period of standing at the bar. As per this advertisement, this would also not in any manner contravene the provisions of Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India. It is on record that respondent No.4 was appointed as a Government Pleader by Governor of Haryana on 12.12.1979. This appointment was in exercise of power conferred by Clause (7) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and through this notification, respondent No.4 was appointed as Legal Officer of Development and Panchayat Department, to be the Government Pleaders for the whole of State of Haryana and he was authorised to perform all or any of the functions expressly imposed by the said Code on the Government Pleader. Civil Writ petition No.13492 of 2008 :20: This would clearly point out the distinction between the appointment of respondent No.4 as Legal Officer or the Panchayat Department and his appointment as a Government Pleader for the whole State of Haryana. Appointment of respondent No.4 as a Government Pleader was in addition to his duties as Legal Officer. It is in this context, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushma Suri's case (supra) would need a notice and consideration. In his capacity as a Government Pleader, respondent No.4 was to perform the duties as an advocate which was the essence and not his being a whole time Government employee. I am, thus, of the view that the respondent No.4 was fully qualified and eligible for being appointed as President of the District Forum and he was rightly considered so and appointed. The appointment does not suffer from any infirmity to call for any interference.
The writ petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
July 16, 2009 ( RANJIT SINGH ) ramesh JUDGE